NATO and the (Re-)Constitution of Roles: “Self”, “We” and “Other”?  
Trine Flockhart  
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TRINE FLOCKHART
Senior Researcher, DIIS
tfl@diis.dk

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ABSTRACT

The popular perception of the role of NATO was famously defined by NATO’s first Secretary General, Lord Ismay, as “keeping the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down”. NATO’s role is still essentially to keep its members safe from threats, to ensure the cohesion of the transatlantic relationship, and to transform relations between former foes. However, behind this alluringly simple description of NATO, lie complex “self”, “we” and “other” definitions and perceptions of roles and relevant functional tasks. This paper seeks to unravel some of the complex processes of constituting and re-constituting NATO’s roles. By utilizing a combination of role theory and social identity theory the paper traces how NATO has been engaged in complex and simultaneous processes of having a role set defined for it, whilst also being deeply involved in constructing its own identity and the identity of its member states, prospective member states and partners.
INTRODUCTION

The popular perception of the role of NATO was famously defined by NATO’s first Secretary General, Lord Ismay, as “keeping the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down”. Expressed with a little more diplomatic subtlety and adjusting for the advance of years, NATO’s role is still essentially to keep its members safe from outside threats, to ensure the cohesion of the transatlantic relationship, and to transform relations between former foes. However, behind this alluringly simple description of NATO and NATO’s role, lie complex “self”, “we” and “other” definitions and perceptions of roles and relevant functional tasks. This paper seeks to unravel some of the complex processes of constituting and re-constituting NATO’s roles and associated perceptions of identity in NATO as an organization (the “self”), its member states and prospective member states (the “we”), its “partners” and in its perception of “other”.

From a role and identity perspective, it could be said that NATO has been engaged in not only constructing the “self” through the continuous development and maintenance of a self-identity in which NATO as an organization defines itself and how it would like to be perceived by others, but that it has also been continuously engaged with defining a role set, seen here as constituting a collection of specific functional tasks that are perceived to be in keeping with, and supporting of, the self-identity. This is a process that is currently undergoing significant change because NATO’s self-identity is in the process of changing from “a defence alliance” to “a security management institution” with an increasingly complex role set. Along with the changes in NATO’s self-identity and role set, NATO has also been engaged in re-constituting a collective we-identity — understood here as the shared feeling of “we-ness” supported by “we-doing”2 in the functional tasks contained in the role set. The “we-identity” encompasses members and prospective members, through a gradual reconstruction of their identities through socialization of a norm set defined by NATO and its members, thereby constituting an identity that is in keeping with the collective shared identity of NATO’s member states and prospective member states, and which entails active support of NATO’s self-identity and agreed role set. However, a growing number of states without membership potential and without influence on NATO’s role set and on the constitution of NATO’s self-identity participate in some of NATO’s functional tasks – especially in the missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Gulf of Aden. This behavioral and functional dimension, has effectively added a new grouping to NATO’s complex constituting and re-constituting of identities and associated role set. The new group is referred to in this paper as “partners”, indicating a group that is not completely part of NATO’s overall self-identity and may not share all of NATO’s core values or fulfill NATO’s membership criteria, but which is nevertheless closely enough related to NATO to engage in practical cooperation within a part of the role set. By distinguishing between 1) NATO’s self-identity (defence alliance or security management

1 Keohane and Wallander’s term (Keohane et al. 1999). They distinguish between a defence alliance with the role of responding to a specific threat and a security management institution which is likely to address a variety of risks.

2 “We-ness” is a concept that was originally used by Karl Deutsch and associates (1957) as one of the essential elements of a security community. ‘We-doing’ is a later refinement introduced by Emanuel Adler (2008) denoting a higher level of integration where NATO is now a community of practice.
Institution), and 2) different “we-identities” (the collective identity of member states and prospective member states) and 3) a third category (“partners”) of states with which NATO has constructive relationships, but which do not aspire to achieve membership, it becomes apparent that NATO has from its earliest history been an active agent in defining and promoting roles and identities in an ever increasing circle of member states, prospective member states and partner countries.

In many ways this is a process of “self-construction” that is very like the process described by Georg Herbert Mead in his distinction between the “I” and the “me” (Mead 1934). The process at first was located internally in the organization as it struggled to define the “I” and the “me” with the “I” representing the irreducible creative “self” and the “me” representing the perception of the “self” vis-à-vis the expectations of others concerning the “(functional) role” of the “self”. Initially the process concentrated on defining appropriate behavior for the organization and its members. Although individual members at times clashed in the struggle over defining NATO’s role and role set, a fragile consensus has been maintained. However, in response to the structural changes in material and ideational terms in the international system, especially following the end of the Cold War and 9/11, NATO’s perception of the “other” and of NATO’s own role has changed. It is no longer self-evident that NATO is “merely” a defence alliance with a well-defined membership, role set and area of operation. It could be said that the structural changes in the international system caused NATO’s internal role construction and norm-promoting activities to become increasingly externalized, as focus shifted from internal processes of role and identity constructions, to an increasing engagement with states that had previously been part of the “other” or states which had previously been defined as “out-of-area”. In so doing, not only did the roles of the norm receivers change along with their change from “other” to “prospective we” or “partner”, but the role of NATO also changed fundamentally to an agent increasingly engaged in norm socialization. In other words, the history of NATO has been a continual process of role and identity construction of “self” “we” and “other” through the internal adoption and external diffusion of the norms, values and associated practices that constitute NATO’s “self”, “we” and “other”.

