Conference Proceedings

NORDIC FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICIES
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Preface
These conference proceedings take stock of the conference on Nordic Foreign and Security Policies that was hosted at DIIS in Copenhagen on 26 November 2013. Back in the Cold War days the foreign and security policies of the Nordic countries were very different: Denmark, Norway and Iceland were NATO members. Sweden and Finland were not. This basic fact has meant that the Nordic countries have had very different starting points for their post-Cold War policies. The conference, as well as the contributions in this report, all grapple with this challenge. What differences and similarities exist to this day? What have been the trends in recent years? And where might there be a basis for more Nordic cooperation in foreign policy and security matters?

Divided across four sessions the participants have tried to approach questions such as these from very different perspectives. Thematically these range from classical evaluations of when and how the Nordic countries use force (session 1) as well as when and how the Nordic countries join in defence cooperation (session 4), to approaches focussing on Nordic norm promotion (session 2) and contributions with a specific geographical focus on the Nordic countries in the Arctic (session 3).

If one is to focus on an overall finding in just about all the contributions it might be that the Nordic countries, though similar in many ways in terms of values and foreign policy behaviour, also still remain very different – not least when it comes to the pursuit of more classical state interests. The track record for Nordic cooperation clearly reflects this. This means that Nordic cooperation might do well to focus, as in fact has often been done in recent years, on limited but realistic cooperation, rather than on grand projects of cooperation that fail to take the still significant Nordic differences into account.

The editor would like to thank the participants for contributing to this report, as well as to thank student assistants Jacob Dreyer and Fie Jeppesen Højgaard for help organising the conference as well as for taking notes during the proceedings for use for this report. Also many thanks to Anine Kristensen and Jessica Lerche for valuable copy-editing assistance.

Mikkel Runge Olesen
Copenhagen, December 2014
Bertel Haarder  
Former Minister, Member of Parliament, Member of the Presidium of the Danish Parliament, First Deputy Speaker: summary of keynote speech of 26 November 2013

It is a paradox that countries like Germany and Italy achieved unification in the 19th century, but that the Nordic countries did not. The differences between the Nordic countries are smaller than the differences between different parts of Germany or Italy. Taken together the Nordic countries would constitute the world's 12th largest economy measured by GDP. Its combined air force would be number one in the EU. As such, the Nordic Countries as a whole would be an obvious member of the G20.

The Nordic countries themselves chose to be small and to think like small powers. Yet, Nordic feelings are strong. Recall that Norway did not ask for independence from Denmark in 1814, and there were few Norwegian freedom fighters against the dual monarchy. When it briefly seemed likely that they might become independent in 1814, they elected the Danish crown prince to be king of Norway. And when they did gain their independence in 1905, they again chose a Danish prince to become king of Norway. Denmark–Norway and Sweden–Finland were for centuries enemies. But since the Napoleonic wars and the Peace Treaty of Kiel in 1814 (which transferred Norway to the Swedish king) there has been peace and mutual sympathy between the Nordic countries. Many volunteers from the Nordic brother countries participated in the Danish war over Schleswig-Holstein in 1848–51 and the war with Prussia and Austria in 1864. They were inspired by the Scandinavian movement that wanted to unite the Nordic countries.

This Scandinavianism was strong. But why then did we not get a Nordic Union? One reason was bad luck. A Danish prince was, on one occasion, elected heir to the Swedish throne, but he fell off his horse and died. Two Danish kings in fact, did not have sons. So there were ample opportunities to merge the kingdoms as many leaders wanted. But Denmark had serious dynastic problems concerning Schleswig-Holstein until Denmark’s defeat at the hands of the Prussians and the Austrians in 1864. And the Great Powers, for obvious reasons, did not want a Nordic superpower.

In the 1930s the threat of Nazi Germany led to talks about a Nordic union protecting Denmark, but Denmark and the Social Democratic Prime Minister Thorvald Stau-ning opposed it, partly due to the resistance from his coalition partners in government, the Social Liberals. After World War II the Nordic Countries wanted an alliance, but the Soviet Union opposed Finland taking part in it, and therefore Sweden also opposed it to avoid provoking the Russians.

Today only three Nordic countries are members of NATO, and only three are members of the EU with Denmark alone being a member of both. However, this does not prevent the Nordic countries from engaging in common foreign and security policies. Sweden and to some extent Finland are interested in Nordic defence and security policies. And while it might be impossible, due to popular opinion, to make them formal members of NATO, increased engagement could aim at making them de facto NATO members. In the same way Norway and Iceland are de facto members of the EU.

A new common agreement secures cooperation about the surveillance of the Icelandic skies. (Iceland has no military of its own.) The Arctic is becoming a more and more important region. Danish surveillance of Greenland has been criticised in a recent report by the State Accountant (Rigsrevisions) and the Greenlanders have proposed that a Nordic drone surveillance system could be the solution.
All this means that while foreign policy and defence have previously been left out of discussions about Nordic cooperation, it is now at the very core of the debates. Defence budgets are being cut in Denmark and in Sweden. One way to deal with the consequences of these cuts is through ‘smart defence’ and by working more together. The armed forces of Denmark and Sweden have already signalled their readiness to pursue this solution. Thus, there is plenty of space for more cooperation between the Nordic countries in the coming years.

The former Norwegian foreign minister Thorvald Stoltenberg came up with 13 areas for cooperation within foreign and defence policy, including common embassies, common defence in cyberspace, cooperation in the Arctic etc.
Session 1: The Nordic Countries and International Interventions

Rasmus Brun Pedersen Ph.D, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and Department of Business Communication, University of Aarhus: “Denmark, the Nordic Countries and International Interventions”

A common Nordic foreign policy has been much debated over the years, particularly in respect to the prospect of a unified Nordic approach to different problems and challenges in the international society, including participation in international interventions. There seem to be two different interpretations of the prospect of a common Nordic approach. An optimistic interpretation has stressed that the Nordic countries have a long tradition for cooperating in multilateral organisations and frameworks such as the UN and further, that common historical traits facilitate the development of aid policies.

Another, less optimistic, approach has focused more on security politics, including the challenges of an increased participation in international operations and the militarisation of international interventions in armed conflicts and civil wars.

As regards the question of international interventions and willingness to use military power to enforce international law and order, there has been a great variation in the security policies of the Nordic countries in the decades after the end of the Cold War. Followed by the liberal moment after 1989, the Nordic countries all subscribed to a more internationalist approach to the international challenges. Denmark was already formally fully integrated in NATO and the EU, but began to pursue a more committed alliance policy in order to become a ‘mainstream EU member state’ and a ‘core member of NATO’. The Nordic countries opted for a more expanded role of the UN in an attempt to regulate the global anarchy and emerging multipolarity through the establishment of an overall UN framework based on the rule of international law and human rights concerns. Despite different nuances and ambitions among the Nordic countries, there seemed to be an overall trend towards more internationalism, with Denmark seeming to be at the forefront regarding willingness to engage in international interventions and on the question of using military force. Denmark therefore increasingly enforced liberal values and principles in its foreign policy, which was, over the decade, combined with an increased willingness to use military force to enforce these principles.

