INTEGRATED NATIONAL APPROACHES
TO INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
THE CASES OF DENMARK, UK, AND
THE NETHERLANDS

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List of abbreviations

3D Development, Diplomacy, Defence
ACPP Africa Conflict Prevention Pool
ALA Asia-Latin America Office, Danish MFA
CA Comprehensive Approach
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation
CPA Concerted Planning and Action
DAC Development Agencies Committee
DANIDA Danish International Development Assistance
DCDC Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre (UK)
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DFID Department for International development
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
EBAO Effects-Based Approach to Operations
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EU European Union
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office
HUM Office for Humanitarian Assistance and NGOs, Danish MFA
IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IDP Internally Displaced Persons
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
JDN Joint Discussion Note
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
MENA Middle East and Northern Africa Office, Danish MFA
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MNE Multi-national Experiment
MoD Ministry of Defence
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
ODA Official Development Assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team
RUD Reconstruction Unit Denmark
SCSC Standing Civil Servant’s Committee
SSR Security Sector Reform
ToR  Terms of Reference
UN   United Nations
WGA  Whole of Government Approach
Executive summary

As part of a larger study of how to improve Danish concerted civil and military planning and action, this sub-report looks at the national approaches of Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK. On the basis of available documents and interviews, the report analyses the concepts, policies and structures that each has developed, as well as the drivers of and problems with the processes involved. This is a moving target, as the three governments are trying to adapt to the challenges and changing conditions of operation in southern Afghanistan, where the three governments have all deployed troops. The same problems with and urgency of the enterprise are experienced as drivers of change in the respective national capitals, and the attempts to integrate civil and military instruments seem to be meeting the same obstacles.

The Danish Concerted Planning and Action initiative has created a simple structure and instruments for the interaction of mainly governmental development, humanitarian and military actors in the context of NATO and Coalition operations. In doing so, it has broken down some barriers and facilitated exchanges, mutual understanding and closer cooperation at the strategic and tactical levels. However, in the wider system and for the general public, Concerted Planning and Action has been associated with military involvement in reconstruction activities at the tactical level rather than the pursuit of more strategic coherence between political, security and development actors and instruments. In terms of decision-making, direction, monitoring and lessons learned, the capacity and charge of the Standing Civil Servant Committee is too limited, while operational planning and coordination has moved into ad hoc structures for country planning and operation.

The UK Whole of Government (or Comprehensive) Approach has developed around the issue of security-sector reform, as well as NATO/Coalition led military operations. The government has set up inter-departmental funds and bodies to facilitate coordination of the three key departments and to fill in the gaps in activities that none of them can fill independently. The Stabilisation Unit has increased operational capacity and functions as a repository of expertise, in terms of both institutional memory and human resources. But the case also shows the importance of ensuring participation by all relevant parties, as well as a clear lead organization. While the Cabinet Office is able to play this role in certain instances, this is not the case in the field if coordination becomes personality-driven as a consequence. After eight years
of experience, it remains to be seen whether institutional collaboration in the UK can be established in a way that does not lead to inter-departmental tensions.

The Netherlands' Integrated Approach has developed alongside the military engagements in NATO and Coalition-led military operations, but security-sector reform has been an important element as well. Integration is pursued through a series of instruments, including exchanges of advisors and inter-departmental funds. However, operations are still by and large stove-piped, and no overall planning format exists. Little integration of civil and military strategies has occurred, but civil-military relations are building up from the field. In 2008 a new Fragility and Peace-building Office was established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which focuses on issues of the fragile states agenda. But even though the ambition is to enhance an integrated approach, the entity remains intra-departmental.

In the three capitals, interviewees note the same differences in institutional cultures, objectives, operational time-scales and working conditions in respect of the participating institutions. Development (and humanitarian) offices, for example, have resisted what they perceive to be the instrumentalization of aid for security purposes. In all three countries, the differences between departments are supplemented by considerable differences between the field levels and headquarters. Much of the impetus for further integration seems to come from the field, where the effects of a lack of departmental coordination are experienced.

Despite the explicit interest of key actors in broadening the scope of participating institutions in the integrated approach, the interest of ministries beyond the ‘3Ds’ (diplomacy, defense and development) remain limited, with a few exceptions. If Ministries of the Interior, Justice, Finance, Economy and Trade are to be included, proposals for their contribution should be specific, and their involvement is likely to be personality-driven. Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be prepared to give support to the internationalization of the mainly domestically oriented ministries.

While there are many similarities between the three national approaches, there are also significant differences. In the UK (and also in the Netherlands), the development department has promoted inter-departmental cooperation around the issue of security-sector reform in post-conflict and fragile states and in general worked consistently on the fragile states agenda. In Denmark, current inter-departmental efforts have emerged predominantly in response to the country’s engagement in NATO and Coalition operations, with limited projection towards more general
issues of fragile states and security-sector reform. A concerted effort at defining the policies and roles of political, security-oriented and development instruments with regard to the fragile states agenda remains on the backburner in Denmark.

Against this background, it is recommended that a revision of the Danish approach takes into account a broader set of volatile contexts in which the state has problems in providing security for the population and controlling the territory. While military instruments are often not appropriate or necessary in these contexts, the revised concept should be developed alongside the formulation of policy and decision-making processes with regard to the broader fragile states agenda. In particular, the government should consider the possibility of engaging more systematically in issues and strategies of security sector reform, including police and judiciary reform.

The use of inter-departmental instruments, such as the stabilization unit and inter-departmental funds, constitutes the other main difference between the country cases. An inter-departmental stabilization unit is not a magic bullet, but it does seem to facilitate more systematic cooperation at the operational level in filling the operational gap between development efforts, military campaigns and national-level political initiatives. Over time, the unit is likely to produce a new breed of civil and military servants with ‘3D sensitivities’, provided that secondments and circulation continue. And finally, it can facilitate a more systematic and joined-up approach to analysis, monitoring, evaluation, lessons learned and feedback. Knowing more about the effects of operations is essential, and this is a weak area in the Danish approach.

However, the UK experience also shows that expectations regarding what a stabilization unit can possibly achieve are unrealistic. The unit risks being an orphan without political weight and lacking strategic leadership. If the aim is to generate an integrated approach, there is a need for high-level responsibility and ownership in order to direct rather than just facilitate the coordination of the contributions of the different entities across the government. The lack of a shared planning format and the absence of the entity formally in charge on the ground also represent problems.

It is recommended that the government considers establishing an inter-departmental office for stabilization, peace- and state-building as a home for a revised approach. Reflecting the changes since Concerted Planning and Action was conceived, the administration of the concept should thus be removed from the Humanitarian and NGO Office – a location which was based on the Balkan experience – and placed under as high a charge as possible, either under the Prime Minister’s office, under a committee of Ministers, or at
director’s level in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The size of the office should reflect actual international engagements, with a small core staff including senior officers with field and international organizational experience, and seconded staff from relevant ministries and entities (Defence, Police, Courts and others), while contributing to country-specific task forces with staff from regional and thematic departments.

Importantly, the process should include all potential participants from the beginning in order to ensure ownership.

In the UK and the Netherlands, interdepartmental funds were invented as incentives for further cooperation between the relevant ministries and as a way of providing flexibility vis-à-vis the criteria for official development aid. For Denmark the latter issue remains problematic, in particular with regard to protection in Afghanistan as long as the Danish Armed Forces have a limited capacity to provide protection and support for civilian advisors and experts.

The government should consider setting up an inter-departmental fund in order to increase flexibility and joint initiatives in future engagements. A fund of this kind would reflect the fact that civil-military cooperation may involve expenses that are neither purely military nor primarily oriented towards development, but rather driven by political interests.

A final consideration is the extent to which the Danish government should develop its own strategic and operational civil-military capacities. Denmark will always be a minor actor in international operations and will have to fit in flexibly with other nations’ civil and military contributions. However, given the demands of the current operations, it seems that the government has to develop both the integration of Danish capabilities and instruments, and the ability to define specific civil and/or military contributions that fit into comprehensive strategic and operational set-ups with partner governments and international organizations. For this purpose, it is important that civil and military personnel take part in joint national as well as multilateral exercises where strategic and operational cooperation is developed. Time for participation in such exercises should be factored into the (time) budgets of the civilian institutions.
Introduction

With the end of the Cold War and the new focus on intrastate wars, state fragility and challenges from transnational networks, a reinvigorated international community became increasingly involved in complex peace operations across the globe. Along with this engagement, coordination and coherence became key issues in discussions of how to improve the operational performance and effectiveness of these multi-agency and multilateral operations. In the 1990s, the ‘strategic framework’ process became one expression of this endeavour, but as its failed application in 1998 in Afghanistan demonstrated, the difficulties involved in developing a concerted, international strategy and operational guidelines were huge. In the new millennium, the international interventions in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, along with the heavy involvement of military forces and the re-emergence of counterinsurgency operations, have added impetus and urgency, as well as further complications, to the quest for coherence and coordination.

This sub-report will look into the forms and dynamics of current attempts to develop more coherent and better coordinated approaches to peace-supporting operations, with a focus on the relationship between their military and civilian components. In the report we use the notion of ‘integrated approaches’ as an umbrella for the range of concepts and approaches that have emerged from different quarters, national as well as international, during the past four to five years. Here, the notion of integrated approaches will also cover coordination mechanisms even though they cannot be classified as integration proper.¹

The current movement towards Integrated Approaches appears relatively uniform in its intention and contours, but it is important to understand the complex motivations and paths that have preceded and fed into this movement. This will also contribute to understanding current difficulties in agreeing on the precise meaning and objectives of these concepts. At least three different fields have hosted discussions on and experiments with increased coherence in international responses to violent conflicts, complex emergencies and fragile states:

1. Relief, development and conflict. In the 1990s, the identification of a ‘gap’ between emergency relief and longer term development efforts spurred discussions of

¹ See Friis and Jarmyr eds. 2007; de Coning 2008.
coordination and placed demands on relief agencies to incorporate longer term perspectives, including institution building and conflict transformation, into their concepts and operations. As relief and development organizations increasingly found themselves involved in areas of armed conflict, their interaction with armed actors intensified. Many chose to develop their ability to operate in conflict areas, including instruments for ‘peace and conflict impact analysis’ (PCIA) and more sophisticated security guidelines. Instead of disengaging from areas of conflict or just delivering humanitarian aid, a number of NGOs chose to work on conflict by engaging in conflict prevention and peace-building activities during conflict, as well as DDR and SSR activities in post-conflict operations. Their position vis-à-vis military forces changed somewhat as they realized the need for the military protection of civilian populations in areas of conflict. NGO success in engaging in advocacy campaigns (against land mines, small arms proliferation and cluster bombs) also encouraged some to accept the emerging concepts and templates for coordination with military forces.

2. Development, security and the ‘fragile states’ agenda. During the 1990s, development aid aimed at reducing poverty and inequality was increasingly identified as a means to prevent conflict by attacking its root causes. This ‘securitization’ of development was radicalized in the post 9/11 context when a linkage was established between ‘failed’ states and terrorism. The subset of developing states that were not living up to expectations in terms of capacity and willingness to embark on reform – labelled as difficult partnerships, difficult policy environments, Low Income Countries under Stress or fragile states – had been sidelined due to the 1990s focus on good performance. But in the post-9/11 period they were recast as security threats. While the processes of forging coherence in development policies and practice through the processes of Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) processes largely excluded considerations of security, linkages of security and development became a constitutive element in the policies in the field of failed and fragile states. Fragile situations, the limited control over population and territory exerted by many regimes and the likelihood of violent conflict made the coherence of donors’ defence, diplomacy and develop-

3 Gordon 2008.
4 Which in fact brought it back to its roots in the Marshall Plan and the national security-oriented development plans of developing countries, in particular in Latin America and Asia in the 1960s
5 IPA 2006a.
ment policies an evident necessity, expressed in the catchy 3D concept (Development, Defence, and Diplomacy) launched by the Canadian government in 2005.

After 9/11, but in prolongation of the 1990s peace-building agenda, state-building emerged as an overarching goal of these policies. The pursuit of more coherent policies was taken further through conceptualization of the Integrated Mission in the UN system. This was also affirmed at the UN World Summit in 2005 and in the decision to set up the Peace-Building Commission. At the level of donor governments, the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) set up a Fragile States Group that has developed a set of principles for good engagement in fragile states and promoted the further development of Whole of Government Approaches (WGA).

3. Comprehensive approach and counterinsurgency. Emerging primarily from within NATO, the movement towards the comprehensive approach may be seen as a reaction to the problems of a troubled state-building process in Afghanistan. Both General Petraeus’s revised counterinsurgency manual FM3/24 and the recent concept of the Effect Based Approach to Operations recognize that the kind of intra-state wars in which NATO is engaged cannot be won by military means alone. A pre-doctrine document on Effect Based Approach Operations states that ‘in the evolving and complex global security environment there is a premium on close cooperation and coordination’ with non-NATO organizations and actors in order to reach the desired effects. The Comprehensive Approach was coined to offer these civilian organizations over which the military do not have Command and Control a concept that the civilian organizations could consent to. The Comprehensive Approach took over from the Concerted Planning and Action concept that the Danish government launched at a NATO conference in Copenhagen in June 2005 in order to promote thinking on civil-military cooperation.