The paper will seek to outline the complex process of constructing and reconstituting NATO itself and its inter-action with a number of other states. The paper will utilize role theory and Social Identity Theory (SIT), to analyze the dynamics of multiple role constructions in NATO and its member states, prospective member states and partner countries. The paper is divided into four sections starting with a review of role theory and SIT and the connection between the two and their application to NATO. The paper will then focus on mapping out the construction of roles and identities focusing on the “self” (NATO), followed by a section focusing on the “we” (old, new and prospective members) and the construction of roles and identities in the group of diverse states that can neither be characterized as part of the “other”, nor as a full part of the “we” – here referred to as “partners”. Both sections are structured around three different phases of NATO’s history defined

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3 At times the consensus has only been skin-deep, where member states have agreed to disagree under a veil of ambiguity.

ROLE THEORY AND SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY

The use of role theory in this paper is based on an understanding that role theory essentially concerns itself with the interaction between agent and structure, and the interaction between different agents. However, role theory can be said to contain two different strains - one that emphasizes material structures as providing resources for certain roles – seen here as role adaptation – and the other which sees roles as embedded in certain social arrangements and patterns of interaction between different agents – conceptualized here as constitutive interaction. The understanding is closely related to Lord Ismay’s original definition of the role of NATO, where the first (keeping the Russians out) is concerned with the material and structural understanding of threats and the subsequent adaption of specific strategies and instruments to counter it. Changes at the structural level have on several occasions given rise to role adaptation, where strategies and instruments have changed, although the overall goals of the organization have stayed fixed. NATO’s development from a defence alliance to a security management institution may be seen in this light. However, the other two roles mentioned by Lord Ismay (keeping the Americans in and the Germans down) have more to do with social relationships between different agents and their ideational basis than they have to do with material structures. Both are concerned with transforming social relationships through complex processes of interaction and identity construction. By an adapted version of Mead’s “constitutive interdependence of self and other” (Mead 1934), NATO can be conceptualized as an agent of socialization, actively promoting a specific norm set and associated behavioral practices. In this understanding, NATO becomes a socializing agent and norm leader, because NATO (or those agents acting on behalf of NATO) sees itself as such – and because that position is accepted and acted upon by states on the receiving end of norm promotion.

The two forms of role behavior – constitutive interaction and role adaptation – coexist simultaneously, and are at times intricately interlinked in a system of mutual constitution and dependence. Role adaptation can only take place if all member states agree, yet NATO actively facilitates agreement on role adaptation through interactive processes of socialization, including bargaining, social influence and persuasion. Similarly in external relations, NATO can only become a socializing agent vis-à-vis prospective members and partners, if NATO sees itself in that role. This, of course, requires agreement from NATO’s highest decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), and from the agents on the receiving end of socialization. Social relationships and the interaction between different agents will to a large extent be influenced by structural material conditions and by individual agents’ choice of strategies and instruments. Conversely, these choices will have an influence on the social relationships.

The relationship between the different agents in the construction of roles is summarized in figure 1. The focus is on the
constitutions of the role of NATO defined here as the “self”, on the member states defined here as the “we - 1”, and on the constitution of roles in a group of prospective members states, defined here as “we – 2”. I use the term re-constitution in the way suggested by Gabi Schlag (2009) to highlight the procedural and contingent dimension of identity, suggesting that an identity is not something an agent inhabits, but includes “a set of reproductive practices and structures of signification which are able to change” (Schlag 2009, 2). As already mentioned, the chapter is also concerned with the impact of NATO on the constitution of roles in a fourth category of states which have constructive relationships with NATO through partnership or dialogue, but where membership is not on the agenda. The impact of NATO on the constitution of roles in this group of states is perhaps the most puzzling and challenging, as this group cannot easily fit into either of the we-categories or the “other”. Yet the new Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, listed relations with this group as one of only four priorities in his first speech as Secretary General\(^4\).

Figure 1: Role Prescriptions and Lines of Influence

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Although role theory goes some way in explaining foreign policy behavior, it cannot account for every aspect of foreign policy behavior, because role theory allows generously for individual interpretation and individual definition of rights, duties, privileges and appropriate forms of behavior (Holsti 1987, 7). As suggested by Hollis and Smith (1990, 14), roles involve judgment and skill, albeit that such judgment and skill is practiced within a structure (Hollis and Smith 1990). There is therefore considerable room for agency in role theory, because the actor has a choice in how to behave and is endowed with different skills and characteristics, which means that there is always scope for behavior which may seem inconsistent with the role of the actor. In times of structural change, the role set is likely to become unstable, leading to a redefinition of roles and intensification of learning and socialization processes, as agents become more open to adopting different norm sets and different practices. Such times are defined in this paper as “an extraordinary moment when the existence and viability of the political order are called into question” (Ikenberry 2008, 3). According to Ikenberry such moments can lead either to resolution that leaves the existing rules and institutions in place or it may lead to transformation, adaptation or breakdown (Ikenberry 2008, 12). In both cases however, learning takes place, as agents change behavior and their guiding norm set. In this paper emphasis is on resolution and adaptation. The structural changes which took place in the international environment following the end of World War 2, the Cold War and in the wake of the Kosovo war and 9/11, did indeed speed up processes of new identity constructions and the re-definition of roles in response to changes in expectations vis-à-vis the role set and role performance. Because of the importance of the “extraordinary moments” for inducing change, the analysis here will focus on these extraordinary moments.

