NATO AND GLOBAL PARTNERSHIPS
– TO BE GLOBAL OR TO ACT GLOBALLY?

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Abstract

The report investigates NATO’s relationship with non-NATO countries and NATO’s journey from being an alliance firmly located within a Euro-Atlantic geographical setting to an alliance that actively contemplates its global role. The report distinguishes between two very different interpretations of “global” – NATO being global or NATO acting globally – and links these two interpretations of “global” to NATO’s integrationalist and interventionist roles. Integration is seen as a strategy pursued actively by NATO especially since the end of the Cold War in its relations with non-NATO countries (partner, contact, dialogue and initiative countries). However, although the integrationalist strategy so far is judged to have been highly successful, the report nevertheless cautions against taking the strategy onto a global level. Doing so is likely to open up difficult issues of hierarchy and legitimacy, which will have an adverse effect on NATO. On the other hand the report argues in favour of a development of NATO as an alliance that is able to act globally. This, it is argued, implies further development of NATO’s interventionist strategy and further considerations about the legality of interventions and the obligation to intervene to protect. Neither option therefore offer any easy solution and clear cut answers to NATO’s role in a global security environment, although it does seem clear that going only – or too far – down the road towards a Global NATO consisting solely of democracies is likely to be self-defeating and to have an adverse effect on NATO’s legitimacy.
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I. Introduction

‘Global’ is a new and frequently used word in NATO parlance. “Global NATO”, “global threats”, “global partnerships”, “global stability” as well as “global security providers” and a “Global Security Providers’ Forum” are expressions which lately have become part of NATO’s discourse. Of course new ‘fashion words’ appear from time to time, but what is puzzling is that not long ago, just uttering the word would have caused nervousness because it indicated a “far-away-out-of-area” role for NATO. Out-of-area has always been controversial, but “global” has been no less than unthinkable, which is precisely what makes it remarkable that “global” not only has entered into NATO’s rhetoric, but also into its operations and its relationships. However, despite the frequent use of the term the institutional and operational implications of “global” are by no means clear.

In the current debate about NATO’s role, the conception of “Global” exists in two different formats. One is the bold vision of Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier who suggest that NATO should take steps to broaden membership widely beyond the transatlantic area to include other democratic countries.1 The other is the much more careful NATO line that NATO should enter into enhanced and pragmatic, but limited, relationships with countries such as Australia, New Zealand and Japan, as well as building on existing partnerships, dialogues and initiatives. In the bold vision the result would be a Global NATO in terms of geographic reach and membership, whereas the more careful vision is a NATO that is able to protect against global threats and to act globally. The distinction between the two conceptions of “global” was summed up by Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer by stating that; “we do not need a global NATO, but a NATO that can protect its members against global threats”.2 Hence a distinction between “a global NATO” and “a NATO acting globally” is clearly visible.

The precise implications of the two visions are however not entirely clear. Different interpretations of “global” have different institutional and policy implications and are based on different understandings of rights and obligations as well as legality and legitimacy in international security. Accordingly this report provides an audit on

the institutional and value based foundations of the interpretations of “global” as it relates to NATO’s partnerships. On that basis the report offers an assessment of the challenges ahead and future perspectives.

This report focuses on NATO’s relationships with non-NATO countries (partner, contact, dialogue and initiative countries). When investigating what global means and what it will mean for the Alliance in the future, the necessarily political relations to non-NATO countries, is precisely the interesting place to look. Relationships and partnerships with countries outside of NATO and increasingly outside Europe go to the heart of what NATO is because they question the geopolitical and value based essence of NATO.