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6 See the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004), Our Common Future.
8 The Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States (OECD/DAC 2005) were endorsed at ministerial level in 2007.
9 In line with the change of emphasis in development aid from output measures to outcome and impact, the effect-based approach is more interested in the intended and unintended effects of operations rather than the tasks of operations themselves.
11 The concept was coined in the UK’s Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre in June 2005. Interview with former DCDC officer, June 2008.
12 Fischer and Christensen 2005.
Approach has met with resistance in NATO, but it was endorsed at the Bucharest Summit in 2008.\footnote{See Jakobsen’s (2008) DIIS report on NATO and the Comprehensive Approach.}

Common to the different concepts is the assumption that a more integrated approach to strategy, planning and implementation will increase the overall effectiveness of peace operations by providing security, humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and development, governance and rule of law in a concerted and coordinated manner. The different instruments are not just added to each other but must be conducted as a part of an overall plan in which they support and reinforce one another. Therefore, each actor must understand the big picture, share the understanding of the conflict, agree to a common planning procedure, and take the requirements of the other actors into account when conducting its own activities. This represents a very tall order. It further raises the question of how and to what degree the participating entities can maintain their autonomy in decision-making.

In this study, we understand the integrated or comprehensive approach as a question of enhancing coherence in three different dimensions:\footnote{Piciotto 2004; see also de Coning 2007 and Baker 2007.}

1) Intra- and inter-departmental coordination of donor governments (coherence in terms of Whole of Government)
2) Coordination of donors (also called harmonization)
3) Coordination between donors (international agencies and donor governments) and host government (also called alignment or Whole of Effort)

Thus, donors have to bring their own instruments and departments together for increased coherence, but they also have to design their strategies, plans and operational structures so as to fit in with those of the donors, as well as international templates for coordination and integration. They also have to ensure that their interventions are aligned with the policies and objectives of the host government. Clearly, the multidimensional nature of the problem considerably complicates the tasks of coordination and integration.

This sub-report looks at how the process of integration and coordination develops in different national contexts. Dealing only with the first dimension – coherence – the study describes how Denmark, the UK and the Netherlands have approached...
this challenge. Aspects of the Norwegian, Canadian and German approaches are added to illustrate specific points. The US approach is described in a separate brief, as the different scale and context makes it difficult to compare meaningfully with the European cases.

This sub-report describes the different concepts and structures as they have developed in Denmark, the UK and the Netherlands respectively. Each of the analyses examines the main drivers of and problems with the processes involved. As the team had considerably better access to information on the Danish case, the section on Denmark is presented in more detail than the two other cases. It thus provides detailed information on the organisational set-up, funding structures and human resource management that were not available to the team in the cases of the UK and the Netherlands. This provides the study with a certain bias, in the sense that problems related to the everyday development and implementation of the concept are dealt with more extensively in the Danish case. This is, however, natural, as the overall aim of this study is to reflect on future improvements in the Danish set-up. The final section thus provides a comparative look at trends and differences and considers how the different processes of change may relate to the Danish case.

The second dimension is primarily analyzed in three expert papers published as separate reports on the EU, UN and NATO, while their mutual relations at the strategic and tactical levels are analyzed in the synthesis report. The last dimension is partly dealt with in terms of the experience and lessons learned analyzed in the second sub-report, and partly by looking at the concrete Danish experience in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Concerted Planning and Action in Denmark

Background
Under the label of Concerted Planning and Action (CPA), the Danish government pushed the issue of civil-military relations onto the NATO agenda by calling for a seminar in June 2005 involving NATO and member representatives, the UN and NGOs. While since then other donor governments and international organizations have gone further in the direction of integrated approaches to peace, stabilization and reconstruction operations, the Danish government was an early bird in the context of NATO and the development of a comprehensive approach.

The following will examine the Danish approach in the broader context of strategies and instruments of the Danish government that have developed in the attempt to produce a coherent response to armed conflict, poverty and insecurity.

Concept and strategy

Development and foreign policy
At the strategic level, the Danish government has shown a sustained interest in issues of armed conflict and their links to problems of development since the late 1990s. The ‘Partnership 2000’ document on Danish development policy states that ‘Denmark will intensify its efforts to prevent, manage and settle armed conflict in the developing countries.’ The document notes that the country has the experience and capacity to play an international role in this field, comprising ‘concrete development activities, humanitarian interventions, initiatives through diplomatic channels and peacekeeping operations.’ The use of these instruments should be based on the fundamental principles of ‘local ownership, co-ordination, and coherence among the various activities.’

Post 9/11 this interest became even more manifest, as expressed in the development strategy for 2005-9, ‘Security, Growth – Development’. With this policy, the linkages between security and development were established firmly as a reason for integrating the two different fields. According to the new development strategy, Denmark would contribute to ‘security, stability and the fight against terror’ by focussing on

'humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, long-term development, refugees and internally displaced people', not least in Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan. While the War on Terror-driven interest in the Middle East and Afghanistan and the home affairs-driven interest in refugee and IDP issues were strong, the interest in security and development in Africa remained high on the agenda. In continuation of, for example, the Conflict in Africa initiative in 2000, the Danish Africa strategy from 2005 gave priority to the linkages between security and development by focussing on the African security architecture, conflict prevention, anti-terror measures and human rights. This interest was confirmed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ report on globalization from 2006, which estimated that ‘civil-military involvement in Africa, in particular through the UN, probably will grow’ due to peacekeeping operations, as well as efforts to build capacity in African security structures.

Despite these trends, the MFA has not pulled its efforts together in terms of an explicit policy on state building and fragile states. While a set of guidelines on fragile states and situations are still underway, it is the Danish military engagement in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan which has driven the attempt to increase the coherence of the government’s efforts in the fields of conflict, security and development.

**Defence strategy**

The parliamentary defence agreement for 2005-9 establishes defence as an important instrument of an active foreign and security policy that pursues peaceful development and the promotion of democracy, freedom and human rights. Apart from safeguarding the country and its allies against threats to their security, the objective of defence is to contribute to international peace and security in agreement with the principles of the UN treaty, in particular through conflict preventative, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and humanitarian operations.

Regarding the UN as the central framework for international order, Denmark will support the development of UN capabilities for peace-support operations, conflict prevention and management, including in Africa. NATO is seen as the central forum for security and defence cooperation, and Denmark will contribute to the collective defence, including NATO’s Response Force. While the parties behind the agree-

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18 Danish MFA 2005 *Africa: Development and Security*.

19 Danish MFA 2006, Diplomacy in a Boundless World. The report notes that it would be important for Denmark to acquire access to the growing security networks surrounding the African Union in Addis Ababa.
ment in principle support Danish participation in EU peace operations outside the region, the Danish opt-out on participation in a common defence policy hinders this contribution.\(^{20}\)

In consequence of this policy, the organization and building of capacities in the Danish armed forces has been reoriented towards their participation in international out-of-the-area operations, including ‘a strengthened coordination [samordning] of the military and the civilian, humanitarian activities in the area of operation’.\(^{21}\) Meanwhile the territorial defence has been down-scaled and reoriented towards developing the synergies of a total defence against transnational threats.

The policy on civil-military relations
The core of the Concerted Planning and Action concept developed from 2003-05. It was partly spurred by an evaluation of the Danish contribution to the intervention in Kosovo in 1999-2003, which encouraged the government to develop a strategy on civil-military cooperation, as well as mechanisms for the monitoring, review and adjustment of the strategy according to changing circumstances;\(^{22}\) and partly by the new challenges related to military deployments in Faizabad, Afghanistan and later, in Basra, Iraq. In this context, the Concerted Planning and Action initiative developed gradually with the production of three key documents, jointly issued by the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs:

1. The **Guidelines for military-humanitarian co-operation on humanitarian efforts financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs**, issued in September 2003. The guidelines aimed at facilitating the co-operation between MFA advisers and the Danish armed forces in terms of humanitarian assistance, rather than dealing more generally with civil-military relations and reconstruction programmes. They concerned humanitarian efforts for which the purpose was *not* to contribute directly to military objectives (force protection following the CIMIC doctrine), and they drew heavily on the Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s (IASC) guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support UN Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (MCDA).\(^{23}\) In the words of one of the authors of the Concerted Planning

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\(^{20}\) DIIS 2008.


\(^{22}\) T&B Consult 2004.

\(^{23}\) See www.Reliefweb.int The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) was established in June 1992 as an inter-agency forum for co-ordination, policy development and decision-making involving the key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners.
and Action policy, they concerned the ‘small CPA’, the one taking place primarily at the tactical level, and the one which came to capture the imagination of most of the actors involved in the debate over the initiative since then.24

2. In March 2004, and following consultations with a wide range of actors, the two ministries issued the joint paper, *Concerted Planning and Action of civilian and military efforts in international operations*. The initiative was launched through a joint op-ed by the ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence,25 who thereby gave the political weight necessary to start the process of operationalization. The paper was later included as an annex to the defence agreement of 2005-9, which also established a temporary working group with the task of proposing procedures for cooperation between humanitarian organizations and the military (see later under instruments).

The Concerted Planning and Action initiative aims at supporting stabilization and normalization in the areas of Danish military deployment by increasing synergies through the concentration and coordinated planning and implementation of civilian and military activities in these areas, the security situation notwithstanding. Planning and coordination should take place ‘within an international framework’. Based on the experience in Kosovo, the paper states that the military may have to engage in the re-establishment of policing and courts. And in case security conditions do not permit the operation of civilian organizations in the area, the armed forces will have to facilitate humanitarian work and the reestablishment of infrastructure, local administration and other direct improvements for the local population through so-called ‘CPA projects’.26 In this case the armed forces would receive financial support and possibly advice from the government, but as emphasized in the Ministers’ op-ed, the idea was not to turn the deployed forces into an ‘armed relief brigade’. Finally the paper emphasizes that the coordination of Danish activities does not entail any hierarchical relationship between the participating organizations, the identity of which should be respected.

3. According to the policy paper, 15 million DKK were reserved for ‘CPA projects’ in the humanitarian budget, which predictably provoked strong reactions from the

24 Interview with former Head of the Humanitarian Department, August 2008.
25 Møller and Jensby 2004
26 The precise wording leaves scope for interpretation as to whether the armed forces should only facilitate humanitarian aid, rule of law and local governance by, for example, reconstructing physical infrastructure, or actually engage in (re-) building local capacity.
NGO community. They were later added to the budget in order to avoid the sense of competition between armed forces and NGOs, and were removed from the humanitarian budget in 2008. In 2005 the ministries issued a set of *Guidelines for military-civilian co-operation in humanitarian and reconstruction efforts financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs* and facilitated by military forces. Compared to the first set of guidelines, these incorporate elements of reconstruction activities as set out in the policy paper of 2004. The policy is specified in terms of the criteria of CPA projects, which should serve at least one of the following aims:

- Meet elementary humanitarian needs
- Assist vulnerable and excluded groups
- Create immediate results in the form of material assistance to the local population
- Assist the (re-)construction of local public administration
- Promote the legal security of individuals and groups

Apart from the provisions regarding the international guidelines and codes of conduct for international humanitarian assistance, the guidelines are rather ‘development-like’, emphasizing the need for the co-ordination and approval of projects by local authorities, demand-driven processes, reliance on local inputs, definition of criteria for success, and co-ordination with the Steering Unit and other actors’ longer-term reconstruction efforts.

On the other hand, the guidelines seek to tailor the projects to the contingent nature of the operations, the need for quick results and minimal dependence on continued maintenance or external resources. In this sense, the ‘CPA’ projects resemble the category of transitional aid known from the efforts to bridge the gap between short-term relief projects and longer term development projects. As a case in point, the guidelines mention the concept of Quick Impact Projects, which were popular in UNHCR programmes in the 1990s. The purpose of these was to quick-start reconstruction and development without creating expectations of lasting commitments beyond the budgetary framework of six to twelve months.

In summary, the guidelines make up a flexible framework establishing what *can* be done and *how* it should be done, rather than what *must* be done. This flexibility was desired by the defence in order to create space for initiative for the armed forces.27

As is evident from the Iraq and AFG reports, the same flexibility has created some frustration for the soldiers engaged in the implementation of ‘CPA projects’.

**Structures for planning and implementation**

The structure set up to implement and develop the Concerted Planning and Action policy was fairly simple, comprising a coordinating entity at headquarters level (the *Standing Civil Servants’ Committee* or *Embedsmandsgruppen for Samtænkning*) and one at field level (the *Steering Unit*). Over time, both have been adapted to specific contexts and adjusted according to experience.

**At headquarters level**

In April 2004, the Standing Civil Servants’ Committee was established to ensure that Danish-funded stabilization activities in the areas of military deployment are concentrated and concerted.\(^{28}\) According to the Terms of Reference, the committee was designed to deal with the planning and coordination of the civilian inputs in relation to the military deployment, which was defined and planned elsewhere (see Box).

The Standing Committee is chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Department for Humanitarian aid and NGOs). From its inception, members have included representatives from other departments in this ministry (regional offices, security policy, the technical advisory services, and the heads of multi- and bilateral relations), the Ministry of Defence offices, the Danish Defence Command, the Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA), the Prime Minister’s Office, the Danish National Police Commissioner’s Office, and Danish Defence Intelligence Service.

As stated in the policy paper, the Standing Committee is a ‘flexible framework’ for cooperation in which no stakeholder is subordinated to others and where governmental entities are included on an *ad hoc* basis, according to emerging needs. Since its inception, the Ministry of Justice and most recently the Danish courts have been represented, reflecting the hope that rule-of-law projects could become more salient in stabilization operations. Meanwhile, the intelligence service and the Technical Advisory Services have left the committee, as the operational tasks have been taken over from the committee by task forces within the MFA (see below). According to a new set of terms from 2008, private companies, NGOs and researchers can also be invited to participate in the committee.