The security policies of the Nordic countries since 11 September 2001 show remarkably different approaches to the new international situation. Norway, Sweden and Finland have all opted for a strong continuance of the internationalist tendencies that they already supported throughout the 1990s. Denmark has – at least for a period – decided to move away from its traditional internationalist policy and choose a closer adherence to the USA in the War on Terror. In this respect, the Iraq War can be seen as a central watershed between the Nordic countries: Denmark was fully engaged, and Norway and Iceland chose to participate to a lesser extent, while Finland and Sweden completely stayed out of the conflict. The differentiated reaction pattern was later repeated in the air campaign in Libya in 2011, where Denmark and Norway were by far the most actively engaged Nordic countries.

Syria is a new example of a Nordic division, where Denmark has again flirted with a more Atlantic orientation with a strong emphasis on ‘alliance solidarity’ and tentative support for an American-led airstrike with or without the UN.

The prospects for a common Nordic foreign policy approach to international interventions therefore seem rather poor when we look at reaction patterns over the last decades. Is in this respect, it is important to note that countries decide to enter coalitions or
participate in international interventions for different reasons and with different rationales. The Danish decision to enter coalitions and international interventions is partly guided by an overall ambition to pursue international order politics where international relations are guided by norms, human right concerns and the rule of international law. These goals can be seen as a central motivation for the Danish participation. However, the Danish engagement is also influenced by other concerns. The most important of these is the argument of showing ‘alliance solidarity’. This rather vague formulation covers the perception that it is in Denmark’s best interest to prove that the country can be considered a trustworthy and committed ally. International participation and visibility seems to be an end in and of itself in Danish security politics: on the one hand, it helps to promote overall order politics while, one the other, it is perceived as a means to gain influence and obtain international diplomatic benefits in London and Washington. With friends such as these, less attention is often given to our other friends in Stockholm, Oslo, Helsinki and Reykjavik.

Håkan Edström, Associate Professor, Lieutenant Colonel, Försvarshögskolan: “New Settings – New Options?”

In November 1989 the Berlin Wall was demolished and less than a year later, in October 1990, the reunification of Germany took place. In July 1991 the Warsaw Pact was officially disbanded and in less than six months, in December 1991, the Soviet Union was dissolved. In about two years these major symbols of the strategic settings of the Cold War vanished. In February 1992 the Maastricht Treaty was signed introducing a new Common Foreign and Security Policy. In June 1992 the UN issued the report An Agenda for Peace, indicating a more ambitious approach to international crisis management by the organisation. The very same month the West European Union adopted the Petersberg Tasks providing an alternative to the UN in these aspects. In January 1994 NATO launched the Partnership for Peace initiative welcoming non-members to participate in the peace support efforts of the Alliance. In less than two years these organisations had adapted to the new strategic settings. In early 1994 they were offering new options to post-neutral states such as Sweden, when adjusting their security policies in order to address the new realities. The Swedish decision makers did not choose, at least not explicitly. By exploring how the Swedish armed forces have been used in international operations over the past two decades the de facto strategy can, however, be deconstructed. If the isolationistic option were the preferred alternative, Swedish military would have been sent to UN-led operations with the same frequency and ambition as during the Cold War. If balance of power were the favoured option, Swedish military would have been used as a tool to balance the influence of the US, the only remaining superpower, by contributing to EU-led operations. Finally, if bandwagoning were the approach, Swedish military would have been participating in numerous NATO-led operations as well as operations led by major NATO members, preferably the US.

During the period 1991–2013 the UN led 35 different force operations, some of them still ongoing. Sweden has contributed with military units to seven of them. Sweden has, in other words, only participated in 20% of the UN-led operations since the end of the Cold War. In 1994 Sweden became partner to NATO. Since then the Alliance has launched several military operations. Partners have, however, only been invited to participate in six of them. Sweden has participated with military units in four of these operations that were opened up to partners, i.e. in 67% of them. Sweden has, in addition, participated in two operations led by a NATO member. In 1995 Sweden became a member of the EU. The Union has, however, only been launching military operations since 2003. Over the past decade Sweden has participated with military units in all six EU-led military operations, i.e. 100% of them. From the
perspective of these organisations Sweden seems, in other words, to prefer the EU and hence the balance of power option.

From a Swedish perspective the picture is, however, slightly different. Out of 19 decisions made by the Swedish parliament on sending military units abroad, seven have been related to a UN-led, six to an EU-led and six to a NATO or a NATO member-led operation. Sweden has, in other words, balanced its participation almost to perfection. The Swedish approach to the new strategic settings is, in other words neither isolationist, nor balancing of power, nor bandwagoning, but rather one of strategic hedging.

Pia Hansson, Director, Institute of International Affairs and Centre for Small States Studies, University of Iceland: “An Icelandic Take”

Ladies and gentlemen – let me begin by thanking the organisers here at DIIS – it is always a pleasure to be here in Copenhagen – and in particular Mikkel for putting it all together – exploring ways for further Nordic cooperation is a welcome topic in my book, and getting the chance to share some of my views with you is a great honour.

First it should be said – Iceland has no armed forces! We used to have a US NATO base and under the auspices of the defence agreement we had with the Americans, we did not need to worry much about this. It was outsourced, if you will. But since they left in 2006 our situation has changed. Nonetheless, we pride ourselves on being a country without an army. It is also a big part of our identity. Although founding members of NATO, and controversial participants in the coalition of the willing – the image we like to portray of us is that of neutral pacifists – a tiny little, peace-loving island in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. Whether the image is true or not, it is an image we like to present.

Following the end of the Cold War there was an increased willingness on the part of the political elite in Iceland to participate and find our role in the international community, the dialogue focused on contribution – how can we contribute – although small we can still do our bit...

Contributions to peacebuilding and peacekeeping became an increasingly important part of the foreign policy – which led to the formation of the Iceland Crisis Response Unit in 2001.

As can be expected with such limited resources available, the focus had to be narrow, both in terms of numbers of personnel and the skills they possessed, and the projects to participate in.

In the first year of operations 15 specialists participated in the fields of administration of justice and policing, public information and the media, civil aviation administration and airport operation, and public health affairs. A list of specialists was set up – 100 names of potential peacekeepers.

