EU AND THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

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Executive Summary

EU efforts at implementing a comprehensive approach – and what it has termed Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO) – must be understood in the context of both the growth of the EU as a security provider by means of civilian and military crisis operations under the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), and of a changing security environment in which state failure and international terrorism increasingly require both civilian and military solutions. Operational experience in the Balkans, sub-Saharan Africa and more recently Afghanistan has further demonstrated the need to combine civilian and military crisis management in order to address security challenges that include the fight against organized crime, the need to reform the police and justice sector, or the provision of military forces on a short-term basis in support of larger peace-keeping missions.

The EU has a range of political, economic but also security instruments at its disposal to respond to international crisis situations that span the divide between the two pillars. The emphasis on ‘effective multilateralism’ and the EU’s commitment to a multilateral, rule-based order make coordination and cooperation with other international actors, mainly the UN and NATO, a key feature of coordination efforts. The increasing number of civilian crisis missions in particular, which rely on Commission cooperation and financing and that often take place in support of or in cooperation with other international actors, including NATO and the UN, bear witness to the importance of a culture of coordination that is built out of ‘co-operation and shared political objectives’ in which ‘working together is an essential element...of EU crisis management’.

However, the experience of EU crisis missions over the past five years has shown that the practical application of CMCO in EU crisis management leaves much to be desired when it comes to internal coordination, but also when it comes to cooperation with other international actors. Having at its disposal a broad range of instruments has not translated into increasing coordination or mission effectiveness due to inter-institutional competition, different agenda-setting, and different decision-making processes in the respective pillars. While the institutional provisions in the Lisbon Treaty promise some improvement by abolishing the inter-pillar divide and increasing foreign-policy coherence through the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the timing of the implementation of these provisions, as well as
their impact on EU crisis management, is uncertain due to the ongoing ratification process of the Treaty.

Similarly, coordination with other international actors has been hampered by different operational priorities and personalities in the case of the UN, as well as inter-institutional competition in the case of NATO. In addition, member states commitments to EU crisis management, let alone CMCO, have not translated into either adequate capabilities, levels of staffing, or the appropriate financing of missions, with increasingly detrimental effects on the running of individual missions. Differing conceptions not only of the role of ESDP, but also of what constitutes a ‘comprehensive approach’ among member states, have further impeded progress on improving civil-military coordination.

This leads to two conclusions on how to improve CMCO and the performance of EU crisis management in the field. First, given the central role of EU member states in this process, a consensus on CMCO in terms of conceptual definitions as well as operational priorities has to be reached among EU member states, and ‘uploaded’ on to the EU level. Secondly, member states have to increase their respective commitments to EU capabilities in terms of both financial and personnel support in order for the EU to play a key role in crisis management.
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I. Introduction

In the context of an increasing number of operations launched under the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) since the inaugural missions in the Balkans, the continued attention being paid to the 2003 European Security Strategy and its implementation, and the growing demand for ESDP operations around the world, the task of coordinating military and civilian crisis-management instruments has arrived at the heart of debates over how to improve the performance of EU crisis management. Beyond merely coordinating civil–military instruments within ESDP, the EU is also developing a comprehensive approach towards the coherent application of all policy instruments pertinent to crisis management, and in this context is working on the elaboration and implementation of Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO). CMCO raises a number of challenges beyond ESDP’s institutional development and improvements in civil–military coordination mechanisms.

In particular, these challenges include combining instruments across the pillar divide in a coherent manner, aligning EU policy with those of EU member states and improving cooperation with other international actors in the field. Beyond the institutional development and conceptual thinking on the EU and member state levels, the application of EU crisis-management instruments in the first and second pillars has in practice illustrated the challenges facing the EU in designing and carrying out missions that either combine civil–military instruments, such as Bosnia; that coordinate military instruments with other international actors, notably the UN, such as DR Congo; or that are placed alongside military operations outside the EU framework and that operate in an environment where conflict is ongoing, such as Afghanistan.

Essentially, the conceptual development of CMCO is a bottom-up process that requires the alignment of member states’ conceptions, as well as material commitments that, over time, result in the development of a European strategic culture and practice in crisis management. In addition, the institutional and operational development of CMCO as well as civilian and military crisis management continues to be hampered by inter-pillar divisions and current practices in crisis management operations that have made the coherent application of instruments in theatre difficult to achieve. While efforts at coordination and improvement on both the national and EU levels are ongoing, the coherent application of crisis-management instruments remains a challenge for member states and EU institutions.
Based on an analysis of the existing institutional framework, as well as attempts to institutionalize CMCO in practice, this paper shows that, despite having the necessary tools at its disposal to implement CMCO effectively, the EU has so far fallen short of achieving the coordination goals it has set for itself. The paper also suggests ways of improving the practice of CMCO in the future.
2. The context of recent changes

Attempts at achieving a coordinated approach to the EU’s foreign, security and defence policies, including the formulation and implementation of CMCO, is grounded in both the changing security framework following the end of the Cold War and the growth of EU foreign policy institutions, and the formulation of its strategic goals through the 2003 European Security Strategy.

Since the end of the Cold War, state failure and the resulting humanitarian emergencies have become a key concern for the international community. The attacks of 11 September and the emerging paradigm of the “war on terror” have since reinforced the conceptual connection between weak or failed states on the one hand and both security and international terrorism on the other – and have made the challenge of preventing state failure and that of (re-)building failed or failing states a central concern for international crisis-management policies, including the European Union as an actor in crisis management. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the European Security Strategy (ESS) lists state failure and terrorism as two of the key threats facing Europe, together with proliferation, organized crime and regional conflicts (Council of the European Union, 2003), further highlighting the interconnectedness between weak state structures and transnational security threats.

Managing complex crises that involve a combination of the threats listed above requires a coherent effort that combines civil and military instruments and that puts into practice the conceptual link between security and development, as well as one that combines effective multilateralism with a coherent and coordinated approach of all available civil and military instruments. The experience in Bosnia, but more recently also in Afghanistan in particular, has sparked increasing discussion over putting into practice a “comprehensive approach” aimed at integrating the political, security, development, rule of law and humanitarian dimensions of international crisis missions. As a result, the EU, along with many international actors and nation states, is creating new concepts and policies for a more coordinated approach to crisis management. Unlike international institutions such as NATO and the UN, the EU has a comprehensive set of military, political and economic tools at its disposal to bring to bear on crisis situations and should, at least in principle, be capable of perfecting and implementing a comprehensive approach. However, although the EU is in an advantageous position to implement a comprehensive approach, in practice the experience of individual crisis missions has revealed room for improvement when
it comes to increasing coherence among EU instruments. This has to do with the EU’s institutional design, in particular the pillar divide that separates CFSP from Community activities; the lack of comprehensive planning in terms of coordinating different strands of crisis-management instruments; the implementation of mission mandates on the ground; and differing member state commitments to equipping ESDP with the necessary capabilities and resources.
3. Strategies and concepts of CMCO

Within the EU, the greatest push towards developing a comprehensive approach arose as a result of the experience of the early crisis-management missions under the ESDP, particularly those in Bosnia, where a civilian police mission (EUPM) and a military operation (EUFOR Althea) came to have been operating concurrently. While the need for coordination was recognized early on, specific recommendations on how policies could be implemented in practice evolved, and continue to evolve, along with the policy itself. The EU has developed its concept for Crisis Management Coordination, which refers both to internal EU processes with respect to civil-military coordination within ESDP, as well as to civil-civil coordination between the CFSP and Commission competences. The conceptual cornerstone of EU efforts towards implementing a comprehensive approach is Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO).

Work on the creation of CMCO, which is broadly understood as a culture of coordination, was undertaken in particular by the Danish and the EU Greek Presidency in 2003. A framework for CMCO, published in November 2003 (Council of the European Union, 2003) emphasized CMCO not just as a culture of coordination, but as a prerequisite for the elaboration of an effective crisis response. Highlighting the fact that an emerging CMCO culture needs to be built into the EU’s response to a crisis, relevant Council documents note that “the culture of co-coordination is to be built on continued co-operation and shared political objectives and relies to a very large extent on detailed preparations at working level [.....] Working closely together is an essential element during the ‘routine’ phase of EU crisis management”.

