NATO in Afghanistan
New research paper from Henrik Boesen Lindbo Larsen. The paper appeared in the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center Discussion Paper Series (International Security Program).
This paper explains changes in NATO's nationbuilding strategy for Afghanistan over time as an internal push-and-pull struggle between the major NATO contributors. It distinguishes between he "light footprint" phase, which had numerous problems connected to limited resources and growing insurgency (2003–2008), NATO's adoption of a comprehensive approach (CSPMP) and counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy (2009–2011), the transition and drawdown (2011–2014), and the Enduring Partnership (beyond 2014). The paper explains NATO's drawdown, stressing both increased budgetary strictures compelling decision makers to focus on domestic concerns and predominant national narratives connected to a protracted stabilization effort in Afghanistan. The United States provided constant pressure for NATO to develop integrated civilian-military capabilities and implement a security-development-governance strategy. It was supported by the United Kingdom, which sought to maximize its political influence, and Poland, which saw NATO as an insurance premium. Germany long resisted the idea of participating in a war-like effort, while France resisted NATO becoming a toolbox for Washington's broader strategic purposes. NATO's internal decisions reveal a pattern of negotiated power and predominant national narratives affecting economic cost-benefit calculi.
Read the paper here