Emphasis was placed on cooperation with ISAF, UNWRA, UN Women, UNICEF, UNHCR and OCHA – in Afghanistan and Palestine respectively. Iceland’s national action plan on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security played an important role in the work of the ICRU. Focusing on peacekeeping work of a civil nature has always been at the heart of the mission of the ICRU. But for the first few years many of the missions Icelanders were involved in were military missions, and the role the Icelanders played was difficult to describe to the general public – and so the image at home began to falter...

And it was a strange and harsh reality for many to see photographs of young Icelandic men in military uniform – the discourse changed: media polls showed almost 60% believed the peacekeepers to be soldiers, not civil officers.

And the politicians took notice:
Steingrímur J. Sigfússon, former chair of the Left Green Movement:
“The Minister should not be surprised that a debate on the topic is taking place in Iceland. It is simply so that it discomforts the Icelandic public to witness increased bearing of arms and participation in projects of a military nature.”

And then, tragically, on 23 October 2004, Icelandic peacekeepers were injured in a suicide attack on Chicken Street in Kabul and two civilians died. Fierce criticism of Iceland’s participation in operations that require the bearing of arms followed in the media and in Alþingi (the Icelandic Parliament).

Guðmundur Magnússon, columnist, in Fréttablaðið – 24 October 2004: “Even though we Icelanders, for the sake of the nation’s defence, have for more than a century been participants in the most powerful military alliance of the world, NATO, the idea that we should be neutral pacifists and mediators in the international arena is very strong and obtrusive in Icelandic society.”

“Peacekeeping is on the verge of law enforcement and military activity and the latter has no tradition in Iceland.”

Sigmússon: “The public clearly views this as military activity and participation in warfare. If the public had also been asked whether they supported that Icelandic citizens be fully armed in war zones, I believe there would have been little support for that. Sadly the nation was never asked whether it was content with this development.”

Ögmundur Jónasson, Left Green Movement, 3 November 2004: “The facts are right in front of us. At Kabul airport in Afghanistan is a group of Icelanders that has gotten military training, bears weapons, revolvers and machine guns that are expected to be used in battle, if needed.”

Kolbrún Halldórsdóttir, MP, Left Green Movement, 3 November 2004: “We have now established an army – an army that works under the auspices of NATO in Kabul in Afghanistan, even in projects that other allied nations were reluctant to participate in. The Icelandic peacekeepers were attacked because they are soldiers. They look like soldiers and they are soldiers. This attack cost the lives of innocent civilians in Afghanistan.”

Þórunn Sveinbjarnardóttir, Social Democratic Alliance, 3 November 2004: “The Icelandic authorities bear great responsibility, sending these men to do this work with the little training they get here at home.”

So obviously there was discontent – and confusion – as to the role being played by the Icelandic peacekeepers, some of who were driving around Afghanistan in modified jeeps exported from Iceland.

The media was fierce and rumours circulated – the naive Icelanders could not grasp the situation, had no means of understanding the danger, hence: ‘this is not something for us to participate in!’

In 2006 a turning point came with a female foreign minister, Valgerður Sverrisdóttir, who decided to soften the image and put the focus back on gender issues – the ‘jeep gangs’ were withdrawn and the focus was back on civil projects – projects that do not require the bearing of arms and that appeal more to women.

This policy was further reinforced by Foreign Minister Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, who also implemented ethical guidelines for the ICRU. Her statement in Alþingi shows the increased willingness (also linked to Iceland’s bid for a temporary seat in the UN Security Council in 2008) to contribute the best way we can: “One of the new cornerstones of Iceland’s foreign policy is conflict resolution – something we should not shy away from participating in as a powerful small state.” Understandably, the bank collapse in Iceland in the fall of 2008 hindered further development of the ICRU – and its operations now are limited to secondments, mainly with
UNICEF, UNWRA, UNHCR and OCHA in Afghanistan, Africa and the Middle East. Currently there are 11 Icelandic peacekeepers deployed.

But the verdict from the Kabul incident lingers on as can be seen in an editorial from 2008 in Morgunblaðið: "The tragedy in Kabul clearly shows that Icelanders have no place in a war zone. Two individuals lost their lives in the attack solely because Icelandic peacekeepers were in a place they should not have been and became a target of terrorists."

It can therefore be stated that there is and has been a reluctance for Icelanders to participate in projects of a military nature if Icelanders have a role that can be construed as military. If, on the other hand, the work being done by the Icelanders has been of a civil nature – albeit in a war zone – the image is much more positive. To that extent one can actually say that the discourse on the ICRU has not really been about our possible contribution to conflict resolution and peacebuilding but more about our own image and even our identity.

On a personal note – having worked as spokesperson for the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission – I would also like to add, that in spite of the outcome, that mission can be seen as a successful case in terms of Nordic cooperation. In that mission we may even find a role model for possible future scenarios – and in that Icelanders can also contribute. Might there be a future possibility for the Nordic countries to promote conflict resolution in unison – under the auspices of Nordic values and norms? Thank you!
Session 2: The Nordic Countries and the Diplomatic Fight for Nordic Norms

Dr Annika Bergman Rosamond
Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Department of Political Science, Lund University: “The Nordic States and Gender Cosmopolitanism”

Western states increasingly place women’s security, rights and freedoms at the centre of their foreign and security policies, and this tendency has become more pronounced in the post-9/11 interventionist era. A good number of peace operations and military interventions have recently been couched in gender-sensitive discourses and practices of empowerment, liberation and peacebuilding. For instance, Sweden has overwhelmingly constructed its commitment to the prevention of gendered discrimination and violence as a cosmopolitan obligation, rather than a communitarian concern alone (Bergman Rosamond, 2013).

The country’s reputation as a ‘good’ gender-sensitive state (Lawler, 2013) is based on its commitment to the pursuit of women-friendly policies within and beyond borders, a process that I have elsewhere defined as ‘gender cosmopolitanism’ (Bergman Rosamond 2013). This commitment is shared by the other Nordic states. The Nordic states’ individual and collective self-narrative(s) rest on a wish to emancipate all women in a fashion that does not discriminate on intersectional grounds. Their foreign and security policies have been effectively used to further these intersectional norms beyond borders, not the least through a strong commitment to ‘gender-just peace’ (Björkdahl, 2012) and cosmopolitan conceptions of empowerment (Bergman Rosamond, 2013). In 2010 the Nordic Ministers for Foreign Affairs (2010) stated, “The promotion of gender equality and women’s empowerment in the field of peace and security is a high priority in the foreign policy of all the Nordic countries. We have seen the positive impact of increased gender equality in our own societies. We are convinced that the advancement of women’s rights and gender equality worldwide can contribute to making our world more peaceful.” This sustains the thesis that they have a dual commitment to women’s security and empowerment, domestically and globally, by promoting gender cosmopolitanism (Bergman Rosamund, 2013). At this stage we might ask ourselves what the practical expressions of such ethical pursuits might be?