Work on CMCO progressed particularly with the experience of further ESDP operations, and a 2006 paper prepared by the Council emphasized the need for a clear strategy and well-defined tasks for EU actors in theatre and cross-support and synchronization of activities in theatre. This means that a political CFSP instrument, specifically the EU Special Representative (EUSR), should be the point of coordination and maintain an overview of the range of EU activities. Additional aspects towards improving CMCO include developing a media and information strategy, as well as EU training and exercise policies, improving interaction between ESDP missions in the field and initiatives by the EC, and the dissemination and sharing of information (Council of the European Union, 2006). CMCO has been developed to highlight the connectedness between civilian and military crisis management and the need to combine both instruments in crisis management and
post-conflict reconstruction. In developing and implementing such a comprehensive approach, the EU has developed and/or adopted a number of strategies and concepts to guide the ideational, operational and institutional development of the European approach to crisis management. The sections below analyse the context of the evolving policy changes by focusing on the specific ideational and operational concepts that continue to guide the development of crisis management in general and of CMCO in particular.

**a. Conceptual**

*European Security Strategy (ESS)*

The European Security Strategy (ESS) underpins many of the security activities that the EU has been engaging in by providing the ideational and “visionary” input into the European approach to security. As such, the ESS outlines the scope of EU activities in the world and provides an ideational backdrop to the EU’s international activities (see Andersson and Biscop, 2008). The genesis of the ESS, however, was less than promising: the 2003 Iraq crisis demonstrated deep divisions between different European states, as well as between “old Europe” and the US. In part an effort to create a consensus on the EU’s role in the world so as to repair the damage done by the differences over Iraq (see Biscop, 2008), member states tasked Solana with creating a common view of how to approach security challenges. The resulting ESS emphasized the EU as a unique security actor distinct from other organizations in its emphasis on multilateralism, the range of instruments at its disposal, and the comprehensive approach to be taken towards countering the security challenges identified therein. Beyond identifying key threats, the ESS also hinted at the need to coordinate civilian and military instruments in stating that “the challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: [...] military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments” (Council of the European Union, 2003). Recent initiatives by the current French EU presidency towards revising the ESS in order to focus on the strategy’s implementation show the extent to which the document has provided a road map for action and retained its relevance: rather than a weakening of EU foreign policy, the increasing activity in the number and scope of ESDP and crisis-management policies show the continued need for engaging in the creation of concepts, vision and link between vision and implementation. As ESS and ESDP come of age, the implementation of ESDP and crisis-management policies more generally become increasingly important.
**Effective Multilateralism**

In order to achieve the security aims stated in the ESS, the EU is to invest in cooperation with other international actors. Through effective multilateralism the EU is to strive for “the development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order”. Furthermore, the ESS is explicit in stating that “we want international organizations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security”. While the ESS explicitly states that “one of the core elements of the international system is the transatlantic relationship” and that “NATO is an important expression of this relationship”, for the EU and ESDP in particular, efforts towards effective multilateralism have meant working towards a close partnership with the UN. This is both because of the two institutions’ broader focus on a rule-based, multilateral international order and the fact that ESDP military crisis missions have frequently been deployed in support of UN peacekeeping operations.

On the institutional level, EU–UN agreements on cooperation in civil-military crisis-management operations were concluded in 2001. The experience of EUFOR DR Congo, as well as Operation Artemis, both of which were in support of existing UN peacekeeping missions; the current operation in Chad, which is in support of the UN; and also the police mission EUPM in Bosnia, which was a takeover mission from the UN, all demonstrate the centrality not only of strengthening the UN system but also of perfecting the coordination and cooperation mechanisms between the two organizations. ESDP military operations in sub-Saharan Africa in particular have presented a steep learning curve for EU–UN cooperation and illustrate the extent to which cooperation with the two organizations has progressed, as well as processes of implementation (see Major, 2008).

Achieving effective multilateralism has proven more difficult with respect to NATO, although the two organizations operate jointly in a number of theatres that include Afghanistan, Kosovo and Bosnia. This difficulty has proved particularly detrimental in the implementation of a comprehensive approach when it comes to the deployment of military and civilian instruments in Afghanistan. Institutionalized coordination does exist in the form of consultation arrangements between the EU Political and Security Committee and the NATO North Atlantic Council (NAC), EU and NATO Military Committees and the EU Secretary General/High Representative and the NATO Secretary General. The 2002 ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangement institutionalized the EU–NATO security relationship by giving the EU assured access to NATO assets and planning capabilities for EU-led
crisis-management operations. However, two factors in particular have impeded the implementation of an ‘effective multilateralism’ between the EU and NATO, with negative effects for the implementation of a comprehensive approach. Initially, differing views over an EU–NATO division of labour in particular have impeded institutional cooperation agreements, with France pushing for European autonomy and Atlanticist member states seeking to align ESDP closely with NATO so as not to weaken the transatlantic alliance. Reciprocally, US reactions to ESDP initially were rather negative (see Howorth, 2007), further reinforcing the notion of institutional competition. Concerns over competition have largely disappeared, and the EU, particularly its civilian crisis-management capabilities, is increasingly seen as complementary to NATO (see Nuland, 2007). Today, the key problem in EU–NATO relations is that of reconciling the preferences of non-EU NATO members, notably Turkey, with operational and institutional requirements for a working EU–NATO relationship. This has proved to be the biggest stumbling block in achieving effective coordination. As a result of the present institutional deadlock, only Berlin Plus operations – in other words, EUFOR Althea in Bosnia – are discussed in formal EU–NATO meetings. Other theatres and operations, including Afghanistan and Kosovo, continue to be discussed bilaterally rather than on an EU–NATO institutional level, with predictably negative consequences for the coordination of instruments in theatre.

Security Sector Reform (SSR)

Although the initial conceptual focus of ESDP was on military crisis management, given that the main impetus for the policy’s creation was to increase European military capabilities (see Howorth, 2007), security sector reform (SSR) and a focus on the rule of law in crisis management has emerged not only as the main operational concept but also the main activity in ESDP. The main challenges in rebuilding state structures in the context of failed states include restoring legitimacy and the control of the use of force to public authorities, as well as establishing the rule of law. A functioning rule of law sector is a key measure of stability. In this context, SSR has become a key concept for improving governance in post-conflict countries. The concept of SSR itself originated in the development field and was based on the increasing realization of the link between security and development as an enabling condition for states to achieve development. Among EU member states, the UK and the Netherlands in particular have been active in developing national SSR agendas (Law and Myshlovska, 2008). Importantly, SSR focuses not only on integrating defence, police, intelligence and judicial reform, but also on a commitment to the consolidation of democracy, promotion of human rights and principles of good governance, including accountability.
and transparency. Key SSR activities thus include reforming security institutions, strengthening control mechanisms and restructuring the security sector.

Given the broad range of political and economic instruments at the EU’s disposal, the EU is in an advantageous position to implement SSR activities though policy instruments located in both the first and second pillars. Technically, SSR is also not a new activity for the EU, as the Commission has been involved in aspects of SSR through its development and its accession policies (European Commission, 2006). The development of the EU as a foreign policy actor, and specifically the creation of the ESDP, has since reinforced the EU’s focus on SSR. The experience of the initial civilian crisis-management missions under ESDP in the Western Balkans (see Emerson and Gross, 2007), which de facto contributed to aspects of SSR, further demonstrated the need for a strategic and holistic approach to crisis management. The fact that, of the twenty operations currently ongoing and/or completed, fifteen were civilian crisis missions engaged in some aspect of SSR bears out the centrality of SSR to ESDP activities. It also points to the increasing need for merging civilian and military crisis-management activities and operations, since aspects of SSR, such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), require military expertise. Moreover, one ESDP operation to date, AMIS in Sudan, has combined civilian and military crisis-management elements, namely an EU civilian–military action to support the African Union’s enhanced Mission to Sudan/Darfur, AMIS-trained African troops, aided with tactical and strategic transportation and provided with police assistance and training, including military and civilian personnel. The example of this particular mission reinforces the interconnectedness of the civilian and military aspects of crisis management and makes it likely that, if not the demand for, certainly the logic of such integrated missions will increase rather than diminish.

