To Change an Alliance

Trine Flockhart (TF): We are interested in change: in your role as the manager or promoter of change in NATO. One thing is to make change when there is a crisis, another is to push change as a result of success, as has been the case for NATO since the end of the Cold War. If we look at the Alliance since the 1990s, one could say that NATO has mostly been characterized by the operations that it has conducted. What will happen when NATO may not have the operations to define it? What will it mean to its identity, and more importantly, to drive its transformation?

Anders Fogh Rasmussen (AFR): The concrete plan is to maintain and further develop our ability to operate and work together. In technical language: to maintain and further develop our interoperability. You are right: our operations, notably in Afghanistan, have served as a driving force for transformation, modernization, and increased interoperability. Our troops have learned how to operate and work together in real time and in real life in Afghanistan. Our equipment has been adapted to that common challenge. As we draw down our operations, it is of outmost importance to maintain that ability to work together. That’s why we have launched the Connected Forces Initiative, which in very concrete terms, will be built up around NATO response force. It exists already, but it has lived a quiet life, in the shadow of the real world operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo and other operations. But now we will revitalize the NATO response force: the Americans have pledged to rotate a military unit through Europe and the NATO response force will serve as the framework for further developing our ability to work and operate together, so we will train, we will exercise. The NATO response force will be a standing force that can be deployed rapidly, so it will be a rapid reaction if we need it. That, you might say, is the other side of what is going to happen when we draw down on the operations: we stand ready to take on responsibility for security operations if needed.

Fabrizio Tassinari (FT): Let’s talk about some of the broader circumstances in which this change is taking place, namely the economic crisis. The crisis has had an impact on how Member States think and act about security and defense; in your Annual Report, you elaborate quite a lot on the consequences of the crisis on military spending. I would like to ask whether and how the economic crisis has had any impact on the strategic outlook of the alliance, about the time and political capital devoted to it, and about NATO’s overall attractiveness.

AFR: There is no doubt that the economic crisis is challenging for the defense ministers, and all of the alliance. Defense budgets are under pressure but, - I know it is a cliché, but it is also a truth- in any crisis, there is an opportunity. The opportunity here is to use the economic crisis as a lever for continued reform, modernization and transformation of our armed forces. In very specific terms, the most important impact of the economic crisis, will be the development of what I would call a new culture of cooperation. It may be that we won’t get much more money in the future, - I think this is a realistic scenario - but then we have to spend the money we do have in a more efficient way. The way to do that is to strengthen cooperation across borders, since it will be increasingly difficult for individual allies to acquire the necessary military capabilities on their own. But if we join efforts, if we pool and share resources, and go for multilateral solutions, then they can. That’s what we call smart defense, because it is a smarter way of spending defense money. I do believe that the outcome of the economic crisis will be a strengthened alliance because allies realize that they need to strengthen their collective approach. It might seem as a paradox, but I do believe that that will be the eternal impact of the economic crisis. Let me just add, this is not just about the economic crisis: the economic crisis makes it obvious that we have to spend our defense money more efficiently. But the long term trend is that the cost of advanced military equipment is rising more rapidly than GDP and inflation. So unless we find new ways of working together, it will be increasingly difficult to acquire the necessary military capabilities. Hence, it’s not just about economic austerity - it’s a long term trend.

FT: Do you sense that the Member States are on board with this approach?

AFR: Yes, absolutely. The term “smart defense” has really gained ground in domestic policies and you will see, - for example in the recent Danish agreement on defense, that smart defense is a really important element, and the same goes for other allies. The challenge will be to transform that political will, into some concrete acquisition of military capabilities. We have already launched 24 smart defense projects, but I would very much like to see what we might call flagship projects – bigger projects – e.g. acquisition of long distance transport aircrafts, air-to-air refueling capacity, capacities within intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, just to mention areas where we have identified shortfalls. Those gaps should be filled through smart defense.

TF: These are military outcomes of smart defense, but there are also political benefits. Smart defense is about guaranteed access, trust, assurance. Those are the kind of terms used in the alliance about nuclear sharing and about showing cohesion. Could you see a future where smart defense is something that gradually takes over on the role of nuclear sharing as smart sharing, for example?

AFR: Maybe not when it comes to nuclear policies. But in general, I take your point. We will have to find solutions to guaranteed access, which will require some new political commitments. This is about ensuring that if you invest collectively. If you go for multilateral solutions, then you also need a guarantee – at least a political guarantee or a high probability that the multilateral capability will actually be deployed once it’s needed. If you don’t have that assurance, let’s call it an assurance, then of course some nations might be reluctant to engage in multilateral projects, because that would be waste of money and their parliament would ask why we have invested in an asset that can’t be deployed because there’s one nation that vetos. It is indeed challenging to solve that problem, but we will have to solve it, and once we do that, - and it can be done in documents, in a memorandum of understanding – there are many specific ways it will also strengthen the collective political commitment to our alliance. This would really develop a new culture of cooperation, I spoke about before: this is the political aspect, and it is very important to strengthen the glue of our alliance. It will be demanding, and we are struggling with that. It is not easy because nations – for many good reasons--will do what they can to protect national sovereignty, when it comes to defense and security. So to strike the right balance between, on the one hand, sovereignty, and on the other engagement in collective solutions and assuring that the collective asset can be deployed, that will be a challenging political task.

TF: NATO partnership policy is challenging because it is another case of change as a result of success. Partnership has probably been NATOs most effective policy since the 1990s and was also one where NATO was used to being the more attractive part in the partnership. What will happen now that partnership is no longer driven by enlargement potential? How is NATO’s approach going to change in relation to partnerships in the Middle East and across the globe?

