A New START
08 April 2010
Last year in Prague, Obama stated “with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons”. He reminded the audience that “as a nuclear power, as the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act.” The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) mandates the vision of global zero; but it is the US, Russia and the other seven possessor states that will need to initially and continually make the politically tough steps and enter negotiations toward a world without nuclear weapons. With the signing of the New START taking place a year since Obama’s Prague speech, the signatures of Obama and Medvedev not only mark a historical landmark in post-cold war relations between the two nuclear powers, but also symbolizes and situates the agreement as one of many baby steps needed toward nuclear weapons disarmament.
Why START again?
The arsenals of Russia and the US account for approximately 95 percent of the global nuclear weapons stockpile estimated at 20,000 nuclear weapons. Of that, the US currently deploys around 2,100 strategic weapons in less than 1,200 delivery systems while Russia has 2,600 deployed strategic nuclear weapons and 800 delivery systems. In comparison, other nuclear weapons states are estimated to possess approximately 300 nuclear warheads each.
The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) or Moscow Treaty of 2002 called for no more than 2,200 strategic deployed warheads by the year 2012 with each side determining “for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms”; but it did not refer to delivery systems, nor contain a verification mechanism, relying instead on those in START I which were to expire three years before the treaty’s deadline. The 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) expired on December 5 2009 after 15 years in force but was extended while negotiators in Geneva continued to work toward a new agreement. After almost a year of negotiations, the new START will require the US and Russia to lower their strategic arsenals to 1,550 deployed warheads, and two limits on delivery vehicles:
- a combined limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.
- a separate limit of 700 deployed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), deployed Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.
The White House website notes the 1,550 warheads figure as 74 percent lower than the 1991 START Treaty and 30 percent lower than the deployed warhead limit of the 2002 Moscow Treaty. Furthermore, the 700 figure is noted as being less than half of the strategic delivery vehicle limit of START I. The comparison however is a bit misleading as none of three treaties use the same counting rules. The new START agreement essentially combines elements from both START and the Moscow Treaty: counting each missile and bomber as one delivery vehicle against the 700 and 800 limits similar to START I while counting only deployed nuclear warheads (except for the new bomber limit) as put forward in the Moscow Treaty. This approach reflects a compromise between the US approach to counting deployed warheads and the Russian approach to counting delivery vehicles. According to the White House, the pact includes no binding limitations on planned U.S. missile defenses, and it does not specifically address a US plan to arm long-range missiles with conventional warheads.
The new START Treaty also does not include restrictions on tactical and stored nuclear weapons. As such, in terms of reductions, the treaty is underwhelming. That said, as the last real arms control negotiations with verifiable monitoring between the two countries came to an end with the signing of the START II Treaty in January 1993 (which did not enter into force), the Prague Treaty represents a much-needed, long overdue revival in arms control talks between the two largest possessors. The body of seasoned professional arms control negotiators had diminished in the generation since START negotiations in the early 1990s. Thus, achieving the treaty and agreement on detailed verification in less than a year underscores the genuine intention on both sides to ‘reset’ bilateral relations. While many have discredited the Prague Treaty as meaningless in its reductions – which are indeed quite modest – it does set the foundation for further talks and reductions, and potentially on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.
Tactical nuclear weapons are next
Noting last month at the International Conference on Security in Munich that the signing of the START agreement would likely lead to pressure to reduce US and Russian tactical nuclear arsenals, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov stated: “Although nuclear armament remains the backbone of the strategic deterrence system, it cannot be viewed as a panacea against all threats and challenges. It can and should be liquidated.” And pressure from European states for substantial reductions of nuclear weapons has been gaining ground as the new START negotiations neared conclusion. In February, the foreign ministers of Poland and Sweden wrote an op-ed in The New York Times calling for significant reductions of tactical nukes and their eventual elimination. Furthermore, five NATO countries, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Norway and Luxembourg have noted their intention to make a joint declaration pushing for withdrawal. With the upcoming NATO foreign ministers meeting in Estonia later this month and Heads of State and Government scheduled to meet in Portugal in November to determine NATO’s Strategic Concept, we can expect much debate in the coming months on essentially making Europe a nuclear weapons free zone – except for France and the UK.
Russian President Medvedev noted on 1 March: “Global zero is a beautiful idea but, as you'll understand, this idea can only be reached as a result of concerted work by all nuclear states.” The Prague Treaty marks the first baby step (of many) required to gain global confidence that the large possessors are serious about achieving more stable force structures on the way down to lower levels. There is a long road to talks amongst the NPT-recognised nuclear weapons states, let alone ‘Nine Party Talks’ between all the nuclear weapons states (China, France, India, North Korea, Russia, Pakistan, US, UK, along with Israel’s declared ambiguity). The Prague Treaty now has to overcome likely heated debates and successful ratification in the US and Russian chambers of representatives - START I took 430 days to ratify and the Moscow treaty, which was only three pages in length, took more than 9 months. The road is long; but thankfully we now have a new START.