DIIS Comment

Time to Debate NATO’s Nukes in Europe

Danish Parliamentarians will debate nuclear weapons today in Christiansborg. The debate will surround the bargains and obligations of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Given recent events, the issue of NATO’s continued possession of US tactical nuclear weapons has also to be addressed
25 May 2010
While the exact figures have never been disclosed, the estimated number of US nuclear warheads in Europe is around 150 to 200. The notion of ‘nuclear sharing’ provides the weapons to remain under US custody during peacetime while the host countries would provide aircraft capable of delivering the weapons to their targets in times of war. Since 1993, the number of nuclear bases has been reduced from 14 to 6, and the number of countries hosting nuclear weapons reduced to 5 (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey). At a level equaling the estimated size of China’s arsenal, three countries hosting the weapons (Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands) and several other NATO countries (such as Luxembourg, Norway and Poland) are again asking what their relevance is to today’s threats and calling for their removal.

Prompted by the German government’s October 2009 initiative for withdrawing remaining US nuclear weapons from Germany and Europe and a February 26 open letter sent to NATO General Secretary Anders Fogh Rasmussen by the foreign ministers of Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norway which called for a “comprehensive discussion” on NATO’s role in nuclear disarmament, NATO foreign ministers officially discussed NATO’s nuclear posture for the first time last month at their informal meeting in Tallinn, Estonia. At a press conference during the meeting on April 22, Rasmussen stated: “I do believe that the presence of American nuclear weapons in Europe is an essential part of a credible deterrent.” Diplomatic sources noted however that Rasmussen’s statement did not reflect a consensus within the Alliance. One senior US official commented, “We were surprised by the urgency with which Rasmussen emphasised the importance of not changing NATO nuclear policies.” Several NATO countries reportedly approached the Secretary-General opposing his statement on the necessity of continued deployment of the tactical arsenal. Summarising the informal discussions the following day, Rasmussen noted that “NATO must continue to maintain a balance between credible deterrence and support for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.”

Some NATO members are still cautious, suggesting that the tactical arsenals protect against vulnerability from Russian aggression or potentially against an armed Iran. Europe’s B61 gravity bombs which have an explosive yield between 0.3 and 170 kilotons (the Hiroshima atomic bomb had an explosive power of around 15 kilotons) however have to be carried to their destination by aircraft. Pilots during the Cold War had a 30-minute stand-by readiness level; today, a NATO brochure notes that readiness is measured “in weeks and months not minutes”- a clear sign that European tactical nukes are militarily inadequate. When asked on 8 April if US nuclear weapons in Europe perform a military mission that cannot be performed by US strategic forces or US conventional forces, General James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, responded with a simple and categorical: “no.”

At the currently ongoing Eighth NPT Review Conference of the NPT in New York, the EU Statement called for “reduction and final elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons as integral parts of the nuclear disarmament process to which all States Parties are committed under Article VI of the NPT.” Taking the issue further, Poland and Norway noted “the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, which we all share, cannot be met without addressing [tactical nuclear weapons] head on.” The Non-aligned Movement (NAM) similarly called on the Review Conference to agree that the nuclear-weapon states “refrain from nuclear weapon sharing, with other states under any kind of security arrangements, including in the framework of military alliances.”

On 14 May, twelve NGOs sent an open letter to all NPT States Parties recognising that while decisions on tactical arsenals would ultimately be taken among NATO members,
 

“...it must be noted how many NPT member states have spoken of the need to reduce and eliminate tactical nuclear weapons as a priority issue during this Review Conference. Nuclear sharing undermines NPT coherence because it creates a group of semi-nuclear states. In addition, a majority of NPT member states consistently criticise NATO nuclear sharing as violating at least the spirit of the NPT, and for undermining the overall credibility of the non-proliferation compact.”

 
It further called on NPT States Parties to declare that tactical nuclear weapons “particularly in non-nuclear weapon states, undermines non-proliferation and disarmament efforts and that states should work towards ending existing nuclear sharing arrangements before the 2015 Review Conference, and to report on those efforts at that conference.”

What are France and the UK Saying?
Their arsenals forming part of NATO’s nuclear deterrence, France and the UK have different voices. France, which does not possess tactical nuclear weapons itself nor takes part in NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, opposed an EU-proposed joint working paper on Europe’s tactical nuclear weapons in advance of the Review Conference. It also opposes what it sees as an internal NATO issue from being discussed in the NPT. Britain, more open to movement toward disarmament, is consciously keeping a low profile in part because it would put more pressure on London to respond to any nuclear attack and in part to allow space for the domestic considerations of the host countries. At the same time, a low profile minimises the potential for questions about the removal of around 100 US nuclear weapons from the Royal Air Force Station at Lakenheath done secretly in June 2008. On its end, the US has been giving subtle signals to their European partners to think about the tactical issue in a new way while noting the alliance will be a nuclear one (i.e. strategically) for as long as nuclear weapons exist.

Time for Their Removal
With the presence of extended, strategic deterrence, the military utility of tactical nuclear weapons is non-existent. It is time for the political posturing of NATO to reorient itself from Cold War thinking toward today’s need for NPT compliance and creating the conditions favourable for eventual disarmament. Similar to Denmark’s decision decades ago that it would not house nuclear weapons on its soil, the decision whether or not to remove NATO’s tactical arsenal perhaps should reside alone within the countries which host them. At the same time, an American Air Force panel in February 2008 revealed that most nuclear sites in Europe did not meet US security requirements, which was further underscored in February of this year when a group of peace activists were able to breach Kleine Brogel Air Base in Belgium where around 10 to 20 B61s are stored. To this end, the issue is one that has immediate security, safety and environmental concerns that extends to Denmark and across Europe.


Time to Debate NATO’s Nukes in Europe