Turkey’s security pivot towards Russia runs deeper than we think

- but reflects a new approach to Turkish security manoeuvring
by Jakob Lindgaard, PhD
Long read
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Putin and Erdogan attend a ceremony at the presidential palace in Ankara on 3 April 2018. EPA/Tolga Bozoglu

On 20 September 2017, the Turkish pro-government news agency Anadolu ran an infographic displaying the merits of the Russian S-400 missile defence system that Turkey was considering buying. Among these merits was an illustration of missiles and fighter jets that the S-400 allegedly is able to intercept – nearly all of them American.

Examples like this are ample: long-time NATO member Turkey seems to be pivoting towards Russia on security. In a recent New York Times op-ed, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan even openly alluded to Russia as an alternative strategic partner to the US.

A number of seasoned observers have cautioned that this seemingly dramatic turn is merely short-sighted manoeuvring guided by ad hoc concerns. Scratch the surface, they argue, and at least four factors will emerge to question the alleged depth of the Turkish-Russian relationship:

  • a long history of conflict between the two countries
  • several frozen contemporary conflicts in their shared neighbourhood
  • remaining tensions in Syria, in support of opposing parties
  • that Turkey and Russia have profoundly different strategic security interests

This long read will address these four notes of caution of what we could call the 'not deep' school and question if they survive scrutiny. The upshot is not one of a classic deep strategic alignment, however. Rather, a deep frustration with the West, domestic opportunism, and regional ambition mesh with the hard reality of relative isolation and limited capacity to buttress Turkey’s pivot towards Russia on security. Together, they can manage regional conflicts, address each party’s national security interests, ensure regional influence, and edge the US and other Western stakeholders out.

A history of conflict – and of solidarity
The typical first-stop argument of the ‘not deep’ school goes like this: Insofar as the security manoeuvrings of Turkey and Russia are both driven by nostalgia for the reach and sway of empires lost, their shared imperial history is one of conflict and mistrust.

There is an element of truth to this argument, but it tends to either disregard or miss two important points:

First, it papers over the fact that the relationship markedly changed as both the Ottoman and Russian empires dissolved around World War I. The rising Soviet Union ardently supported Turkey against the Western powers already during the 1919-22 Turkish War of Independence, and the Soviet Union was the first to recognize Atatürk´s government already in 1921. In spite of the post-WWII Truman Doctrine’s firm embrace of Turkey into the transatlantic security framework, the US still withdrew its nuclear Jupiter missile warheads from Turkey as part of the solution to the Cuban Crisis in 1962. This was ceased upon by the Soviet Union to make Turkey the largest recipient of Soviet foreign aid at the time. Prominent Turkish leaders Bülent Ecevit in the 1970’s and Turgut Özal in the 1980’s also both made considerable outreach to the Soviet Union.

The 1990s were somewhat schizophrenic, e.g. with Turkey in support of the Chechen separatist cause and Moscow staging a large conference for Turkey’s Kurdish nemesis, the PKK, in 1994. But already in 1998, Russia denied PKK-leader Abdullah Öcalan asylum, and the 2000s—with Putin and Erdoğan at the helm—saw a steep warm-up of relations, including a shared resistance to the 2003 US-led war in Iraq, a muted Turkish response to the Russian 2008 aggression in Georgia and a shared support for the Iranian regime during the Green revolution of 2009.

The second point from history that tends to be missed by the ‘not deep’ school is the fact that the Neo-Ottoman ambition of the former Foreign and Prime minister Ahmet Davutoğlu—in the guise first of ‘zero problems with neighbours’ and then a more assertive form of ‘strategic depth’—was to a large degree abandoned as a framework of Turkish foreign and security policy in 2015, as it isolated Turkey in the region and almost saw the AKP party lose the 2015 general elections. The Neo-Ottoman ambition has been substituted for something along the lines of a strong-man nationalism with a predilection for anti-Kurdish antagonism, as well as support for ‘national integrity’ and regime retention in the region. Insofar as Turkey’s still extant regional ambition comes across Russia’s, it is thus less likely to tap into the history of imperial conflict.

