DIIS Comment
Give the minorities in Syria an international security guarantee
16 August 2012
Give the minorities in Syria an international security guarantee
16 August, 2012
If Syria is not to dissolve after Assad, the international community needs to give the Syrian Alawites a security guerantee
The recent defection of former Syrian Prime Minister Riyad Hijab is yet another indication of the crumbling of Bashar al-Assad’s power base. Although Riyad Hijab was not part of the inner circle of the regime – composed mainly of family members and heads of the security apparatus – the defected PM has obviously concluded that Bashar al-Assad’s demise is inevitable.
And indeed the battle for Syria has entered a new and bloody phase. It has become more sectarian, more civilians are being hit, and all parties to the conflict now have blood on their hands. In many respects the Syrian army is looking more like a militia than a national army: rape, looting and arson have now become part of everyday accepted practice. According to a recent report by (ICG), Alawites – followers of a particular sect of Shia Islam, which the Assad family also belongs to – have allegedly moved into the deserted quarter of Homs (Baba Amr) and raised the Alawite flag – not seen since the French mandate and yet further testimony to the growing sectarian nature of the conflict
Also, the armed opposition groups appear to have grown more sectarian. In early August rebels attacked a compound near Homs killing 16 civilians, a majority of whom were Alawites and Christians. Just one click on any of the many uploaded rebel videos on YouTube will serve up chilling reminders of the brutality on both sides. Rebels cheer and praise Allah when bodies of their opponents are found, and summary executions and beheadings have been reported by foreign correspondents and international human rights organisations.
There is no doubt that when the regime of Bashar al-Assad finally falls these atrocities will make it much more difficult to attain a peaceful transition. How can a post-Assad Syria avoid acts of revenge, ethnic cleansing and fragmentation? The horror scenarios of Iraq 2003–2006 and Bosnia 1992–1995 are well known and have been skilfully employed by the Syrian regime itself. However, most observers now acknowledge that such regime propaganda has turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy and Iraqi or Bosnian type scenarios now loom on the horizon.
The Iraqi scenario. A weak and narrowly Sunni-led government takes over after the fall of Bashar al-Assad, leaving little or no room for Alawites, Christians and Druze. Without the inclusion and broad participation of minority groups, a transitional government risks being too focused on revenging the atrocities committed during the Assad era, and too keen on cleansing the bureaucracy and security apparatus of former Assad loyalists. In the Cairo Declaration the Syrian opposition states that as soon as a new caretaker government assumes office it will dissolve the ruling Baath party and its affiliated institutions, alongside a restructuring of the armed forces, security agencies and the shabiha, which are to be disarmed and rid of all members involved in the current repression (Cairo Declaration, under the auspices of the Arab League, 3 July 2012). Yet by such widespread prosecutions and the dismantlement of state institutions post-Assad Syria risks repeating the mistakes of post-Saddam Iraq. Alawites and others associated with I’ancien régime may feel that they have everything to lose in the new Sunni-led order and seek refuge in the mountains and coastal areas of the north-western parts of Syria. From there they will be able to organise resistance and terrorist attacks against Sunni strongholds and Syria will be thrown into one more round of violence and civil war à la Iraq 2003–2006.
The Bosnia scenario. Bashar al-Assad’s regime will not formally fall. Instead, the regime will withdraw to the Alawite dominated areas. From there it will seek independence from Syria as a last desperate means to secure survival à la Republika Srpska of the early 1990s. Yet, since the Sunnis and Christians also inhabit the main cities along the coast, attempts to secure an Alawite state will almost inevitably spell forced displacements and even ethnic cleansing. The Syrian Kurds in the north, encouraged by the Alawites, may also attempt to gain their own type of independence. However, there is no doubt that the Sunni majority will refuse to accept any partitioning of Syria. Also, regional powers fearful of what might happen in neighbouring Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey – which have somewhat similar ethnic and sectarian compositions – are unlikely to sit idly by if Syria were to disintegrate. Alawite attempts to secure survival through separation will, in other words, lead to a new type of ethnic war frighteningly similar to Bosnia’s civil war of 1992–1995.
But there is of course a third and more peaceful scenario. However, if such a scenario as this is to materialise, the international community will need to move beyond mere calls for reconciliation and inclusion of Syria’s minorities. Minority groups and in particular the Alawites will need hard security guarantees backed up by the international community and, if necessary, by an international peacekeeping force. Also the Syrian opposition will need to come to terms with a more gradual and pragmatic restructuring of state institutions and the security apparatus, in order to avoid an Iraq-style de-Baathification and breakdown of security. But, first and foremost, the Syrian opposition will need to spell out how it intends to protect Alawites and other minorities after the fall of Bashar al-Assad. In the midst of fierce fighting on the ground this is, understandably, a difficult task for the fragmented Syrian opposition, and it may very well involve a commitment from the international community to a peacekeeping force. However, Russia may be reluctant to accept any international peacekeeping mission, just as the US on this side of the American presidential elections may continue to have little appetite for a new mission in the Middle East. Yet without an international security guarantee, a post-Assad Syria would risk dissolving into yet a new round of civil war.
