How to improve security in fragile states?

A major goal of post-conflict reconstruction is to ensure that people have access to security and justice. But how is that goal best achieved? Is it through a (re)building of the formal state institutions, including in particular the police, the army and the judiciary? Or are other "informal" structures of security and justice provision more in tune with local realities and thus more sustainable, and perhaps more legitimate, in the long run?

A new article by Louise Riis Andersen discusses the dilemmas that confront the international donor community when it seeks to transform ineffective security systems in war-torn societies into legitimate and accountable systems that comply with ideals of human rights and democratic governance.

Based on a reading of the policy debate on "peacebuilding as statebuilding", the article identifies two competing models of security assistance: a conventional model that reflects the Weberian ideal of a state monopoly on the legitimate use of force; and an innovative model that conceptualizes fragile states as "hybrid political orders". When used as a strategy for intervention, the choice between the two is not simply between a top-down "imposition" of a universal state model and a bottom-up "working with what is there" approach. It is also a choice between direct and indirect forms of rule. This makes the dilemma real for liberal-minded practitioners who wish to ensure that international standards and norms of human rights are respected without imposing external solutions to localized problems

Link:

“The Liberal Dilemmas of a People-Centred Approach to Statebuilding”, Conflict, Security and Development, 12 (2): 103-21