This report first provides a historical backdrop outlining NATO’s development from a regional to a more globally oriented organisation, followed by an analysis of NATO’s varied partnerships and a discussion of the rationalities driving them. This discussion is further elaborated by juxtaposing NATO’s partnerships with liberal scholarly and political debates about legitimacy and order as well as hierarchy and equality in world politics. The overall conclusion of the report is, first, that the differentiation between ‘a global NATO’ and a ‘NATO acting globally’ will continue to be difficult in political practice. Secondly, we argue that going only – or too far – down the road towards a Global NATO consisting solely of democracies is likely to be self-defeating and to have an adverse effect on NATO’s legitimacy.\(^3\)

\(^3\) The report is based on extensive interviews conducted in NATO headquarters in October 2007. All interviews were conducted for “background” and cannot therefore be attributed to officials by name.
2. From Regional to Global – the end of the out-of-area taboo?

The French political thinker Raymond Aron once argued that the Atlantic alliance has always been more than an alliance within the Euro-Atlantic zone and ‘less than a traditional alliance outside that zone’. This fits NATO during the Cold War, where political and military focus was almost exclusively on the Soviet threat in Europe. Quite to the contrary, issues taking place outside Europe were regarded as dangerous to the alliance. For instance American involvement in Vietnam questioned American commitment to Europe and thus provoked anxiety among NATO partners. Equally, using NATO as a forum for more general discussions on world affairs could make inter-allied disagreements spill into NATO, which could undermine the unity of the Alliance.

Instead of coping with broader international affairs the strategy was to isolate and insulate the Alliance from issues outside the Euro-Atlantic area. In the words of an anonymous French diplomat: ‘hors zone, hors sujet’. Issues outside Europe were better kept away from NATO. It has even been argued that keeping out of area issues off the agenda explained the longevity and ultimate success of the Alliance during the Cold War. To focus on issues other than the threat justifying the alliance in the first place would risk tension and potentially mean the break up of NATO.

Contrasted with this Cold War history, the actions of NATO after the Cold War appear even more significant. It makes it easy to understand why the claim by US Senator Richard Lugar in 1993 that NATO “had to go out of area or out of business” at the time was widely seen as controversial and against conventional wisdom. Nevertheless, the story of NATO after the fall of the Berlin Wall can very well be seen as a gradual breaking down of the out of area taboo.

5 Quoted in Elisabeth Sherwood, Allies in Crisis: Meeting Global Challenges to Western Security, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1990, p. 187
7 E.g. Stephen Walt ‘the origins of alliances, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1988
8 Richard Lugar, ‘NATO: out of area or out of business’, Remarks delivered to the open forum of the US State Department, August 2, 1993, Washington DC.
Towards ‘a Europe whole and free’

These were the words used by President Bush (senior) speaking to the citizens of Mainz in May 1989 stating the American vision for the future of Europe.” This vision ‘to a move beyond containment’ together with the events on the Balkans, combined to make Senator Lugar’s exclamation reflect the new reality of NATO. This was because, firstly, making Europe whole and free would be difficult without in some way including the Eastern European countries, and secondly, standing idly by while the Balkan wars raged would be morally untenable. Slowly, and after heated disagreements, NATO crossed its Rubicon and engaged with issues outside a narrowly defined Euro-Atlantic area. NATO had in effect not only crossed an important threshold by seeking to make Europe secure ‘beyond containment’, it had embarked on a combination of two simultaneous strategies: integration and intervention.¹⁰

Already in 1991, the first step in the new integration strategy was taken with the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)¹¹. NACC was envisaged as a forum where NATO members could meet with the countries of East and Central Europe and ‘aid in fostering a sense of security and confidence among these countries and to help them transform their societies and economies, making democratic change irreversible.’¹² The next step of the integration strategy was taken in 1994 with the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. While not amounting to the membership that many partners strived for, PfP nevertheless formally indicated that the security of these countries could become an issue for the Alliance. The PfP thus marked an important first step in politically moving beyond the original conception of Alliance territory.