\(^{28}\) ToR for Embedsmandsgruppen for sammentænkning. Unofficial translation.
Box. Terms of reference of the Standing Civil Servants’ Committee

The Committee must

- Ensure, as far as possible, that a concerted Danish stabilization effort takes place in the area of responsibility where Danish military forces are deployed, and plan relevant exit strategies for civilian crisis efforts.
- Ensure that as far as possible civilian aid organizations, including private Danish ones, carry out the stabilization efforts financed by Danish funding. To the extent possible the Danish stabilization effort should be coordinated with other actors’ stabilization efforts in the area of deployment.
- Discuss, plan and concert civilian stabilization activities in order to establish the basis for decision-making regarding the dimensions of the military security force in order to achieve the greatest effect possible. The planning should, as far as possible, take place within an internationally coordinated framework.
- Discuss proposals for further civilian activities in relation to the concrete crisis-management effort.
- Exchange information about other Danish activities of relevance for the effort in the military area of operation.
- Make sure that activities in the Danish area of operation are continuously evaluated with a view to gathering experience and potentially amending the concept [i.e. the CPA], including cost-efficiency.  

As the Danish engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan developed, the operational aspects of the Standing Committee’s work devolved to country-specific working groups, where development of analysis, country strategies, planning and day-to-day operational issues were dealt with. The crisis management for Iraq, including back-up for development advisors and the Steering Group in Basra, recruitment, training and briefing of advisors, was the responsibility of the Middle East office (MENA).

29 Terms of Reference for the SCSC, April 2004.
MENA coordinated the Danish activities through its own direct relations to the Ministry of Defence, the Intelligence Services, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Integration (with commitments with regard to the repatriation of refugees and rejected asylum-seekers) and the Ministry of Justice. With regard to the military deployment, MENA worked with and through the Ministry’s Security Policy office, which managed relations with the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Command. From a MENA point of view, the Standing Committee was kept informed and mostly involved with regard to humanitarian issues and allocations of CPA projects. A similar process occurred with regard to the crisis-management activities in Afghanistan. In this case a formalized, matrix-like, inter-ministerial Task Force was set up in mid-2007 under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Asia office (ALA).

The formalization of the Task Force spurred a redefinition of the Standing Civil Servants’ Committee and the development of a new set of ToR from 2008. In the future, the committee will only have responsibility for the development of concepts, strategy and policy with regard to the coordination of Danish contributions to international crisis management. It will have a particular role in the initial phases of new Danish engagements before the decisions in this regard have been made. Participation in concept development and capacity-building in international organizations (UN, EU, NATO, African Union) receives more attention in the new Terms of Reference, as does the supervision of evaluations and lessons-learned processes, and the development of criteria of effectiveness and success for country-specific operations.

At field level
The 2004 policy paper envisioned the establishment of MFA Steering Units in the areas of Danish military deployments. The concept emerged from the Danish experience in the Balkans. In Sarajevo, the consulate facilitated coordination between Danish NGOs, private companies, MFA and the local authorities. In Pristina, a Steering Unit was established in 1999 with responsibility for the coordination of Danish support to civil reconstruction activities in Kosovo, including a humanitarian contact group.

The aim was to contribute to coordination and information exchange and to assist in making the Danish efforts as effective as possible, and the unit was given certain decision-making powers in regard to stabilization and reconstructions projects. As

30 Interview MFA, August 2008. The interview gave the impression that the SCSC was rather peripheral to the overall coordination tasks.
an alternative or supplement to the Steering Unit, the policy paper pointed out that a Development Advisor could be attached directly to the military forces.

In practice, the operational planning and coordination at field level has been more complex, as the Danish contributions have been accommodated to the multi-national set-ups. The operation in Basra saw both a Steering Unit and a Development Advisor attached to the Danish battalion, but when the UK-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Basra was established, Danish advisors were placed in the PRT as well, alongside the Steering Unit. In the case of Afghanistan, steering units were never established. Development Advisors have been attached to the Danish military entities, while decisions and coordination have been undertaken somewhere between the Danish representation in Kabul, the advisors in the areas of operation, and the UK or German PRTs, in which the Danish contributions have been incorporated.

The civilian and military lines of command and reporting between the ministries and the field level are separate, running between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Embassy and the Steering Unit or development advisors on the civilian side, and from the Danish battalion via the Operational Army Command and the Defence command to the Ministry of Defence (and in the case of the CPA projects further on to the Steering Committee).

**Funding**

Danish military contributions to international peace-support operations are funded directly from the annual state budget (§35) following parliamentary agreements. Currently DKK 1 billion (ca. € 125 million) is assigned for international operations. If and when this amount is surpassed, the Armed Forces draw on the ordinary defence budget (§12) to fill the gap. Consent-winning CIMIC projects are funded from the budget for international military operations.

All contributions for civilian crisis management, humanitarian work, stabilization, reconstruction and development are taken from the DKK 14 billion development aid budget (€1.75 billion), which, with a few exceptions, is controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These contributions have to live up to the OECD’s criteria for Official Development Aid (ODA), which were expanded in 2005 to include certain civilian aspects of Security Sector Reform. The Danish government has

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31 See OECD/DAC 2005.
not designated a particular fund for crisis management and stabilization operations which can be used for activities that do not necessarily follow the ODA criteria. In the 1990s a substantial fund for ‘Environment, Peace and Stability’ figured in the state budget, but this was brought to an end in 2001.

Danish ODA contributes to peace operations, crisis management and conflict prevention in a number of ways. These include multilateral funding for UN, EU and African Union operations and international trust funds, bilateral contributions to partnership countries (such as Nepal, Uganda and Bolivia), and bilateral contributions to non-partnership countries and territories, in particular Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine and Sudan.

Two funding mechanisms are of particular relevance in this regard.

First, humanitarian assistance is the most flexible mechanism in terms of administrative procedures and quick disbursements, which, in the extreme case, permits, for example, DEMA to have applications for up to 5 million DKK approved within a half hour. Activities of up to twelve months duration can be funded from the humanitarian aid budget, and NGOs and UN agencies are the major implementing partners. The Danish strategy for humanitarian assistance from 2002 emphasises the principles of neutrality and impartiality, the prominence of the UN as coordinator, the anchoring of humanitarian activities in local communities in order to optimize longer term effects, and the need for a broader framework that comprises peacekeeping, humanitarian and development activities.\(^{32}\)

CPA projects were from the outset funded from the humanitarian aid budget. The guidelines, including UNs Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s guidelines and the Red Cross code of conduct, were designed to ensure that the standards and policy for humanitarian aid were followed. From the inception, and upon consultation with the development advisor, the military commander was given authority to approve grants of up to $25,000. The limit was changed to $50,000 in 2007.

As mentioned above, until 2008 DKK 15 million (ca. €2 million) from the humanitarian aid budget was set aside (and later added to the budget) for CPA projects per year. This issue created much debate and resentment within the NGO community, since military involvement in emergency aid in times of war was seen as incompat-

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\(^{32}\) Danish MFA Danida 2002, *Strategic Priorities in Danish Humanitarian Assistance*. 
ible with the humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality. Between 2005 and 2008, DKK 33 million (ca. € 4.5 million) were allocated for CPA projects in Iraq and 8 million (€1 million) in Afghanistan. Unused funds were transferred to other relief activities.

Secondly, in 2003 the Danish government designed a particular budget line for the Regions of Origin Initiative (ROI). The initiative aims at supporting durable solutions for refugees, repatriates and internally displaced populations in their home countries or countries in the neighbourhood. The budget line covers a grey area between short-term humanitarian and long-term, poverty-focussed aid, supporting peace-processes and ensuring maximum coordination with efforts to repatriate refugees and rejected asylum-seekers from Denmark.\(^{33}\) For the period 2004-8, DKK 1 billion (ca. €125 million) was set aside for the purpose, with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and NGOs as the major implementing partners, but bilateral programmes have also been funded through this mechanism, including the Local Government Fund in Basra.

In addition, since 1994, the Danish police have been allocated a special fund in the state budget for their participation in international peace operations. Currently DKK 50 million (€6.25 million) are reserved in the development aid budget for salaries and operational costs for a maximum of 75 officers to be deployed in peace operations. Finally, the MoD has a fund of DKK 10 million (€1.25 million) at its disposal for SSR activities, which is currently mostly used for training and for improvements to the barracks and other infrastructure of the Afghan National Army.

**Human resources**

*CIMIC personnel.* The parliamentary agreement on national defence for 2005-9 entails a major reorientation of the armed forces from territorial defence capacities towards international operations. The agreement aims at developing the capacity for sustaining a force of 2000 soldiers in international operations by the end of the period, but the actual capacity is still well below this aim.\(^{34}\) As part of the agreement, a CIMIC company was established in January 2005.\(^{35}\) It works as a virtual company

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34 As of 22 September 2008, 1322 were deployed in international operations and 263 in international service. Status of deployed troops, Ministry of Defence.
35 The text states that the experience will be evaluated in order for the parties to decide if and how the CIMIC capacity should be strengthened (MoD 2004: 7). As of 2008, only two of the twenty designated positions were filled.
with a support unit and staff responsible for a six-week training course for CIMIC officers, placed at the Danish Army Fire Support School. Training comprises general and mission-specific courses, including a two-week Concerted Planning and Action course.\textsuperscript{36} Trained CIMIC personnel are deployed instantly, and there is no capacity in terms of personnel with mission-specific training to replace losses.

\textit{Civilian advisors and experts} are being identified and contracted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through a combination of channels, including the short-term recruitment humanitarian experts through the International Humanitarian Preparedness office (IHB),\textsuperscript{37} other short- and longer term experts through the office for private sector and personnel assistance (ERH),\textsuperscript{38} in addition to personal networks, public announcements and the formal and informal assistance of private companies.\textsuperscript{39} The ministry has been responsible for pre-deployment briefings and the ongoing training of advisors.

There is some disagreement regarding the effectiveness of the system of recruitment and availability of experts.\textsuperscript{40} In the military, the general opinion suggests that recruitment is too slow and limited considering the needs, while it has been argued in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the lack of armed protection in Helmand is a decisive factor. However, the bottom line seems to be that there are few people available for deployment who have optimum qualifications for the specific tasks they are given and the challenges they encounter in the operational environment. Recruitment officers state that there have been problems with unclear profile description, and that stabilization experience and capacity for political analysis represent the bottlenecks in terms of qualifications.

A final issue concerns contractual conditions and duty of care. These have been harmonized between the different offices where contracts are seen as well-suited to the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{36} Interview at the CIMIC School, June 2008.
\item \textsuperscript{37} 28 deployed in the field in October 2008. IHB shares a humanitarian roster with the Danish Red Cross and Danish Refugee Council.
\item \textsuperscript{38} 80-100 short-term experts and 140 long-term as of October 2008.
\item \textsuperscript{39} MFA entered a framework agreement with NIRAS in 2007 for the recruitment of experts for Danish capacity-building programmes in the central administration in Baghdad. Similar solutions are envisaged for advisors in the areas of military operation, a solution which would make the company responsible for recruitment, training, briefings, follow-up etc. (interviews in MFA, October 2008).
\item \textsuperscript{40} As of October 2008, a total of eight civil advisors have been recruited and posted at one position in Basra (2005-7), one in Faizabad (2005-8), one in Mazar-e-Sharif and later in Kabul (2006-8), and one in Helmand (2006-7; two from 2008). MFA has recruited experts for the Steering Unit and PRT in Basra, as well as one education expert in PRT Helmand and, from 2008, a senior political advisor with experience of Pristina and Basra. Postings have varied from six months to three years.
\end{itemize}
particular conditions. However, in the field, and compared with the UK advisors, the Danish system is seen as lacking in duty of care aspects (security requirements for transport, shelter etc.).

*MFA and MoD* staff have been posted to the embassies or in the quality of short-term consultants in the areas of military deployment. Staffing in Kabul has been limited due to the decision to channel as many funds through Afghan government institutions as possible. In 2008, staffing was upgraded as a reflection of the substantially increased budget.

*Police officers* have been posted in substantial numbers in peace operations in EU, UN or bilateral police reform programmes upon requests from the MFA. Not all of the requests are being met by the Danish police, which can generally recruit between 50 and 60 police officers of the 75 allocated in the annual budget. Recruitment is voluntary and takes place in the police districts where information campaigns and meetings are used to generate an interest in international postings. The recent police reform in Denmark lowered interest, but this recovering during 2008. Economic incentives are limited. However, two thirds of the officers who have been posted to peace missions re-enlist for new postings. Officers receive two months pre-deployment training in courses which are increasingly coordinated between the Nordic countries to allow for faster deployments.

*Judges and other court personnel* have not yet been fielded as part of Danish contributions to international operations, but individuals have been directly involved in international projects. With a projection towards the future, in 2008 the Danish courts were invited to take part in the SCSC.

*Personnel from the Danish Emergency Management Agency* (DEMA) may be deployed for short-term missions in relation to ‘complex emergencies’ and disasters, and has developed international experience since the 1950s, in particular since its participation in the missions of the European Commission’s Humanitarian Office in the Balkans in the 1990s. Staff members have been deployed on short missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and elsewhere. The agency has rapidly deployable (within

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41 See Schmidt’s 2009 report on Afghanistan. According to interviews in London, duty of care is considered a problem in UK operations as well.