Despite the increasing focus on SSR and the demand for integrated missions, institutional practices have revealed shortcomings that negatively affect coherence and as a result also the planning as well as the implementation of a comprehensive approach. To begin with, both the Council and the Commission have developed separate concept papers on SSR that highlight their respective understandings of SSR, as well as the instruments at their disposal. However, an integrated SSR concept has not been developed to date, and planning and policy formulation proceeds from separate concepts rather than a joint Council–Commission SSR concept (see House of Commons, 2007). In addition, inter-pillar competition over policy formulation and agenda setting, a lack of institutionalized training,
but also effective financing procedures have meant that the EU is facing significant shortfalls and delays in the deployment and conduct of civilian crisis-management missions (see Jakobsen, 2006).

**b. Operational**

*Headline Goals*

In order to meet the personnel and institutional requirements needed for carrying out a crisis mission, the EU has introduced individual military and civilian headline goals in order to set targets and strengthen EU capabilities. While the original December 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal foresaw member states being able “by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks”, in May 2004 the original Helsinki Headline Goal was transformed into the new Military Headline Goal 2010 (HG2010). HG2010 calls for member states “to be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty of the European Union”. HG2010 also included some specific objectives, including commitments to create a Civilian Military Cell and Operations Centre, as well as the creation of EU battle groups made up of 1,500 troops each. Beyond setting new targets, HG2010 emphasizes a process: by introducing the concept of battle groups as well as focusing on interoperability, deployability and sustainability, the EU is enabling defence transformations by referring to defence tools rather than focusing solely on troop numbers (Quille et al., 2006).

In addition to the elaboration of HG2010, 2004 also saw the formulation of a Civilian Headline Goal 2008, which was adopted by the European Council in December 2004. Key commitments in the elaboration of the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 include the development of integrated civilian crisis-management packages; the ability to conduct concurrent civilian missions; the ability to deploy at short notice; the ability to work with military missions; and the coherence of ESDP actions with longer-term EC programmes (Council of the European Union, 2004).

The 1999 Helsinki Council adopted an Action Plan for non-military crisis management by the EU, and the issue of civilian crisis management was first addressed at the Feira European Council in June 2000, where for the first time member states identified four priority areas for civilian action: civilian police, rule of law, civilian
administration and civil protection. The Feira Council identified concrete targets, including 5000 police officers (with 1000 deployable within 30 days) and 200 rule-of-law experts, with less concrete targets for the remaining two policy areas. The emphasis on civilian crisis management was further supported under the Swedish EU Presidency in 2001. At a ministerial conference in November 2001, member states established commitments to maintain a capacity of 5000 police officers and other civilian personnel, of which 1400 were to be available at short notice, and they also committed 282 officials, 60 of whom can be committed within 30 days, at a rule-of-law commitment conference in May 2002. Formulating capability needs and goals with respect to civilian crisis management became an important issue, given that the initial – and many of the current – ESDP operations concerned civilian crisis management. Here the EU soon faced capability shortfalls and the need to define and build up a cadre of personnel for tasks associated with transforming existing police forces, justice systems and border police.

**Civilian Response Team (CRT)**

Based on the experience of staffing problems in individual crisis missions, the Civilian Response Team (CRT) concept has been developed in order to strengthen the EU’s capabilities in civilian crisis management. The objectives of establishing CRT are to create an early presence on the ground in order to facilitate the implementation of a fully fledged civilian crisis-management mission. CRTs are to be ready for deployment within five days of a request by the Secretary General/High Representative Javier Solana, the PSC or the Council and to stay in the field for up to three months. As defined in its concept document, a CRT will be drawn from a pool of experts pre-selected by member states in accordance with agreed criteria and procedures, which can include Council Secretariat and European Commission participation. Among the aims and objectives of a CRT are to undertake assessment and fact-finding missions; establish a rapid initial presence in the field after a Joint Action and support to the deployment of a crisis mission; reinforce existing EU mechanisms for crisis management, notably in assisting an EUSR function; and provide logistical support. The concept document foresaw the creation of a pool of up to a hundred experts who will undergo specific CRT induction training (Council of the European Union, 2005). To date, CRTs have been fielded as individuals rather than teams.

**Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC)**

CIMIC is a concept designed to facilitate coordination between military and civilian actors in crisis management, with the specific aim of connecting and making use of military capabilities in theatre for the coordination of and cooperation with national,
international and non-governmental civilian actors. Although the concept is primarily concerned with coordination in theatre rather than an overall strategic concept of complete institutional cooperation, CIMIC nevertheless represents an important operational component of CMCO. Within the EU, the EU Military Staff (EUMS) is responsible for planning and implementing CIMIC on the political and strategic levels, and for the procedural roles for civilian and military capacities. This includes coordinating the planning, communication, information exchange, separation of mandates and long-term goals, and the transition of responsibilities between military and civilian actors in crisis situations. In developing CIMIC, the EU held two conferences to develop procedures for CIMIC. The first CIMIC Conference, held in June 2002, brought together internal and external civilian and military actors for an open dialogue on CIMIC in an attempt to define the functions between civilian and military actors in crisis situations and the guiding principles behind them. The second EU CIMIC Conference in June 2003 was aimed at the operational and tactical levels rather than the politico-military strategic and conceptual levels. The conference led to a draft document entitled “Civil-military Cooperation concept for EU-led Crisis Management Operations: Cooperation with relevant external civil humanitarian organizations – Generic Guidelines”, as a starting point for further consultation. The EUMS subsequently decided to explore a new medium/long-term approach for the CIMIC in EU. Rather than creating a context for real exchange between civilian and military actors, however, the meeting “gave the impression that the ‘hearts and minds’ tactic, including humanitarian and rehabilitation work, is almost synonymous with CIMIC among many of the EU Member States’ military staffs” (Erhardt, 2007). This highlights different and evolving conceptions of CIMIC – similar to that of CMCO – among different member states, which is impeding the development of an EU-level strategy towards the concept’s implementation (see Section 7).

**Conclusion: mainstreaming CMCO?**

Based on a presentation of the strategies and concepts that are relevant for the conceptualization and implementation of a comprehensive approach at the planning but also the implementation stages, a number of shortfalls are immediately apparent. Although the ESS stresses cooperation with partners by means of ‘effective multilateralism’, and although CMCO emphasises ‘a culture of coordination and shared political objectives’ in the implementation of crisis-management operations, both SSR and the operational concepts reveal significant gaps between strategic objectives and methods of implementation. Meeting either the Military or the Civilian Headline Goals has presented a challenge to member states both in terms of making available financial resources, and in adjusting domestic institutional processes so that
civilian personnel can be made available; to date, indeed, the EU has to grapple with significant capability shortfalls. Moreover, the divide between the first and the second pillars within the EU, as well as competition over agenda-setting and resources, has meant that in practice political objectives – shared though they may be – have not profited from an emerging culture of cooperation. Incremental improvements such as the discussions over an integrated SSR concept or the creation of the CRT concept notwithstanding, the EU is some way away from achieving CMCO. The imperfect institutional structure of EU crisis management from which CMCO is to originate, discussed in the next section, reinforces this conclusion.
4. Institutions and Structures

The institutional structures of EU crisis management bear witness to the challenges of coordination and coherence, as they combine intergovernmental with supranational elements, and as crisis-management instruments and competences span the pillar divide. Apart from committees consisting of member state representatives and the relevant Directorates in the Council Secretariat, the Commission also contributes to the crisis-management structures. Although CFSP/ESDP structures, with the groundwork laid by the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice respectively, are still evolving. However, they have become sufficiently institutionalized to undertake their respective crisis-management functions, but also to consider concrete ways, based on amassed experience, to create not just coherence, but a culture of coordination foreseen in CMCO. However, the uncertain future of the Lisbon Treaty and the implementation of institutional changes foreseen therein, as well as the experience of lacking coherence in individual missions, make substantial improvements in the institutional structure of EU crisis management unlikely in the short term.