NATO not only embarked on a new strategy of integration beyond its own territorial area, it also slowly came to terms with the possibility of intervention in areas of instability along NATO’s European borders. Accordingly, the Alliance gradually involved itself in peacekeeping in the Balkans. As early as 1992 the Alliance took

⁹ George Bush, Remarks to the Citizens in Mainz, May 31, 1989, esp. § 8, online at: http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga6-890531.htm
¹¹ The NACC was refashioned into the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997 and today encompass the 26 Allies as well as 23 Partner Countries, see further http://www.nato.int/issues/eapc/index.html
the principled decision to make its ‘resources and expertise’ available for CSCE peacekeeping missions. Peacekeeping was at the centre of attention in 1995 when a NATO-led bombing campaign forced the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord. This was followed by the deployment of the NATO-led IFOR in Bosnia to implement the accords. The final step towards a fully interventionist strategy came in 1999 when NATO decided – without being legitimised by any other international institution – on a substantial air campaign to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.

The above shows that NATO’s strategies of integration and intervention have been intertwined from the beginning. In the first place both were focused on making Europe ‘whole and free’ with regional peace and stability. Furthermore, from the first steps in Bosnia, most NATO-led operations have been made up of military contingents from non-NATO countries as well. NATO’s incentives to build partnerships have thus always been both political and operational.

The events of 1999 perhaps signify the clearest expression of these dual strategies of intervention and integration. NATO engaged in the Kosovo campaign, it granted membership to the first of the former Warsaw-Pact countries and it published a new strategic concept. All are expressions of a NATO coming to terms with acting outside a narrow Euro-Atlantic area. The 1999 strategic concept explicitly states that future threats will stem from ‘around the Euro-Atlantic area’ from the ‘periphery’ and that the Allies have to take into account ‘risks of a wider nature’ and ‘the global context’. These formulations show an Alliance acknowledging the importance of the outside of Europe, but not certain on how to deal with it.

Global Terror and the Limits of Regional Responses
The events of 9 /11 had important consequences for NATO. Already on the 12th of September, the North Atlantic Council decided for the first time in the history of the alliance to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, declaring the attacks an attack on all member states, thus expressing utmost solidarity with the US. However, the symbolism of the decision stood in stark contrast to the marginal role played by the organisation in the immediate aftermath of the attacks. In the war in Afghanistan,

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14 The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, Approved by the Heads of State and Governments, North Atlantic Council, 23-24 April, 1999, §20, online at: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm
15 Ibid, § 24
the US decided to organise the campaign independently of NATO building instead a coalition of willing countries.

Nevertheless, 9/11 and the invoking of Article 5 made it clear that NATO had to take account of global threats and that it had to review both its forces and partnership relations. In 2002 the Allies reiterated the decision on September 12th and stated that an attack ‘from whatever direction’ would be covered by the Treaty, and that the alliance would have to focus on developing forces that can ‘move quickly to wherever they are needed’16. The reference to the ‘periphery’ in the 1999 Strategic Concept had now been replaced with ‘whatever’ and ‘wherever’. This was followed at the Prague Summit with the creation of the NATO Response Force, supposed to contribute to the full range of missions possibly undertaken by the Alliance and to be able to ‘move quickly to wherever they are needed upon decision by the NAC’.17 These developments and decisions show an Alliance no longer exclusively thinking regionally but with a clear acceptance that global threats matter. Accordingly NATO has to be able to act globally. The regional interventionism strategy of the 1990s has, at the start of the 21st century, become globalised.

The interventionist strategy is clearly reflected in NATO’s decision on August 11, 2003 to take over responsibility for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan – a mission that has subsequently developed significantly in both geographical and operational scope. Today NATO – together with partners and the Afghan authorities – is engaged in a countrywide effort to stabilise the country, an effort more akin to counterinsurgency or actual war fighting than peacekeeping. Today more than 4000018 troops under NATO leadership are engaged in this difficult mission. The operation in Afghanistan is without doubt the most demanding operation the Alliance has ever undertaken and it has consequently dominated much of the agenda in NATO. There is no doubt that the mission in Afghanistan is a major challenge for the Alliance, which may well mean that NATO will be more cautious in the future before accepting an interventionist role far afield in an inhospitable environment.