To start with the Nordics share a strong commitment to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) on Women, Peace and Security. All five states have adopted and published National Action Plans and in so doing sought to implement the key objectives of the resolution. First, by increasing the number of women participating in international operations, and, second, by seeking to include more women in local peace processes. It is interesting to note here that the Swedish branch of ‘Women to Women’ has identified several gaps in the implementation stage of the Nordic national action plans, such as ‘no allocated budgets’ and ‘weak monitoring mechanisms’ (Kvinna till Kvinna 2010). This in turn raises important questions about the Nordics’ commitment to gender cosmopolitanism more broadly. The Nordic states have, nonetheless, offered their collective support for SCR 2122 that was adopted in 2013, whose main objective is to “strengthen women’s role in all stages of conflict prevention” and, as such, fill some of the gaps left by 1325. At the Security Council’s Open Debate on Women, Peace and Security the five Nordic states expressed their joint commitment to SCR 2122. In their view international security and peace can only come about if the international community commits itself to “(s)afeguarding women’s access to justice, applying a gender-sensitive approach to transitional justice mechanisms and including women in post-conflict reparations programs” (Gruditz, 2013:1). Further, the Nordics agreed that this requires a close scrutinisation of “systemic barriers of gender inequality,
including economic empowerment, women's citizenship rights, legal capacity, proprietary rights, as well as safety in terms of safe transportation and access to witness and victim protection programs" (ibid). The five states, moreover, conceptualise gender as a broad intersectional category that "must encompass the whole population – women and men, boys and girls" (ibid).

In this context we should also take note of the Nordic states’ collective initiative to launch the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations, which is hosted in Sweden. The centre aims at integrating “Gender Perspectives into Peace Support Operations” that “will support and strengthen the Human Rights and overall security situation for the whole population; men, women, girls and boys” (Dunnurray, undated: 1). Furthermore, they argue that “[g]ender perspectives will support the outcome of a mission. Operations will benefit from the integration of gender perspectives (including UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions)” (ibid).

One such related resolution is SCR 1960 which commits the international community to deal more efficiently with “the slow progress on the issue of sexual violence in situations of armed conflict, in particular against women and children” and “to end impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other egregious crimes perpetrated against civilians and, in this regard, noting with concern that only limited numbers of perpetrators of sexual violence have been brought to justice”. To this effect Margot Wallström, the former Swedish Deputy Head of the European Commission, was appointed as the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) on Sexual Violence in Conflict from 2010–2012. In her capacity as Special Representative she headed an office of legal experts at the UN headquarters and undertook many trips to war zones where she and her staff documented occurrences of sexual violence for the purpose of prosecution and ending impunity.

From the brief introductory discussion above we have learnt that the Nordic states share a strong commitment to gender cosmopolitanism within and beyond borders. Independently and collectively they have launched policy statements and initiatives that are in line with the normative objectives of 1325 and other UN resolutions. Their reputation as good gender-sensitive states has helped to legitimise their efforts in this regard. Furthermore, the appointment of a Nordic top politician to the position of SSRSG on sexual violence is symbolically significant. Yet the Nordic states, despite their advancements in promoting gender equality domestically and globally, have their own set of problems. For example, rape rates and other forms of gendered violence, including honour crime, define segments of Swedish society (Bergman Rosamond, 2013), and women are overrepresented in the public sector in all five countries. What is more, only Norway and Iceland have managed to considerably increase the number of women on company boards, and only doing so through quota legislation.

Finally, one might also ask critical questions of a more postcolonial kind. For example, to what extent are the Nordic states’ efforts to empower and liberate women in Afghanistan and elsewhere an outflow of Western imperialism? To what extent do such policies take account of local tradition and intersectional variations? The solution here might be to ensure that cosmopolitan efforts to promote women’s rights and freedoms in conflict zones pay sufficient respect to the cultural subjectivities of that region, while retaining a strong commitment to universalism (ibid.).

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Bergman Rosamond, Annika (2013). *Protection Beyond Borders: Gender Cosmopolitanism and Co-constitutive Obligation*, Special Issue (Kindvall, C red), Global Society 2013, vol. 27

Since the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) have been very active in its work. Two early secretary-generals, Trygve Lie and Dag Hammarskjöld, were Nordic nationals, and the latter in particular is credited with a number of significant achievements such as promoting the administrative capacity of the UN secretariat and pioneering the practice of peacekeeping. The states have also cooperated closely, often voting as a bloc in the General Assembly and taking turns serving on the various councils and committees of the UN institutions. Broadly speaking, they have been promoting the values and norms of the Scandinavian international society.

The focus of my comments at the DIIS conference on Nordic foreign and security policy was the question of whether this still holds true today, and if so, how does it manifest itself? To address this question, I discussed Nordic joint statements in the UN over the past three years (2011–2013). I looked at two things. First, the general themes they have addressed, and secondly, the way in which they have argued their particular points. The latter relates to an interest of mine in how normative structures become accepted and taken for granted in international relations. The inspiration is the Sardinian Marxist Antonio Gramsci and his argument about how ideational hegemonies need to resonate with people’s common sense beliefs.

1) Used here interchangeably with Norden.
With respect to the first point about themes, I generally found that the statements reflected four core Nordic values that have also been promoted historically: gender equality, law and order, peace and development. To give a few examples, a 2013 statement in the Security Council debate on ‘Women, Peace and Security’ and a 2011 statement to the sixth committee of the General Assembly on the report of the International Criminal Court. I have to emphasise that this was a very tentative analysis, without any systematic use of quantitative methods.

Looking at the second dimension, argumentative structure, I noted two main forms of argument, what could be labelled ‘discrete causal’ and ‘common sense’. Here is an example from the 2013 statement above that combines the two:

“To carry out the Rule of Law while excluding women is not only a paradox [LS: common sense] – it undermines the achievement of sustainable peace and security [LS: discrete causal].”

There was, however, also at least one example of the ‘Nordic model argument’. This is a fairly old argument in Nordic public diplomacy, going back to the 1930s, which holds that Norden has succeeded in building particularly attractive societies that the rest of world can, and should, take inspiration from. In this case it appeared in a 2012 statement entitled ‘On Equality between Men and Women – the Nordic Way’.

What are we to make of this? It is too early to tell. As I state in the title, it is very much a tentative analysis and my main intention was to suggest possible lines of future inquiry. However, on the face of it there does seem to be some continuity with the past, both in terms of value themes and in terms of how these are presented/argued for. What is certain is that there is still a fight going on for Nordic values at the UN.