The following sections address the individual actors and institutions involved in CMCO and illustrate the difficulty in delineating competences between member states, the Council and the Commission, as well as the individual decision-making and supporting structures. They also highlight the sometimes overlapping expertise between the pillars, as well as the different decision-making structures that stand in the way of achieving coherence. Decision-making rests with the member states, and here the Political and Security Committee (PSC) holds a key position. The supporting structures, including CPCC and EUMC, are part of the Council Secretariat, which is overseen by HR/SG Javier Solana. The Commission, lastly, is “fully associated” in the CFSP and plays a crucial role through its budgetary competences and its foreign policy, but also through its development policy competences and its Delegations on the ground, through which Commission projects and policies are implemented. The graph below is intended to aide visualization of the institutional organization of the EU CFSP/ESDP.

*Political and Security Committee (PSC)*

The PSC comprises the permanent representatives of the member states and one representative of the Commission. The task of the PSC is to monitor the international situation, to present opinions on the CFSP/ESDP to the Council and to monitor
Institutional Organization of the EU CFSP/ESDP

Council Structures

European Council

General Affairs and External Relations Council

Coreper

Political and Security Committee (PSC)

EU Military Committee

Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM)

Council Secretariat

Secretary General/High Representative

Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN)

Policy Unit

EU Military Staff Civ-Mill Cell

Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC)

EU Special Representative
the implementation of specific policies. Importantly for crisis management operations, the PSC holds political oversight and strategic control of ESDP operations. It usually meets twice a week. The chair is held either by the country holding the Council Presidency or the High Representative. Since its creation in 2001, the PSC has developed a key role in the planning and oversight of crisis-management operations, as well as in creating a consensus and a culture of coordination in European decision-making among member states (see Meyer, 2006). The PSC is supported by two committees, one dealing with the civilian aspects of crisis management (CIVCOM) and the other the EU Military Committee (EUMC). The PSC has two key functions with respect to contributing to the goals of CMCO, namely a ‘culture of coordination’ and ‘shared political objectives’. First, given its increasing function as a negotiation and decision-making body, the bi-weekly meetings serve to align member states political positions. Second, the presence of a representative of the Commission is to provide a bridging function between the first and second pillars.

**CIVCOM**
The committee for dealing with the civilian aspects of crisis management (CIVCOM) consists of representatives of all the member states, the Council and the Commission. The main tasks of CIVCOM include oversight of the management of civilian crisis operations, the support of the PSC and other relevant Council bodies in the oversight and improvement of the EU’s civilian crisis-management activities, and the drawing up of strategies and recommendations to the PSC (see Nowak, 2006).

**HR/SG Solana and the Council Secretariat**
HR/SG Javier Solana, supported by the Council Secretariat, fulfils an important function in both crisis management and CMCO. Solana and the Secretariat are to support the Council of the European Union in preparing the meeting of the Council, and Solana himself has emerged as a highly visible and effective crisis manager and figurehead for EU foreign policy. Solana is supported by the Policy Unit, which is composed of representatives from member states, as well as Commission and Council officials. The Policy Unit is to provide daily policy guidance, and it serves as an extended cabinet with an early warning function (Cameron, 2007). Within the Council Secretariat, crisis-management issues fall under the responsibility of the Directorate General (DG) E for External and Politico-Military Affairs. Subordinate to DG E are the DG E VII (ESDP), the DG E VIII (Defense), as well as DG IX (Civilian Crisis Management, including civil-military co-ordination). The EU Satellite Centre is located within DG E VIII, and Solana also has at his disposal the Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN), which provides early warning and situation monitoring, and
serves as an operational point of contact for Solana. Among its tasks are risk assessment, ad hoc intelligence briefings and reports that are distributed to members of the PSC and the EUMC. Intelligence is provided by individual member states and offers the advantage of making intelligence available to all member states, thus aiding European as well as national decision-making.

**EU Military Committee (EUMC) and EU Military Staff (EUMS)**
The EU Military Committee (EUMC) was created in 2001 and consists of member states’ representatives of the respective defence ministries. The EUMC is the highest military body in the existing political-military structures of the Council. It gives military advice and makes recommendations to the PSC, exercises military oversight of all military activities within the EU framework, and is also charged with the planning and implementation of EU military operations. The EUMC is supported by the EU Military Staff (EUMS). The mission of the EUMS is to perform early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for missions and tasks in the frame of ESDP, including the identification of national and multinational forces. The EUMS has a multinational staff of 180 people and provides the source of the EU’s military expertise, as well as the link between the EUMC and the military resources available to the EU. Rather than being an emerging European headquarters, the EUMC does not have command and control competencies, which reflect the ongoing discussions and differences among member states as to the acceptable degree of the EU’s autonomy from NATO structures. Instead, these competencies are fulfilled either by NATO (according to the Berlin-Plus Agreement) or the headquarters of the so-called “framework” nation, the member state offering its national headquarters for autonomous EU operations, such as France during Operation Artemis in 2003.

**Civ-mil cell**
The Civil-Military Cell supports the co-ordination of civil and military operations. The CivMil Cell is located within – and is responsible to – the EUMS, being an integral part of the EUMS that reports to CIVCOM and EUMC. Its specific aim includes enhancing the EU’s capacity for crisis-management planning; reinforcing national HQ that are designated to conduct an EU autonomous operation; and generating the capacity to plan and run an autonomous operation (see Khol, 2006). The CivMil Cell is composed of a comprehensive strategic planning unit and a permanent core of permanent staff that forms the Operations Centre. The planning unit consists of eight military planners and seven civilian planners (including two from the European Commission). The Operations Centre Permanent Staff comprises five military staff and four information systems administrators. The
Operations Centre, when activated, will be under the Operations Commander, who will be appointed by the Council to command the respective military operation and will be responsible for conducting the mission at the strategic level. Given its location in the Council Secretariat Structure, the Civ-Mil cell can improve coherence between the civilian and military aspects of ESDP, but it is not in a strong position to coordinate measures across pillars. With respect to increasing efficiency for civil–military co-ordination, it has been suggested that the Cell be taken out of the EUMS and installed as an overall co-ordination mechanism at the working level, even though this runs counter to some member state and Council Secretariat bureaucratic interests (Erhardt, 2007).

**CPCC**
The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) was established in August 2007 in order to provide the planning structure for CIVCOM. It is part of the Council Secretariat, and is responsible for eight missions: EUPM, EUPT and EULEX Kosovo, EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah; EUJUST LEX, EUPOL Afghanistan; EUPOL RD Congo; and EU SSR Guinea-Bissau. CPCC consists of approximately 60 staff in Brussels divided between Council officials (50%) and seconded national experts (50%) in order to develop integrated working methods and procedures (ESDP Newsletter, 2008). CPCC is responsible for the protection of ESDP staff and supports the conduct of the mission. The advantage of CPCC is a unified and clear chain of command for civilian ESDP operations. It is to acquire full operational capability later this year (2008) in order to improve the planning and conduct of the missions under its responsibility.