42 20,000 DKK taxable + allowances and extra vacation + official travels home every three months.

43 Interview September 2008, the Danish National Police.
twelve hours) capabilities in fact-finding and management (four to seven staff), sanitation, food and water (with a short-term rescue team of up to sixty persons). In addition, as a member of the International Humanitarian Partnership, the agency has specialized in delivering base camp, communication and CBRN modules for emergency operations.

The 2005-9 defence agreement placed the Emergency Management Agency under the Ministry of Defence with the intention of strengthening the Danish capacity for total defence. Apart from its own capacities, the agency has a broad network involving other public institutions in Denmark and may have a role in the identification of advisors and specialists. Under the current law regulating the agency, its staff may be deployed involuntarily in peacetime missions, but not in the context of armed conflict. However, on a voluntary basis they can work under armed protection, but they are neither trained nor prepared to use arms. When operating in contexts of conflict, agency staff do not wear uniforms, and the agency sees itself as occupying an intermediary role between humanitarian NGOs and the military, understanding the rationalities and cultures of both.

From the outset, NGOs have been considered as potentially contributing to humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in areas of Danish military deployment, but the launch of the policy caused tensions between the ministries and the NGOs for the reasons mentioned above. Furthermore, during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, they were reluctant to operate in areas of military deployment, despite being urged to do so. However, the policy paper also established a working group on relations between the military and relief organizations involving the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence as well as NGOs representing various positions on civil-military cooperation, including Médecins sans Frontières, Danchurch Aid and the Danish Refugee Council. The report from the working group specifies the forms and limits of cooperation, emphasizes the voluntary and independent nature of NGO cooperation and demonstrates the importance of considering how different contexts influence the scope of cooperation. The report points out how NGOs can

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44 Formed by Denmark together with the UK, Finland, Sweden, Holland, Estonia, and Norway and operating within the UN Disaster and Coordination Framework, UNDAC.
45 Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear.
46 Interview with DEMA staff, September 2008.
feed into early warning, pre-deployment briefings, training activities, evaluation and lessons-learned processes.

The working group did not establish fixed procedures for cooperation apart from the continuation of meetings in the existing Humanitarian Contact Group (with the two ministries, Danish Defence Command and NGOs) and the establishment of a focal point for security clearance at the defence ministry. The contact group has functioned well for its purposes of exchange of information and discussion of experience and possible engagements. NGOs have been invited to take part in country-specific and thematic hearings in the ministries, and some have been involved in the development of training of CIMIC officers, courses in International Humanitarian Law, seminars etc.

**Training and exercises**

The only training aimed at facilitating the implementation of the Concerted Planning and Action policy is the specialized two-week course which forms part of the general education of CIMIC officers. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been responsible for the development of the course, which has been outsourced to the Danish Refugee Council since 2007. In addition to country and area-specific introductions, the course comprises a compact introduction to the concept, guidelines for project management, including Log-Frame Analysis, principles of participation, ownership and sustainability, and monitoring and reporting procedures. Formerly deployed officers, several NGOs, the two ministries and the Army’s Operational Command appear on the course, which is continuously revised. If possible, currently deployed development advisors should take part in the course as well, but so far it has seldom occurred. CIMIC school staff members are assigned to follow the development in the various areas of deployment, including (if possible) a two-week fact-finding mission in the area every six months.48

Danish military and to a limited extent civil representatives have taken part in the Multinational Experiment 5 exercises49 on the Comprehensive Approach, but otherwise joint civil-military exercises have not been organized. NGO and Ministry of

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48 Interview at the CIMIC school, June 2008. The perception of CIMIC has changed from an ‘if nothing else we can use him for CIMIC’ attitude to one which places more emphasis on personal skills, such as understanding, communication, attitude and general outlook.

49 MNE5 is an extensive series of exercises held in 2008-9, led by the US Joint Force Command and with Germany, France, Sweden, Spain, Canada, UK and others as members. http://www.jfcom.mil/about/experiments/mne5_mn.html
Foreign Affairs staff are regularly invited to participate in military exercises, but in Denmark as elsewhere civilian entities, lacking a standing capacity, find it difficult to put other obligations aside at the time the exercises take place.

**Towards concerted planning and action?**

To what extent do the Danish concept, strategies, structures and instruments enhance the concerted planning and implementation of civil and military activities? On the basis of the previous sections (and without drawing upon the case studies of Afghanistan and Iraq), the following points can be made.

**Common understanding and shared objectives**

It is clear that a great deal has been achieved since the conception of the Concerted Planning and Action. The Standing Civil Servants’ Committee has served as a forum for difficult discussions, exchanges and learning processes. Interviews give the impression that the committee almost forced very different worlds together and that exchanges over principles and practical matters were rather heated in the beginning. Over time, mutual understanding has increased, and with the continuing cooperation over the Iraq and Afghanistan operations, cross-ministerial relations and exchanges have spread beyond the committee.

Until 2008, however, the common understanding and shared objectives have pertained to a rather narrow group of staff in the military and civil entities involved in the Concerted Planning and Action initiative. Two issues stand out as divergent. First, the concept has been understood widely as the coordination of civil and military relations at the field or tactical level, and in particular as the involvement of the armed forces in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. The understanding that civil and military involvement has to be concerted at a higher, strategic level has been limited, but is now spreading. Secondly, for good reasons military institutions are permeated by the objective of getting the soldiers home alive. In practical terms this means that force protection – rather than reconstruction and governance – is seen as the ultimate objective of civil-military coordination.\(^{50}\) In contrast, the development side perceives assistance to the local population to be the objective of Concerted Planning and Action.

\(^{50}\) See, for example, the reactions to Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen 2008, which suggest that the military deployment would be more effective in achieving the end goal if they changed the balance between force protection and reconstruction activities.
Analysis
Several interviews have questioned the overall analytical capacity of the Danish system vis-à-vis the challenges of civil-military operations in rapidly changing contexts. While the study team has not been able to assess the system-wide or institutional analytical capacities with any reasonable accuracy, it is clear that much analysis depends on the capacity of international organizations and think tanks such as the International Crisis Group or larger partners such as the UK. This resonates with the 2006 study of the Danish (MFA) experience of conflict management and peace building, 51 which suggested that the systematic employment of recently developed templates for conflict analysis was limited due to the time constraints and the availability of international resources, some of which receive Danish funding. In particular, in longer term crisis and conflict situations a more systematized analytical approach is likely to pay off.

Strategic coherence
As mentioned above, two different vehicles have mainly driven civil-military cooperation at the international level in recent years. On the military side, the deployment of substantial troops in Iraq and Afghanistan has called for increased involvement of civilian capabilities. Development institutions, as in the cases of the UK and the Netherlands below, have come to consider security-sector reforms as a necessary element in the attempts to strengthen fragile states and consolidate post-conflict processes of democratization and development.

In the Danish case, it is the former which has driven the increased civil-military cooperation, while security-sector reform at the strategic level has played a very limited role. At the operational level, the training of police and soldiers has been a more important element. Within aid policy there have been early engagements in security-sector reform in southern Africa (the Southern Africa Defence and Security Management Network, SADSEM) and attention to general capacity-building regarding issues of peace and conflict in Africa (Africa Programme for Peace, APP). Given the general interest in the linkages between security, development and state fragility, and considering the specific interest in peace and security in Africa, there seems to be scope for a more concerted inter-departmental effort at defining policies and roles of political, security and development instruments and actors with regard to the fragile states agenda. 52

51 NCG 2006.
52 In terms of resources, it is worth mentioning that the MFA does not have internal experts in the field of security-sector reform.
Operationalization of the Concerted Planning and Action policy

Over time, the organizational set-up has changed in several aspects, at both the ministry and field levels. The removal of operational responsibility from the Standing Committee, as well as the disappearance of the Steering Unit and Reconstruction Unit Denmark, illustrates the ability to adapt to changing conditions, but also to the ad hoc and experimental character of the set-up.

Several bones of contention have characterized the work of operationalizing the policy. One important issue has been the interpretation of ‘the extent possible’ to which Danish civilian aid activities are supposed to be focussed in the area of operation. Both within the Standing Committee and between the government and the NGOs, differences have been evident. Thus different principles have met in 1) discussions of the degree to which aid should be instrumentalized in terms of the share of the country-specific aid budget earmarked for the area of deployment; and 2) the means that could be used to procure civilian capabilities for deployment in the area of operation. The former issue touches upon the need-based approach and the policy decision to privilege distribution of aid through central state institutions in order to strengthen state governance from the top.

While these discussions have developed and changed the positions in the Standing Civil Servants’ Committee, decisions have stalled on three other issues:

1. Deployment of armed forces in Sudan as part of a large Danish contribution to the peace process in southern Sudan. The issue has been brought up repeatedly in the Standing Committee as a matter of information on ongoing discussions elsewhere, with implications for the extent to which the Concerted Planning and Action could be applied to Sudan. The issue was never been brought to a close, partly because of reluctance from the defence side towards military engagement in Africa and in particular because of the over-extension of the armed forces.

2. Protection of civilian advisors, NGOs, police, and Danish representations. The policy is not very clear on this point, but officially an agreement has been reached between the Ministers and confirmed in the Parliamentary decision B161 (2007), according to which the Danish Armed Forces will provide the necessary protection. However, in the armed forces a tension exists between having the capacity to

53 As shown in the minutes from SCSC meetings 2005-7.
54 A force of 45 was deployed to the SHIRBRIGs Headquarters module in Khartoum.
engage in ‘kinetic operations’ and taking up the additional task of close protection with the current level of deployment. The question is whether DAF is attuned to undertaking personal protection tasks, and whether this capacity receives the necessary priority in the military institution.\textsuperscript{55}

In the field, commanders have referred to their dilemmas between living up to petitions and commands from international partners (the UK) and attending to the needs of development advisors, consultants, police or other civil partner organizations.\textsuperscript{56} As a consequence, the civilian advisors’ operational scope and flexibility has been considerably limited, thus questioning the value of the further deployment of civilian advisors.\textsuperscript{57}

The most obvious alternative is the use of Private Security Companies, of which several, both international and local, are operating in areas of Danish military deployment.\textsuperscript{58} However, apart from the legal complications and the general lack of regulation of private security companies,\textsuperscript{59} the issue has been regarded a political no-go area in Denmark. Financial calculations have not yet been brought into the discussions, comparing the actual costs of armed forces and different private providers. Either way, the need for protection makes the deployment of civilians in stabilization and reconstruction a very costly affair, which has to be taken into account when developing and operationalizing strategies. Finally, the question of perception is raised when civilian representatives arrive for meetings with a military escort.

\textit{Monitoring, evaluation and feedback mechanisms}

Formats and procedures for monitoring, evaluation, lessons learned and further conceptual development form part of the Terms of the Standing Committee. The study team has experienced that the documentation of civil-military activities is spread out over a number of institutions and offices, which complicates access and overview. The Standing Committee is ideally the point at which the otherwise separate civil and military reporting lines meet, but this does not happen in any systematic way. Apart from recurring discussions of the suitability of different

\textsuperscript{55} Veicherts 2008; Thruelsen 2008.
\textsuperscript{56} Interviews, Army Operational Command, June 2008.
\textsuperscript{57} SCSC meeting summaries 2007, interviews in MFA May 2009; Udenrigsministeriet 2007.
\textsuperscript{58} In Helmand, the UK advisors, who unlike the Danish advisors are not allowed on board military vehicles, use Armor Group, which has given the Danish advisors occasional support. Currently a more permanent arrangement has been negotiated with the UK government, which enables Danish advisors to make consistent use of Armor Group.
\textsuperscript{59} Holt 2006; Stoddard et al. 2008; Henriksen 2008.
reporting styles and formats, as well as discussions of commissioned evaluations and reviews, the fulfilment of this part of the committee’s Terms of Reference requires further institutionalization of joint analysis, reporting procedures, formats and registers, as well as joint lessons-learned exercises. This, however, requires more administrative resources from the ministries than have currently been allocated to the Standing Committee.

Finally, the attention and follow-up given to the reporting is not entirely consistent when seen from the field. The armed forces organized several lessons-learned seminars in 2008, but it is important for civil and military institutions to find ways of organizing these in a joined-up manner. The experience should have fed into conceptual and strategic development anchored in the Standing Committee, but again it seems that the resources have not been adequate for this to happen. The benchmarking process initiated in 2007-8 in relation to the Danish Helmand Plan is a positive step in the direction of becoming more realistic in terms of which aims can and should be achieved. But the dearth of information on the impact of combined civil and military efforts in the field continues to represent a problem for the operationalization of the Danish policy.

In sum, the Danish Concerted Planning and Action initiative has created a structure and instruments for the interaction of mainly governmental development, humanitarian and military actors. In doing so it has broken down some barriers and facilitated exchanges, mutual understanding and closer cooperation at the strategic and tactical levels. In terms of decision-making, direction, monitoring and conceptual and strategic development, the Standing Civil Servants’ Committee structure is too weak, while operational planning and coordination have been devolved to ad hoc structures.

