The importance of understanding the differences between Hamas, IS and al-Qaeda

In a joint press conference with US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken on 12 October, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu said that “Hamas is ISIS […] and Hamas should be treated exactly the way ISIS was treated.“

Based on the rich availability of graphic evidence as well as witness accounts, Hamas’ attack on 7 October appears indeed comparable with IS, at least in terms of its anti-civilian brutality. However, frequently shared statements conflating the two organizations miss an important point: Hamas is neither affiliated with IS, nor have these two organizations collaborated in the past. Rather, the opposite is true: IS is a vicious opponent of Hamas and both groups have repeatedly spoken out against each other. Al-Qaeda, IS’s global jihadist rival, has a distinct position vis-à-vis both Hamas and IS too, thus further complicating the picture.

It is therefore helpful to take a closer look at these jihadist actors, their positioning vis-à-vis Hamas and how they have responded to Hamas’ so-called “al-Aqsa Flood” campaign, which is the name that Hamas has used in its public statements since 7 October when referring to the initial terrorist attack as well as its ongoing military operations. A better understanding of these various organizations is also necessary to evaluate the risk of al-Qaeda and IS potentially becoming involved in the unfolding violence, which is something both organizations have already expressed a desire for. Moreover, analyzing these dynamics is relevant to assess the risk of spill-over effects of the current situation in the form of jihadist terrorism abroad.

Shared views

Before analyzing al-Qaeda’s and IS’ reactions to Hamas’ self-declared “al-Aqsa Flood” campaign, it is helpful to start by laying out some core positions that are shared by these two organizations and Hamas. To begin with, there is a shared view across these actors that Israel is illegally occupying Muslim lands on the entirety of its state territory and that it should be, at least ideally, fully erased as an independent state.

As a result, violence against Israeli civilians is generally seen as commendable and usually framed as heroic resistance against occupation, not only when it takes place in the context of illegal Jewish settlements in the West Bank, but also on Israeli territory not considered as occupied under international law. The different actors also display Israel as part of an alleged anti-Muslim, Jewish-Christian “crusader” conspiracy. At times, the Israeli state is portrayed as a puppet of the US and its European allies, whereas Jews are simultaneously often depicted as manipulating these very actors.

In this regard, the full rejection of Israel as an independent state also corresponds with sharp opposition towards the normalization processes between various Arab states and Israel in recent years. Another central, shared theme are calls for “liberating” the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, which is legally under custodianship of Jordan. Here, Hamas typically focuses on condemning Israeli security forces entering the compounds of the Mosque, or restricting access for local civilians, whereas al-Qaeda and IS, while also addressing these issues, tend to focus more strongly on the mosque’s global significance as the world’s third most-sacred site in Islam.

Fault lines between global jihadists and Hamas

However, despite sharing similar views on these larger issues, al-Qaeda and IS fundamentally disagree with Hamas on a number of issues.

First, they are both globally oriented, jihadist organizations. Hamas, in contrast, propagates an Islamist-nationalist agenda that has focused on the Palestinian question, rather than the larger goal of creating a global Islamic caliphate. The idea of a caliphate governed by Sharia-based law and uniting the world’s Muslims under a single leader, thereby breaking existing nation-state borders, has historically been central to both al-Qaeda and IS, although the two organizations have differed in their views regarding the envisioned timing of declaring such a caliphate. Whereas for al-Qaeda and IS the aspired liberation of Palestine and the fight against Israel represent first and foremost a strategic opportunity to unite the world’s Muslims in a global struggle, for Hamas, the Palestinian struggle constitutes the sole, primary focus.

Second, Hamas’ cooperation with Iran and a variety of Iran-sponsored Shi’ite Islamist actors, including the Lebanese Hezbollah, is particularly problematic for al-Qaeda and IS as Sunni Muslim, Salafi-jihadi actors, not least because both al-Qaeda and IS have clashed directly and indirectly with several of these Shi’ite actors in the Syrian Civil War. Hamas had previously fallen out with the Lebanese Hezbollah too, because it opposed Hezbollah’s support for the Assad regime, but this did not prevent the two organizations’ later rapprochement.

Third, a major concern for al-Qaeda and IS, which condemn democracy as a Western and un-Islamic concept, has been Hamas’ participation in the 2006 legislative elections in the Palestinian territories and its subsequent power-sharing agreement with its secular rival Fatah. These decisions were already at the time sharply opposed by al-Qaeda, which viewed it as a step of Hamas towards accepting the existing nation-state order and, thereby, indirectly accepting, and legitimizing Israel’s existence.