**The Commission**
The Commission plays an important role in EU crisis management. In the CFSP the Commission is “fully associated”, and a representative of the Commission sits in on RELEX working groups, as well as the PSC and CIVCOM. Other aspects of the Commission’s role include the management of the EU budget, the network of Commission delegations in third countries that can act in support of ESDP crisis-management operations, and its permanent presence in the troika. With respect to ESDP the Commission remains an essential player, in particular due to its support (and partly financing) of ESDP operations. The role of the Commission as far as crisis management and CMCO is concerned lies in its contribution to both long-term conflict-prevention activities and short-term crisis interventions. With respect to long-term conflict prevention, the Commission DG Relex and DG Development are most important with respect to conflict prevention.
DG Relex houses a conflict-prevention and crisis-management unit that coordinates conflict-prevention activities and provides the Council with a watch-list of potential crises. The launch of the Instrument for Stability (IfS) in 2007 in particular enhanced the Commission’s crisis-response component. A financial instrument to respond urgently to crises, it aims to improve the link between first-pillar and second-pillar operations, as well as to streamline short-term crisis responses with the longer-term programmes of the European Community. Its total budget for 2007 was €100 million. The IfS replaces the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), which, with a modest budget of around €30 million, financed projects of up to six months and either kick-started programmes under geographic budget lines or dovetailed with CFSP/ESDP. Measures adopted under the RRM included funding after the 2001 intervention in Afghanistan, in response to the Aceh peace process as well as the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) to the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. The IfS is explicitly considered to be part of the EU’s overall capacity to respond to crisis situations in third countries, and to ensure that EU instruments work together as a coherent whole. IfS crisis-response programmes supported a range of issues targeted at post-conflict situations either in the form of short-term support to develop SSR, complementary measures in areas where ESDP is deployed, or support to regional peace-building capacities. The largest share of the funds (43%) was allocated for measures in sub-Saharan Africa, followed by the Middle East (22%) and the Western Balkans (11%) (European Commission, 2008).

DG Development, on the other hand, contributes to conflict prevention through long-term programming aimed at structural improvements: its mandate is to enhance development policies, to provide policy guidance on development policy, and to oversee the programming of aid in the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT). The Cotonou Agreement provides the framework for development aid to the 77 ACP countries, funded mainly by the European Development Fund (EDF), which delivers long-term development aid. Immediate crisis relief can also be provided through the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), which is responsible for humanitarian assistance to third countries that are affected by conflicts or disasters, whether natural or man-made. ECHO has some relevance to CMCO in the sense that it provides an immediate disaster response in a given crisis. However, it constitutes a needs-based instrument (see Gourlay, 2006) rather than one, like the IfS, that is used to kick-start responses in crisis situations that lead to longer-term support.
Institutional improvements through the Lisbon Treaty: towards coherence?
The foreign policy provisions of the Lisbon Treaty promise some measure of relief from the pillar divide that separates CFSP/ESDP instruments from those at the disposal of the European Commission, which negatively affect CMCO. Treaty provisions call for a ‘High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’, a post that will be double-hatted as Vice President of the Commission, and that will be supported by a European External Action Service (EEAS). This post will alleviate the pillar divide, although the exact composition of the EEAS and its relations with member states’ diplomatic representations and ESDP missions have yet to be determined. The Treaty also foresees an expansion in the scope of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). This includes the delegation of ‘tasks’ to a ‘group of member states’ that have the necessary will and capabilities, as well as the possibility for permanent structured cooperation, that permits those member states ‘whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions [to] establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework’. The explicit goal is to improve capabilities through either explicit benchmarks or incremental changes through the political incentives of being in or out of a grouping. Changes outlined in the Treaty thus increase the potential for coherence, particularly in the application of instruments located in the first and second. However, it is worth bearing in mind that the exact parameters of the implementation of Treaty provisions, particularly as regards the EEAS, remain vague, and the timing of their implementation uncertain.
5. Financial and human resources

Financing and staffing missions have emerged as one of the key challenges in carrying out crisis-management missions. Apart from inadequate financial means in light of the ever-growing demands on EU foreign policy in general and CFSP/ESDP and crisis management in particular, there are two issues with respect to financing that have come to haunt crisis-management operations: first, difficulties in aligning procurement cycles with mission implementation, with the start of missions frequently preceding the arrival of the necessary equipment; and secondly, the financing operations of military operations in particular. Their “costs lie where they fall” principle, privileges (or taxes, depending on one’s view point) the larger and wealthier member states and make it difficult for smaller states to assume leadership, thus highlighting the problem of simultaneously achieving leadership and legitimacy in ESDP (see Giegerich and Gross, 2006).

Financing European crisis management

There are different mechanisms for financing civilian and military missions. Generally, operating expenditure is charged to the CFSP budget “except for such expenditure arising from operations having military or defense implications” (TEU, Art. 28). With respect to civilian crisis management, funds can be drawn from a number of sources: the EU/CFSP general budget, the European Development Fund (EDF), the Instrument for Stability (IfS), as well as ad hoc missions. The CFSP budget covers the operational costs of specific CFSP Joint Actions, including support for EU Special Representatives. For civilian ESDP operations, it covers the common costs, but the salaries of seconded personnel are born by the member states.

In terms of budgetary resources for crisis management, the Financial Framework for 2007-2013 allocates € 1.740 million for CFSP, € 2.531 for IfS and € 8.046 million for an emergency aid reserve and other ad hoc envelopes such as humanitarian aid. IfS funding, like RRM funding previously, has worked relatively well and has made a valuable contribution to first- and second-pillar crisis-management initiatives. However, there remain some problems with civilian crisis management and concerns over the cost and delivery of equipment for crisis-management operations in particular. Procurement for civilian missions happens through framework contracts, and in the past there have been significant delays in the procurement cycle that have affected individual crisis missions. Lastly, the EDF can also be used to support civilian crisis management in ACP countries. As EDF resources are channelled through either
grants or loans, this resource can be used for support programmes run by organizations working in close cooperation with the EU.

Military crisis management is explicitly excluded from the CFSP budget. The ATHENA mechanism, which took effect in March 2004, institutionalized the “costs lie where they fall” principle for member states’ military contributions to ESDP operation. Common costs of military missions, on the other hand, are borne by a common operational budget in which individual contributions are calculated on a member state’s share of the EU’s GNP. All EU member states, with the exception of Denmark, participate, and third countries may contribute as well. Common costs can cover aspects of the planning phase, including costs incurred through fact-finding missions or the running of the operational headquarters during the actual mission (Bendiek and Bringmann, 2008).

Financing the missions by means of contributions from individual member states through the “costs lie where they fall” principle has the disadvantage of uneven burden-sharing amongst contributing member states. Smaller member states accordingly find it difficult to act as lead nations or to finance missions based on their own military and defence resources. At the same time, individual member states object to the expansion of common costing at the expense of national influence over decision-making (Bendiek and Bringmann, 2008). Finally, administrative costing and member-states’ co-financing can be used to realize certain projects with private companies, international organizations or the EU – for example, the EU Commission has financed CIMIC projects within PRTs/ISAF in Afghanistan.

**Staffing ESDP missions**

Staffing crisis missions has revealed its own range of problems as a result of the experience of initial ESDP missions. With respect to the staffing of military missions, member states commitments to contributing troops and adequate equipment to missions, as well as significant levels of deployment under NATO or UN frameworks through ISAF in Afghanistan or UNIFIL in Lebanon, have most recently delayed the launch of EUFOR Chad and regularly provoke discussions over insufficient defence budgets and commitments to military crisis management under ESDP. At the same time, there is a structural asymmetry between military personnel, who are trained for specific operations, and civilian personnel, who are drawn from national administrations. Initially no work was being carried out towards developing either a blueprint or provision for training for overseas crisis missions. As a result, whereas the availability, training and deployment of personnel in military crisis manage-
ment is sufficiently structured and routine not to create obstacles to the execution of operations once member states have made commitments to individual missions, civilian crisis-management operations have regularly experienced problems in attracting qualified personnel. This is a function of the specific nature of the expertise sought, the increasing demand for civilian crisis management staff, and the problem of providing adequately and uniformly trained personnel.

