A Vademecum to Cameron's Speech

As British Prime Minister David Cameron approaches his long-awaited and much delayed speech on the UK's relationship with the EU, DIIS Senior researcher Fabrizio Tassinari approached Jon Worth, a British consultant and analyst. The work of Mr Worth, who lives in Copenhagen and writes one of the longest-running blogs on EU affairs, came to our attention since he was nominated by the leading EU news website Euractiv as one of the 40 most influential Britons on EU policy. The result is an exchange on the context, significance and implications of Cameron's speech, which we report below.

Fabrizio Tassinari (Ft): One of the reasons there is much hype about this speech is because of the context in which it takes place: the polarization of the EU debate in the UK, the Eurocrisis and the solutions that have been proposed to it. Could you shed a bit of light on this context? And would you be able to spell out how much of this is indeed 'hyped,' say on the part of some special interests inside the UK, and what are instead the substantial issues which, in the British national interest, might justify this speech and a proposed change of policy?

Jon Worth (JW): The current UK-EU debate, and the particular problems the European Union poses to the Conservative Party, date back at least until 6th December 2005, the day that David Cameron was elected party leader. While on many issues Cameron is perceived to be a moderate in the party, on EU matters he showed his hardliner credentials by promising to take the Conservative MEPs out of the European People's Party/European Democrats group in the European Parliament as part of his pitch to be party leader. That pledge, delivered upon after the 2009 European Parliament elections, has set the Conservative Party off on a track away from the party political mainstream in the Europe.

Cameron's EU problems have become more severe since becoming Prime Minister in 2010. In coalition with the more pro-EU Liberal Democrats, backbench Conservatives have become more and more shrill in their criticisms of the European Union. It has also been convenient to point the finger at the Eurozone for the UK's economic woes; while that is statistically a questionable accusation, it has been politically opportune for the Conservatives as the UK economy has been in recession. Further, as the government struggles, and the UK Independence Party (UKIP) grows stronger in the polls, so the Conservative Party feels it can express its anti-EU sentiments. These sentiments are deep rooted in British society, and are reflected by the anti-EU bias of the UK newspapers that continue to ferment anti-Brussels feeling in the population.

The idea that David Cameron should make a speech about EU matters came about almost by chance, as a throw away line in an article his team penned for the Daily Telegraph on 30 June 2012. Since then the pressure has been growing on David Cameron to express his view on the European Union. The pressure on him from the press about his ever delayed speech led to his 10 December 2012 comment that the speech would be like tantric sex -- better when it actually did come.

The problem of course is that Cameron cannot possibly make a speech that pleases everyone. On the anti-EU side, UKIP are demanding an in-or-out of the EU referendum, something that Cameron does not want as he fears the consequences for British business. He instead wants to see 'fresh consent' of the British people for a new UK-EU relationship, with at least some powers repatriated to the UK from the EU, and to hold a vote on this sometime in the latter half of this decade, presuming the Conservatives win the general election in 2015. The problem is that voices from elsewhere in the EU seem to indicate that concessions to Cameron are not going to be easily obtained.

FT: Anti-EU views and the way in which these have played out in the British domestic debate have clearly dominated the scene. At the same time, what the EU has gone through over the past 3-4 years has been extraordinary. The crisis and the resolution mechanisms adopted or proposed until now, have raised objections in other parts of Europe too. Some of the proposals on fiscal integration would have been the object of serious scrutiny for any UK government. Could you elaborate on the views of the Labour party on the EU since the financial crisis hit the Eurozone and also on the EU position of some of the other relevant actors, like business and unions? And could you give me a brief tour d'horizon about how Cameron's positions have been met so far in Brussels and other European capitals?

JW: Cameron's positions have not been favourably viewed in other national capitals. Most notably in Germany both Wolfgang Schäuble and Gunther Krichbaum warned against the UK trying to blackmail ('Erpressen') the rest of the EU. Finnish Prime Minister Katainen was also not favourable to the UK plans, while in the Netherlands, would be scene of the speech that was cancelled, Mark Rutte distanced himself from Cameron and would not have attended the speech. The problem is that the Conservatives place a lot of emphasis on the positions of Germany, assuming that Germany will under all circumstances want to keep the UK inside the European Union. But Cameron has mis-read Merkel before - in December 2011 when EU member States agreed on a fiscal compact without Britain - so this is far from certain.

Since 2010 Labour has tried to stay out of the EU debate in the UK, until Ed Miliband was finally drawn into the discussion last December when the media discussion around Cameron was at fever pitch. Labour essentially seeks to defend the status quo - it wants the UK to remain in the EU, but does not countenance the idea of the UK joining either the Euro or Schengen, nor any of the facilities to stabilise the Eurozone. Conversely, it the party is opposed to the repatriation that Cameron demands, because any repatriation would focus on European social policy. Labour is not split internally about EU matters in the way the Conservatives are, but Labour's pro-EU approach is reluctant and never fervent.

UK trade unions, and most notably the Trades Union Congress (TUC), have been solidly in favour of the UK's membership of the EU, and have been more vigorous defending EU social policy than Labour has been. On the business side, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) has also been resolutely pro-EU and has been more willing to speak out about it in the last couple of months. There are of course individual business people who - often for personal rather than business reasons - back UK withdrawal, so the views of business presented in the media tend to look more split. Large car firms such as BMW and Honda (both have manufacturing facilities in the UK) have recently spoken out in favour of the UK remaining in the EU.