Fourth, both al-Qaeda and IS have previously criticized Hamas for what they view as its failure to implement appropriate Sharia-based legislation in Gaza.

Last, Hamas’ earlier repression of Salafi-jihadi factions in Gaza, some of them known for their supportive stance towards al-Qaeda or IS, has equally raised objections. Examples include the al-Qaeda-leaning Jaysh al-Ummah and the pro-IS Jama’at Ansar al-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi Bayt al-Maqdis.

These various divides can thus explain why Hamas has long perceived both al-Qaeda and IS primarily as threats, rather than as potential allies. The strategic dilemma for al-Qaeda and IS lies in the fact that Hamas has been acting as the vanguard of violent Islamism in a conflict that bears enormous symbolism for Muslims around the world, including al-Qaeda’s and IS’s very own target audiences.

Thus, the two organizations have had to strike a balance between positioning themselves favorably vis-à-vis attacks against Israel, as these attacks are highly popular among their own followers and because Israel is the shared enemy, while at the same time trying to frame such events in line with their globally oriented agenda, rather than Hamas’ nationalist-Islamist vision.

Different jihadist reactions

Despite sharing similar objections vis-à-vis Hamas, as outlined above, al-Qaeda and IS are themselves fundamentally opposed to each other. In 2014, al-Qaeda’s rejection of IS’ excommunication of fellow Muslims, as well as IS’ refusal to follow orders from al-Qaeda’s General Command, led to the split between the two entities and the emergence of IS as a fully independent organization. Since then, al-Qaeda has increasingly taken a more pragmatic stance, relative to IS, with regard to its strategic positioning vis-à-vis other Islamist actors such as Hamas, whereas IS has continued to maintain its doctrinally rigid stance, essentially rejecting any organization that deviates from its own creed and methodology.

These tendencies already manifested themselves during the last military escalation between Hamas and Israel in May 2021. Already then, al-Qaeda’s double-edged strategy became evident. On the one hand, this implied avoiding to refer to Hamas by its name, while, on the other hand, praising the achievements of its military wing, the al-Qassam Brigades, even going as far as calling their highest military commander Mohammed Deif a ”heroic leader”. IS, in contrast, directed sharp accusations at Hamas at the time, depicting the group as an Iranian proxy, while simultaneously accusing al-Qaeda of hypocrisy because of the latter’s support of an actor (Hamas) that was collaborating with Iran.

Confirming these earlier positionings, since the inception of Hamas’ self-declared “al-Aqsa Flood” campaign on 7 October, al-Qaeda has taken a more openly supportive and positive stance towards it than IS, which has positioned itself more cautiously. On 13 October, al-Qaeda published an official statement from its General Command through its ‘al-Sahab Media Foundation’, voicing strong support for the Hamas-led operation, again avoiding referring to Hamas as a whole and limiting its attention to Hamas’ military operations. As regards the latter, the statement exaltedly praised “al-Aqsa Flood” as a "gem in the battles of Islam in the modern history of our Ummah”, celebrating its strategic planning and direct impact.

At the same time, the statement represents a clear attempt at spinning the developments in such a way that they are perceived as forming part of al-Qaeda’s global campaign against the alleged alliance of “Crusader, Zionist, and Israeli” forces. For example, it calls upon Muslims from abroad to support their Palestinian brethren by whatever means possible, but also to attack US targets in the region. Adding further emphasis to the global framing, the statement emphasizes the importance of other battlefields on which al-Qaeda is active across the globe, including the Arabian Peninsula, the Sahel region, or the Indian Subcontinent.

In line with this, within the first week after 7 October, all of al-Qaeda’s major affiliate groups around the world published their own, respective statements that unequivocally voiced support for Hamas’ operations as well. These statements are overall closely in line with the General Command’s framing, although some slight differences can be observed.

For instance, only one of the al-Qaeda-related statements addresses the issue of Shi’ite support towards the Gaza-based factions as problematic. In this regard, in a joint statement, al-Qaeda’s Sahel-based coalition (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa-l Muslimeen/JNIM) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) call upon Muslims to provide financial support to the factions in Gaza, in order to render them less dependent on external Shi’ite support from the “Iranian axis of evil”. In several cases, the regional al-Qaeda branches further seek to link events in their own battlefields to the developments unfolding in Gaza. For instance, the Somalia-based al-Shabaab compares the exposure of Somali civilians to US aerial bombings to Palestinian suffering as a result from Israeli airstrikes.