16 August, 2012
If Syria is not to dissolve after Assad, the international community needs to give the Syrian Alawites a security guerantee
The recent defection of former Syrian Prime Minister Riyad Hijab is yet another indication of the crumbling of Bashar al-Assad’s power base. Although Riyad Hijab was not part of the inner circle of the regime – composed mainly of family members and heads of the security apparatus – the defected PM has obviously concluded that Bashar al-Assad’s demise is inevitable.
And indeed the battle for Syria has entered a new and bloody phase. It has become more sectarian, more civilians are being hit, and all parties to the conflict now have blood on their hands. In many respects the Syrian army is looking more like a militia than a national army: rape, looting and arson have now become part of everyday accepted practice. According to a recent report by (ICG), Alawites – followers of a particular sect of Shia Islam, which the Assad family also belongs to – have allegedly moved into the deserted quarter of Homs (Baba Amr) and raised the Alawite flag – not seen since the French mandate and yet further testimony to the growing sectarian nature of the conflict
Also, the armed opposition groups appear to have grown more sectarian. In early August rebels attacked a compound near Homs killing 16 civilians, a majority of whom were Alawites and Christians. Just one click on any of the many uploaded rebel videos on YouTube will serve up chilling reminders of the brutality on both sides. Rebels cheer and praise Allah when bodies of their opponents are found, and summary executions and beheadings have been reported by foreign correspondents and international human rights organisations.
There is no doubt that when the regime of Bashar al-Assad finally falls these atrocities will make it much more difficult to attain a peaceful transition. How can a post-Assad Syria avoid acts of revenge, ethnic cleansing and fragmentation? The horror scenarios of Iraq 2003–2006 and Bosnia 1992–1995 are well known and have been skilfully employed by the Syrian regime itself. However, most observers now acknowledge that such regime propaganda has turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy and Iraqi or Bosnian type scenarios now loom on the horizon.
The Iraqi scenario. A weak and narrowly Sunni-led government takes over after the fall of Bashar al-Assad, leaving little or no room for Alawites, Christians and Druze. Without the inclusion and broad participation of minority groups, a transitional government risks being too focused on revenging the atrocities committed during the Assad era, and too keen on cleansing the bureaucracy and security apparatus of former Assad loyalists. In the Cairo Declaration the Syrian opposition states that as soon as a new caretaker government assumes office it will dissolve the ruling Baath party and its affiliated institutions, alongside a restructuring of the armed forces, security agencies and the shabiha, which are to be disarmed and rid of all members involved in the current repression (Cairo Declaration, under the auspices of the Arab League, 3 July 2012). Yet by such widespread prosecutions and the dismantlement of state institutions post-Assad Syria risks repeating the mistakes of post-Saddam Iraq. Alawites and others associated with I’ancien régime may feel that they have everything to lose in the new Sunni-led order and seek refuge in the mountains and coastal areas of the north-western parts of Syria. From there they will be able to organise resistance and terrorist attacks against Sunni strongholds and Syria will be thrown into one more round of violence and civil war à la Iraq 2003–2006.
The Bosnia scenario. Bashar al-Assad’s regime will not formally fall. Instead, the regime will withdraw to the Alawite dominated areas. From there it will seek independence from Syria as a last desperate means to secure survival à la Republika Srpska of the early 1990s. Yet, since the Sunnis and Christians also inhabit the main cities along the coast, attempts to secure an Alawite state will almost inevitably spell forced displacements and even ethnic cleansing. The Syrian Kurds in the north, encouraged by the Alawites, may also attempt to gain their own type of independence. However, there is no doubt that the Sunni majority will refuse to accept any partitioning of Syria. Also, regional powers fearful of what might happen in neighbouring Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey – which have somewhat similar ethnic and sectarian compositions – are unlikely to sit idly by if Syria were to disintegrate. Alawite attempts to secure survival through separation will, in other words, lead to a new type of ethnic war frighteningly similar to Bosnia’s civil war of 1992–1995.
But there is of course a third and more peaceful scenario. However, if such a scenario as this is to materialise, the international community will need to move beyond mere calls for reconciliation and inclusion of Syria’s minorities. Minority groups and in particular the Alawites will need hard security guarantees backed up by the international community and, if necessary, by an international peacekeeping force. Also the Syrian opposition will need to come to terms with a more gradual and pragmatic restructuring of state institutions and the security apparatus, in order to avoid an Iraq-style de-Baathification and breakdown of security. But, first and foremost, the Syrian opposition will need to spell out how it intends to protect Alawites and other minorities after the fall of Bashar al-Assad. In the midst of fierce fighting on the ground this is, understandably, a difficult task for the fragmented Syrian opposition, and it may very well involve a commitment from the international community to a peacekeeping force. However, Russia may be reluctant to accept any international peacekeeping mission, just as the US on this side of the American presidential elections may continue to have little appetite for a new mission in the Middle East. Yet without an international security guarantee, a post-Assad Syria would risk dissolving into yet a new round of civil war.
Topics
Regions
Syria
DIIS Experts
Photo/illustration by Mads Nissen
Give the minorities in Syria an international security guarantee