FT: Even if the speech is unlikely to offer 'a shopping list', it remains to be seen what repatriation will amount to in terms of areas of policy. Would you be able to offer a tentative assessment of which powers are likely to be subject to renegotiation, and their impact? The question on impact is really two questions: how, in the government's view, repatriation serves Britain's national interests and whether it will suffice to appease the Euro-sceptic, at least until the general elections.

JW: There are three possible areas for repatriation of powers. The first, and most often mentioned, is employment and social policy. Conservatives often take aim at the Working Time Directive, although the UK already has a partial opt out from the legislation anyway. Minimum standards of maternity and paternity leave are also covered by this area.

Secondly, the Conservatives fear that EU legislation is somehow a danger to the City of London, so first back in 2011 (ultimately unsuccessful), and since then in interviews with Tory EU-sceptics, the idea keeps being raised that protections for the City could be guaranteed with some sort of special voting procedure, new vetoes, or a renewed Luxembourg compromise. This is not repatriation as such, but a protection looking towards the future.

Third is the idea that agriculture and fisheries policy would be returned to the UK. The critique is both in efficiency (the CFP and CAP are expensive) and sovereigntist terms, but the practicalities of repatriation, and also the quiet yet grudging support for CAP among many UK farmers, mean these issues are pursued less than social policy or protecting the City.

The important point with all efforts at repatriation is that the demands are essentially political - it is not that there is a rigorous economic assessment to justify these requests. It is instead highly symbolic for Conservatives to be seen to be going to Brussels with demands, and to 'win'. Of course the politicians making these demands often have little or no understanding of how the EU works, nor any understanding that their counterparts elsewhere in the EU would have little incentive to agree to the UK demands.

One final point: the UK has already decided to exercise its opt out of JHA measures agreed up until 2009, due to the Treaty of Lisbon opt out (more here), but there are vague demands to opt out of JHA legislation agreed between 2009 and present, where the UK had used its opt-out-to-opt-in. These demands should be taken no more seriously than any of the other renegotiation demands.

FT: Provided that the speech will succeed in calming the domestic front (which, I understand, remains to be seen), you imply that the price that Cameron will have to pay will be very tough negotiations in Brussels and with other member states. Will Britain's role at the EU table change after this, and if so how? What objections do you expect key EU partners to rise to Cameron's demands? What concessions will Britain have to agree to in order to have its way on the repatriation?

JW: Cameron has already succeeded in partially smoothing relations with his party, and indeed calming the UK-EU debate to a certain extent. Former cabinet minister Liam Fox, known to be on the EU-sceptic right of the Tory Party has been quoted as saying he likes what he has seen of the speech.

Cameron is essentially banking on his middle way - to demand renegotiation - doing the trick. He neither wants to be seen to be taking the UK out of the European Union, yet conversely sees that he cannot defend the status quo due to the pressure in his party. His speech will hence manage to keep his backbenchers happy for a while, and to take EU matters off the table for a short period of time at least. But the problems Cameron faces are not going to go away. UKIP and their charismatic leader Farage will keep gnawing away at the Conservatives, while the UK Permanent Representation and the diligent Europe Minister David Lidington will do their best to paper over the cracks that David Cameron's speech has caused.

FT: Whether or not the speech will go beyond generalities, it represents something of a nodal point in a development that, as you wrote above, really started in 2005. The position of the UK in the EU has changed (some would say deteriorated) gradually since then, but after Cameron lays out his views, it may move more decisively away from the EU. What does this turn of events say in your opinion about the EU project? What is the future of the ‘ever closer union’ after this? Will Cameron's position affect cooperation in fields that Britain has traditionally championed? And how do you think a country such as Denmark with its own history of Euroscepticism will be influenced by the British position? One indirect consequence of the latest developments seems to be that the Danish government has reaffirmed in very clear terms its commitment to the EU. Will it last?

JW: There should not be too much worry about the future viability of the European Union as a result of the choices being made now by the Conservative Prime Minister in the UK. The UK has not been in the Euro, has been at best half hearted about joining, and is not in Schengen. Since 2010 it has also been a reluctant participant in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy as well. All of this is viewed in other national capitals, and in Brussels, as one step further of Britain distancing itself, and that solving the Eurozone's woes is the main task in hand. If the UK takes itself towards the exit there will be some sadness in other capitals, but not too much - if anything it will mean that an ever closer economic union of the Eurozone countries will actually be easier to achieve in future, rather than harder.

The Denmark-UK parallels are hard to define. Denmark, and Sweden too, have seen a normalisation of relations with the European Union in the last decade or so as the traditional Nordic left wing critique of the European Union has subsided. The EU-scepticism in the UK comes from the right and is rooted in the fear of the erosion of sovereignty and harks back to when the UK was still a world power. British politicians that favour a UK exit think that the country could survive on its own out of the EU as a kind of greater Singapore - low social protection and a large financial sector, buttressed by the UK's enduring military strength. While critique of the EU may grow in Denmark as a result of Cameron's approach in the UK, Denmark nevertheless as a small and generally socially minded country is not going to find itself with debate like the UK's any time soon.