Role theory is useful for explaining the interactive processes between agents and the structural conditions effecting the individual agent, but in the end the outcome of the influence exercised from both structure and interactive processes is the agent’s own role conception. Holsti (1987, 8) outlines the sources of role conception as a variety of factors, including history, culture, norms and values, needs and interests. In other words, where expectations for role performance and the role set take place in the space between different actors, role conception is a process that takes place within the individual agent – in this case NATO. These internal processes can broadly be termed identity construction processes. The question is however, how we account for differences in role conception between agents that seem to have been subject to similar structural constraints, histories and cultures and which seem to have been faced with similar expectations for role performance. How do we account for the difference in role performance and role conception between for example Ukraine and Belarus, or between Croatia and Serbia, or Georgia and Azerbaijan? The answer was given above – role theory gives plenty of scope to agency and acknowledges that agents’ choice, preferences and ability will influence role conception and role performance. However, this is clearly an unsatisfactory answer if we want to understand why some agents choose one option whilst a seemingly similar country chooses a completely different option, which over time will lead the two on widely diverging paths. Therefore if we want to be able to understand why similar agents sometimes make such different choices, it is necessary to supplement role theory with a theory located
at the agent level which can account for differences between otherwise similar agents. A useful theoretical perspective for this puzzle is SIT, particularly self- and other categorization processes.

SIT provides a theory of the agent that is not dependent on assumptions of material or interest-based rationality, but focuses instead on agents' inherent desire to maximizing their own self-esteem. The assumption of SIT is that individuals' self-esteem cannot be maintained in isolation, but is derived from, and maintained through, social relationships which take place through membership of social groups that is psychologically significant for the members and to which they relate themselves subjectively for social comparison with other social groups (Turner 1987, 1). In SIT all agents are assumed to belong to a social group, where a number of social groups are assumed to be arranged hierarchically within a similar realm between a shared “other” which is what defines what the “self” is not and what it seeks to distance itself from, and a shared “significant we” which defines what the “self” admires and strives to become (Flockhart 2006, 94). Social groups therefore acquire a central position within SIT, because it is through differently ordered and categorized social groups that individuals acquire their norms and values, and achieve and maintain their self-esteem. Interactive processes are therefore as important for SIT as they are for the constitutive interaction strain of role theory.

A constant process of self and other categorization will take place where agents are continuously categorizing the social groups within a specific realm (such as European security) and their position and possibilities within this similar realm. Agents will prefer membership of the social group which is categorized as the “significant we”, or at least as close to the “significant we” as possible, because the higher ranked the social group is, the more likely it is that group membership will generate the desired self-esteem. Membership of the social group is however not open to all, but will depend on the agent’s willingness and ability to adopt the norms, values and practices of the social group it wishes to join, and on the existing group’s willingness to accept new members. Agents who regard NATO as a “significant we” are more easily socialized than agents who do not. Agents who regard NATO as part of the “other”, or who are indifferent to NATO, are unlikely to be socialized voluntarily. Differences in agents’ choice, as in the example of Ukraine and Belarus, can be explained through different conceptions of what constitutes the “significant we” and the “other”. In the case of Belarus, the “significant we” is regarded as Russia, whereas in the case of Ukraine, the “significant we” is a politically contested issue. NATO therefore is likely to have more influence in Ukraine than in Belarus.

SIT clearly reveals that identities are constructed through complex self- and other categorization processes, where the “self” is sought located as far away from the “other” and as close as possible to what is regarded as the “significant we”. During the process of such identity constructions, agents learn through socialization and mimicking about the dominant norm set and are likely to learn

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5 For a fuller description of self- and other categorization processes, see Flockhart 2006.

6 Clearly this is not a settled issue at the domestic level, where a considerable portion of the population has a different conception of “significant we” from the government that was in power until 2009. The relationship with NATO has been one of the contentious issues in the election campaign in late 2009 and early 2010.
to behave in ways that are appropriate to the dominant norm set of the desired social group. In the case of NATO, the norm set, which “we-1” and “we-2” agents are required to learn and adopt, is a form of Liberal Internationalism, which has been continuously developed and specified into more and more specific norms and behavioral requirements. NATO and the other institutions of the liberal order established after 1945 have gradually acquired the role as “keepers of the norm set” and as the main norm promoting agents. An important pre-condition for an organization to be able to act as norm socializers, is that there is agreement within the organization on what constitutes the “self” and appropriate behavior.

By combining the elements of role theory outlined above with the conception of SIT also outlined above, it is possible to trace changes in the construction and re-constitution of roles and identities in NATO and in the agents with whom NATO has interactionist relationships. As suggested above, the analysis is organized around three extraordinary moments in NATO’s history: 1945-1949, 1989-1991 and 1999-2001. The defining feature of these moments is that structural changes took place in the international system giving rise to a general ideational change, and to changes in NATO’s strategic documents. It must be pointed out however, that the use of these specific dates is indicative, simply suggesting that new ways of thinking followed in their wake. The dates are by no means meant to indicate that change has only occurred during these specific times, because although the three moments have been followed by attempts of role adaption and by changed patterns in constitutive interaction, gradual change and re-constitution has also been a characteristic of NATO. The use of both role theory and SIT facilitates a holistic approach allowing for both structural and material factors as well as social and ideational factors, which means that it is possible to trace sometimes subtle changes in role conception and self-identity, role adaptation and constitutive interaction patterns in NATO across time.

CONSTRUCTING AND RE-CONSTITUTING THE “SELF”

The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington on 4 April 1949 provided the basic contours of the Atlantic Alliance, although the precise role, the precise relationships and the precise formulation of strategic documents still needed to be completed. As a result, what constituted appropriate behavior within NATO was from the beginning not completely straightforward and behavior and rhetoric have at times appeared illogical and contradictory. To understand the source of the apparent contradictions in NATO’s rhetoric, it is necessary to look at the main foreign policy strategies formulated in the aftermath of the Second World War. As suggested by Ikenberry (2001), the postwar period has been characterized by two parallel foreign policy strategies — a strategy of containment and a strategy of institution building leading to a liberal order (Ikenberry 2001). The existence of two foreign policy strategies, which in many ways can be seen as contradictory, have given rise