The potential added value of CRTs is their ability to provide reliable, trained expertise capable of being mobilized at short notice. Given the relatively small size of a pool of a hundred experts in light of the personnel needs for the ever-increasing number of civilian crisis missions, in order for the EU to ensure a comprehensive and effective response to crisis situations, the EU and its member states face the need to enhance the recruitment and training procedures of civilian personnel. Fundamentally, the problem with staffing civilian missions is that the expertise and personnel sought compete with national domestic needs: police and justice personnel are primarily educated and trained for domestic employment and function within national career schemes. This creates several problems. First, qualified personnel are often equally needed at home, and persuading national administrations to release personnel, especially qualified personnel, can be difficult. This in part explains the reluctance over commitments to increase the size of individual missions, or the slow speed with which individual missions are filled. Secondly, the system of secondment needs to be improved in order to facilitate re-entry for those who are participating in ESDP operations and to reduce career uncertainties (European Parliament, 2006). Thirdly, and finally, the fact that staffs are being seconded from national administrations means that there often is no common training or understanding of the task at hand, and that skills and expertise developed in the national context are often not adequate or appropriate for a mission in third countries.
6. Coordination

The coordination of various crisis-management instruments in individual theatres has revealed shortfalls in both internal and external coordination, which hamper the implementation of a comprehensive approach. With respect to internal coordination, this highlights that, despite the fact that the EU is in a privileged position to act as a comprehensive crisis manager, coordinating the EU family poses significant challenges when it comes to operationalizing CMCO. Beyond the aspect of internal coordination, however, there is also the aspect of external coordination. Whereas coordination between the UN and the EU in crisis management has become increasingly institutionalized, that between the EU and NATO remains difficult, with predictable consequences for coordination efforts. Further, external coordination also involves individual non-EU states engaging in SSR and crisis management, such as the US.

Internal Coordination
Experience in theatre highlights the fact that coordinating the EU family and implementing CMCO remain challenging. Shortfalls in coordination have, for instance, affected the role of the EUSR in a number of theatres, but also the running of two concurrent ESDP operations in Bosnia in particular. Lastly, the disconnect between mission start dates and procurement cycles has impeded the running of individual missions, indicating that coordination not only affects the running of missions in theatre, but also the planning process that precedes it.

The scenario of the EUSR assuming the role of an EU focal point in theatre has not always proved to be realistic in practice. In principle, the post of EUSR is intended to coordinate operational activities with the EU Presidency, the Commission, ESDP operations and the mission of the member states (Grevi, 2007). In practice there is limited administrative support and the EUSR is not usually part of the chain of command of ESDP operations. This in turn has meant that the EU is not (yet) speaking with one voice when it comes to implementing crisis-management activities. The disconnect between an ESDP operation and the EUSR negatively affects the impact of crisis-management operations if the “voice”, “eyes and ears” – and as a result also political influence in theatre – is disconnected from the implementation of reform. In theatre, the combination of EUSR and ESDP operations together with the presence of the EC Delegation means that the “voice” of the EU is further diluted and the coordination of programming made more difficult. While the double-hatting of the EUSR/Head of Delegation has alleviated some of these coordination problems in
practice in the case of FYROM, the double-hatting solution has not been replicated elsewhere due to either member-state or Commission reservations concerning the possible introduction of “the Constitution by the back door” in the case of double-hatting the head of Delegation with that of EUSR; or of the Commission losing influence if a Council-appointed EUSR assumes the task of Head of Delegation. As a result, the method of double-hatting has to date been only very selectively used, and the post of EUSR has not aided the achievement of coordination in the field and therefore CMCO.

The experience of coordinating concurrent civilian and military crisis-management operations in Bosnia in particular illustrates difficulties of coordinating mission mandates and of taking into account operational and structural differences between military and civilian crisis-management operations. As part of its mandate to provide security reassurance, EUFOR focused in part on fighting organized crime, an approach that did not find favour with the EU Police Mission EUPM (Leaky, 2006) One of the reasons why EUFOR decided to focus its support on organized crime to begin with was the fact that EUPM’s original mandate was unable to tackle this issue to begin with (Penksa, 2006). Although the EUPM mandate was eventually strengthened in order to give the police mission the leadership and coordinating role among the ESDP operations, the Bosnian experience illustrates the perils of not planning and defining mission tasks and of leaving coordination problems to be identified and solved in the field.

With respect to procurement, delays and shortfalls have affected civilian mission throughout ESDP’s operational history from the Balkans (see Ioannides, 2007) to EUPOL Afghanistan, where delays in the provision of both IT equipment and armoured vehicles prevented EUPOL staff from venturing outside their Kabul compound and delayed the mission’s implementation further (interview with member state official, Brussels, April 2008). Taken together, problems of internal coordination can affect equipping missions, cooperation with other EU actors in the field, and connecting the operational and political roles of EU crisis-management actors. This also shows that, despite the fact that Council and Commission officials participate and closely cooperate in the fact-finding missions that precede the launch of an operation, in practice the inter-pillar divide hampers coordination in theatre.

*External Coordination*
With respect to coordinating with external actors, the EU can look to formalized agreements with both NATO and the UN, the two organizations it has cooperated
with most closely. In practice, however, the relationship with NATO leaves much room for improvement – analysts have gone as far as terming the relationship a “frozen conflict” (Hofmann and Reynolds, 2007) – and coordination with the UN, while growing closer on the political level, in practical terms has not been immune to growing pains.

While the Berlin Plus arrangements concluded in 2002 give the EU access to NATO planning assets in carrying out military ESDP operations and were concluded in order to put transatlantic differences over the relationship between EU and NATO to rest, in practice only one ongoing ESDP operation – EUFOR Althea in Bosnia – is a Berlin Plus operation. EU–NATO cooperation is still required, however, in theatres in which the EU and NATO operate concurrently, and here the coordination problems and the current deadlock due to Turkey’s objection to closer NATO–EU relations are more pronounced and have partially delayed or negatively impacted on ESDP operations. Afghanistan is a case in point: although the EC is the biggest donor to Afghanistan, although the EU has appointed an EUSR and has launched an ESDP operation, and although member states contribute significantly to ISAF and since July 2007 also to EUPOL Afghanistan, no formal EU–NATO discussions are taking place over the coordination or exchange of intelligence. The lack of external coordination in the form of intelligence-sharing or issuing a security guarantee to the impending ESDP operation forced the EU to conclude technical agreements with the lead nations of individual Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in order for EUPOL to be able to operate outside Kabul and inside PRTs. Technical agreements between the EU and NATO were also necessary in the case of Bosnia, where EUFOR Althea and remaining NATO elements in charge of conducting defence reform were operating concurrently, although the problems over how to coordinate these two operations and share infrastructure and intelligence pale in comparison to those relating to Afghanistan. The problem of EU–NATO coordination does not lie between the two institutions themselves but in the capitals of NATO member states, Turkey in particular. This illustrates the centrality of member-state involvement and of political positions in what remains a fundamentally intergovernmental framework.

EU–UN cooperation in crisis management has become increasingly institutionalized on the political as well as operational levels, as both military operations in DRC in support of the UN should be understood as contributions to wider UN operations in the spirit of effective multilateralism. In the Balkans, close EU–UN coordination

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1 Operation Concordia in FYROM, the first ever military ESDP mission, was also a Berlin Plus operation.
continues to be required in Kosovo and to a lesser extent also in Bosnia, where the first ever ESDP mission, EUPM, was a take-over mission from the UN. Institutionalized cooperation was first proposed in 2001 and was to include EU ministerial-level meetings with the UN Secretary-General; meetings and contacts between the EU HR/SG and the DG Relex Commissioner on the one hand and the UN Deputy Secretary General on the other; PSC meetings with the UN Deputy Secretary General and Under Secretaries General; and contacts between the Council Secretariat and the Commission with the UN Secretariat. In January 2003 task forces were set up to co-ordinate the interaction between the two organizations at the appropriated levels, but it was when ESDP launched its first mission in 2003 that the EU–UN relationship gained substance.

After the completion of Operation Artemis, in September 2003 the EU and the UN signed the “Joint declaration on EU-UN co-operation in crisis management”, which suggests practical steps to further cooperation, including a declaration establishing a joint consultative mechanism at working level to examine ways to enhance co-ordination. The implementation of these commitments with regard to military crisis management was discussed by the European Council in 2004. Two options for cooperation were addressed: the provision of national military capabilities within the framework of a UN operation; and an EU operation in answer to a UN request in support of the UN but under the political control and strategic direction of the EU. Rapid response operations received particular attention and envisaged two categories: the bridging model, which is to provide the UN with the time to mount a new operation or to re-organize an existing one; and the “stand-by model”, where the EU provides an “over the horizon reserve” or an “extraction force” in support of the UN.

