The 'secret' nuclear discussions in NATO

Trine Flockhart argues that although the Review ought to undertake a thorough and open discussion leading to a defence and deterrence posture more in line with the security environment of the 21st century, many features of NATO's cold war nuclear posture are likely to remain in place.

It is especially the issue about the fate of the remaining American Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons based in Europe that is a difficult issue for the Alliance, not because of any particular military value of these weapons, but SOLELY because of their deeply symbolic value and the belief that Alliance cohesion is ensured through nuclear sharing.

Trine Flockhart takes a more radical stance by arguing that as NATOs 2010 Strategic Concept defines the Alliance as Active and Engaged and fit for the 21st century, it also needs a defence and deterrence posture that reflects this change, most notably different ways of ensuring cohesion by moving from nuclear sharing to missile defence sharing and more equally shared
participation in NATO's crisis management operations; a shift from emphasis on deterrence by punishment to emphasis on deterrence by denial; and a coherent policy vis-á-vis Russia as either a partner for cooperation on missile defence and other shared issues or as a potential adversary that makes it prudent to retain American nuclear weapons in Europe.

Unfortunately however, the likely outcome of the Defence and Deterrence Posture Review in the forthcoming NATO Summit in Chicago is an ambiguous stance that in all likelihood will stay close to the current status quo.