Politicians' "lessons" of the past may play roles in foreign policy decisions - but which?

The Interplay of Geopolitics and Historical Lessons in Foreign Policy: Denmark facing German post-War Rearmament
New article introduces the idea of 'learning' from the past into realist geopolitical theory.

Hans Mouritzen and Mikkel Runge Olesen in an article, newly published in the journal Cooperation and Conflict's December 2010 issue (vol. 45, no. 4, pp. 406-27) lay out a set of ground rules for when we should expect to see policy-makers decisively influenced by alleged 'lessons' drawn from the past experiences of their country. The article suggests that such lessons are particularly influential when a state enjoys significant action space and correspondingly less likely to dominate, when a country is subjected to intense geopolitical pressure from outside.

The article puts these propositions to the test through an analysis of the Danish foreign policy course when faced by the prospect of West German rearmament 1950-55. The situation put Danish politicians in a difficult situation. On the one hand the Danish borders were threatened by the near proximity of the Soviet Union. West German troops, rearmed and added to the NATO ranks, offered an enticing opportunity for creating a line of defence far enough East to shield Denmark from a Soviet attack. On the other hand, however, the German occupation of Denmark was only 5-10 years away. Danish politicians and population alike therefore had a very fresh memory of the kind of dangers to Denmark that a military strong Germany might constitute. Faced with this choice Danish politicians chose to heed present geopolitical necessities and accept West German rearmament in the face of self-doubt and a highly sceptical population. The Soviet threat to Danish state survival was simply too grave, and the historical lessons were brushed aside. However, the article also shows how Danish politicians by bluffing internationally were able to take advantage of the Never again April 9. lesson as a bargaining piece to extract concessions from West Germany in the completely unrelated question of Danish minority rights in Southern Schleswig.

The main conclusion of the article, however, remains that alleged ‘lessons of the past’ are overruled when a present external danger demands a different kind of action.


Link:
Cooperation and Conflict's December 2010 issue