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7 Although the adoption of MC14/3 in 1967 (Flexible Response) certainly was a major achievement, and in many ways could be seen as a critical moment in NATO’s history, as France left the integrated military structure, 1962-1967 is not counted as a critical juncture because the process towards the adoption of Flexible Response was extremely drawn out, and the document in effect only codified existing strategic thinking. Furthermore, despite the defection of France, no overall structural change took place in the international system.
to two parallel processes of role and identity construction. NATO’s special position as an important instrument in the strategy of containment, and as an important part of the new institutional architecture, has from the beginning problematized the construction of “the self”, because NATO always had to contend with “two selves”. Within the strategy of containment, NATO’s “self” was based on a material “other” – the Soviet Union – and the concrete and material threat of nuclear war. The “significant we” was conceptualized as “the free world”, which allowed inclusion of dubious contenders for that title, such as Spain and Portugal (the latter a founding member of NATO). Within the strategy of liberal order, on the other hand, “the self” was based on an ideational “other” – Europe’s own warring past (Wæver 1998) and a rather vague threat in the shape of the danger of a return to Great Power rivalry in Europe, whilst the “significant we” was a community of liberal states in which conflict would be resolved peacefully. During the whole postwar period, the two strategies have existed side by side, although with differing degrees of emphasis and with parallel role conceptions and prescriptions.

Throughout the history of NATO, the construction of the “self” has taken place through socialization processes based on persuasion and negotiations between the member states. An important part of the process has been an almost constant search for consensus on all policy decisions to be taken in the NAC. Especially agreement on strategic documents has been a slow and arduous process. In these internal processes of persuasion, the role of the United States as primus inter pares has allowed the United States to establish itself as the organization’s agenda setter and internal socialization agent.

1945-1989 Vague values, but a concrete “other”

During the initial period of NATO’s existence, NATO’s primary role conception was based on the concrete and menacing “other” in the form of the Soviet Union and an overwhelming nuclear threat. As a result the role position of NATO during the Cold War became very clearly a role as a military defence alliance with the very specific task of ensuring that the containment strategy worked and that nuclear war was avoided. The role was expressed most clearly in Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty, and was gradually specified further in a number of strategic documents8 which aimed at providing the Alliance with strategic direction and codifying decisions taken in the day-to-day management of the Alliance (Rynning and Ringsmose 2009, 6). The protracted negotiations in the case of the 1957 strategic document outlining Massive Retaliation and of the 1968 document outlining Flexible Response meant in both cases that the processes have been constitutive for how socialization was to take place by establishing expectations for negotiations to take place until agreement could be reached.

NATO’s “secondary self” based on the strategy of liberal order always lurked in the background, which was most clearly underlined in Article Two of the Atlantic Treaty, which specifies that the alliance will contribute toward peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions and by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded (Atlantic Treaty, art. 2). However, the commitment to the second

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8 During the Cold War NATO agreed four strategic documents; DC 6/1(1949), MC3/5 (1952), MC14/2 (1957) and MC14/3 (1967).
foreign policy strategy of building a liberal order was not a priority in the first years of NATO’s existence, where events such as the Soviet nuclear explosion and the Korean War cemented the Soviet Union as NATO’s “other” and made the threat of nuclear war appear very real. The construction of a self-conception based on the strategy of the liberal order did not start in earnest until the agreement of the Harmel Report in 1967, which can be seen as a turning point for acknowledging the liberal order strategy as part of NATO’s self-conception and for acknowledging Article Two of the Treaty. It concluded that “the way to peace and stability in Europe rests in particular on the use of the Alliance constructively in the interest of détente” (Harmel-Report 1967). Nevertheless, during the Cold War, the containment strategy formed the basis for the most dominant role conception, and for the *raison d’être* of the Alliance. As a result NATO’s Cold War role definition was as a military defence alliance.

1989-1999 A vanishing “other” and testing tasks

The disappearance of the Soviet threat robbed NATO of the source of its most obvious role prescription and much of its self-conception. The end of the Cold War therefore faced the Alliance with the task of refocusing on the ideational “other” of Europe’s own warring past and the ideational “significant we”, now conceptualized as a “security community”. NATO had to engage in urgent role adaptation if it was to “stay in business”. The response came swiftly with the adoption of a New Strategic Concept agreed in November 1991. The new document emphasized dialogue, partnership and cooperation and stressed that the threat was now political instability and ethnic unrest on the European fringe. This proved a very precise prediction, but as NATO at the beginning of the period had not yet redefined its role to go “out-of-area”, NATO could not play a full role in the Balkans. This was despite the fact that provision for a role in crisis management was part of the New Strategic Concept, which provided for “the management of crises affecting the security of its members”9. NATO’s involvement in the Balkan crises therefore started slowly and tentatively in 1992, in the first instance to monitor and enforce the UN-imposed arms embargo. However, in 1995 NATO intervened militarily, thereby cementing the organization’s role in conflict prevention and crisis management which meant that NATO crossed an important threshold into the so-called “out-of-area”.

The task of reconstructing the “other” from a material “other” to an ideational “other”, and the “significant we” from the “free world” to a security community composed of democratic states, was not easy. Both concepts were abstract and conceptually demanding because of the difficulty in defining the “self” in the absence of a distinct and material “other”. Also no logical or material borders could be constructed for the “self”, as the overall values defining the “self” increasingly were shared by agents that were not part of NATO – many without a real potential for ever becoming members. It was simply difficult to delimit the “self” based purely on values such as liberal democracy. As demands for membership and association with NATO increased, NATO had to consider much more carefully its criteria for membership. However, in order to formulate precise criteria for membership, it was also necessary to be much more precise about defining the

9 http://www.nato.int/issues/crisis_management/index.html#role
“self”. The result was a gigantic project of state socialization in which NATO became a major agent of socialization of liberal democracy and associated behavioral standards in the entire New Europe (Schimmelfennig et al. 2006). Although most of the socialization process was directed at constructing the “we” through norm promotion, the process became self-transforming and contributed to the re-constitution of NATO’s “self” by constructing the Alliance as a norm promoter and socializer. Within a short time NATO had established a network of institutional structures, for socialization purposes, such as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and Partnership for Peace (PfP). NATO has taken its new role as socialization agent extremely seriously and has come to define the promotion of liberal norms and associated practices as one of the organization’s primary roles. As a result NATO’s post-Cold War role definition can be described as a defence alliance with added responsibilities for conflict prevention and crisis management, AND with the important added role as a promoter of a liberal norm set.

