Everybody hates Raymond: implications for the deep schisms within USA-Pakistan alliance

Raymond Davis fired ten bullets at two Pakistani youth in a crowded market in the bustling, populous city of Lahore. While the US claims Raymond is an embassy official, some American sources suggest him to be a CIA contractor. Just about every Pakistani believes Raymond to be an American spy operating with impunity in their homeland. The incident has ignited a bitter diplomatic row between the US and Pakistan – one that represents the tip of the iceberg. Underlying this spy saga and the hullabaloo surrounding it are the intricate details of regional politics and the onus on Islamabad to play an ever-greater part in countering terrorist trends emanating from the Af-Pak war theatre. US policy in the region and the future of its relations vis-à-vis Pakistan bear ramifications for its security landscape. Gauging from past and current events, undermining Pakistan’s sense of security eventually comes to undermine that of South Asia, in particular Afghanistan and India. Perceived US interference in Pakistan, a microcosm of which has become the Raymond case, threaten to render Pakistan and Pakistanis more insecure.

For years now the US-Pak relations have been on tenterhooks. Despite Pakistan’s role as a key US ally in the fight against terror, the relationship between the two countries has been lukewarm at best. Anti-American sentiment amongst Pakistanis has been on a steady rise since the Musharraf regime agreed to join the US-led war on terror. A 2009 Gallup Survey revealed that 59% Pakistanis believed the US to pose the greatest threat to their nation, while only 11% thought the Taliban to be a risk.

Recent tines have witnessed at least two incursions by the Paktika Defense Force – one of six CIA-trained Afghan special operations force used against insurgents throughout Afghanistan – into Pakistani territory. This is coupled by a widespread belief that Pakistan is fighting “America’s war;” suspicion surrounding the expansion of the US embassy in Islamabad and the alleged presence of private security contractors in the country foments anger and paranoia amongst Pakistanis. Criticism that Pakistan is “not doing enough” to counter terrorism further exacerbates resentment against the US who is seen as unappreciative of the heavy losses made by Pakistan. The war on terror has so far killed at least forty thousands Pakistanis while fourteen American lives were claimed in Pakistan.

Adding regular grist to the anti-American mill is the US drone campaign inside Pakistan’s tribal region that has spiked drastically since 2008; the attacks have severely hampered the United State’s legitimacy in the eyes of the local populace who increasingly view Western forces as foreign occupiers.

Faced with Pakistani resistance in turning Raymond over to American authorities, the latter restarted its drone campaign inside Pakistan’s tribal areas, demonstrating additional aspect of the strikes: bargaining chips to pressure Islamabad in accordance with the political necessity or demand of the time. Similarly, Pakistan calibrates attacks on ISAF-bound supply trucks that pass daily through the country’s tumultuous North-West.

Domestically, Pakistan sits in a precarious position where it remains engaged in a battle against an indigenous Taliban movement that deems the existing Pakistani establishment “apostate” and demands Sharia law. The levels of jihadist violence remained high throughout 2010 despite the presence of the Pakistani Army in six of the seven tribal agencies. Security forces and symbols of state remain the preferred targets of jihadi wrath; however, sectarian violence has also taken on a newfound al-Qaeda-inspired vigour as seen by the high number of sectarian mass casualties. This is symbolic of the growing momentum of the Punjabi Taliban – consisting largely of segments of sectarian outfits and groups previously focused on Kashmir/India – and it’s subsumption by wider jihadist currents.

However, in light of recent political and military manoeuvres along Pakistan’s North Western Pashtun belt, the dynamics of “Talibanization” – i.e. jihadist activity and enforcement of a parallel administrative system and social code – are expected to alter. Yet the extent of this alternation remains questionable as Pakistan continues its hesitation in combating militants holed up in North Waziristan – most of who are focused on waging a jihad alongside the Afghan Taliban. This is also the root of American frustration with Pakistan and explains why 104 of the 118 US drone strikes in 2010 were aimed at North Waziristan. A White House report from October 2010 pointed out the Pak Army’s reluctance in conducting military operations that would “put it in direct conflict with Afghan Taliban or al-Qaeda’s forces in North Waziristan.”