16 Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 14 May, 2002, § 3 & 5, online at: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-059e.htm
17 Riga Summit Declaration, North Atlantic Council, 28-29 November 2006, § 22, online at: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm
In tandem with – and intimately related to – the mission in Afghanistan, NATO is also in the process of rethinking its partnership relations. It could be argued that by globalising the intervention strategy, an impetus occurred for change or redevelopment of the integration strategy. Throughout much of the 2000s the question of how NATO relates to and integrates its partners has therefore also been on the agenda.

In many ways this process can be considered a re-run of what happened during the 1990s. The integration strategy still hinges on the same two rationalities. Firstly, NATO still focuses on projecting stability, and secondly on creating interoperability with non-members. The difference is, however, that both these aims are taking place under different geographical imperatives; tackling global threats changes the integration strategy as well. The threat from terror and the subsequent mission in Afghanistan first changed the meaning of existing partnerships, and second catapulted NATO into contact with new regions and new partners, which are in no way Euro-Atlantic in character.

Afghanistan plays a big part in this. Afghanistan has put the Alliance under tremendous pressure in creating a significant demand for troops, and NATO is in ISAF working together with a range of troop contributing countries with different institutional affiliations with the Alliance. Further, Afghanistan makes the countries of the region increasingly important for NATO. As a result of this and the wider threat from radical fundamentalist inspired terrorism, the relationship between NATO and the greater Middle East has become pivotal. These developments can be seen clearly in how NATO’s partnerships have developed since 9/11. Virtually all of the organisation’s arrangements have been touched by this, and new ones have been developed.

The dilemma between operational and stability projecting rationalities has – again in relation with changed geography – shown itself for instance in the EAPC forum. In the first place the countries participating in EAPC are very different, ranging from European non-aligned countries like Sweden to Central Asian countries such as Turkmenistan. These differences are underlined by the varied relations these

20 The participation of these Central Asian Countries in what is still called the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, in itself indicates well the changing geographical conditions for NATO.
countries have with NATO. First, for instance Sweden, contributing substantially to ISAF has a need for close cooperation with NATO on operational issues. Different issues are at play in relation to the Central Asian countries, who are important for NATO through their geographical proximity to Afghanistan, and for whom traditional PfP issues such as defence reform are of interest, but who have no operational relationship with NATO.

Another issue closely related to Afghanistan, is how NATO is to interact with countries contributing troops to the mission in Afghanistan such as Australia, or with countries that in other ways are important for the now globalised alliance, but who have no formal institutionalised relations with NATO? This issue illustrates well the problems of a regional alliance thinking in global terms. As the Summit in Riga 2006 approached, the United States pushed for more institutionalised relationships with these countries, aiming at a ‘Global Security Provider’s Forum,’ which would serve to integrate distinctly non-European but Western oriented countries with NATO. This proposal sparked panic in many European capitals, and the Summit ended only with declaring partnerships important in general and that developing them further should be looked at. The overall geo-strategic reason for the European panic in relation to global partnerships is that the ideas behind it break with everything regional. NATO’s other partnerships have all been argued from a regional or geographical logic. Firstly, by their proximity to the Euro-Atlantic area, and secondly they themselves have been structured and argued with a view to regional security. These two geographical logics have functioned as limits for the Alliance’s actions outside its area. Going global forcefully introduces another logic which is restructuring existing partnerships. Instead of geographical location, now functionality becomes the underlying logic. ‘Who are they and what can they do?’ is the underlying logic, not ‘where are they?’ From this perspective, being democratic and providing troops is paramount, not location or proximity to Europe.