1999 and beyond – the emergence of new threats and practical tasks

On the occasion of the 50th anniversary, and amidst the beginning of the bombing campaign in Kosovo, the first former Warsaw-Pact countries were welcomed into the Alliance, and the New Strategic Concept from 1991 was revised, by removing the word “new” from the title and by adding crisis management and partnership, cooperation and dialogue in the North Atlantic area as a collective fourth strategic priority (Rynning and Ringsmose 2009, 10). In terms of articulation of self-representation, the new strategic concept was however a little vague, expressing that future challenges and risks were likely to stem from “in and around the Euro-Atlantic area” (NATO 1999, 7) and that the Allies have to take into account “risks of a wider nature” and the “global context” (Flockhart and Kristensen 2008, 9). However, on this occasion, the strategic document is perhaps not the best way to gauge NATO’s self-conception for the period after 1999, as the Strategic Concept very clearly describes the situation as it was before 1999.

Since the agreement of the 1999 Strategic Concept, NATO has been “through the mill”! The important events that have shaped NATO include the Kosovo campaign, which despite the success of the mission displayed American and European differences on how to handle the war, as well the impossible gap in technological military capability. The inability of the Europeans to fully participate in the Kosovo air campaign seriously challenged NATO’s self conception as a military organization able to deal effectively and in unison with crisis management and conflict prevention. The negative self-conception was further increased, when NATO, following the tragic events on 11 September 2001, decided to invoke Article Five, only to have the offer of help in Afghanistan politely declined by the United States. European allies felt snubbed, and the chance for the Bush Administration to reassure the European allies that NATO was still valued by the United States had been lost. The chill across the Atlantic deepened amidst rhetoric of “the axis of evil” and “preemptive strikes” to such an extent that some foresaw “the end of the negotiated international order” (Peterson 2004, 624). The chill turned into “a near-death experience” when

10 An unnamed NATO diplomat is reported to have described the refusal of the NAC to honor Article Four in those terms.
the NAC in February 2003 refused authorization for advanced NATO military planning to help defend Turkey in the event of war in Iraq. Hence by the spring of 2003, NATO had been through nearly four years of continuous crisis over a whole range of issues (Pond 2004). As suggested by Hitchcock (2008, 54) the reason why the crises of the beginning of the 21st century loom so large, is that they – especially the Iraq crisis – have prevented the process of adaptation, rule making and compromise from being successfully implemented (Hitchcock 2008). The unhappy constellation of structural change necessitating adaptation brought about by 9/11 with the occurrence of several crises in the Atlantic political order has meant that NATO has not been able to reach agreement on adaptation or resolution. NATO was at a point where it simply had to turn the tide. By then, however, Ikenberry’s (2008) two options “resolution” or “adaptation” had been substituted with a new discourse on “transformation”11 (Ikenberry 2008).

Rynning and Ringsmose (2009, 16) suggest that there are currently two competing visions of NATO. One is “Come home NATO” which calls for a regionally anchored organization which emphasizes Article Five issues (Rynning and Ringsmose 2009). The other is “Globalize stupid” which argues that NATO should be a more global organization. Although the question is not settled, and is more a matter of emphasis than either or, NATO has taken a number of decisions, which can be seen as gradually redefining the organization from a regional organization to an organization that is able to act globally. In practice, the decision on 11 August 2003 to take over responsibility for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan – a mission that has subsequently developed significantly in both geographical and operational scope, meant that NATO had now, for better or for worse, moved not only “out-of-area” but out of the Euro-Atlantic region altogether (Flockhart and Kristensen 2008). The transformation of NATO towards a more global and more expeditionary security actor can also be seen in the development of the NATO Response Force (NRF), which consists of smaller and more agile forces geared towards meeting threats where threats occur, rather than the traditional reliance on a large stationary territorial defence. It is also visible in the Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) from 2006, which can be seen as an interim strategic concept, describing the likely threats as terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

The final outcome of NATO’s new strategic concept will not be known until the end of 2010, so it is still too early to say if NATO chooses the “Come home” or “Globalize stupid” option. However, NATO has been involved in a number of activities, which all seem to indicate the dominance of a role conception that emphasizes the “Globalize stupid” vision for NATO. NATO’s practical military involvement in Kosovo and Afghanistan, its pirate chasing activities in the Gulf of Aden, disaster relief in Pakistan and assistance to the African Union in Darfur, are all activities, which point towards a role conception as a security organization with a wide portfolio of tasks and a wide geographical reach. On the other hand, the “Come home NATO” vision seems to be gathering strength, not least since the Russian-Georgian war and the cyber attack on Estonia in 2006. A lengthy process of consultation was

11 The word “transformation” appears frequently in NATO’s discourse after 2003. Although it is unlikely that the term is used in the same way as here, its frequent use does signify an understanding that major change – not just adaptation – is necessary.
launched in the summer of 2009\footnote{The process was kick-started with a major stakeholder conference in Brussels “NATO’s New strategic Concept: Launching the Process” in July 2009. Invited delegates were asked to define the agenda and main issues for NATO in the 21st century.} with the aim of defining a new strategic concept for NATO. Judging by the lively discussions undertaken since the process was launched both visions are still in play – greater emphasis on Article Five \textit{and} a more global role. It may be time to finally acknowledge that NATO is no longer just a defence alliance, but is increasingly a security management institution that is able to act globally and regionally, militarily and politically and in cooperation with other international organizations and with a large number of partners and special relationship countries, not just in the Euro-Atlantic region, but as far afield as Australia and New Zealand.

