Border Control and Border Myths

Clandestine border activities such as smuggling, human trafficking, illegal immigration and transnational activities of criminal networks require a response by the state. Often, border control is the immediate solution that comes to mind. As a physical separation between states, the border seems an obvious place to control and manage the transnational flows of goods and persons. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of border control is vastly overestimated. As the Danish Ministry of Justice concluded as late as March this year, more border control is unlikely to contribute much to the fight against transnational crime. But if professionals agree that border control is largely ineffective, why does it nonetheless stay on the political agenda?

A large part of the explanation is the story told about border control and European integration. This story goes as follows: the disappearance of internal borders in the EU does not only promote the legal flow of goods, persons and services, but also facilitates criminal movement – therefore, it is necessary to regain some of that lost control. Although this narrative is seductive in its simplicity, it is based on a range of false assumptions.

First, the idea of regaining control exaggerates the extent to which states ever had control over the border. Illegal movement and smuggling have accompanied the history of the border up to the present. In fact, border control can sometimes encourage rather than deter illegal trafficking. By making it more difficult to enter a state legally, border control creates the conditions for a market for clandestine border-crossing activities. Human trafficking is a case in point.

Secondly, there is no statistical evidence of a clear relation between the opening of borders on the one hand and the rise of crime on the other. In fact, such an assumption relies on the shaky supposition that people only decide to move or engage in criminal activities when borders are abolished. In reality, of course, people’s motives to engage in crime are much more complex and related to their life choices and structural living conditions.

Thirdly, the story mistakenly represents the Schengen agreement as an agreement on free movement only. This could not be more wrong. Although the opening of borders is the main objective of Schengen, most of the Schengen measures actually pertain to issues of border control. By now, the EU has developed and built an extensive security system, where external border control is integrated into a wider risk management system that also includes anticipatory measures taken beyond the border.

Another explanation must be found in the border’s symbolic meaning as a prominent site for shaping public perceptions of the nation state. Images of a border out of control – as the example of the U.S.-Mexican border shows – can lead to feelings of public anxiety and concerns about a state’s capacity to protect its citizens. Border control thus sends a clear and tough message to the public that the state is doing everything in its power to protect innocent citizens from outside dangers.
However, when border control fails as an effective response to transnational crime, symbolic border politics may ultimately prove counterproductive. Instead of building trust between the government and its citizens, the public may interpret the continuation of crime and insecurity as a sign of the government’s incapacity to provide protection and security. In that event, governmental legitimacy is not so much undermined by crime itself as by the symbolic logic of borders to which some politicians at times all too easily subscribe.