21 Or Morocco in Kosovo for that matter, Morocco not being part of the EAPC, however, just underlines the pressure for expanding the cooperation in the Mediterranean Dialogue.
22 What used to be called ‘triple-non’s’, but whose label lately has been changed to ‘contact countries’.
23 Karl-Heinz Kamp, NATO Summit: Waiting for Another Day, in The World Today, p. 14, vol. 62, no. 10, November 2006, Chatham House, UK. The most often mentioned candidates to this forum are Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, sometimes Taiwan, Argentina and Brazil.
24 Riga Summit Declaration, North Atlantic Council, 28-29 November 2006, § 11-13, online at: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150c.htm
25 E.g. the logic of the Mediterranean Dialogue is to a large extent to create regional security structures in the region, thus enhancing security and stability there.
The above tells the unfinished story of a regional Alliance trying to come to terms with a global role. The aim of ‘global stability’ is replacing ‘European stability’ as the key raison d’être of the Alliance.26 The issue will accordingly be with us for some time. On one hand there are cautious ‘regional’ voices trying to limit NATO’s globalisation (however conceptualised). Others, like US Ambassador Nuland present the opposite argument:

“Today NATO is increasingly providing a forum for the democracies of the world to meet in partnership to defend their common security interests. So NATO is not just the 26 anymore. It is also increasingly becoming the core of a global democratic security community.”27

Is it? And if it is, then how? Resolving these differences – finding out what a global NATO means – will be a major challenge for the Alliance in the future in coming to terms with how a regionally conceptualised Alliance can contribute to global stability. The following section begins this by investigating in depth the logics and developments of NATO’s various partnerships and relationships. Through this, it paints a very murky picture of current state of affairs.

27 Year of Balkan Opportunity, Remarks by Ambassador Nuland at the Faculty of Electrical Engineering in Skopje, Macedonia, November 8, 2007, online at http://skopje.usembassy.gov/nuland tome.html
3. New Partnerships – going global through an integrationist strategy?

NATO’s integrationist strategy has over the years produced an Alliance with a network of differentiated relationships with different actors that reach well beyond NATO’s own geographical borders, and which has tended to move further and further afield from the Euro-Atlantic area. This is a development, which has evolved in an ad hoc fashion based on the concerns and interpretations of the day and the constellation of the international security environment of the time. Nevertheless despite the ad hoc nature of the process, NATO’s integration strategy has been based on a clear understanding that core NATO (consisting of those with full membership) has to operate in an environment where networks and partnerships with other actors in the international system is a necessary key principle for both operational reasons (being able to respond to a multitude of threats) and preventive reasons (developing positive relationships and/or contributing to regional stability and internal stability within weak state structures). Within this strategy it is possible to analytically – and a bit polemically – distinguish between three different forms of relationships:

1. Relationships with countries with membership potential. Such relationships include developing operational and political partnerships as well as extensive institutional activities where NATO has an advisory/guiding capacity.
2. Relationships with countries that are not regarded as potential members. Such relationships are mainly a diplomatic dialogue forum with developing institutional activities where NATO has a limited negotiating/influencing capacity, and where limited operational partnerships may be established in shared areas of interest.
3. Relationships with other (non-European) liberal democracies with whom NATO share fundamental values, but who are not regarded as potential members. Such

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28 Strictly speaking there are five different kinds of relationships as NATO’s relationship with other international organisations, and NATO’s special relationships with Russia and Ukraine are also important parts of the debate on NATO’s partnerships. Still, for present purposes, it is more relevant to focus on how NATO’s relationships explicitly outside Europe are developing. Further, both other relationships will be the specific topic of three forthcoming DIIS publications during 2008; the NATO-Russia relationship; the relationship between NATO and Ukraine and Georgia by Karsten Møller and an analysis of NATO’s relationship with the EU by Trine Flockhart.

29 This group includes some countries which are decidedly not democratic or which have significant “democratic deficits”. Nevertheless at the time of their inclusion, they were deemed to have a (albeit sometimes weak) democratic potential. Others were simply included in NATO’s structures by virtue of their status as a former constituent part of the Soviet Union.
relationships include operational cooperation, but no agreed tailor-made formal institutional framework exists.