Jointly managing frozen conflicts
History aside, the ‘not deep’ school reminds us that there are still enough contemporary frozen conflicts in Turkey and Russia’s shared neighbourhood to muster potential for conflict. Take your pick: Russia and Turkey come down on opposite sides of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno Karabakh region, of the peoples of Crimea, of the Christians and Muslims in the Balkans, over Cyprus (where Russia has naval bases on Greek Cyprus, and more generally a strong relationship to Greece), of the conflict in Egypt between the Muslim Brotherhood and Abdel Fatah al-Sisi’s regime, and on Israel.

 

Even leaving the infamous Turkish downing of the Russian jet over Syria in November 2015 and other tensions in Syria to the side for now, there are enough frozen conflicts to question the depth of Turkey’s claimed pivot towards Russia.

On closer inspection, however, Russia and Turkey have increasingly found ways to manage or compartmentalize these potential conflicts. One obvious example is Russia’s recent USD 5 billion sale of weapons to Azerbaijan, even as Russia is typically perceived to be on the Armenian side of the conflict. Another example is Crimea. Turkey voiced a strong criticism of the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 as it threatened the Turkic Crimean Tatars and antagonized Ukraine, another Turkish ally. However, 2014 also saw Turkey increase its foodstuff exports to Russia as it chose not to join the European sanctions on Russia, it saw Turkey and Russia sign the Turkstream gas deal as the EU scrapped its planned South Stream deal with Russia, and it saw Turkey and Russia resuscitate the plan for Russia to build and run Turkey’s first nuclear power plant.

Turkey and Russia are increasingly able to turn the fact that they represent opposite sides of numerous conflicts to their advantage, as their joint endeavour emerges as a potential platform of conflict resolution and, as a result of that, a token of legitimacy for the other.

Turkey aligning with Russia in Syria
The ‘not deep’ school could seem to have a strong point on Syria. The November 2015 Turkish downing of the Russian jet is a case at point here. As late as in the 7 September 2018 trilateral summit in Teheran within the Astana-Sochi framework between Turkey, Russia, and Iran, Erdoğan openly disagreed with Rouhani and Putin on TV, and they left a final statement that no agreement had been reached. This, the ‘not deep’ school will note, is an example of how deep the differences are between Turkey and Russia in Syria.

Granted, Syria has been the one conflict that has taken the largest toll on Turkey’s relationship with Russia. Putin is astutely aware that Erdoğan is running out of favours from his NATO partners and seems to be ready to push Erdoğan hard in Syria. But as the subsequent 17 September Turkish-Russian memorandum of understanding on a demilitarized zone in Idlib revealed, recent years have seen Erdoğan and Putin in an ever-closer give-and-take on Syria. In January 2018, Putin even dropped Russia’s long-time support for the Kurdish YPG forces in Afrin to reel Turkey in. In return, Erdoğan has cut down on his support for the opposition, grown less belligerent with the Assad regime, and has joined Russia and Iran in upping the pressure on the US presence in support of Kurdish YPG in Syria.

Turkey has also dropped its 2011-2017 antagonism against Iran – Russia’s closest ally in Syria. Turkey and Iran jointly spoiled the Kurdish quest for independence in the Kurdish Region of Iraq in the fall of 2017. Both countries share a deeply felt animosity against Israel, and Turkey has openly refused to abide by US sanctions against Iran and intends to continue importing the much-needed Iranian oil (Turkey gets half of its oil-supply from Iran). Joint Turkish-Russian interests in a strong Astana Platform enable them to straddle minor differences.

Not-so-divergent strategic security interests
The fourth and final note of caution (and potential relief for the worried of the West) is that Turkey and Russia simply lack alignment on the deep strategic level to be a viable alternative to Turkey’s NATO membership. Also, Russia is simply not a match for the security package offered by NATO. In the wider economic frame, seven of Turkey’s top ten export markets are European. Russia does not even figure in top ten. A NATO member since 1952, Turkey’s armed forces are also deeply entrenched in NATO infrastructure. This is a strong point – but again it is an open question whether it survives scrutiny.

