DIIS Comment
A Middle East Free of Nuclear Weapons
On May 28, states parties at the Eighth Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) issued a consensus document. The most contentious part dealt with the issue of a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East, raising the question: can the region really be free of WMD?
07 June 2010
Background of Regional Arms Control Talks
In the autumn of 1991, the Madrid Peace Conference agreed to proceed with bilateral and multilateral meetings in the Middle East on water, refugees, economic development, the environment and arms control. Based on the arms control experience between the USSR and NATO, the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group was established and held meetings between 1992 and 1995 with the view that incremental steps to arms control tended to precede formal arms control measures. Making much more progress than predicted, ACRS drafted a statement with a declaration of principles for regional security and arms control; the creation of a regional security center; the establishment of a communications network; the production of a Pre-notification of Certain Military Activities agreement; an Exchange of Military Activities document; and a number of maritime confidence-building measures. The statement however was never formally adopted as the issue of arms control continued to stall progress, particularly the ongoing disagreement between Israel and Egypt over at what point to discuss WMD in the Middle East.
At the 1995 NPT Review Conference, States Parties (Israel not one of them) adopted a Resolution on the Middle East which called upon all states of the Middle East to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to accept IAEA full-scope safeguards. Adopted without a vote, the resolution endorsed the objective aims of the Middle East peace process and called upon states in the region to take practical steps towards the establishment of a Middle East Zone free of WMD.
The 2010 NPT
There was a general understanding amongst delegations in lead up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference that implementation of the 1995 Resolution had to be addressed. As one Egyptian delegate commented “the 1995 Resolution cannot be postponed for another 15 years.” The language and plan agreed to in the 2010 Final Document underscored the validity of the 1995 Resolution and “reaffirms [the Conference’s] endorsement of the aims and objectives of the Middle East Peace Process and recognises that efforts in this regard…contribute to, inter alia, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction.” It also specifically mentions “the importance of Israel’s accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.” The document tasks the UN Secretary General to hold a conference on the establishment of a WMD free zone in the Middle East “to be attended by all States of the Middle East” in 2012. US Undersecretary of State Ellen Tauscher later said that the US would work with countries in the region to organise a successful conference but noted that US ability had “been seriously jeopardised because the final document singles out Israel in the Middle East section, a fact that the United States deeply regrets.” It should be noted however that this is not the first time Israel has been named in a NPT Final Document. The naming language in 2010 is the same used ten years ago that named Israel in relation to the universal adherence to the NPT in the Middle East. India and Pakistan – the other two nuclear weapons states not party to the NPT – were also ‘named’ and called upon to join the NPT.
Upset that Israel was singled out in the 2010 document and Iran not even mentioned, the Israeli government responded that it would not take part in its implementation and that “as a non-signatory state of the NPT, Israel is not obligated by the decisions of this Conference, which has no authority over Israel.” While many delegations would have preferred more balanced wording in the Middle East context and were not pleased with Iran’s desire to block consensus if it was named, the US and the majority of delegations were not prepared to have a repeat of 2005 and leave New York without a consensus document. Instead, the document makes general references to countries not being in compliance – a watered down implication to the current case of Iran before the IAEA and UN Security Council.
According to Foreign Sources: It’s Out of the Bag
Unlike other possessors, Israel has never declared its arsenal, choosing instead a policy of ambiguity – neither declaring nor denying its nuclear status. Outside of Israel the international community speaks of Israel as a nuclear weapons state with many debates and factsheets written about its stockpile, doctrine, and history of development; inside Israel ambiguity is robust with a law restraining Israeli journalists from referring to the state’s nuclear weapons, unless quoting from foreign sources.
Israel’s policy pledge not to test, declare or make visible the presence of its nuclear weapons capability was seen as the way both Israel and the US could keep Israel’s bomb in the basement while restraining Arab countries from developing nuclear weapons themselves. The US in turn provided a level of political cover to Israel at various international gatherings such as the NPT Review conferences; but the policy of ambiguity has reached its limits. The P5 for example have taken the issue of transparency beyond simply declaring their presence to disclosing numbers of operational nuclear warheads: France declared a ceiling of 300 warheads in March 2008; the US disclosed for the first time on 3 May 2010 that it has 5,113 warheads and the UK acknowledged three weeks later that it maintained 225, of which 160 are on operational status. Along with an increasing number of voices calling for movement toward lesser numbers, even zero nuclear weapons, there is a growing global pressure on all possessors to make their numbers and postures transparent. In a region where more than a dozen states have expressed an interest in developing nuclear energy, leading potentially to threshold breakout capabilities down the road, not openly talking about WMD arsenals may continue a sense of vulnerability as a whole in the region.
Whether states of the Middle East actually believe the region can become free of nuclear weapons is unclear, but there is a strong belief that raising the issue is a worthy exercise, possibly leading to better negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme. For Israel, the concept of a region free of WMD is a desired one predicated on a regional peace agreement. Its current apprehension though is that many of its regional neighbours who also lack a democratic saliency will use a WMD conference as another tool to question the legitimacy of its existence. Indeed a political feat to have Israel, Iran and the Arab states together in the same room particularly as a number of these states do not recognise Israel, their presence at the table in 2012 would be de facto recognition. Similarly, the debate about whether to have peace before disarmament (as Israel desires) or disarmament along the way to peace (as the Arab states desire), the goal of normalisation of relations, let alone peace, cannot happen without multilateral (and bilateral) talks.