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61 As discussed at the joint MFA/MoD lessons learned workshop in Dubai, January 2008.
Whole of Government in the UK

Background
As in the case of Denmark, the British development of an integrated approach must be seen as part of a more general move towards integrating security and development. From the outset, the UK played a major role in promoting and formulating this agenda. Former Secretary of State for International Development, Clare Short, recalls the undeniable perception in the international community that, following the end of the Cold War, there was a ‘massive growth in conflict within and between countries, causing enormous suffering and preventing development. I mean, you couldn’t be intelligently interested in development in Africa and not be focused on how you bring all these conflicts to an end’. Development and security were coming together as a means of making, keeping and consolidating peace. Following 9/11 the context for combining security and development has changed entirely. It is therefore not surprising that in the UK most of the important steps towards integrating security and development policy were taken prior to the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The Concept and Strategy
The UK concept for a Comprehensive Approach (CA) developed from 2004 and onwards from a military point of departure. From the outset the concept entailed a continuation of ongoing efforts to join up UK government efforts. To describe it, the focus must therefore be on how the concept has developed within a broader context of cross-departmental collaboration in Whitehall. This includes presenting the Conflict Prevention Pools and the related establishment of the Stabilisation Unit. The latter aims at filling the gap between emergency responses and military interventions on the one hand and long-term development on the other.

The Conflict Prevention Pools
In 2001 the UK Government concluded that it could make coordination much more formal with respect to activities around security-related programming. The new 2001

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62 This section is written by Michael J. Jensen and Peter A. Albrecht, DIIS.
63 Clare Short, interview, June 2008, UK.
64 It is worth mentioning here that, at the time of writing, it is even being questioned whether the newly established CPP will receive funding. The issue was to be resolved in the Cabinet Office.
Overseas Development Act and the establishment of the African Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) and the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) the same year were vital. As one of the key advisors at the time noted about the early 2000s: ‘Until then, we had steered away from anything to do with weaponry. Not that we [Department for International Development] could do anything with weaponry, but at least the Conflict Pool mechanism got us into that.’

The three relevant ministers, Clare Short (Development), Jack Straw (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Geoff Hoon (Defence), jointly set up these two funding mechanisms. Behind the scenes, however, the idea of the African Conflict Prevention Pool had initially come from the Department for International Development (DFID), immediately followed by the idea of the Global Conflict Prevention Fund from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). Indeed, the Global Fund was allegedly a reaction to DFID’s proposal for an African Fund, which was DFID’s attempt to become more involved in policy-making. The pools were originally based on ideas coming from Gordon Brown and the treasury to encourage cross-departmental collaboration. One of the advisors in DFID’s Africa Division came up with the concept of an Africa Conflict Prevention Pool. The Treasury would put £20 million on the table, a relatively insignificant amount, and the other three departments would match it. The novelty was, however, that this money would be coordinated and applied jointly. For DFID, specifically, it was a significant step towards involvement in policy-making, including with the security services, which was a novelty.

The idea of the pools was to provide a formal indicator that the three departments were willing and able to work together, and, as such, they were better positioned, but by no means perfectly, to respond to political pressure within Whitehall. The accounting officers of the departments would remain accountable for the expenditure, whilst the Ministers engaged in joint policy decisions. Apart from the practical circumstance that each of the pools dealt primarily with post-conflict situations rather than ‘conflict prevention’, there were additional problems in making the pools genuinely joined-up. In particular, the different cultures amongst the different ministries were exposed within the operational mechanism of the pools, as well as continuing bureaucratic obstacles to meaningful collaboration.

66 Clare Short, interview, 2008, UK.
The Stabilisation Unit

Like the Conflict Prevention Pools, the Security Sector Development Assistance Team (SSDAT) and the Stabilisation Unit are cross-departmental bodies that are jointly owned and administered by the FCO, MoD and DFID. The Stabilisation Unit was set up to ensure that political decisions and policies that are developed and agreed by the three departments are being properly operationalized.

Tellingly, however, both cross-departmental bodies were physically and administratively located within DFID, and the conceptual and financial tension between development, national security and political control of these processes overseas remains a problem. It is evident that the lack of any single organization, such as the Cabinet Office, which has the necessary authority to take the overall lead in the field has hampered coordination in the past. Indeed, back home in London, it is not regarded as a given that the Cabinet Office has the necessary capacity, that is, size, to take a robust lead.\(^67\) The FCO, politically representing the UK abroad, is not always in a position to impose its will on DFID and how the latter strategically spends its funds, which often has political consequences.

The mission statement of the Stabilisation Unit is to provide ‘specialist, targeted assistance in countries emerging from violent conflict where the UK is helping to achieve a stable environment that will enable longer term development to take place.’\(^68\) Its focus is on filling the gap between emergency humanitarian and longer-term development assistance, which is done by:

- Providing assessment and planning in order to create common understanding of the issues in the conflict zone.
- Provide experienced civilian personnel through a roster of Deployable Civilian Experts. The issue of recruiting qualified civilian staff remains critical, and is likely to be a generic challenge given the number of civilian skill sets that is potentially needed in the immediate aftermath of – or during – conflict.
- Identify lessons learned.

In other words, the Stabilisation Unit fills a critical gap between the departments. One of its main challenges is the limit of its powers at director level, which has the

\(^{67}\) Interview former MoD DCDC, June 2008.

\(^{68}\) See: http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk.
consequence that it has ‘nobody to impress or depress.’\(^{69}\) However, it may also be noted that, even if the Stabilisation Unit seems to lack power being the junior partner, it provides very able assistance.\(^{70}\)

**The Comprehensive Approach**

As already noted, it is within the broader debate and efforts of cross-departmental collaboration that the concept of a Comprehensive Approach (CA) should be situated. The concept was initially outlined in the defence document, Joint Discussion Note 4/05. It codifies ‘emerging best practice and provide initial guidance to the MOD on the principles that should guide incorporation of CA thinking into the planning and execution of UK operations.’\(^{71}\) The document sets out framing principles, including:

- A proactive cross-Whitehall approach.
- Shared understanding.
- Outcome-based thinking.
- Collaborative working.

The concept was further refined in November 2006 with the publication of the ‘Comprehensive Approach Core Script’ by the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit, the Stabilisation Unit’s predecessor.’ The document outlines the aim of bringing together departments and stakeholders outside the government in order to:

1. promote shared understanding, aims and objectives;
2. develop structures and processes;
3. establish relationships and cultural understanding.

Furthermore, it was acknowledged in Joint Discussion Note 7/06 that ‘some of the supporting effects may lie predominantly outside military ability to deliver’ and that ‘other agencies may expect the military to contribute to, or deliver, supporting effects not initially considered by the operational headquarters.’\(^{72}\)

Specifically, with respect to the Comprehensive Approach, the Joint Discussion Note and the Core Script are the only strategic documents that exist. These documents should be seen as the basis for the three departments to develop an approach to the

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\(^{69}\) Interview with former MoD DCDC, June 2008.

\(^{70}\) Interview, UK MoD, June 2008. Further generic challenges that arise from the short-term contracts that the Stabilisation Unit can offer include limited influence on potential advancement by the person contracted, and thus limitations to career planning, lack of a job upon return, and so forth.

\(^{71}\) JDN 4/05, p. iii.

\(^{72}\) JDN 7/06, p. 2-13.
Comprehensive Approach that is in line with their own strategic direction, as well as the overall concept. Just like the Conflict Prevention Pool concept, the Comprehensive Approach is ideally shared across the FCO, DFID and MoD.

While the Pools were innovations coming from DFID and FCO respectively, the new concept thus stems from a defence doctrine. Following experiences in Sierra Leone, but more pertinently Iraq and Afghanistan, there was an acknowledgment within Ministry of Defence of the limitations to military engagement in making peace, and the need to involve other government departments and civil society in sustainable peacemaking.\(^73\)

The fact that the concept originates from one department means that ownership of its operationalization is not fully shared with the FCO and DFID.\(^74\) This may also be why one officer in the MoD noted a preference for the more neutral concept of a ‘cross-governmental approach’ rather than a ‘comprehensive approach.’\(^75\) Another real issue in this regard is the circumstance that, while the MoD expects civilian participation, the FCO and DFID do not, unlike the military, have a standing capacity for rapid deployment. However, for DFID as well as for the civilian Stabilisation Unit team in Afghanistan, for instance, the fundamental stumbling block remains that of staff protection, which comes at a significant financial price and, potentially, a political one as well.

**Structures for Planning and Implementation**

Strategy groups such as the Afghanistan Strategy Group permit a thematic focus on a conflict in a joined-up process between the Cabinet Office and the three departments. The role of the Cabinet Office is regarded, particularly by the FCO, as decisive in terms of providing direction and guidance. Indeed, in the field where all three departments operate, one clear lead department is missing, and proper coordination is often relatively weak as a consequence, and very much personality-driven.\(^76\) Indeed, as noted by one MoD staff member: ‘In general, individuals take the lead, not institutions.’\(^77\)

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\(^74\) Interview, former MoD DCDC.

\(^75\) Interview, UK MoD, June 2008.

\(^76\) Albrecht and Jackson 2009.

\(^77\) Interview, UK MoD, June 2008. The same point was made in a RUSI interview, June 2008.
Within the FCO, the Comprehensive Approach has been divided into two areas of responsibility. The conflict group handles thematic issues such as specific conflicts, whether defined geographically or thematically. The Security and Policy Group handles the conceptual aspects of the approach. The FCO is currently working towards the enhanced integration of military and civil structures and has introduced a civilian commander of Provincial Reconstruction Team Helmand in Afghanistan. The military will report directly to this person, rather than through the military chain of command via the MoD. It should be pointed out, however, that the military will be ‘directed, not controlled or commanded’, by the civilian commander.

Within DFID, Comprehensive Approach issues and cooperation with the Stabilisation Unit is located in the Conflict, Humanitarian, and Security office. In the planning process of specific operations, DFID makes clear what the other participants can expect from the department in terms of, for example, livelihood programmes. The Conflict, Humanitarian and Security office is also responsible for DFID’s involvement in security-sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR).

The MoD’s role vis-à-vis the Comprehensive Approach is twofold, providing military input, and, given the military nature of the approach, leading on its conceptual and doctrinal development. However, although the implementation of military strategy takes place through campaign planning, there is a clear understanding of the need to engage a wide set of actors, including civil society-based organizations. The NGO/Military Contact Group has been set up with the purpose of developing ‘mutual understanding and facilitating education and training opportunities between the military and humanitarian sectors.’ The weakness of this setup is its ad hoc nature. The inclusion of humanitarian, stabilization and development advisers in British military doctrine is another example of the attempt to integrate the civilian and military aspects of operational and planning processes.

The general UK approach to aligning civil and military planning has so far been to establish ad hoc cross-departmental committees. Examples include the Iraq Policy Unit and the Strategic Delivery Unit in Afghanistan. Of a more permanent disposition is the cross-departmental CA working group, which is responsible for the UK Joint Venture exercises. However, the participation of the three main departments in

78 JDP 3-90, p. 3-3.
79 JDP 3-90, p. 4-4.
the exercises is very uneven, since only the defence side has standing capacities that permit them to involve many people in the exercises.

**Funding**
Restrictions on the use of UK overseas development assistance impacted directly on the initial pooling of human and financial resources that materialized in the conflict prevention pools. Unlike the FCO and MoD, DFID’s funding is mandated by the 2002 International Development Act, which explicitly states that funding should be spent on poverty reduction, not trade or UK national security matters. The establishment of the Conflict Prevention Funds was an explicit attempt by the Treasury to stimulate greater cross-departmental collaboration.

However, as the Iraq and Afghanistan operations developed, they were seen as ‘polluting’ the original concept and purpose of the conflict prevention pools.\(^{80}\) Hence, in 2007, the government set up the Stabilisation Aid Fund in support of ‘hot stabilization’ activities such as Quick Impact Projects.\(^{81}\) Other situations were to be covered through the other pools, in 2008 merged in the Conflict Prevention Pool with a budget of £112 million for the first year (at the time of writing, debates over the future of the CPP continue). The budget of the Stabilization Aid Fund was £269 million in 2008, and around half of the expenses are classified as development aid.\(^{82}\) The Stabilisation Unit manages the fund, reporting to the MoD, while the FCO and DFID are meant to be on the board of the pool. Operationally, funding decisions have been pushed towards the host country rather than London.

**Towards Whole of Government?**
In sum, the UK approach to integrating instruments of foreign policy, including development and military power, has been ongoing since the late 1990s, when a perceived upsurge in conflicts following the Cold War led to the pooling of funding by the FCO, DFID and the MoD. It is the rationale of cross-departmental collaboration that lies at the heart of this process, as envisaged by DFID and the FCO respectively, as well as the Comprehensive Approach as it originated from the MoD. With a similar

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80 Interview, DfID, 3 June 2008.
81 See [http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk](http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk)
82 Ibid.
point of departure, both concepts transcend conventional notions of civil-military cooperation and coordination.

The evolution of joined-up work in Whitehall is thus a relatively recent phenomenon. Indeed, due to departmental autonomy and the political culture in the UK, collaboration across Whitehall has always been highly dependent on the informal networks of individuals. Inevitably, because of fundamentally different mission statements, strategic approaches and work cultures, friction occurs among the departments. Basically no one minister is willing to ‘give way’. In Whitehall and in the field, attempts to establish a lead agency has in many cases had limited success, particularly with respect to DfID and the FCO (the MoD tends to seek political leadership in the latter). There is evidence – as in the case of Sierra Leone, where the bulk of the African Conflict Prevention Pool was spent – that creating coherent cross-departmental strategies remains a challenge, even today, when the UK is preparing to scale down its engagement in the country’s security sector.\textsuperscript{83} Such strategic incoherence appears, for instance, when a clear consensus does not exist about whether a country is in a ‘post-conflict’ or ‘development’ phase, which in turn has direct consequences for what types of assistance are deemed necessary.