\textbf{TRANSFORMING RELATIONS – THE RE-CONSTITUTION OF “WE” AND PARTNERS}

The founders of the Liberal Order and of NATO were, as indicated by Lord Ismay, fully aware that NATO’s role could not only be to “keep the Russians out”, but that it also had to be to transform the relations between states that only recently had been bitter enemies, or who had been content with an isolated existence protected by the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. From a role theory perspective, the transformation of relations, which gradually have constituted the “we” and “partners” have taken place through constitutive interaction parallel to the processes of role adaptation described above. These have been continuous processes throughout NATO’s history, although changes in their patterns have been influenced by the same extraordinary moments that defined the role adaptation.

Unity and the maintenance of a “we-feeling” has always been a priority in NATO, because unity must be forged between sovereign states with differing interests and different cultural and historical backgrounds and because NATO is built around a promise of nuclear protection, which, if honored, would almost certainly lead to the destruction of the protector – the United States. As a result, cohesion has always been regarded as particularly important for NATO, because signs of disunity could bring the credibility of the nuclear guarantee in doubt. All member states have therefore been subjected to substantial moral pressure to agree to decisions that would either lead to “resolution” or “adaptation”, as it was believed that “transformation” or “break-down” would indicate a lack of cohesion, which could undermine the credibility of the nuclear guarantee. In reality of course, there have been many examples where the diverging interests of member states have prevented reaching either resolution or adaptation. In such situations NATO has relied on the “ambiguity option” – a position where all members tacitly agree not to disagree, and not to push for clarity, hence being able to maintain the appearance of cohesion.

\textbf{Constitutive interaction and community building}

NATO has been characterized by bargaining, persuasion and negotiation amongst the members in order to maintain consensus in all matters relating to the management of the Alliance. Questions of particular importance have been strategic issues, burden-sharing, the role of nuclear weapons, the credibility of
the nuclear guarantee, German re-armament and enlargement. In all the consensus-building processes, the United States has been privileged in its ability to define the shared values and expected codes of conduct. The United States has therefore performed the internal role as socializing agent vis-à-vis existing members. The privileged position of the United States as the main socializing agent is a product of two historic bargains between the United States and Europe. One is that the United States provided the Europeans with protection and access to U.S. markets, whilst the Europeans in turn accepted American leadership and agreed to be reliable partners by providing diplomatic, economic and logistical support to American leadership (Ikenberry 2008, 10). The other is that the US agreed to operate within, and be constrained by, an agreed institutional system, whilst the Europeans accepted the American blueprint for the institutional order. The bargain was accepted by most members, although France has never wholeheartedly accepted America’s leading position, and has always doubted the credibility of the security guarantee.

The practice of patient consensus making within NATO under the leadership of the United States has been constitutive of the identity of the member states and has over time generated a growing sense of “we-feeling”, which has gradually forged the Alliance into a community of states based on shared values and a collective identity and shared conceptions of the “other”. Although it is probably unlikely that the architects of the Atlantic Alliance set out to establish a “security community”, through happy coincidence, they appear to have put in place precisely what Karl Deutsch and his associates (1957) later identified as the necessary ingredients for establishing a pluralistic security community (Deutsch 1957). Deutsch et al. argued that a leading power was needed to help construct a security community within a shared sense of threat, and that the maintenance of the security community depended on the existence of a sense of shared values and a firm commitment to talk and bargain rather than to polarize and fight (Hall 2008, 229). Added to that is Deutsch’s understanding that it is through the plurality of interests and the occurrence of crises, that community building is brought forward. This seems to be precisely what happened during the Cold War, where individual states with individual interests gradually became a collective “we” and value community through the established practices of interactions within NATO.

The role construction through constitutive interaction therefore took place in an environment of a clear conception of “we” (NATO members) and a clear conception of hierarchy within the “we-group” where the voice of the United States was accepted as louder than the rest – on condition that it stayed within the parameters of the agreed institutional order. Furthermore the constitutive interaction took place in the agreed knowledge of a shared “other” and with agreed practical procedures for interaction based on persuasion and negotiation around a joint enterprise (Wenger 1998, 77). These are conditions which all new members have had to accept, and which have been a continuing characteristic of all constitutive interaction within the “we-1”, and the basis on which all decisions have been taken. Through the institutionalization of practices of persuasion and negotiation, agents have become emotionally attached to both the practice and the shared enterprise, making it very difficult and emotionally costly to redefine or break old routines (Adler 2008, 204). However, it was precisely the established practice of persuasion and negotiation around a shared enterprise, which was disrupted during the
Bush presidency – especially in relation to the war in Iraq. In so doing the established patterns of constitutive interaction within the “we-1” group were disrupted with profound consequences for the ability of the Alliance to tackle the necessary role adaptation in response to the structural changes of 9/11.