Current cooperation patterns as a result of the formalization of recent years thus include bi-annual steering committee meetings; contacts between the secretariats that have been established at different levels; the discussion of training standards and modules; UN personnel participation in EU training courses; and dialogue on planning and EU–UN cooperation, such as took place in the EU–UN Exercise Study EST 05 in April 2005. The EU–UN joint statement of June 2007 reaffirms their “determination to work together in the area of crisis management” and calls for the enhancement of mutual cooperation and coordination in precise areas, such as senior-level political dialogue, coordination and cooperation mechanisms in crises in which both are engaged, and systematic lessons learned. However, the experience of EUFOR DR Congo, a mission launched in support of a UN peace-keeping operation (MONUC), shows that, despite the generally successful and positive efforts
in EU–UN coordination in crisis management, perfect external coordination in theatre was not quite achieved for a number of reasons: the complexity of the agreed procedures; the different levels of responsibility and perceptions of the chain of command, where EUFOR regarded itself as autonomous rather than subordinate to MONUC; the limitations of EUFOR in terms of capacities and tasks; and different overall emphases in which MONUC focused on its broader political mandate, while EUFOR Congo followed a purely military logic (Major, 2008).
7. Analysis

Based on the development of the conceptual and operational strategies, institutional design and experience of ESDP operations in recent years, a number of drivers and barriers can be identified that will impact the extent to which the EU can successfully implement CMCO and which highlight enduring problems and dilemmas.

Drivers
Among the drivers of continued work on perfecting CMCO and putting into practice a “culture of coordination” are the increasing demands placed on comprehensive crisis management in general and ESDP in particular. The trajectory of missions that started with Bosnia and that has continued to include Afghanistan and currently Chad and Guinea Bissau demonstrates that the focus on SSR, the internal and external coordination of civilian and military operations, and the activities of non-governmental actors in conflict and post-conflict zones, remain highly relevant. Put simply, the key threats identified in the 2003 ESS continue to be relevant today, and the nature of these threats not only points to their interconnectedness, but also to the centrality of state-building and post-conflict reconstruction in restoring and maintaining international security. The ongoing lessons learned as a result of individual ESDP operations, and institutional developments as a result of the increasing demand on both coherence and operational experience in the field, act as important drivers in the process of pushing a comprehensive approach forward. Individual EU member states as well as the EU level have ongoing processes defining the nature of comprehensive approaches on the national as well as European levels. This indicates the increasing institutionalization of CMCO on the European level – understood as both nation-state and EU levels – that will guide future operations in crisis management.

Barriers
Despite the not insignificant push factors towards more integrated European crisis management, there are several barriers to effective civil-military coordination. These in part derive from disjointed efforts on the part of various actors, operational experience that has seen more repetitions than improvements on lessons to be learnt, and problems of capabilities, burden-sharing and an institutional division of labour that has haunted ESDP since its creation ten years ago.

Weak military capabilities, and a reluctance to equip and push the ESDP in particular, continue to act against mission effectiveness, as well as against creating new
momentum for a more capable ESDP. Current initiatives taken by the French EU Presidency on European defence show enduring divisions between the British and the French approaches and political commitments to ESDP. And, as ten years ago, without agreement between the two major military powers in Europe, significant progress is unlikely. Ten years after the Franco-British summit at St Malo that started ESDP, Paris is attempting another push on European defence with an emphasis on increasing capabilities, while London continues to object to plans to establish a planning centre for the ESDP, despite welcoming Sarkozy’s initiatives to return France to the military command of NATO, which it left in 1966 (see Centre of European Reform, 2008). While a French return to the military command of NATO suggests that an inter-institutional division of labour might be arrived at that could put to rest or at least ease current disputes (although it would not solve the problem of Turkey), more worryingly, there does not seem to be much interest in European, let alone European defence affairs on the part of the current British government; and this does not bode well for a sustained breakthrough or creative and committed thinking on the part of key member states. Debates and differences in 2003 over the idea of an autonomous EU headquarters and concerns over a de-coupling from NATO impacted debates over, and the design of, the civ-mil cell, for instance (see Quille et al., 2006), and revealed enduring divisions between the Atlanticist and Europeanist positions within the EU (see also Witney, 2008). While the need for closer cooperation with NATO is acknowledged, the exact nature of this cooperation remains undefined. The enduring reluctance on the part of member states to equip ESDP with the necessary capabilities compounds the problem of increasing EU crisis-management capabilities.

Aside from member states’ commitments as regards their capabilities and the tension between transatlantic and European commitments, a second barrier to the development of and progress on CMCO lies in the different modes of implementation and progress being made in conceptual thinking on the part of the member states. Whereas the UK and Austria are relatively advanced in conceptual thinking and implementation – after all, their respective EU Presidencies in 2005 kept the issue on the priority list and signalled their respective commitments – and whereas Sweden and Finland have traditionally emphasized civilian crisis management as well as CIMIC, other countries not only define the “comprehensive approach” differently, but are also at different stages with respect to conceptual clarification, cross-ministry collaboration and budgeting. Given the necessary combination of national bureaucracies and resources, which requires cross-ministry coordination that is not always part of national foreign and security policy machineries (for instance, police forces in many
EU member states are under the authority of the ministry of the interior, constructing CMCO is essentially a bottom-up process that must be transported on to the European agenda. Linking the work of national ministries as well as national concepts must go hand in hand with EU-level development and implementation. Given the relatively recent emphasis on CMCO on the EU level, creating or “Europeanizing” national practices is bound to require additional time and effort.

A brief comparison between France, Britain, Germany, Finland and Denmark illustrates this. Finland prefers a scenario of handling conflict prevention and civilian and military crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction jointly so as to have available a spectrum of instruments best suited to the specific stages of a conflict. The government white book on “Finnish Security and Defense Policy” makes explicit mention of an active and comprehensive policy of conflict prevention and crisis management. In addition, two international training centres undertake civilian-military training and are to organize a joint civil-military course on integrated crisis management that aims to facilitate coordination in the field by training civilian experts, soldiers and NGO representatives in October 2008. The budget line for Civilian Crisis Management is EUR 14.5 million.

France, by contrast, emphasizes its activities in short-term crisis management and long-term reconstruction efforts, and it places these activities explicitly within the EU’s activities. In this vein, in 2007 France adopted a policy paper on Fragile States and Situations of Fragility, but it also strongly supports the growing involvement of the EU. Given France’s emphasis on fragile states, an interagency network has been set up in the Foreign Ministry that regularly meets to share analysis from individual embassies to identify priorities, but little is said regarding a comprehensive approach or CMCO specifically. Germany considers a comprehensive approach to consist of “Networked Security” that comprises the areas of economic, developmental, environmental, financial, educational and social policy. The 2004 Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace Building action plan affirms the government’s intention to orient German activities more towards conflict prevention, roughly following the logic of the 2003 ESS. While the military is said to be an integral part of policy responses, the key emphasis seems to be on civilian instruments: no explicit role for the military is foreseen, and much emphasis is placed on conflict prevention through development.

The UK interprets the comprehensive approach as an effort to bring together government departments and other stakeholders in crisis management in order to promote
shared understandings, aims and objectives; to develop structures and processes; and
to establish relationships and understandings through training exercises in analysis
and planning. An integrated civil-military approach appears as a clear strategic politi-
cal commitment in the 2008 UK National Security Strategy. The UK’s Stabilization
Unit (formerly the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit) is tasked with assessment and
planning, providing personnel, and sharing and identifying best practice in the UK and
internationally, being the repository for lessons learned in civilian crisis management.
Fundamentally, the UK sees its efforts as part of a stronger NATO, a more effective
EU and most importantly more integrated cooperation with the UN.

Denmark has an explicit policy on Concerted Civil-military Planning and Action and
has actively promoted the Comprehensive Approach in NATO. But in the EU the
Danish voice has been muted by the country’s opt-out with regard to participation in
EU military activities, which resulted from the negotiations following the rejection
of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1992. As a consequence, Denmark had to pull out of
Bosnia-Herzegovina when the EU took over from NATO and has not been able to
contribute to the deployment of EU troops in UN missions in Africa, otherwise a
Danish priority. Thus, Denmark has to pursue its civil-military agenda within NATO,
the international organization that, compared to the EU and the UN, is least suited
to a comprehensive approach (DIIS 2008).