Some of the issues that remain with the implementation of a Comprehensive Approach, which are likely to be generic for all cross-departmental efforts, and clearly will be for Danish efforts also, include:

- Lack of an agreed general plan.
- Lack of agreed cross-governmental planning format.
- Lack of agreed persons or organizations with the overarching responsibility to lead and drive the process of cross-governmental coordination forward.\textsuperscript{84}

At the same time, whilst resistance remains strong among development agencies against engaging in security-related programming, it is important to recognize that the three departments have travelled a long distance since 2000 in terms of working jointly: ‘This period will in the future be looked at, probably not as seismic, but as a quite significant shift in the whole ethos. The idea of being involved in intelligence is strange – I mean, talking to people in Vauxhall Cross, it was dangerous.’\textsuperscript{85}

\textsuperscript{83} Output to Purpose Review, Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programme, April 2007.
\textsuperscript{84} Interview with MoD, June 2008.
\textsuperscript{85} Garth Glentworth, Roundtable, 18 December 2007.
While Danish capacity to deploy military and civilian personnel is clearly limited compared to that of the UK, there are nevertheless generic lessons that can be learned for future Danish activities in line with the CA concept. First, whatever policy is developed that encompasses more than one department needs to engage all relevant parties from the outset or ownership will not be shared. Secondly, there is the need to identify one clear lead body for joint efforts across the departments. There is an inherent contradiction in this statement. However, ensuring the acceptance of all relevant parties as well as a clear lead department (or organization) is likely to enhance the possibilities for greater integration in the field.

While the Cabinet Office in the UK is able to play this role in certain instances, this is not the case in the field, where collaboration and coordination as a consequence becomes personality-driven. Indeed, after eight years of experience, it remains to be seen whether institutional collaboration in the UK can be established in a way that does not lead to inter-departmental tensions (and ultimately withdrawal from coordinated collaboration). This is the case because it remains unclear whether the MoD, FCO or DFID would allow any one department to take the lead.

The UK has set up separate bodies, such as the Stabilisation Unit and the Security Sector Development Assistance Team, to coordinate the efforts of the three departments and to fill those gaps in activities that neither department can fill independently. The Stabilisation Unit, for instance, was established in explicit acknowledgment of the vacuum that exists between possible military interventions and the realistic initiation of development efforts. This is clearly a consequence of the UK capacity for robust military intervention as well as international development activities. While the Stabilisation Unit is not yet fully consolidated as an organization, it fills an important gap as a repository of expertise in terms of both institutional memory and human resources.
Integrated Approach in the Netherlands

Background, Concept and Strategy
In the Netherlands, the Integrated Approach is publicly known as the ‘3D’, even though the approach is moving in the direction of incorporating the whole of government, as well as sectors outside the government. In official documents, it is called the Integrated Approach. In retrospect, this development started in the early 1990s with the incipient recognition of security as a development issue, and the creation in 1992 of a CIMIC fund from the development budget in the context of Dutch participation in the UN mission in Cambodia. In 1996, the Ministries of Development and Foreign Affairs were merged.

One influential factor influencing the incorporation of a more integrated approach to foreign policy was the painful Dutch experience with peace operations in the Balkans. Politically, the Balkan experience led to the downfall of the Dutch prime minister and to the introduction in 2000 of new procedures to strengthen the role of the Dutch parliament vis-à-vis the government in decisions regarding Dutch military participation in international operations.86 The new procedures are laid down in two amendments to the constitution on the joint initiative of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence: According to Article 100 the government will keep Parliament informed (through ‘Art.100 letters’) about investigations, decisions and progress or changes in regard international military deployments. Also annual interim evaluations must be undertaken, and final evaluations must cover military as well as political aspects.

Likewise Article 97 specifies the criteria and the political as well as military basis of Dutch participation in international military operations. Of particular interest in terms of a comprehensive approach is the notion that ‘additional resources may be needed’ if the assignment of military units ‘includes humanitarian or civil tasks’.87 Of importance is also the insistence on a clear command structure and the retention of full command as a national, Dutch responsibility, thus avoiding lines of command with different international organizations (‘dual-key situations’).88

88 Ibid., p. 9.
At the strategic level, the war on terror and the Dutch engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq gave new momentum to the process. From 2003, but building on the early experience in Cambodia, a ‘Policy framework for Cimic’ provided tools for the Dutch troops in the field, but retained a very limited military and ad hoc scope. In 2004, the MFA established a Stability Fund for development and foreign policy activities that was not bound by the OECD’s Official Development Aid criteria. Finally, in September 2005, the comprehensive approach found a formal expression at the policy level in the form of the ‘Memorandum on post-conflict reconstruction’. This White Paper was presented to Parliament by the ministers of Foreign Affairs, Development, Defence and Economic Affairs, but it also addresses the roles of the Ministries of Justice and the Interior.

Unlike a former memorandum on reconstruction (from 2002) – which emphasized the development dimensions of good governance, social services, civil society and economic reconstruction – the 2005 policy paper lists a series of military, political, development and economic instruments of reconstruction. The paper advocates an integrated approach at the international as well as national levels, based on clearly assigned roles. As the basic operating principle at the national level, the Dutch effort should match the priorities of the country in question as closely as possible.

Apart from mentioning a series of security-related development activities, the policy paper holds that reconstruction activities are important as part of an exit strategy for the military in peace operations, and that this should be taken into account when deciding whether to deploy Dutch troops in a given area (MFA 2005: 22). While reconstruction activities should be planned between donors and local authorities, the need for resources for reconstruction in areas with a Dutch military presence should be taken into account. ‘This is not to say, however, that there should be an automatic link between aid and military presence, as this could hamper the effective implementation of reconstruction activities in both areas’ (ibid.: 23).

The policy paper also points towards the need for greater communication between the NGOs and the MoD, as well as a closer involvement of the private sector in reconstruction activities. One suggestion is to attach people from the private sector to the military units as reservists, as is done in the US, France and the UK. This would help in establishing contacts with local companies, and Dutch companies would also receive ‘reliable protection’ (ibid.: 24).
In 2007, the ten Rotterdam-recommendations ‘for increased synergy between defence, diplomacy and development’\(^{89}\) specified some of the intentions in the 2005 policy, suggesting that integrated strategic planning should emanate from the highest level of authority, and that operations should be ‘As civilian as possible and as military as necessary’. In a post-hoc conference organised by various Dutch NGOs with the participation of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, more weight was placed on conflict prevention as against the post-conflict perspective of former attempts at increasing the 3D synergy.

In the policy letter ‘Our common Concern’ (2007), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs enhanced its focus on fragile states and on the category of ‘security and development’ countries assisted by the Netherlands, partly in the interest of human security, and partly out of ‘enlightened self-interest’. In 2008, a strategy followed this up, emphasizing the integrated approach as a main instrument.\(^{90}\) In addition, the new strategy will seek to be ‘as multilateral as possible and as bilateral as necessary.’ This allows for bilateral initiatives in relation to ‘orphan states’ or cases where the Netherlands can facilitate international engagement, such as Burundi.

Policy papers on Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration as well as socio-economic development are under way, and a more active policy in regard to the private sector’s role in fragile states is still to be approved. While there is an interest in involving the private sector more in relation to fragile states and reconstruction, a set of guidelines will most likely seek to prevent the potential cases of ‘fuelling conflict’.\(^{91}\)

**Institutions and structures**

Rather than setting up an entirely new, inter-ministerial entity, the Dutch government has sought integration through:

- exchanges of advisors between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence;
- the development of country-specific strategies, mainly in the Great Lakes region, the Balkans, Horn of Africa and Afghanistan, which have been singled out as priority areas for comprehensive approaches; and
- inter-ministerial committees.

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\(^{89}\) Centre for European Reform and MFA 2007

\(^{90}\) Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008.

\(^{91}\) Interview, MFA, June 6, 2008.
One of these committees is the Steering Committee for Security Co-operation and Reconstruction, which meets four times a year. It has the responsibility for coordinating country strategies in fragile states, and developing policies on Security Sector reform, Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration, debt relief and socio-economic reconstruction. The committee has representation from seven ministries, including the 3Ds, as well as the Ministries of Finance, Taxation, the Interior and Economic Affairs, represented at Director-General or deputy level. The committee is also supposed to organize meetings and platforms for information-sharing on specific countries, drawing on the broader community of NGOs, researchers and private companies; preparing for closer liaison in the field; and seeking to integrate a number of different rosters on civil capacity for conflict prevention and reconstruction.

Another committee is the Steering Group for Military Operations, an operational entity which meets on a weekly basis and includes the Director Generals of Political Affairs and Development Cooperation in the MFA and the Chief Defence Staff of the Ministry of Defence. In the MoD, meetings take place on a daily basis with participation from the MFA. Other meetings on country-specific and thematic issues take place regularly, involving staff from MoD and various MFA departments. For Afghanistan in particular, an inter-ministerial task force was set up for the management of security and development issues, but meetings have been few in this committee.

The political interest in setting up an inter-ministerial Stabilization Unit after the UK model has been limited from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs side because of the flaws in this model. This is evidenced by the recent (2008) internal reorganization, a follow-up to the new policy focus on fragile states and the integration of security and development activities. The former Human Rights and Peace-building department has been upgraded from 10 to 24 staff members and turned into a Peace-building and Stabilization Unit (known as the Fragile States Unit).92 The unit has no participation from the Ministry of Defence or other ministries, but it does have a military advisor to enhance the integrated approach. Otherwise the process has primarily been an internal affair of the MFA, with little consultation with the MoD and other ministries regarding restructured roles and linkages. The Security Policy office remains the entry point for defence in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The new unit is taking over some responsibilities for several countries from the regional and thematic departments, including Sudan, Burundi, DRC, Kosovo and

92 In Dutch, called the Fragility and Peace-building Unit.
Afghanistan. In the latter case, responsibility is now split between four offices within the ministry. The Fragile States Unit has sole responsibility for reconstruction activities, and shared responsibility for security issues. The Unit also has catalytic activities in Colombia, Guatemala, Palestine and Pakistan, where it is checking programs for conflict sensitivity. The placement of specific countries depends on ad hoc decisions based on experience, the political context and considerations of the potential for added value from a security/development-focused Dutch engagement.\(^9\)

As yet there is very little experience with the new set-up, but it is viewed with some scepticism both within and outside the MFA.

At the tactical level, the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) model has been a driver for the development of the Dutch approach to integration. The Netherlands took over the Baghlan PRT from the Germans in 2004-6, which was then handed over to Hungary. Another operation started in the less stable province of Uruzgán in 2006. Task Force Uruzgán was established in August 2006, and military forces were deployed in the PRT, as well as in the Dutch Battle Group. The PRT was military-led with civilian advisors attached, as well as specialists from the Reserve, but since 1 April 2009, the PRT has been civilian-led by a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Advisors, reporting directly to the embassy, monitor the implementation of projects from the Facilitating Fund for Reconstruction (which is different from the military’s own fund for small ‘Hearts and Minds’ projects) and may assist in the identification and implementation of longer term reconstruction projects, which are formulated and implemented by other agencies, including NGOs and the UN.

Increasingly, working relations have been built with parts of the NGO sector, the academic community and the private sector, and Dutch NGOs are increasingly engaged in Uruzgán. The policy on relations with NGOs and private companies is described in the 2005 White Paper. The ministries have involved NGOs in consultations in preparation for its engagement in Uruzgán, as well as in trainings and exercises with military staff. The MoD coordinates an Afghanistan ‘platform’\(^9\) while the MFA has similar initiatives on African countries. According to one NGO, the image that the ministries have of the NGOs seems to have changed in the process. Rather than being merely service providers, ministries are increasingly perceiving them as organizations that provide critical contributions to state-building on the basis of different understand-

\(^9\) Interview, MFA, June 2008.
\(^9\) Five Dutch NGOs in the Uruzgán platform have substantial programmes in the province.
ings and concepts. Furthermore, embassies increasingly recognize that they depend on cooperation with NGOs because of their capacity for implementation and their institutional memory. But it all depends very much on the individuals involved.

**Funding and human resources**

As an important step in the development of its integrated policy, the government set up a *Stability Fund* in 2004 with the purpose of supporting activities in the field of peace and security which are relevant for development, such as support for peace processes, crisis management, DDR operations, SSR, proliferation of small arms, mine-clearance and peace-enforcement activities by developing countries. In 2008, the Stability Fund had €100 million for project support. The fund is financed via the ordinary development and foreign policy budget, but activities can be funded regardless of whether they meet the ODA criteria or not.

A steering committee manages the fund, with the MoD taking an active part. An evaluation of the first two years of operation lauded the initiative for its facilitation of cooperation between the MFA and MoD. Most funds were used for SSR and DDR projects. The evaluation indicates that some of the initial problems related to differences in accustomed standards of applications in the different ministries, as well as a lack of appreciation in the MFA of the needs and limitations of operational military missions.

Apart from the Stability Fund and the ordinary development budgets for specific countries (following ODA criteria), the new MFA Stabilization Unit has access to a smaller but very flexible fund of ODA that has been established in support of activities in fragile states and is disbursed through the embassies or other organizations (including international agencies). This fund comprised €15 million in 2008, rising to 35 million in 2010.

With regard to civilian, human resources for rapid deployment, the ministries involved in the integrated approach manage a number of independent rosters with

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95 E.g. by emphasizing the notion of fragile societies instead of fragile states; interview with Cordaid, August 2008.