AFR: First of all, I agree that our partnership policies have been a great success since the end of the Cold War, not least because it led to the enlargement of NATO, and through that enlargement, we have contributed to creating a Europe, whole and free and at peace. Now, there are still countries queuing up to become members of NATO and we are working on that. But I do also see new dimensions of our partnership policies. Firstly, operational partners: we have seen in Afghanistan that 22 partners, have added to the 28 allies. All in all, we have a nice coalition of 50 nations. So many partners contribute in a very concrete way to NATO operations, and that’s one way of being a partner.

In the future, as we draw down our operations, I see a new area of cooperation with partners, namely the Connected Forces Initiative. We have learned how to work and operate together – not only as 28 allies, but also with our 22 partners—and we want to maintain that ability to work together with our partners, because we realize that if we are to accomplish our security missions in the future, we will need partners across the globe. We have partnerships with Australia and New Zealand, South Korea – just to mention some – and we want to maintain our ability to work and operate together with them, so we will invite them to participate in our Connected Forces Initiative. So, here you see the new perspectives of our partnership policies in the future, while there is still an open door to European democracies that fulfills the necessary criteria.

FT: Which brings me to a quick question on the US “pivot.” How does the future look for NATO in light of the American re-balancing towards Asia? Should NATO follow or stay in the Atlantic sphere to take care of challenges there, perhaps without American leadership?

AFR: Taking into account the rise of emerging powers is inevitable. The United States is also a pacific nation and I welcome the re-balancing. My starting point is that a strong US engagement is always key to stability and security. If you ask me whether NATO should follow or should remain in the Euro-atlantic sphere I say that NATO does need a global perspective. That does not mean that NATO will itself rebalance in the Asia-pacific but it does mean that it should develop partnerships across the globe. I have just finalized a partnership with Australia. If we are to accomplish our security mission in the future we need a global perspective.

FT: Let’s move on to the EU: it is a well-known dictum that these two organizations are in the same city, but live on different planets. Between NATO and EU, there have been political difficulties and institutional rivalries. I would like to ask what in your opinion would be the ideal division of labor between the EU and NATO. And secondly, I would like you to indicate positive examples of cooperation that can show the way forward for these two organizations.

AFR: Some of the difficulties apart, let me focus on success stories. One success story is of course that the EU has taken responsibility for the operation in Bosnia, using NATO structures, NATO assets - technically it is one of the Berlin plus arrangements. It is an example that the framework that we created immediately after the decision to enlarge the EU and NATO can work. The EU can take on responsibility for military operations using NATO assets. In other theatres, we have parallel operations. In Afghanistan, we have the ISAF cooperation and we have EUPOL. In Kosovo, we have the NATO-led KFOR operation and we have the EULEX mission. Counter-piracy, along the coast of Somalia: we have an EU operation, we have a NATO operation, and we cooperate. So in daily, practical life, we get along with each other.

In Mali, the EU is now going to deploy a training mission, and I don’t see a role for NATO, and that’s another example of the EU taking on an operation, while NATO doesn’t. Libya was the same – NATO took responsibility for the operation and the EU didn’t. So I think case by case, we can work out a division of labor with a view to ensuring efficiency.

TF: When you talk about working efficiently together, do you also refer to the practice of working around the political difficulties?

AFR: Yes, well, let me point to one absurdity. I mentioned the EU operation in Bosnia: because of the Berlin-
plus arrangement, which is a formalized arrangement, we are able to have formal, joint EU-NATO meetings, which, on the EU side only involves EU member states that also have partnerships for peace arrangements with NATO, which excludes Cyprus. But the only thing we are allowed to discuss in those formal meetings—the only issue—is Bosnia and why Bosnia is important. I could easily think of issues, which deserved joint consultations in joint EU-NATO meetings, but that’s not possible, not in the formal meetings. And it is very difficult to get agreement on informal meetings for the well-known reasons that originate in the Cyprus dispute, so there is reluctance on the EU side as well as on the NATO side to engage in that.

But having said that, we do our utmost to muddle through in daily life. For instance, I have regular meetings with the leaders of the EU institutions, President of the European Council, President of the Commission, the High Representative, and even the President of the European Parliament. And at staff level, we have regular staff-to-staff consultations, and in theatre, it works smoothly. At the very top political level, there may be problems, but I would say in daily life, we get along and we solve the issues in a pragmatic way.

FT: One last question about leadership. Academics distinguish transactional leaders, who bring about change in an incremental and inclusive manner. Then there are transformational leaders, who lead thanks to their charisma and other personal qualities, as well sheer political weight. In reality, this gap is much thinner: you have to have both qualities. But can you, with your almost four years of experience at NATO, point at successes and challenges relating to these two aspects of leadership?

AFR: These theories may be interesting, but yes in practical life there is an overlap, and you will need elements of both – and more - to actually exercise leadership. In the daily life at headquarters, you will need to engage with the system as such, which works on behalf of 28 sovereign, individual nations, so it is daily hard work to forge consensus, and you have to work with the bureaucracy, to move forward. In other situations, it is a more top-down political approach.

Let me give an example to illustrate this: we had a defense ministers meeting in Istanbul some years ago, shortly after I took office as Secretary General, and here we had an interesting discussion on reforms. At the end of the discussion, the defense ministers, on the proposal of the American defense minister Robert Gates, gave me a task to elaborate a proposal as to how we could reform our military command structure. That task was a personal task to me, I had to elaborate such a proposal and present it to the defense ministers at one of the upcoming meetings, and I did. We have now executed that: we have carried through a comprehensive reform of our military command structure, reduced number of headquarters, and reduced number of processes significantly. That’s an example of a politically initiated process, where nations work in close cooperation with the Secretary General to move forward on a reform agenda. I think we need both of the approaches if we are to succeed.