Meanwhile inside Pakistan there is a crisis of confidence in the civilian leadership that faces a multitude of challenges – ranging from terrorist threats to flood relief efforts to widespread poverty – all of which can have deleterious effects on the stability of the state. Further it is perceived as a corrupt puppet regime run by a foreign power, namely the United States. With anti-Americanism peaking, any coercion tactics from Washington – especially with regards to the Raymond Davis case – are likely to further disrupt the bumpy political terrain at home.

Pakistani sense of sovereignty needs a political vamping before it is able to play an effective role in fighting extremism or to work towards regional cooperation. Part and parcel of this endeavour entails a cessation of US operations in Pakistani territory. Echoing expectations levelled at Pakistan, the United States, too, is required to “do more” to raise its credibility amongst Pakistanis.

Yet, despite stewing over what it perceives as a repetition of American betrayal, Pakistan is heavily dependent on the United States. It has hitherto struggled to prove its centrality to the Afghan conflict as well as its relevance for regional security mainly out of fear for being internationally marginalized and losing US alliance and money. Since 2001 Pakistan has been the recipient of up to $18 billion aid from the US In October 2010 the US announced a $2 billion military and security aid package that was to complement a $7.5 billion civilian aid deal approved in 2009.

For Pakistan most, if not all, regional policy equals a zero-sum game with India. US involvement in the region is also to be viewed in this context. Pakistan vies to remain the preferential ally of US – a position from which it feels gradually dethroned as US-India relations (specifically over military/defence cooperation) appear to strengthen. Frail in stature compared to India, Pakistan needs to constantly secure US support, which has historically been granted only intermittently based on strategic priorities of the time. It therefore struggles to retain its status as a frontline state in the war on terror.

However, in light of recent announcement of a drawdown in US/NATO troops in Afghanistan, Pakistan is reminded of the not-too-distant past when it felt abandoned by the US in the aftermath of the Soviet defeat. This time around there is the added anxiety related to American propping of India as a South Asian power. During President Obama’s Delhi visit in November 2010, a $3.5 billion defence deal was signed between the two nations. India’s newfound proclivity to turn to the US in order to meet its military aircraft requirements speaks of the rapidly evolving relationship between them. Also, as it stands, India is the largest regional donor to Afghanistan with aid programs reaching $1.2 billion since 2001.

Therefore, Islamabad aims to preserve the Taliban asset for it insures Pakistan against the eventuality of a US/NATO departure, when the Indo-Pak proxy war on Afghan soil is likely to intensify and Pakistan would need to stave off an Indian preponderance. From Pakistan’s optic, supporting Pashtun insurgents in the form of the Afghan Taliban and its affiliates is one of the few avenues open to it for exerting influence over Kabul, especially if those currently sitting at the helm of power in Kabul are seen to provide leverage to New Delhi. Insofar as Pakistan feels sidelined by the US in favour of India and the latter continues its footprint in Afghanistan, the continuum of double dealing by Pakistan is unlikely to break. The question remains how long Pakistan will find it necessary to continue its double games tactic – tacitly supporting some extremist elements whilst being a frontline state in the war on terror. Bridging the legitimacy and trust deficit between USA and Pakistan is important in this regard.

An amicable resolution to the lingering Raymond Davis case will be the first step. At present, releasing Raymond will open the floodgates to Pakistani resentment against the US as well as the Pakistani government; Pakistanis are likely to come out in violent protest. Yet if Islamabad refuses to extend diplomatic immunity to Raymond, the much-needed US aid and support to Pakistan is threatened. The Raymond case in all its unseemly intricacies is reflective of where the USA-Pakistan relationship stands and its settlement indicative of where it will go.