96 The Dutch government also worked for a change in the OECD/DAC criteria for development aid, which were changed in March 2005 to include democratic control and governance in the security sector, the involvement of civil society in the security sector, prevention of the recruitment of child soldiers, the promotion of civilian peace-building activities, conflict prevention and conflict resolution, and activities to curb the proliferation of small arms.

mainly non-governmental experts within different fields (elections, SSR etc.). The SU is currently looking at how to merge these, and is trying to combine them with similar UK initiatives. In Dutch military operations, functional specialists (e.g. water, irrigation, energy and agriculture) from the Reserve are deployed on a temporary basis until civilian specialists can take over.

The recent prioritization of fragile states places heavy demands on ministerial personnel because of the comparatively more difficult conditions of operation. The SU recommends that every embassy as a minimum (i.e. without having to operate programmes) by staffed by an ambassador, a deputy and three senior staff, each representing one of the three D’s. However, it is generally very hard for the MFA to staff embassies in fragile states, even though the ones in Afghanistan and Sudan have finally been fully staffed after an upgrading. The Ministry is working on its incentive structure, including salaries, R+R, career friendliness and a guarantee of being able of going back to the former position in the ministry. The MOD is likewise increasing the number of defence attachés in Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, as well as elsewhere.

Towards an integrated approach?
The MoD seem to be the most energetic stakeholder in the Dutch version of an integrated approach, with the urgently experienced need for having civilian actors involved in (primarily) Afghanistan. The MFA is taking an active part as well, not least at the top level, even though the process of reorganization and cutbacks has taken its toll, and resources are spread out thinly at the ministry as well as embassy levels. From the point of view of the MoD, there is still some confusion as to the distribution of roles and responsibilities within the MFA, its participation in information-sharing and common exercises is limited, and commitments only slowly materialize, which hampers the functioning of the Steering Group for Reconstruction. In practical terms, the main lines of operations are defined in the more powerful Steering Group for Military Operations, which has higher level representation, including from the Prime Minister’s Office, meets every week, and mostly deals with operational military issues.

98 Interview, MFA, June 2008.
99 Interviews in MoD, June 2008.
100 AIV 2009.
The Ministry of Economic Affairs is taking an incipient interest in the process of integration, while the other ministries are only nominally involved. The MoD and MFA consider the potential contributions of the Ministries of the Interior, Justice and Finance to be highly relevant, but the latter obviously need to define if and how they will involve themselves in the process and how they will deal with the demands for internationalization that follow from such involvement.

In general, the impression is that the process of integration still depends very much on personal contacts and commitments, and that institutional inertia dominates the process. The distance between the general policies laid down in Article 100 letters and the need for policy guidance for the planning process is still long, the capacity and processes for generating shared understandings and analysis is limited, and operations are still by and large stove-piped. Thus, according to a civil assessment of the situation in Uruzgán, the coordination of the different participants succeeds in ‘de-conflicting’, but an integrated civil and military strategy has been slow in coming. Civilian input is very much an add-on to the military operation, and the timing and planning of civil-military operations are not integrated sufficiently according to the MoD. Nevertheless, integration in the field seems to be progressive and changes faster than in Den Haag.

101 But the recognition that different participants in the process have different goals may be an important step.
National approaches from a Danish perspective

Concept and doctrine: what’s in a name?
Short of doctrines proper, the national concepts for integrated approaches to international operations are inscribed in white papers, co-authored op-eds from Ministers, letters to the parliament, concept notes and the like. And, despite the fact that national approaches have become identified with one in particular of the current labels – CPA, WGA, CA, 3D or the integrated approach – ownership and understanding of the particular concept is very uneven across government departments and institutions. As one ministerial staff member asked rhetorically: ‘Are we in this together?’

While, for example, the concept of the Comprehensive Approach emanates from the military side, Foreign Affairs and Development tend to prefer the Whole of Government approach. One of the founding fathers of the Comprehensive Approach concept remarked that the reception of the concept outside the MoD and the UK armed forces was characterized by the ‘NIH syndrome’: Not Invented Here.\(^{102}\) The process of naming is itself an issue with overtones of institutional politics. Institutions prefer their own names, while imported or imposed concepts are received with caution since they come with associated visions, assumptions and hierarchies.

At the level of general policy, the Rotterdam principle, ‘As civilian as possible and as military as necessary’, seems to be a common denominator among the states that practice some form of engagement of military forces in otherwise civilian activities, such as relief and reconstruction. The principle is clear and useful as a guideline, but the definition of what is possible and necessary is, of course, less clear.

The concepts vary in terms of how comprehensive the approach is. The three Ds are at the centre, but the tendency is to include more and more governmental entities, such as Justice and Internal Affairs (for police reform and rule of law programmes), Economic Affairs (for debt relief, trade agreements, and private sector programmes), Agriculture and others. ‘Whole of Government’ is the ambition, but the non-3D ministries have not yet taken a great interest in the concept, with some exceptions, such as Economic Affairs in the Netherlands (and the Finish Ministry of the Interior).\(^{103}\)

\(^{102}\) Interview, former UK MoD DCDC officer, May 2008.
\(^{103}\) The Australian MFA has set up a facility for supporting other ministries in their efforts to become more internationally oriented.
government, the comprehensive approach also seeks to include NGOs and the private sector, which is increasingly seen as having the potential for facilitating economic development, but also engaging directly in informal conflict mediation.

The national approaches are predominantly focussed on cross-governmental coherence, but they are not without interest for how they relate to international set-ups. The Danish CPA explicitly notes that the Danish contribution should be planned within an international framework. The new Dutch approach is supposed to be ‘as multilateral as possible and as bilateral as necessary’, considering cases (such as Burundi) where a Dutch bilateral initiative could facilitate further international engagement.

**Interdepartmental integration**

Looking across country cases, three levels of interagency coordination and decision-making emerge, with some variation:

1) At the *top executive level*, policies, objectives and overall strategies for improving inter-departmental cooperation are defined in general terms, as well as in terms of specific country or regional operations. These terms allude to the right mix of instruments – civil and military, as well as bilateral and multilateral – depending on the context and specific objectives.

In none of the cases has the integrated approach found a clearly defined ‘home’, being dealt with rather in various high-level committees and secretariats, in the UK under the auspices of the Cabinet Office, and in Holland at the level of Director General and Chief of Staff. In Denmark strategies of civil-military cooperation are developed at a lower level of staff, but occasionally involve the Ministers. This may be a general trend, as the cases of Canada and Norway illustrate. In Canada, the Privy Council Office and the Cabinet’s Foreign Affairs and National Security Committee have been the drivers of departmental integration and coordination, while in Norway, in the specific case of the country’s engagement in Afghanistan, coordination takes place at deputy-minister level. The ministers themselves are mostly involved on an *ad hoc* basis, very much dependent on their personal engagement in the matter. Even in the case of the UK, participants in the system note that there is still a lack of a concerted format for the cross-governmental planning process, and no authority has been assigned the central responsibility for an integrated approach.

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104 Patrick and Brown 2007.
One important issue to consider at this level is the condition of small states with regard to international operations, be they Coalition, NATO, or UN-led. Small nations can decide to participate or not in specific operations, but their influence on strategic decisions that affect their participation and conditions of operation will often be minimal. Hence, the national strategic leadership has to ask how influence can be exerted on international operation planning, how and when strategic decisions by international partners are being communicated, and what the possibilities are to incorporate these decisions in operational planning.

2) At a vaguely defined ‘mid-level’, a variety of ministerial departments, military commands and intelligence services undertake the necessary analysis of contexts and situations; development and adjustment of policies, strategies and benchmarks; operational planning; monitoring, evaluation and development of lessons learned; mobilization of financial, material and human resources; and further development of concepts and instruments for these purposes. The institutional arrangements at this level vary from inter-departmental working groups and task forces (DK and Holland) to the establishment of the separate, cross-departmental units for stabilization (UK).

Given the paradigmatic example of the UK Stabilization Unit (and the Canadian START), the central question at this level concerns the benefits and drawbacks of establishing a permanent, operational unit to undertake these tasks. In order to consider the organizational ‘home’ of a revised Danish concept, lessons learned from attempts at increasing coherence by establishing a permanent cross-departmental unit are useful. Experience from the UK and Canada thus indicates that:

- To be effective in decision-making and setting clear frameworks for interaction, inter-departmental units should be placed under the responsibility of the highest possible executive authority, e.g. a committee at Cabinet level, involving ministers or deputies. The further upstream interaction is established, the easier joint-ness is achieved at the lower levels. Thus, the SU is still very much a junior partner which is dependent on being represented in Cabinet Office committees by its mother institutions. In particular, the Ministry of Defence deplores the lack of decisive executive power of the unit, which could make things happen faster and resolve disagreements.
- The higher the political profile of a concrete situation, the higher the charge

105 Patrick and Brown 2007.
necessary for solving associated (inter- and intra-departmental) conflicts. Such conflicts furthermore tend to increase with the number of stakeholders\textsuperscript{106} and the political profile of the context.

- Standing cross-departmental units help institutionalize procedures and diminish ad hoc solutions, improve institutional learning, facilitate ‘reach back’ to and ‘buy-ins’ from line ministries, and may relieve mother ministries of certain pressures (to become operational in the case of development and foreign affairs).\textsuperscript{107}

- The drawbacks of standing cross-departmental units are: 1) the risk of becoming a bureaucratic and political orphan institution with no directly responsible Minister; 2) the organizational costs of introducing new structures that encroach upon other institutions’ jurisdictions; and 3) the risks of overstretch and unrealistic expectations: ‘Sticking to a realistic and well-defined mandate, as well as assiduously pursuing buy-in from line ministries, is critical to success.’\textsuperscript{108}

These general, organizational observations have to be viewed against the nature of the specific political and administrative context. Thus,

1) The existing stand-alone stabilization and reconstruction units (UK and Canada) are products of a ‘Lex Afghanistan’, designed in response to the challenges of the high-profile conflict with large troop deployments and low governmental capacity in the host nation. The question is to what degree a possible Danish stabilization unit should be designed primarily to cater for such extraordinary circumstances, or whether it should incorporate provisions for other, smaller military and/or civil deployments in EU, NATO and UN missions (most likely in Africa), and more generally to security-development issues in fragile situations, such as inputs for security-sector reform and demobilization, disarmament and reintegration programs.

2) The pressure to set up a stand-alone unit may be lessened when Development and Foreign Affairs have been merged into the MFA (as in Holland and Denmark), instead of having strong, independent development departments (e.g. Canada, UK).\textsuperscript{109} Development departments seem to be hesitant in becoming too involved with defence and political departments because they fear that development aid may be subsumed by agendas of national (political and security) self-interest, rather than

\textsuperscript{106} Patrick and Brown 2007. This would also be a standard observation in organizational theory.

\textsuperscript{107} As in the UK case, where the Stabilization Unit has taken off the pressure on DFID to become more operational (interview, DFID, May 2008).

\textsuperscript{108} Patrick and Brown 2007: 133.

\textsuperscript{109} See also OECD 2006.
being guided exclusively by the needs of the host country. However, in the case of the UK, DFID was the department which promoted interdepartmental cooperation in the first place around SSR issues, but this happened in a different security-political context than the current one.

The new peace-building and stabilization unit in the Netherlands has been set up within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The process illustrates one of the drawbacks of developing a new unit and the corresponding disruption to structural reorganization. It is a heavy investment in terms of time, manpower and the conflicts caused by changing portfolios, authority and responsibilities of, for example, the regional offices. From the perspective of other departments, cooperation with the MFA almost stalled during the drawn-out process.

All three country cases suggest that the development and foreign affairs ministries are confronted with expectations for the instant delivery of reconstruction and development in areas of military deployment in accordance with the Comprehensive Approach. The posting of advisors at provincial and district levels place high demands on the day-to-day operational capacity of the ministries. For at least two decades, donor governments’ management of development cooperation has become less operational and project-oriented, and more and more strategic, policy- and programme-oriented, with central budget support, multi-donor trust funds and similar forms of transfer. Hence the operational demands of a comprehensive approach go against the grain of development in the ministries.

In this context, the new operational unit takes off a lot of pressure in particular from the development and foreign affairs departments. Hence, after the establishment of the Stabilization Unit, it has become easier for DFID to focus on its strategic-level efforts to have an impact at the international level of policy development.

The answer to the question of the structure and the allocation of operational capacity is linked to the political weight placed on future engagements in fragile states and situations. Fragile and failed states are to a large extent defined by the risk of armed conflict and the lack of protection for the population. They have therefore been identified with the need for a closer integration of security, development and political

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110 E.g., as defined in the International Development Act in the UK.
111 Interview with DFID, June 2008. In addition, humanitarian disasters put pressure on the operational capability of DFID. For this purpose, DFID has developed a stand-by operational facility, ready to be staffed (e.g. Burma...
instruments, including security-sector reform, the possibility of international military deployment and the sequenced application of a range of cross-government capacities for state-building and reform.\footnote{DIIS REPORT 2009:14} Whereas security-sector reform has emerged as the development agencies’ answer to security needs in fragile situations, these programmes are often discussed and managed separately from direct military operations, and (at least in the case of the UK) to a large degree involve NGOs in order to work on the involvement of civil society in discussions of security reform issues.

If a special organizational unit like the Stabilization Unit is set up for inter-departmental engagements in failed and fragile states, the questions of the division of labour and cut-off points emerge. While massive military deployment in peace-support operations is an obvious defining element, it is hard to define a clear division of labour otherwise. First, the definition of fragile states is less than clear, and secondly, the identification of countries as being ‘fragile’ or ‘failed’ and therefore in need of special procedures has difficult diplomatic implications. Hence, in practice the dividing line between the special entities and the mother ministries is defined on an ad hoc basis. The Dutch case, in which four different offices in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been involved in the Afghanistan operation since the fragility unit was set up, illustrates the inherent dangers.