 

 

Firstly, the time of deep and structural strategic alignment on a multilateral level arguably is no more. Nations hedging their bets on an ad hoc and transactional bilateral pitch seems to be in the ascendancy. As the recent thaw between Turkey and Germany also suggests, European countries could now seem to enter this pitch of bilateral and compartmentalized relations with Turkey.

Secondly, it is open for debate whether the NATO umbrella is a better fit for Turkey’s main security concerns. Fighting the PKK is not a NATO priority. The same goes for fighting the Gülen movement—designated a terror group by Turkey. Turkey has even, at times, been an ambivalent partner in fighting Europe’s number one security threat, Islamist terrorism. Russia has proven to be a more supportive partner for Turkey, especially enabling Turkey to fight PKK’s sister groups, PYD/YPG in Syria. But Putin was also quick to support Erdogan against coup attempt against him in 2016, allegedly crafted by the Gülen movement.

Thirdly, Turkey is just deeply frustrated with NATO, and polls show that only 10-15 percent of the population think favourably of the alliance. Ankara feels that NATO has dragged its feet when Turkey has called for missile defence support, as in 2003 against Saddam Hussein, in 2012 against Assad, and in 2015 against Russia in Syria. A deep sense of hurt has also surfaced as Turkey’s conditions for purchasing their much-needed air defence systems were turned down by NATO partners. Turkey then first turned to China, and ultimately to the Russia.

Add to this that it was only Turkey’s rapprochement with Russia in mid-2016 and the setting-up of the Astana Trio that brought Turkey up on the podium as a key stakeholder for the future of Syria; and presented Turkey with the key regional role that both NATO and Davutoğlu’s Neo-Ottomanism had denied Erdoğan. Arguably, Turkey’s primary security concerns and geopolitical ambitions are better served by liaising with Russia.

Turkey is turning inward, not eastward
All this said, Turkey is not pro-actively turning eastward towards Russia, as it is often popularly claimed. If anything, it is turning inward. It shares its two primary security concerns—the Kurdish PKK and the Gülen movement—with no other country, and it has grown increasingly isolated on its support of extremist Islamist groups in Syria. A deep distrust of the West is the most palpable manifestation of this inward turn.

polarization3

Source: Bilgi University, Istanbul

 

According to a recent survey, 87,6 percent of Turks believe that Europe wants to ‘divide and conquer’ Turkey. According to this survey (and several others), between 54-72 percent of Turks believe the US to be Turkey’s biggest threat. Expressed trust in the EU, NATO, the UN, and the US range between 10 and 15 percent. In sum, suspicion of the West seems to unite an otherwise deeply polarized country.

Erdogan has aptly capitalized on this unity and pursued a highly popular belligerent approach to Europe, NATO, the UN, and the US. But this is not because Turkey is courting Russia as an alternative strategic partner.

Trust in Russia as a partner is 28 percent, only slightly higher than that of Turkey’s Western partners, and 20,4 percent believe Turkey has no key ally, only 12,1 percent picks Russia.

polarization11
Source: Bilgi University, Istanbul

The problem for Turkey is that independence is not an option, neither economically, as recent developments have made gapingly clear, nor on security, as the mentioned Neo-Ottomanism had completely isolated Turkey by 2015.

Turkey as an unruly NATO member is a real prize for Putin. Arguably, Turkey’s participation in the Astana Trio has lent an air of legitimacy to the blatantly euphemistic idea of ‘de-escalation zones’ in Syria, and has allowed for Assad, Iran and Russia to take back Syria bit by bit from the opposition that Turkey still purports to support. As mentioned, Putin has even been willing to cut his long-term support for the Kurds to get this prize.

2019 will be the year of Turkish culture in Russia, and Russian culture in Turkey. A deep Turkish frustration with the West, domestic opportunism invoking nationalist tropes against the perceived PKK and Gülenist threats to the sovereign Turkish state to support a strong-man leadership, and a reshaped regional ambition meshes with recent regional isolation and limited capacity to support Turkey’s pivot towards Russia. Only in sync, they can manage regional conflicts, address each other’s national security interests, ensure regional influence, and edge the US and other Western stakeholders out of their shared neighbourhood.