Leni Stenseth  
Director, UN Policy and Gender Equality, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “The Nordic Countries and the Diplomatic Fight for Nordic Norms. The Norwegian Perspective”

Main arguments:

1) The UN is the central international arena for establishing universal norms. To retain the UN’s unique international status and relevance at a time when the UN is under pressure is in itself in the interest of the Nordic countries.

2) Practical cooperation and burden sharing make it possible for us to have Nordic positions and views represented in more arenas at the same time, and we accomplish more together than we would have done alone.

3) It is not always a strategic advantage to act as a joint Nordic group. Building alliances with other countries often proves more efficient.

4) Nordic cooperation is often limited by the dynamics within the EU.

Why norms matter:

- Small countries are more dependent on having international rules of conduct as well as established norms than larger countries. For Norway, as an example, the International Law of the Sea still has paramount importance for the prosperity of our country.

- Norwegian foreign policy is based on respect for international law and human rights and promotion of the international legal order. Our foreign policy is based not only on what is in our interest, but also on the values of our society.

The unique role of the UN:

Argument 1: Retaining the UN’s unique international status and relevance is, in itself, in the interest of the Nordic countries.

- The UN is beyond compare the most important arena for the development of
international norms. Most of the conventions and other legislation that make up international law have originated in the UN.

• The UN is unique because of its universal membership, and the principle of consensus in decision making creates an unmatched legitimacy.

• The UN also has a special convening power that brings a broader range of actors together in addition to member states in order to discuss and bridge gaps; actors like civil society organisations and the private sector.

• The unique role of the UN in promoting the international legal order is upheld by international conventions and agreements, but also by the development of international norms that are not formalised through agreements.

• As small states, dependent on a well-functioning international legal system, a strong UN serves our interests. As societies built on democracy and respect for human rights our values correspond strongly with the basic foundations of the UN system.

• We are all major contributors to the UN system, and therefore have a relatively larger influence than the respective size of our countries might imply.

Nordic cooperation on Nordic values

Argument 2: Practical cooperation and burden sharing make it possible for us to have Nordic positions and views represented in more arenas and as a result we accomplish more together than we would have done alone

• Sharing a common set of values, the Nordic countries often work for the same purpose when it comes to establishing and developing international norms in the UN system. It is logical to coordinate our efforts and cooperate in order to reach common goals.

• Nordic countries are coordinating their efforts quite broadly, especially at the practical level:
  • Burden sharing in the gathering and systematisation of information
  • Nordic rotation/taking turns in leading negotiations on human rights resolutions in the third committee of the General Assembly
  • Joint statements.
  • Nordic rotation system ensuring there is always one Nordic country represented
  • Burden sharing; lead in different thematic areas

• Clear ambition to do more together: ongoing process to establish co-located missions abroad. We will possibly be co-located in NY in a very few years from now – will enable us to cooperate even more on the normative agenda of the UN.

Using Nordic cooperation wisely

ARGUMENT 3: It is not always a strategic advantage to act as a joint Nordic group. Building alliances with other countries often proves more efficient.

• Established rights and values may be challenged by a shift in the international balance of power. We see two main trends where established norms are put under pressure:

1) Authoritarian regimes continue to pay lip service to political and civil rights while increasingly tightening the space for civil society and democratic processes

2) Established HR norms are being challenged by countries that insist on ‘traditional values’ as the filter through which human rights should be understood

• Norway is actively promoting sexual and reproductive health and rights in all forums and processes where international norms
are negotiated (UNGA, HR Council, Commission on the Status of Women) – and in our bilateral dialogues whenever possible.

• It is more often than not the rule that the Nordic may be perceived as representing the special interests of a few very privileged countries, with a large budget for international development cooperation and with a shared interest in promoting ‘our (Western) values’.

• We need to build broad alliances across regional groups in order to reach majority or consensus. More often than not it is not in our strategic interest to be perceived as a Nordic Bloc.

**Nordic Cooperation and EU**

*Argument 4: Nordic Cooperation is often limited by the dynamics within the EU*

• Three Nordic countries may at times not go as far as we can when it comes to pushing the agenda.

• As one of the few European countries outside of the EU, Norway has a more independent position allowing us to act more independently and build broader alliances across regional groups.

• This has allowed us to take leading roles working for the rights of, for example, human rights defenders, for sexual and reproductive rights, as well as defending LGBT rights.

• Sometimes we are asked by the Nordic EU members to front specific issues in cases where they have their hands tied by the EU position.
Session 3: The Arctic Policies of the Nordic Countries

Dr Teemu Palosaari, Post-doctoral Researcher at Tampere Peace Research Institute TAPRI, University of Tampere, Finland: “Landlocked. Finland’s Arctic Policy.”

According to Finland’s Arctic strategy nearly one third of all the people living north of the 60th parallel are Finns. The strategy also notes, “much of Finland’s territory lies North of the Polar Circle” (Finland’s strategy for the Arctic Region 2013, 8). Clearly, Finland is an Arctic state.

However, Finland has no coastline on the Arctic Ocean. This means that Finland is not a member of the so-called A5 group of Arctic coastal states, and consequently has no direct access to the natural resources – oil, gas and minerals – of the Arctic seabed. To put it bluntly, Finland is a landlocked Arctic country. Consequently, the search for ways to compensate for the geographical disadvantage has been a visible feature of Finnish Arctic policy latterly. The former foreign minister of Finland, Alexander Stubb, once stated that the Arctic is the sexiest region in the world, meaning that the new transport routes, oil and gas, minerals and fish stocks have turned the Arctic into a hotspot in world politics. For Finland the risk is that the key decisions concerning the region are made among the coastal states, thus undermining Finland’s political influence and economic prospects. Yet, Finland wants to have a say on the development taking place so close to it.

According to international relations theory the lack of a coastline is often considered a barrier to improved economic performance. Therefore landlocked states (such as Austria, Mongolia, Paraguay, Zimbabwe and 44 other countries) look for bargaining power with the help of cooperation on various levels. Finland’s current policies in the Arctic seem to follow this pattern. The Finnish Arctic Strategy states that “one of Finland’s key objectives is to bolster its position as an Arctic country and to reinforce international Arctic cooperation” (Finland’s strategy for the Arctic Region 2013, 43, emphasis added). Indeed, Finland has been actively seeking for more influence and bargaining power in the Arctic in three main ways. Firstly, and in line with the general Finnish foreign policy, there is the European way: to go the Arctic Ocean via Brussels. Finland supports the reinforcement of the European Union’s role in the Arctic region (ibid, 47). The establishment of a permanent EU Arctic Information Centre in Rovaniemi is also one of Finland’s objectives. According to the Arctic Strategy, the centre “would also increase Finland’s visibility in the international scene as an Arctic expert” (ibid, 47). The EU has not, however, been warmly welcomed by the Arctic coastal states and indigenous peoples. For instance, the European Commission has not been granted full observer status in the Arctic Council. Furthermore, the Arctic indigenous peoples’ organisations have been critical towards the EU, mainly thanks to the EU ban on the import of seal products.