Likewise, the Syria-based Hurras al-Din’s statement frames the airstrikes against Gaza as a continuation of the aerial bombing campaign that jihadist groups in Syria have been exposed to for the past decade.

As regards IS, it took the organization almost two full weeks to react. In Issue 413 of its weekly ‘al-Naba’ propaganda magazine, published on 19 October, it dedicated the editorial and an infographic to the unfolding events around Gaza. The reaction was much less celebratory than the statements published by al-Qaeda and its respective affiliate branches. Although the editorial highlights the purported importance of fighting Jews, it cautions against focusing on the Palestinian context only, arguing that this would prove insufficient because of the alleged Jewish conspiracy with the US and European states.

Following this notion, the editorial argues that only by striking all of Israel’s external allies simultaneously, there is a real chance to defeat Israel. While the attempt to frame the current events in global terms thus shows some similarities to al-Qaeda’s statements, IS clearly seeks to avoid any framing that could be seen as giving too much credit to the Hamas-led operation. For example, whereas al-Qaeda’s statement explicitly calls upon its followers “to engage in this battle” and to “interface positively with this Islamic flood”, even referring to “our heroes in Palestine”, IS only speaks generically of “Muslim youths fighting there” and fully refrains from using the term “al-Aqsa Flood” altogether. Rather, the IS editorial contents itself with some basic operational advice, for example suggesting that local fighters should make greater use of suicide belts.

Implications for global jihadism

The grave humanitarian suffering among civilians in Gaza, who have been exposed to Israel’s aerial bombings as part of its military response to Hamas’ terrorist attack on 7 October is currently a dominant topic being discussed in jihadist deep web forums, Telegram groups, and a variety of other online communication spaces. There is a risk that radicalized individuals in the West or elsewhere, who feel emotionally affected by the current developments, may decide to take action into their own hands and act upon the instructions formulated by al-Qaeda and IS in their recent statements following upon Hamas’ self-declared “al-Aqsa Flood” campaign.

Whereas al-Qaeda focused on calling for attacks against American targets in the Middle East, inciting its followers to “shake the ground beneath the American bases, airports, and embassies in our Islamic region”, IS provided a list of Jewish targets to strike, wherever possible in the world, including Jewish neighborhoods, night clubs and religious sites, but also Israeli and “crusader” embassies. IS’ calls for attacks against Jewish targets are particularly concerning in light of the sharply increasing numbers of antisemitic incidents registered in various European countries. In turn, as regards Hamas’ recent, official communication to international audiences, it has largely limited itself to calling for international anti-Israeli boycotts and urging its followers abroad to participate in large-scale demonstrations to support its ongoing struggle. The group has not formulated similar calls for violence against, for example, Western targets, as al-Qaeda or IS. Again, a central fault line is that Hamas remains strongly focused on its fight against Israel, whereas al-Qaeda and IS seek to elevate the ongoing violence to a global level.

Lastly, although al-Qaeda and IS have long wished to gain an operational foothold in the Palestinian arena, it remains unclear to what extent they will be able to do so within the near future. Not only is Hamas opposed to both organizations, but an additional, major challenge is that all states that directly border Israel and the Palestinian territories – Egypt, Lebanon (including the Hezbollah as the dominant actor in the South), Jordan and Syria – are hostile towards them. As regards Iran, while being hostile to IS too, it has long engaged in various forms of tacit cooperation with al-Qaeda, including allowing high-ranking al-Qaeda operatives to reside on its territory. However, this type of Iranian support has been substantially different from the much closer operational and financial links that exist between the Iranian Regime and its various Shi’ite proxy groups throughout the region.

Further reading

Batrawi, Samer. 2015. "Islamic State Affiliates Press Hamas." CTC Sentinel 8 (8): 25-27. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/CTCSentinel-Vol8Issue817.pdf.

Bunzel, Cole. 24 June 2021. Hamas and the Jihadis. https://www.jihadica.com/hamas-and-the-jihadis/.

Mir, Asfandyar, and P Clarke Colin. 2021. "Making Sense of Iran and al-Qaeda’s Relationship." Foreign Policy Essay. The Lawfare Institute. Accessed 08 August 2022. https://www.lawfareblog.com/making-sense-iran-and-al-qaedas-relationship.

Mendelsohn, Barak. 2009. "Al-Qaeda's Palestinian Problem." Survival (London) 51 (4): 71-86. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330903168865.