Experience
Despite the barriers listed above, and despite the different national conceptions and
commitments to integrated crisis management, the experience of crisis-management
operations has led to improvements in both coordination and mission design. Expe-
rience in the Balkans in particular has yielded a substantial lessons-learned process.
Commission involvement in mission planning and design, attention to mandates
and expertise required, and efforts to increase joint training and provide a pool of
experts show that the experience of crisis management has led to a more comprehen-
sive conceptualization of crisis management. At the same time, transposing lessons
learned and experience gathered to the next mission has its difficulties as well, given
that the theatres in which the EU places its missions are becoming progressively
more complex. Whereas ESDP in Bosnia profited from a complex but inherently
stable and fairly secure political constellation in which to test and consolidate its
crisis-management structures, experience in Afghanistan and Chad presents the EU
with different kinds of state-building and security challenges – and, in the case of
Afghanistan, with a contested international field as well, where the US, NATO and
other international players are all claiming a stake in the post-conflict reconstruction
The experience gathered so far also underlines the drivers and barriers identified in previous sections: the increasing demand for European crisis management – on the basis of its comprehensive set of instruments – is leading the EU to place missions in increasingly complex contexts, while institutional bottlenecks, competition and deadlocks negatively impact on individual missions.

Despite increasingly speedy decision-making, staffing the missions has become a recurring problem, revealing member states reluctant commitment to equipping the EU with the forces they have in principle agreed to provide. It also shows that, although member states are generally happy to give their consent to individual missions, this does not automatically translate into providing forces and equipment, as the force generation process in Chad and as delays in the staffing and equipping of EUPOL Afghanistan both demonstrate. The problem of staffing is not just one of limited EU capacities, as this paper has shown in previous sections – it is also that individual member states are committed to operations outside the EU framework in theatres such as Iraq or Afghanistan. Despite individual member states having military capabilities at their disposal, as long as these capabilities and troops are committed to NATO missions, UN operations or coalitions of the willing as in the case of Iraq, they distract from the EU’s growing capabilities, and drive home the fact that national commitments to EU crisis management are more easily given in principle than in practice. Current problems in carrying out and putting in place missions in Kosovo and to a lesser extent in Afghanistan also demonstrates the link to the broader geostrategic issues that the EU and its member states are grappling with: the lack of a UNSC resolution, and diverging positions on recognizing Kosovo have postponed the start date of EULEX Kosovo, while the sensitive political atmosphere with respect to transatlantic and EU–NATO relations, coupled with procurement shortfalls and a challenging local context, are negatively impacting on EUPOL Afghanistan’s mission effectiveness. This gives added importance to aligning the macro and micro levels of the EU’s geopolitical position and CMCO implementation.

**Effectiveness**

The “effectiveness” of individual missions and their overarching concepts is difficult to measure, and judgment in large part depends on the standards adopted. If one adopts as a standard for effectiveness whether or not individual missions can carry out their mandates, the number of missions the EU is able to launch, or the speed with which the EU can plan and execute a mission, then the EU – and CMCO – can be said to be by and large effective: ESDP missions have been able to carry out their mandates, the EU has been able to launch an impressive number of missions over the past five
years that increasingly combine civilian and military instruments, and decisions to launch missions have generally been taking quickly.

However, if effectiveness is taken to mean the EU’s impact on the ground where it is active through ESDP or coordinating with other international actors in contested political settings such as Afghanistan, its record is mixed, although the experience of EU–UN cooperation in DRC was sufficiently positive to allow us to talk of effectiveness.

Lastly, if one takes effectiveness to mean successful coordination and progress towards a culture of coordination and therefore CMCO, then the record is decidedly mixed. On the positive side, both Council and Commission personnel are involved in the fact-finding and planning stages of individual ESDP missions, and the EU has appointed an EUSR to reinforce its political presence in most areas where it has an ESDP mission. On the downside, the individual instruments deployed in theatre have not achieved coordination in practice. For instance, EUSRs are usually not part of the chain of command of ESDP missions and, as a result, the crisis management of ESDP missions is separate from the political representation as well as reporting from the EUSR. Commission Delegations, on the other hand, operate separately from second-pillar instruments, which frequently lead to at least three distinct EU voices and policies in the field. Lastly, although lessons-learned documents on individual ESDP missions are collected, there is no common template for setting benchmarks, reporting, training or implementing lessons-learned processes. As a result, many ‘lessons’ all too often have to be learned again in subsequent missions.

**Dilemmas**

One recurring dilemma for the EU’s foreign policy and now also its crisis-management ambitions is what has been termed the capability–expectations gap: while the EU is taking on an increasing number of missions and developing a growing profile as a security actor, it does not always have the resources to back up its commitments. This resource crunch is now evident in Afghanistan and to a lesser extent also in Kosovo. Increasing demand for the EU’s crisis management portfolio, in other words, outstrips what the EU is able to supply at this point. And while in the past the EU has grown predominantly as a result of external crises and its failure to respond in a united fashion (as in Iraq in 2003 or in Kosovo in 1999), limited commitments of member states and the current institutional framework place restrictions on what the EU can deliver and how coherently it can deliver it. The rejection of the implementation of the foreign-policy provisions of the Lisbon Treaty and what looks like their consequent
and infinite delay means that the increased coherence and representation of the EU abroad is some way off, and that the EU and the member states will have to continue to operate under an imperfect institutional structure for some time to come.
8. Conclusion

Overall, the development of the EU’s crisis-management capabilities and policies, as well as the elaboration and implementation of CMCO, bear witness to significant achievements in EU foreign and security policy, despite the shortfalls and bottlenecks cited above. Institutional improvement and development is continuing, although the Irish “no” to the Lisbon Treaty has put a stop to speedy institutional change and improvement. Given the centrality of member states’ resources and commitments, CMCO remains to a large extent a “bottom-up” process that is fed from the more careful elaboration of national approaches to a “comprehensive approach” and the EU’s role in this comprehensive approach, as well as the alignment of different national emphases and idiosyncrasies with that of the EU. As key drivers in the further development of a culture of coordination member states have a key role in the further elaboration of CMCO, not only by keeping the topic on the political agenda, but also through their role in the design and oversight of individual crisis-management missions.

Beyond further conceptual work at the national and EU levels, the question of capabilities, staffing and procurement continue to pose significant challenges to the EU in its execution of crisis missions. Beyond broader strategic questions over the EU’s role in the world and its interactions with other institutional players such as the UN and, more controversially, NATO, the EU will have to improve on these capability issues before it is able to exert a greater strategic impact. While having all instruments under one roof does not automatically translate into easier coordination, identifying and working on the main barriers to effective action should provide the necessary input to increase significantly the EU’s delivery of a “comprehensive approach” and its realization of the desired “culture of cooperation”.
### List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-military cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIVCOM</td>
<td>Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMCO</td>
<td>Civil-military coordination</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPCC</td>
<td>Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRT</td>
<td>Civilian Response Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defense Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate General</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUJUST LEX</td>
<td>European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq</td>
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<td>EUSR</td>
<td>European Union Special Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Policy</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUBAM</td>
<td>European Union Border Assistance Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>European Union Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUJUST</td>
<td>European Union Rule of Law Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
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<td>EUMS</td>
<td>European Union Military Staff</td>
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<td>EUPM</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission</td>
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<td>EUPT</td>
<td>European Union Planning Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<tr>
<td>HG</td>
<td>Headline Goal</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR/SC</td>
<td>High Representative/Secretary General</td>
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<tr>
<td>IfS</td>
<td>Instrument for Stability</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCT</td>
<td>Overseas Countries and Territories</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
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<td>RELEX</td>
<td>External Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>RRM</td>
<td>Rapid Reaction Mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>SITCEN</td>
<td>Joint Situation Centre</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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References