Secondly, Finland has tried to gain more influence in the Arctic by Nordic cooperation. However, this has not been as smooth as expected. Due to their status as coastal A5 states, Norway and Denmark have different starting points than Finland, Sweden and Iceland. Thirdly, Finland has tried to gain more influence in the Arctic by bolstering the Arctic Council. Finland is in favour of admitting new observers into the Council and believes that the Council should establish better contacts with non-Arctic actors. Finland also supports the recognition of the Arctic Council as a treaty-based international organisation. Additionally, Finland has proposed holding ‘Arctic Summits’ to “outline Arctic policies from a wider perspective” (ibid, 44). The coastal states, however, have been more hesitant towards increasing the role of the Arctic Council. They regard the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as a sufficient diplomatic framework for handling many of the topical issues in the Arctic.
All in all, Finland is yet to find a working way to compensate for its landlocked status in the Arctic. The European, Nordic and Arctic routes to the Arctic Ocean all have their problems. Perhaps as a result of this there has been some evidence of a fourth route, one which connects global climate politics to the Arctic. This relates to the so-called ‘Arctic Paradox’ (Palosaari 2012) that has lately found its way into the Finnish debate on the Arctic: the faster we use fossil fuels, the sooner we get access to new under-ice oil and gas resources. In other words, hydrocarbon use contributes to the climate warming, which makes the sea ice melt and new oil and gas resources become available. Using those resources then further accelerates climate warming. This moral dilemma related to the Arctic natural resources surfaced in Finland last year when two Finnish icebreakers participated in a Shell test drilling operation in the Arctic Ocean. The following public furor (including the resignation of the International Development Minister) served as a wake-up call that revealed the complexity of Arctic issues for Finns. Since then, the use of Finnish icebreakers in the Arctic Ocean has remained in the domestic discussion. The debate centres on the following question: is it acceptable to explore and exploit new oil and gas in the Arctic at a time when humankind should be reducing its carbon emissions?

Global attention on the Arctic is growing. The sea level rise in the coastal areas around the world is linked to the melting of glaciers in the Arctic. It is likely that in the future not only NGOs but also non-Arctic states will question the sustainability and morality of Arctic oil and gas exploration. In the future, linking the Arctic with world climate politics may well serve as a way to for Finland to earn global standing and prestige in Arctic issues. According to the Finnish Arctic Strategy, “Finland leads the way in the sustainable development of the Arctic region” (Finland’s strategy for the Arctic Region 2013,7). Furthermore, the strategy notes, “In global climate negotiations Finland advocates ambitious emission reduction targets by highlighting issues related to climate change in the [Arctic] region” (ibid, 13). Finland has also proposed a network of conservation areas in the sea areas surrounding the North Pole. The increasing traffic in the Arctic waters, and particularly on the Northern Sea Route, together with related logistics hubs, offers opportunities for Finnish ‘snow-how’ and innovative icebreaking – even without participating in the oil and gas exploration and drilling.

References:


Gunnar Heløe, Captain (Navy), Norwegian Ministry of Defence: “The Norwegian Arctic Policy – Summary of the Main Points” (by Mikkel Runge Olesen)

“The High North will remain Norway’s most important strategic priority area in the years to come” (quote from the 2005 political platform of the previous Norwegian government, repeated in 2009)

The Arctic holds great promise both in terms of natural resources and in terms of new possibilities in navigation. The region holds approximately 25% of the world’s undiscovered petroleum resources. Furthermore, the Arctic also holds Europe’s richest fishpond, which has been managed quite well. With respect to navigation the potential is equally

4) Built on my own unpublished notes, on student assistant Jakob Dreyer’s (DIIS) unpublished notes, and on Gunnar Heleb’s unpublished power point presentation from the proceedings.
5) From Gunnar Heleb’s unpublished power point presentation from the proceedings.
promising. By 2050 there might no longer be significant ice obstructing the northwest and the northeast passages. As of right now the value of the passages is still limited. In 2011 thirty-three ships used the northeast route compared to 18,000 ships using the Suez Canal. The environment is still very rough and the supporting infrastructure is weak. However, the potential is great; the northbound route between Hamburg and Yokohama, for example, is 40% shorter than the southern route.

The Arctic is a relatively peaceful region. To be sure, there are still unresolved differences. For example there are still unclarified border areas between Denmark and Canada and between Russia and the US. But there are no major disagreements. From a Norwegian perspective, Russia is not regarded as an adversary. Norway does not consider the recent Russian military build-up in the Arctic to be directed against itself, and this has had no effect on the bilateral relationship. The key to a continued peaceful development in the high north lies in constructive dialogue with Russia. Of course, Russia is not regarded as an ally either, but Norway considers its relationship with Russia to be very good. Concretely, negotiations between Russia and Norway led to the resolution of the long-standing border dispute between Russia and Norway in the Barents Sea, in force from 7 July 2011.

From a Norwegian perspective the Arctic is generally considered an area of the highest importance. The Norwegian policies concerning the region generally enjoy a broad domestic consensus with only nuances separating the centre-right and the centre-left. The Norwegian sea area is the size of the Mediterranean Sea, and Norway has both substantial security and economic interests in the region. Regarding natural resources, the Norwegian oil and gas industry has significant future potential in the region, and the Norwegian fishing industry has crucial interests in the Arctic. Challenges include possible migrations of fish stocks across borders as a result of global warming, and the prevention of illegal fishing. This last task is specifically important for the Norwegian coastguard. The Norwegian armed forces have many other tasks in the region only heightened in importance by the ongoing transformative effects of climate change. These tasks include: ensuring stability in the high north, protecting Norwegian sovereignty, sending firm political signals and conducting efficient surveillance, intelligence gathering in the region, as well as maintaining crisis response readiness. Finally, the region is well-suited for training and exercises, which the Norwegian armed forces have pursued, in recent years even in cooperation with Norway’s Swedish and Finnish neighbours.
Session 4: Opportunities for Cooperation in Security and Defence Matters

Valur Ingimundarson, Professor of Contemporary History, University of Iceland: “The Role of Iceland in Nordic Security and Military Cooperation”

In the absence of state threats, what has usually been cited as the driver for increased Nordic security cooperation is the need for pooling of resources in a changed military economy. Underlying pan-Nordic choices are perceived commonalities in terms of geography, ideology, and identity. The perception is also strong that it is easier to drive domestic political bargains if they are put under the rubric of Nordic solidarity. Successive Icelandic governments—be they on the Left or on the Right—have supported Nordic security schemes for various reasons. Having been forced to rethink pre-existing security policies, the Nordic dimension was considered consistent with the tradition of Nordic cooperation. It was also felt that Iceland can accrue material benefits from it in the fields of disaster relief, cybersecurity, maritime surveillance, Arctic security, peacekeeping, and search and rescue. And finally, as an embryonic ‘soft security community,’ it was seen as complementing or cushioning—depending on ideological preference—the military connotations of Iceland’s participation in NATO.