3) \textit{At the field or tactical level}, national integrated approaches are commonly associated with the concept of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), which has unfolded in NATO and Coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.\footnote{See, for example, Haims et al. 2008 (‘Breaking the Failed States Circle’).} Both the UK and the Netherlands have led multinational PRTs, and, like other national contributions, these have continuously been developed and adapted to their contexts. In this sense, the PRT has been a laboratory of civil-military relations, and it has pushed the lead nations’ governments towards more integrated approaches at higher levels.\footnote{See DIIS Report on lessons learned (Brett 2008) and the synthesis report (Stepputat 2009) for summaries of criticisms of the operation of PRTs.}

In the Danish case, several \textit{ad hoc} entities have been developed for the same purpose of coordinating military and civilian contributions to stabilization and reconstruction, including the Steering Unit in Kosovo and Basra, Reconstruction Unit Denmark (RUD), and the deployment of civilian advisors directly with the Danish Armed Forces and the Tsunami). The Danish MFA also set up transitional operational offices in the context of the Tsunami, as well as the cartoon crisis.

\footnote{Abbaszadeh 2008.}
in Basra, Badakshan and Helmand. However, they have sat somewhat awkwardly with the parallel development of the PRTs, to which Denmark has contributed as well. The Danish experience, which is documented in the sub-reports on Iraq and Afghanistan, illustrates the small nation’s problems in accommodating strategic and operational integration at the national level in the context of multinational operations. If a particular national political and strategic footprint is desired, it will have to be mediated and negotiated through strategically placed representatives in the multinational PRTs (or indeed, in higher level institutions for strategic planning). An alternative model, now developing in the UK-led PRT in Helmand, is the district level ‘mini-PRT’. The main distinctions between different PRTs regard the mix and relationship of civil and military elements in terms of leadership and military engagement in reconstruction and governance reform tasks. In Afghanistan, despite an overall tendency of PRTs to become ‘civilianized’ with increased ratios of civilian to military personnel, PRTs have generally been subjected to military leadership (including the Dutch PRT in Uruzgán until March 2009). The Norwegian and the two German PRTs have been ‘two-headed’ (defence and development), while the UK has experimented with a 3D triumvirate in Mazar-e-Sharif, and is now trying out a model with a high-level diplomat ‘directing’ the PRT in Helmand (without Command and Control over the military). This reflects the lesson learned that interagency cooperation, and in particular shared leadership, is extremely dependent on the particular personal relations. Despite the changes of the leadership, the command and reporting structure is still divided between military and civilian chains, but in all these cases attempts are being made to speed up funding procedures by decentralizing decision-making.

The Danish, Dutch and British approaches to civil-military cooperation incorporate the possibility that on a limited scale the armed forces engage in, assist, or facilitate reconstruction tasks beyond force-protecting CIMIC activities. In the Dutch and UK cases, functional specialists from the reserve work in water, irrigation, agriculture and other sectors until civilian specialists can take over. In the other cases, CIMIC teams do the job. This contrasts with the German and Norwegian PRTs, which are distinguished by their stricter separation of civilian and military personnel and mandates.

**Inter-departmental funds**

Funding for activities in the volatile contexts of fragile states and armed conflicts needs to be timely and flexible to take advantage of windows of opportunity, contribute to

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115 Ibid.

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peace dividends, close the gap between short-term relief and long-term development, and cover a combination and sequencing of security, peace and development-related activities.\textsuperscript{116} However, access to flexible project and programme funding is often highly skewed for the relevant departments and agencies, leaning either to the military side, as in the US case, or to the civilian side, as in the case of donor countries with high percentages of development aid, which funding, as some agencies see it, has ‘strings attached’. OECD’s criteria for Official Development Aid (ODA) place middle-income countries and most security-related activities off limits.\textsuperscript{117} Armed protection of civilian advisors, for example, cannot be classified as development aid.

The traditional funding set-up creates incentives for ‘poor’ agencies to poach the funds of more abundantly endowed agencies, or to create conditions for highly unbalanced portfolios of activities.\textsuperscript{118} Inter-departmental funds that straddle the ODA/non-ODA divide have been recommended as an instrument for addressing these problems and encouraging joined-up approaches by donor governments when dealing with armed conflicts and fragile states. While generally considered a very appropriate instrument which facilitates shared understanding and cooperation, it has also been argued that the funds risk being used as an additional funding possibility alongside department budgets, creating ‘stand-alone’ projects and competition between departments. Thus, based on the experience of the UK and the Netherlands (as well as Canada, Norway and Sweden), the challenge remains how to encourage joint-ness, ensure that projects link up with strategic country approaches and forge shared ownership between the participating departments.

Denmark does not have an inter-agency fund. Development aid has funded all non-military activities, which have remained under the control of the MFA and the Danida Board, and other ministries have no or very limited funds for crisis- and conflict-related international activities. However, negotiations have led to larger allocations of development aid to areas of military deployment and the release of limited funds for ‘CPA projects’ facilitated by the armed forces (which are no longer drawn from the humanitarian budget). Police deployment in reform programmes is also funded from the aid budget. A large part of the aid budget is tied up in long-term commit-

\textsuperscript{116} See, for example, OECD 2006.

\textsuperscript{117} OECD 2006b. Apart from the ODA criteria, donor countries have assigned certain shares for bilateral partners of development cooperation and have set certain goals for regional priorities, often leaving very little for countries which are not long-term priority partners (Patrick and Brown 2007).

\textsuperscript{118} Patrick and Brown 2007. A large police reform programme, Focused District Development, in Afghanistan is one example of civilian activities funded by the US military. The programme fills an urgent need, but also creates some reluctance to engage from the side of potential civilian partners. See Rosén 2009.
ments with partner countries and international agencies, so humanitarian aid and the Regions of Origin initiative are the main budget lines that have provided flexible and fast disbursable funding for recent operations. While indirectly the latter is conditioned by agreements regarding the return of refugees and rejected asylum-seekers, the former is linked to criteria of impartiality and neutrality. However, in some contexts – such as in Afghanistan and Iraq – humanitarian aid provided by the military forces can hardly be considered neutral.

In the larger perspective, an inter-agency (mixed) fund would provide for more flexibility with regard eligible countries and activities. In this case, it is important for funding to be linked to the development of a common strategic framework for the country or region in question, and for agencies with operational experience from the area in question to be involved in programming.

**Coordinating mechanisms between governmental and non-governmental organizations**

While the Danish Humanitarian Contact Group provides a well-functioning forum for the exchange of information and the discussion of appropriate cooperation and strategies, the UK and the Netherlands have other, looser set-ups for exchanges between government and NGOs. Discussions within the NGO community, in particular among the humanitarian NGOs, are intense because of the highly politicized and militarized contexts of operation. There is little consensus on common positions and initiatives, but a strand of principled pragmatists is developing new approaches, involving, for example, instruments that help make difficult trade-offs between conflicting concerns and principles. Interaction with regard to information-exchange and inputs for training and country-specific strategies (organized around platforms in the Netherlands) are examples of fruitful relations. While civil-military relations are fairly well regulated in international guidelines in the field of humanitarian aid, reconstruction activities remain in limbo in terms of international regulation. Such initiatives would be worthwhile pursuing in relation to a revision of the Concerted Planning and Action guidelines.

**Recruitment of civilian capacities**

The problem of civilian capacity is voiced in all countries and international organizations that are involved in interventions with military deployments in armed conflicts.

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120 Hilhorst 2008.
The national defence organizations raise the issue most vigorously when confronting a vacuum if ‘land grabs’ cannot be followed up with immediate improvements of public services and governance. The limited standing capacity and the lack of experts with stabilization experience and capacity in political analysis are common problems. Initiatives comprise the development of comprehensive qualification-needs analysis, consolidated rosters, revision of incentive structures and duty-of-care rules.

The issue of civil capacity in crisis management is also voiced in the context of UN and EU operations. For this reason, a number of initiatives at the national and international levels have been taken to forge pools of rapidly deployable civilian capacity. Given the risk of having many, uncoordinated parallel initiatives, it may be an idea to host an international workshop on recruitment systems and procedures.
Conclusions and recommendations

This sub-study has reviewed the attempts of Denmark, the UK and the Netherlands to develop integrated and comprehensive approaches to international operations. This is indeed a moving target, as the three governments are trying to adapt to the challenges and changing conditions of operations in southern Afghanistan where they have deployed their troops. The same problems and the urgency of the enterprise are experienced as drivers of change in all three capitals, and their attempts at integration seem to meet the same obstacles.

Likewise, in the three countries, interviewees note the same differences in the institutional cultures, objectives, operational time-scales and working conditions of the participating institutions. Development (and humanitarian) offices, for example, have resisted what they perceive to be the instrumentalization of aid for security purposes, whether they are located inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as in the Netherlands and Denmark, or outside, as in the UK. In the three countries, differences between departments are paired by considerable differences between the field level and headquarters. Much of the impetus for further integration seems to be coming from the field, where the effects of a lack of departmental coordination are experienced.

Despite the explicit interest from key actors in broadening the scope of participating institutions in the integrated approach, the interest of ministries beyond the ‘3Ds’, diplomacy, defence and development, remain limited, with a few exceptions. If Ministries of the Interior, Justice, Finance, Economy and Trade are to be included, proposals for their contribution should be specific, and their involvement is likely to be personality-driven. Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be prepared to give support to the internationalization of the mainly domestically oriented ministries.

While there are many similarities between the three national approaches, there are also significant differences. In the UK, and partly in the Netherlands, the development department has promoted inter-departmental cooperation around the issue of security-sector reform in post-conflict and fragile states and in general worked consistently on the fragile states agenda. In Denmark, current inter-departmental efforts have emerged predominantly in response to the engagement in NATO and Coalition operations, with limited projection towards the more general issues of fragile states and security-sector reform. A concerted effort to define the policies and
roles of political, security-oriented and development instruments with regard to the fragile states agenda remains on the backburner in Denmark.

Against this background, it is recommended that a revision of the Danish approach takes into account a broader set of volatile contexts in which the state has problems in providing security for the population and controlling the territory. While military instruments are not always appropriate or necessary in these contexts, the revised concept should be developed alongside the formulation of policy and decision-making processes with regard to the broader fragile states agenda. In particular, the government should consider the possibility of engaging more systematically in issues and strategies of security-sector reform, including police and judicial reform.

The use of inter-departmental instruments, such as the stabilization unit and inter-departmental funds, constitutes the other main difference between the country cases. An inter-departmental stabilization unit is not a magic bullet, but it does seem to facilitate more systematic cooperation at the operational level, filling an operational gap between development efforts, military campaigns and national-level political initiatives. Over time, the unit is likely to produce a new breed of civil and military servants with ‘3D sensitivities’, provided that secondments and circulation continue. And finally, it can facilitate a more systematic and joined-up approach to analysis, monitoring, evaluation, lessons learned and feedback. Knowing more about the effects of operations is essential, and this is a weak point in the Danish approach.

However, the UK experience also shows that expectations regarding what a stabilization unit can possibly achieve are unrealistic. The unit risks being an orphan without political weight and lacking strategic leadership. If the aim is to generate an integrated approach, there is a need for high-level responsibility and ownership in order to direct rather than just facilitate the coordination of the contributions of different entities across the government. The lack of a shared planning format and the absence on the ground of the entity formally in charge also represent problems.

It is recommended that the Government considers establishing an inter-departmental office for stabilization, peace- and state-building as a home for a revised approach. Reflecting the changes since Concerted Planning and Action was conceived, the administrative responsibility should thus be removed from the Humanitarian and NGO Office – a location which was based on the Balkans experience – and placed under as high a charge as possible, under the prime minister’s office, reporting to a committee of ministers, or at director’s level in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The size of the office should reflect
the actual international engagements, with a small core staff including senior officers with field and international organizational experience and seconded staff from relevant ministries and entities (Defence, Police, Courts), while contributing to country-specific task forces with staff from regional and thematic departments.

Importantly, the process should include all potential participants from the beginning in order to ensure ownership.

In the UK and the Netherlands, interdepartmental funds were invented as incentives for further cooperation between the relevant ministries and a way of providing flexibility *vis-à-vis* the criteria for official development aid. For Denmark the latter issue remains problematic, in particular with regard to protection in Afghanistan, as long as the Danish armed forces have limited capacity to provide protection and support for civilian advisors and experts.

The government should consider setting up an inter-departmental fund in order to increase flexibility and joint initiatives in future engagements. A fund of this kind would reflect the fact that civil-military cooperation may involve expenses that are neither purely military nor primarily oriented towards development, but rather driven by political interests.

A final consideration is the extent to which the Danish government should develop its own strategic and operational civil-military capacities. Denmark will always be a minor actor in international operations and will have to fit in flexibly with other nations’ civil and military contributions. However, given the demands of the current operations, it seems that the government has to develop both the integration of Danish capabilities and instruments, and the ability to define specific civil and/or military contributions that fit into comprehensive strategic and operational arrangements with partner governments and international organizations. For this purpose, it is important that civil and military personnel take part in joint national as well as multilateral exercises where strategic and operational cooperation is developed. Time for participation in such exercises should be factored into the (time) budgets of the civilian institutions.
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