Decentralization can strengthen the regime in weak states

Yemen has an extensive legal decentralization framework, but decentralization has been limited. This article shows how the Yemeni regime used formal decentralization reform supported by international donors as a regime maintenance strategy instead of devolving decision-making capabilities to local tiers of government.

The article demonstrates how a weak Yemeni regime, that could not depend solely on coercion, used domestically popular decentralization reforms to expand the reach of its patronage network. This strategy was effective in Yemen due to a strong historical tradition for localized governance. During the 1960s and 1970s, Yemen had a strong movement of localized and independent initiatives, that the regime was able to co-opt in the name of decentralization during the 1980s. Decentralization remained popular among the Yemeni population and international donors alike. In 2000, this led to the formulation of an extensive legal framework for decentralization supported by international donors, including Denmark. However, despite local elections being held in 2001 and 2006, decentralization did not lead to substantial improvements in service delivery. Instead, many local councils struggled with limited resources and restrictions on their decision-making powers.

The article argues that the regime primarily carried out decentralization reforms to increase its internal and external legitimacy. It used decentralization reforms to portray itself as interested in building the formal institutions of the state, while, in reality, using the reforms to strengthen its patronage network.