But there are limits to Nordic security and military cooperation. Cold War allusions to ‘missed opportunities’ or ‘paths not taken’ or to the failed Nordic Defence Union in 1949 are misplaced in a different geopolitical landscape and era. As Tuomas Forsberg has argued, Nordic defence cooperation has become possible because it is not seen as an alternative to cooperation within the EU or NATO. Similarly, the Nordic countries cannot act alone in the Arctic; they are dependent on other larger actors. In the Icelandic case, the Defence Agreement with the United States is still in place. And while the Americans have not shown much interest in Iceland since their military departure, they are the only ones who have taken part in air policing annually since 2009.

Ironically, what has received most attention abroad about Iceland’s role in Nordic security cooperation—the air surveillance component—has not been seriously discussed or contested in the Icelandic domestic political sphere. As I have argued here, the emphasis on air policing in the Stoltenberg Report reflected an Icelandic security thinking which was prevalent before the financial crisis; it centred on responding to Iceland’s demilitarisation and to the Russian bomber flights. Indeed, the mostly unstated rationale for Cold War style air policing and surveillance is Russia, even if its right to conduct strategic aviation is accepted. Apart from military modernisation plans and increased military presence in the North, Russian bombers have exercised attacks against Norway and, recently, Sweden. They have not, however, engaged in any provocative acts against Iceland in the last few years. And while air policing can be interpreted as establishing a link between a Cold War past and Arctic futures, it is rooted in long-standing military routine, not current threat perceptions.

The forthcoming event, when the Norwegians, Swedes, and Finns will join hands in Iceland, is set to be bigged up as a major step toward Nordic military cooperation. It will be heavy on symbolism, bordering on the propagandistic, with the foreign and defence ministers of the Nordic countries visiting Iceland on the occasion. But as a NATO military operation, the mission is somewhat half-baked, with the Norwegians acting alone if the Russians decide to test Nordic solidarity in a nasty, playful or provocative way. Ultimately, the tripartite surveillance exercise is more about the relationship of Sweden and Finland to NATO—and its military collaboration with Norway—than about Iceland’s territorial defence.

Magnus Petersson, Professor, The Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies: “Opportunities for Nordic Defence Cooperation”

‘Everybody’ likes Nordic cooperation. The Nordic defence cooperation that was launched in 2007 by the Norwegian and Swedish Chiefs of Defence, later (in 2009) formalised as Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) – that includes all Nordic Countries, is not an exception to that rule. NORDEFCO has solid backing from the political and military leadership in the Nordic countries, and it also enjoys legitimacy from people in general (Forsberg, 2013). Furthermore, it has been highlighted by NATO and the US as an example to follow of how to pool and share military resources and create ‘smart defence’.

However, to be honest, we have rather few examples of successful Nordic cooperation in general, and even fewer examples of successful defence cooperation – at least if we talk about formal, structured, in-depth cooperation (integration). That is true also for NORDEFCO. The latest example is the Norwegian–Swedish Archer Artillery Project that was turned down by the Norwegian government recently (December, 2013). But there are still several opportunities for Nordic defence cooperation.

I have identified five areas with opportunities – economy, structure, geography, strategy, and doctrine – and I am sure there are more. In the following I will give a couple of examples within each area, and after that I will finish off with a short discussion of some important restraints on cooperation.

1. Economic opportunities
Since the start of the contemporary Nordic defence cooperation, economy has been the main driver. Ideas of buying, storing, and maintaining whole defence systems – such as artillery, helicopters and tanks – in a Nordic context have an enormous economic, as well as operational, potential. Some analysts argue that this is the only way to avoid serious capability gaps for small states, and to keep the breadth of the force structure (Diesen, 2013a).

But there are also smaller fish to be caught. In a recent report from the Centre for Military Studies at the University of Copenhagen, it is suggested that a more developed Nordic command and staff college cooperation would be cheaper and more effective than the national solutions we have today (Schaub jr. et al, 2013). There is, in short, no need for four national defence colleges where the staff at each defence college could easily educate and administrate all Nordic officer students.

2. Structural opportunities
Structure is also an area that holds a lot of opportunities if the four defence forces could agree to specialise: Denmark and Norway could concentrate on naval capabilities, Sweden and Norway on air force capabilities, and Finland and Denmark on land force capabilities (Forsberg, 2013). That would provide us with one capable, cost-effective army, navy, and air force, instead of four not-so-capable, costly, ‘full spectrum’ forces where many of the units are way under the ‘critical mass’ (or simply abolished).

There are, in principal, two ways of specialising: either horizontally or vertically. Horizontal specialisation means that the forces can operate side by side in national constellations (such as in the ISAF operation in Afghanistan, or with specialised branches as suggested above). Vertical specialisation means that the forces are wholly or partly integrated (such as the Nordic Battle Group).

The former Chief of the Norwegian Defence, Sverre Diesen, has recently suggested a partly horizontal, and partly vertical, structural solution with Nordic Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) units, with high readiness, that could be deployed in all relevant directions from the Nordic countries (Diesen, 2013b).
3. Geographical opportunities
Being geographically proximate makes it easier to cooperate in general. Although the distances in Norden are long (the area of both Norway and Sweden individually is larger than Germany, and Finland’s area is larger than Poland), the fact that they are adjacent to one another still gives a huge advantage. Also very good infrastructure, plenty of space for exercising, etc. are beneficial for cooperation. It is also easier to defend the Nordic Region as a whole than the individual states, since the region is so intertwined (with the exception of Greenland and Iceland). That was a main driver for secret Nordic (or more precisely Scandinavian) defence cooperation during the Cold War, but it is still relevant today (Diesen, 2013b, Petersson, 2010).

4. Strategic opportunities
The problem with Nordic defence cooperation has often been that it has been driven from the top down, and focused on grand strategy. That was typically the case during the Cold War, when there was a relatively comprehensive – but more or less ad hoc, and secret – defence cooperation, especially regarding military intelligence cooperation and cooperation between the Scandinavian air forces, whereas the ‘large’ initiatives, such as the negotiations on a Scandinavian Defence Union in 1948–1949, failed (Petersson, 2012).