**Constitutive interaction and norm socialization**

The close and firmly-established relationships within the “we-1” were challenged following the end of the Cold War by persistent pressure from former foes to become part of the “we”. NATO members were initially not enthusiastic about enlarging the established “we” group, which was seen as a potential source for undermining the important cohesion of the Alliance. However, politically the pressure for closer relationships with former Warsaw Pact members clearly could not be resisted, so already in July 1990 NATO agreed to “extend the hand of friendship” to their former Warsaw Pact opponents. Almost at a stroke, the constitutive interaction processes in NATO changed in character and the circle of interacting agents increased significantly. As argued most persuasively by Alexandra Gheciu (2005), NATO became systematically engaged in projecting a liberal democratic norm set into Central and Eastern Europe, where NATO became an agent of socialization outside the confines of NATO itself (Gheciu 2005). In so doing, the role conception of the “self” changed to be an external norm socializer, which also entailed considerable change in the role definition within the states on the receiving end of NATO’s socialization efforts, and in the conceptualization of the “we”.

Initially NATO had no clear blueprint for the extensive institutional network that was to develop following the decision to “extend the hand of friendship”, and even where such a blueprint was in place, the breath-taking speed of events meant that plans frequently had to be altered. This was especially the case when NATO’s first initiative – the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) – at its inaugural meeting in December 1990 fundamentally changed in character, as the Soviet Union literally ceased to exist during the meeting. What was supposed to have been a manageable group of 23 states, suddenly increased to a gathering which also included all the successor states of the Soviet Union. The unexpected growth of NACC resulted in such a diversity of interests and such a difference in the level of participation that those states with a strategic objective for achieving membership felt that their needs could not be sufficiently addressed in the Co-operation Council. The Central and East European countries – in particular Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia (later the Czech Republic and Slovakia) categorized themselves as closer to their “significant we” (NATO) than some of the former Soviet Republics. They argued persuasively for increased levels of differentiation between the members of NACC, which in 1994 resulted in a new institutional initiative for managing socialization – the Partnership for Peace (PfP).

Even though it is doubtful that NATO from the start had a completely clear idea of whether PfP was a tactic for gaining time before difficult decisions had to be addressed or if it was a first step towards full membership of NATO, from a role construction perspective, PfP must be said to have been a stroke of genius. The PfP initiative was based on the twin principles of self-differentiation and self-financing, which effectively meant that the individual PfP-country set the pace and the goals of their own socialization process.
In effect therefore, NATO left the responsibility of categorization to the PfP-countries themselves, whilst NATO’s role was restricted to defining the conditions for membership of the “we-1” group by setting out the overall political membership criteria and specific lists of areas in which NATO could work with partners to fulfill the criteria. It was not only the prospective members who had been launched onto a steep learning curve – the same was true about NATO. The internal learning in NATO is evident in the development of the socialization methods and adaptation of the structures for socialization. This is particularly so in the case of the method of self-categorization, which was further developed in the Membership Action Plan (MAP), in which prospective member states work towards fulfilling all the necessary criteria judged by NATO to be required. Over time as NATO became more used and adept at its new role as norm socializer, new specific accession criteria were added based on the developing constitutive rules of the Western community (Schimmelfennig et al. 2006, 29) and increasingly based on NATO’s own needs in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Indeed, prospective members were put on notice that they were expected to behave as security producers and not simply as consumers of NATO assistance (Moore 2009, 3).

Since the PfP process started in 1994, twelve countries have moved from the “we-2” group to the “we-1” group by gaining full membership of NATO. The result has been that the group of prospective members has shrunk significantly, whilst NATO membership has increased to 28. In the process, the role conception of the “we-1” has barely moved, as NATO’s collective identity still is viewed as a community of democratic states conceptualized as a security community. In contrast, the role and self-conception of those states which have moved from the “we-2” to the “we-1” group has changed significantly, suggesting that NATO has had considerable success in its new role as a socializing agent. What is more is that the new member states also have an influence on the construction of NATO’s role conception, as they are the main proponents for the “come home, NATO” vision, as the new member countries are the primary supporters for a greater emphasis on Article Five issues, rather than a more global role as a security management institution.

**Constitutive interaction and partnerships**

One of the firm beliefs that have developed in NATO since the end of the Cold War is that NATO’s own territory cannot be truly secure if instability reigns along its periphery (Moore 2009, 1). Although most attention has been focused on NATO’s eastern flank, the southern flank has also long been recognized as an area of instability with many unresolved security issues. Therefore, building on the success of the PfP program, and having taken on a role conception as norm socializer, NATO decided in 1994 to promote other partnership initiatives than simply PfP (Adler 2008, 210) in relations with states whose membership potential was regarded as minimal or non-existent. In 1994 NATO established the so-called Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) with seven states (Israel, Egypt, Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia, Jordan and Algeria) all of which had neither aspirations nor invitations to become members of NATO. In 1997 the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council was established along with a decision to upgrade NACC to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which was designed to be a forum for political consultation that
was aligned with the PfP practical cooperation, thereby making the two complimentary institutions (Flockhart and Kristensen 2008, 17). At the same time specific membership preparation was moved into the MAP, which thereby separated PfP and EAPC from the issue of membership. Since 1997 further institutional initiatives have included closer institutional arrangements with Russia, Ukraine and Georgia in recognition that these states have special issues that cannot be resolved within the existing partnership and cooperation arrangement. The process of establishing relationships with states outside NATO received new impetus with the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, as NATO since then gradually has abandoned its Euro-centric focus by establishing the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) in 2004, which included Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates and by declaring their intention to transform the Mediterranean Dialogue into a genuine partnership (Moore 2009). Finally, at the summit in Riga in 2006, NATO opened up for yet another category of states, referred to variously as “global partners”, “triple nons” (non-NATO, non-partner, non-European) or now as “other partners across the globe”. The “other partners” include states such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea.