In the autumn of 1991, the Madrid Peace Conference agreed to proceed with bilateral and multilateral meetings in the Middle East on water, refugees, economic development, the environment and arms control. Based on the arms control experience between the USSR and NATO, the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group was established and held meetings between 1992 and 1995 with the view that incremental steps to arms control tended to precede formal arms control measures. Making much more progress than predicted, ACRS drafted a statement with a declaration of principles for regional security and arms control; the creation of a regional security center; the establishment of a communications network; the production of a Pre-notification of Certain Military Activities agreement; an Exchange of Military Activities document; and a number of maritime confidence-building measures. The statement however was never formally adopted as the issue of arms control continued to stall progress, particularly the ongoing disagreement between Israel and Egypt over at what point to discuss WMD in the Middle East.
At the 1995 NPT Review Conference, States Parties (Israel not one of them) adopted a Resolution on the Middle East which called upon all states of the Middle East to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to accept IAEA full-scope safeguards. Adopted without a vote, the resolution endorsed the objective aims of the Middle East peace process and called upon states in the region to take practical steps towards the establishment of a Middle East Zone free of WMD.
The 2010 NPT
There was a general understanding amongst delegations in lead up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference that implementation of the 1995 Resolution had to be addressed. As one Egyptian delegate commented “the 1995 Resolution cannot be postponed for another 15 years.” The language and plan agreed to in the 2010 Final Document underscored the validity of the 1995 Resolution and “reaffirms [the Conference’s] endorsement of the aims and objectives of the Middle East Peace Process and recognises that efforts in this regard…contribute to, inter alia, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction.” It also specifically mentions “the importance of Israel’s accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.” The document tasks the UN Secretary General to hold a conference on the establishment of a WMD free zone in the Middle East “to be attended by all States of the Middle East” in 2012. US Undersecretary of State Ellen Tauscher later said that the US would work with countries in the region to organise a successful conference but noted that US ability had “been seriously jeopardised because the final document singles out Israel in the Middle East section, a fact that the United States deeply regrets.” It should be noted however that this is not the first time Israel has been named in a NPT Final Document. The naming language in 2010 is the same used ten years ago that named Israel in relation to the universal adherence to the NPT in the Middle East. India and Pakistan – the other two nuclear weapons states not party to the NPT – were also ‘named’ and called upon to join the NPT.
Upset that Israel was singled out in the 2010 document and Iran not even mentioned, the Israeli government responded that it would not take part in its implementation and that “as a non-signatory state of the NPT, Israel is not obligated by the decisions of this Conference, which has no authority over Israel.” While many delegations would have preferred more balanced wording in the Middle East context and were not pleased with Iran’s desire to block consensus if it was named, the US and the majority of delegations were not prepared to have a repeat of 2005 and leave New York without a consensus document. Instead, the document makes general references to countries not being in compliance – a watered down implication to the current case of Iran before the IAEA and UN Security Council.
According to Foreign Sources: It’s Out of the Bag
Unlike other possessors, Israel has never declared its arsenal, choosing instead a policy of ambiguity – neither declaring nor denying its nuclear status. Outside of Israel the international community speaks of Israel as a nuclear weapons state with many debates and factsheets written about its stockpile, doctrine, and history of development; inside Israel ambiguity is robust with a law restraining Israeli journalists from referring to the state’s nuclear weapons, unless quoting from foreign sources.
Israel’s policy pledge not to test, declare or make visible the presence of its nuclear weapons capability was seen as the way both Israel and the US could keep Israel’s bomb in the basement while restraining Arab countries from developing nuclear weapons themselves. The US in turn provided a level of political cover to Israel at various international gatherings such as the NPT Review conferences; but the policy of ambiguity has reached its limits. The P5 for example have taken the issue of transparency beyond simply declaring their presence to disclosing numbers of operational nuclear warheads: France declared a ceiling of 300 warheads in March 2008; the US disclosed for the first time on 3 May 2010 that it has 5,113 warheads and the UK acknowledged three weeks later that it maintained 225, of which 160 are on operational status. Along with an increasing number of voices calling for movement toward lesser numbers, even zero nuclear weapons, there is a growing global pressure on all possessors to make their numbers and postures transparent. In a region where more than a dozen states have expressed an interest in developing nuclear energy, leading potentially to threshold breakout capabilities down the road, not openly talking about WMD arsenals may continue a sense of vulnerability as a whole in the region.
Whether states of the Middle East actually believe the region can become free of nuclear weapons is unclear, but there is a strong belief that raising the issue is a worthy exercise, possibly leading to better negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme. For Israel, the concept of a region free of WMD is a desired one predicated on a regional peace agreement. Its current apprehension though is that many of its regional neighbours who also lack a democratic saliency will use a WMD conference as another tool to question the legitimacy of its existence. Indeed a political feat to have Israel, Iran and the Arab states together in the same room particularly as a number of these states do not recognise Israel, their presence at the table in 2012 would be de facto recognition. Similarly, the debate about whether to have peace before disarmament (as Israel desires) or disarmament along the way to peace (as the Arab states desire), the goal of normalisation of relations, let alone peace, cannot happen without multilateral (and bilateral) talks.
A Middle East Free of Nuclear Weapons?