A bottom-up focus on operations, instead of grand security policy or strategy solutions, could actually be a ‘strategic opportunity’ for Nordic defence cooperation. In the 20 years since Finland and Sweden joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) in 1994, the Nordic defence forces have experienced a massive transformation, which has included harmonisation of procedures for planning, execution, and evaluation of operations within a NATO framework. In addition, the build-up of the EU Nordic Battle Group has contributed to even more interoperability.

5. Doctrinal opportunities
The defence transformation, and NATO harmonisation, of the Nordic defence forces since the end of the Cold War have also contributed to a harmonisation of doctrines of operations. This, in turn, creates opportunities and makes it easier to cooperate on the operative and tactical level. The forces are manoeuvre oriented, relatively interoperable, have high readiness, and think and fight in a similar way, which for example was demonstrated during the Libya Operation in 2011.

Concluding remarks
Although there are lots of opportunities for Nordic Defence cooperation, there are also important restraints. Three of them are: the sovereignty vs. the efficiency problem (Saxi, 2014), the competitor vs. the complement problem (Petersson, 2010), and last but not least the historical record (Forsberg, 2013).

The sovereignty vs. the efficiency problem is arguably the most serious restraint on Nordic defence cooperation. The Nordic countries are, as Håkon Lund Saxi argues, “still extremely reluctant to integrate their armed forces in ways that increase their mutual dependency and limit their governments’ freedom of action”, even though it could save a lot of money for the taxpayers and at the same time create more military power.

The competitor vs. the complement problem is also restraining cooperation. ‘Everybody’ agrees that NORDEFCO is a complement to the existing EU and NATO cooperation, but with shrinking defence budgets, smaller defence forces, and less manpower, it is impossible to prioritise all types of defence cooperation all the time, even if you like them. There are not, simply put, enough resources for that, which to a large degree explains why the Nordic countries do not prioritise Nordic defence cooperation above other types of cooperation.

Finally, the historical record does not make it easier to create Nordic defence cooperation.
Grand initiatives during the 19th and 20th centuries, such as Danish–Swedish defence of Southern Jutland, Finnish–Swedish defence of the Åland Islands, and the failed Scandinavian Defence Union – not to mention the Danish, Finnish, and Norwegian disappointment regarding the Swedish ‘neutrality policy’ during World War II – have soured the climate for cooperation. It might be improving slowly, but this is still an important restraint.

References


Conference programme appendix:

Nordic Foreign and Security Policy
Tuesday 26 November 2013, 9.30–17.30

Danish Institute for International Studies
Main Auditorium
Østbanegade 117, ground floor
2100 Copenhagen Ø

Background
Is there such a thing as Nordic foreign policy? Speakers from each of the Nordic countries, a mix of practitioners and researchers, attempt to address core issues related to Nordic foreign policy in four separate panel discussions.

Nordic foreign policy as a concept has been the centre of much debate in recent years. On the one hand, the security policies of the Nordic Countries have varied markedly. No more so than in the case of the Iraq War where Denmark was very much involved, Norway and Iceland participated to a lesser extent, and Finland and Sweden stayed out. This difference was also mirrored in the war in Libya in 2011, where Denmark and Norway were by far the most actively engaged Nordic countries.

On the other hand, however, the Nordic countries have a long tradition for cooperation in multilateral organisations such as the UN when it comes to promoting Nordic norms. Furthermore, Nordic defence cooperation, itself an age-old idea, is once again on the agenda and new challenges, not least in the Arctic Region, might also benefit from Nordic cooperation.

Speakers
Bertel Haarder, Former Minister, Member of Parliament, Member of the Presidium of the Danish Parliament, 1st Deputy Speaker

Rasmus Brun Pedersen, Associate Professor, University of Aarhus

Håkan Edström, Associate Professor, Lieutenant Colonel, Försvarshögskolan

Laust Schouenborg, Assistant Professor, Roskilde University

Leni Stenseth, Director UN Policy and Gender Equality, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Teemu Palosaari, Post-doc researcher, University of Tampere

Kristinn Schram, Director, Centre for Arctic Policy Studies, University of Iceland

Gunnar Heløe, Captain (Navy), Norwegian Ministry of Defence

Magnus Petersson, Professor, Institutt for Forsvarsstudier

Valur Ingimundarson, Professor of Contemporary History, University of Iceland

Annika Bergman Rosamond, Senior Lecturer, Director of the Masters in Global Studies, University of Lund

Pia Hansson, Director, Institute of International Affairs and Centre for Small States Studies, University of Iceland

Emmi Oikari, Counsellor, Unit for UN and General Global Affairs, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Programme
9.30-09.50
Registration and Coffee

09.50-10.00
Introduction
Mikkel Runge Olesen, Researcher, DIIS

10.00-10.20
Keynote Speech: The Conditions for Nordic Foreign and Security Policies
Bertel Haarder, Former Minister, Member of Parliament, Member of the Presidium of the Danish Parliament, 1st Deputy Speaker
10.20-11.00  
Session 1: The Nordic Countries and International Interventions

Rasmus Brun Pedersen, Associate Professor, University of Aarhus

Håkan Edström, Associate Professor, Lieutenant Colonel, Försvarshögskolan

Pia Hansson, Director, Institute of International Affairs and Centre for Small States Studies, University of Iceland

11.00-11.40  
Q&A

11.40-12.40  
Sandwich Lunch

12.40-13.20  
Session 2: The Nordic Countries and the Diplomatic Fight for Nordic Norms

Laust Schouenborg, Assistant Professor, Roskilde University

Leni Stenseth, Director, UN Policy and Gender Equality, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Annikka Bergman Rosamond, Senior Lecturer, Director of the Masters in Global Studies, University of Lund

Emmi Oikari, Counsellor, Unit for UN and General Global Affairs, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

13.20-14.00  
Q&A

14.00-14.30  
Coffee Break

14.30-15.20  
Session 3: The Arctic Policies of the Nordic Countries

Teemu Palosaari, Post-doc researcher, University of Tampere

Kristinn Schram, Director, Centre for Arctic Policy Studies, University of Iceland

Gunnar Heløe, Captain (Navy), Norwegian Ministry of Defence

15.20-16.00  
Q&A

16.00-16.15  
Coffee Break

16.15-16.45  
Session 4: Opportunities for Cooperation in Security and Defence Matters

Magnus Petersson, Professor, Institutt for Forsvarestudier

Valur Ingimundarson, Professor of Contemporary History, University of Iceland

16.45-17.15  
Q&A

17.15-17.30  
Concluding Remarks

Moderator: Mikkel Runge Olesen, Researcher, DIIS