The result is that NATO now has a network of differentiated relationships with different states that, for a variety of reasons, are not likely to ever become a part of either the “we-1” or the “we-2” groups, but nor are they part of the “other”. The group of states, broadly referred to as partners can be divided up in five sub-groupings;

- PfP-countries with no membership potential (for example some of the Central Asian former Soviet Republics)
- PfP-countries with no current wish to achieve membership (Finland, Sweden, Ireland, Switzerland and Austria)
- Mediterranean Dialogue countries or Istanbul Cooperation Initiative countries, all of which neither seek membership nor are likely to get invited
- “Other partners across the globe” here referred to as “global partners” such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea, with whom NATO share fundamental values and a number of shared interests, but which are not regarded as potential members.
- Special relationship countries such as Russia, Ukraine and Georgia, where Georgia and Ukraine have both membership aspirations and potential, but also special issues to be resolved.

From a role theory and SIT perspective, NATO’s relationship with this diverse collection of states is complicated because role adoption and constitutive interaction is more than usually inter-linked, and NATO’s (and partners’) rhetoric is more than usually shrouded in a veil of diplomatic talk. However, it is clear that the renewed impetus into developing the various forms of partnerships can be seen as a reaction to the structural changes in the international environment following 9/11. This is not least the increasing need for contributions to NATO’s costly operation in Afghanistan, where contributions from countries such as Sweden and Australia are very welcome. On the other hand, the simultaneous decision to elevate the MD and to establish the ICI is clearly also related to the events of 9/11, but rather than seeking material contributions, the relationships emphasize political dialogue and participation in PfP activities and other training, as well as courses at NATO schools (Moore 2009,
The relationships were elevated during the Bush presidency and amidst rhetoric of democracy promotion in the Middle East and around the Mediterranean. However, it is difficult to see that these countries have the same potential for democracy promotion as they neither seek nor are offered membership of NATO. Nor are they states that categorize NATO as their “significant we”, which is likely to severely limit the possibilities for socialization. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, relationships with the MD and ICI have been elevated by NATO’s new Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, to a special area of priority for the Atlantic Alliance. This elevation of MD and ICI must be seen as a conscious attempt by Mr. Rasmussen to enter into new relationships of constitutive interaction to counteract the negative impact of Mr. Rasmussen’s handling of the Danish cartoon crisis in 2006. In so doing NATO is seeking to enter into constitutive interaction with Muslim countries, in order to counteract negative perceptions in those countries.

As outlined in Figure 1 at the beginning of this paper, the lines of influence between NATO and “partners” are likely to remain thin. This is likely to remain the case even with the relationships having been elevated to special status because the conditions for significant influence in either direction are simply not present. Nevertheless, relationships with global partners clearly provide a much-needed contribution to the operation in Afghanistan at a time when NATO resources are stretched to the limit. Similarly, establishing enhanced relations with the MD and ICI countries is likely to have positive effects (albeit of a limited nature) on the diplomatic relations between NATO and Muslim countries, who may view NATO’s intervention in Afghanistan rather negatively and who have a view of NATO’s new Secretary General formed during the cartoon crisis. Notwithstanding the functional attributes of its partnerships, NATO will need to address the question over the form and function of partnerships, because as suggested by Rebecca Moore: “partnerships is really a debate over the very purpose and identity of the Alliance” (Moore 2009, 10).

TOWARDS A MATUER ALLIANCE WITH MULTIPLE ROLES AND CONSTITUTIVE RELATIONSHIPS

The question of what NATO’s role is, is a question that has been debated ever since NATO’s foundation in 1949. Implicitly or explicitly, it has always been clear that NATO had multiple roles that extended beyond merely “keeping the Russians out”, yet as the security environment changed and NATO’s roles became more complex and overlapping, a degree of confusion and frustration has taken root, which has been portrayed as crises in NATO and as being caused by having too many and too complex roles. The view put forward here is that multiple and complex roles are not by themselves the cause of crisis in NATO. NATO is a complex organization built on a complex set of compromises and bargains that necessitate multiple roles. NATO has successfully managed this complexity through an established set of practices based on persuasion and bargaining around a joint enterprise (Wenger 1998) within the “we-1” group, where the recurrent crises throughout NATO’s history almost always have led to resolution or adaptation or ambiguity. As the security environment

13 The withdrawal of France from NATO’s integrated military structure in 1966 is the exception.
has changed, NATO has undertaken role adaptation and changed its constitutive relationships with other agents, which is precisely what a healthy and mature organization needs to be able to do, and which is precisely the condition necessary for the establishment of a security community (Hall 2008). Crisis of the dangerous kind – that is a crisis that does not lead to either resolution or adaptation – has only occurred when NATO faced a disruption in its established practices on how to achieve resolution or adaptation following the abrupt end to negotiation and persuasion during the Bush presidency, in particular in the run-up to the Iraq War. The end of persuasion and bargaining in NATO was therefore the real threat – not the wars in Iraq, Kosovo or Afghanistan.

A mature organization such as NATO can and should encompass multiple roles and complex interactions with other agents – both as norm taker and norm giver, and as a more broadly defined security management institution. In so doing the paper effectively takes issue with proponents who see NATO’s multiple roles as a sign of weakness – a desperate search for a raison d’être – by arguing that multiple, and constantly evolving, roles may be seen as a function of maturity and development. Just as complex societies tend to have many layers of roles and identity (Mennell 1994, 177), so a mature organization representing those societies, such as NATO, is likely to have multiple roles and multiple layers of relationships. What is important is not which role(s) and relationships NATO may be said to have, but rather if they are compatible with the overall values underpinning the identity of both NATO itself, its member states, prospective member states and partner countries, and if they can take place within the established practices. On the whole NATO has managed to stay within these limits, although difficult questions lie ahead in deciding on relationships with non-democratic regimes and in questions of when and where to intervene in the face of future erupting crises and conflicts. In order to be prepared for such questions, NATO absolutely needs to think through both its role and its relationships and formulate them in an agreed strategic concept.
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