These different forms of relationships can be translated into a rough distinction between countries that “can/may become like us”, “cannot/will not become like us” and “are like us, but far away”. Although it is doubtful that a neat fix ever existed between the underlying logic and the institutional setup of NATO’s partnerships, subsequent political developments and institutional changes have produced a situation that is rather messy and probably outdated. The situation has produced an institutional structure where Belarus and Sweden are both Partner countries despite their clear difference on adherence to democracy and despite their different level of involvement in NATO operations. At the same time Egypt, Jordan and Morocco have all acted like Partner countries through their contributions to IFOR, SFOR and KFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, but are clearly countries for whom membership of NATO is not on the agenda, but whose involvement with NATO is more developed than some Partner countries. Finally countries such as Australia participate in NATO operations along a similar line to Sweden, but the two have no institutional forum in which to meet, and have no decision-making powers in relation to NATO operations. Added to that is the fact that NATO’s enlargement process is almost complete, which means that where NATO’s partnerships in the past have served as a platform to prepare partners for membership, this is no longer the case.30 NATO’s relationships with non-member countries seem therefore in dire need of reorganisation.

**Relationships with countries with membership potential**

When the security environment fundamentally altered following the end of the Cold War, NATO was initially rather cautious about establishing new relationships with its former adversaries. The London Declaration of 1990 admittedly referred to “extending the hand of friendship” to former adversaries, but it was not clear what this “hand of friendship” entailed. For some of the former Warsaw Pact countries it clearly meant membership, but this was certainly not NATO’s intention. A temporary solution was NACC. In its original format NACC was a forum small enough for the Central and East Europeans (CEEs) to develop relationships with NATO and

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for them to play an active role. However, literally as the inaugurating meeting took place, the Soviet Union (also a member) collapsed.\textsuperscript{31} This fundamentally altered the conditions for the Council. By a stroke the membership was significantly enlarged and the cultural profile altered, thereby making prospects for meaningful cooperation seem difficult. NACC was therefore not only an outdated forum literally before the ink was on the document, but it also came to include a number of countries that lacked membership potential.

In the following years, it became clear that NACC would not satisfy the wish of the CEE countries for a “full return to the West”. There was simultaneously a significant shift in attitude within NATO, where the new Clinton Administration saw democracy promotion as one of its prime foreign policy objectives\textsuperscript{32} and NATO enlargement as a way of achieving it. Clinton’s advisors had been inspired by the rediscovery within academic circles of the so-called “Democratic Peace Thesis”\textsuperscript{33} and partly through Samuel Huntington’s “Third Wave” thesis.\textsuperscript{34} These shifts in attitudes effectively set the scene for the further development of NATO’s relationships with CEE countries.

With the introduction of PfP in January 1994, NATO started its integrationist strategy in earnest, whilst at the same time also acknowledging that NATO’s relationships with former adversaries had to be differentiated according to each individual country’s level of development and ambitions thus partly addressing the problems of the NACC. The PfP programme therefore consists of individual programmes agreed between the partner country and NATO. The formal basis for the PfP is a Framework Document, which is signed by the participating state and which sets out a commitment by the Alliance to consult with a Partner country in case of a perceived threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security. In the document each partner country also set out a number of specific undertakings and a political commitment to uphold democratic societies, to maintain the

\textsuperscript{31} The dissolution of the Soviet Union was actually announced at the meeting with a request that all references to the Soviet Union in the document to be substituted with naming all independent states covering the area of the former Soviet Union.

\textsuperscript{32} Democracy promotion was stated to be “the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace” in President Clinton’s 1994 State of the Union address. Online at http://www.thisnation.com/library/sottu/1994bc.html


\textsuperscript{34} Samuel Huntington, \textit{The Third Wave; Democratization in the late 20\textsuperscript{th} century}, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.
principles of international law, to fulfil obligations under the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act and international disarmament and arms control agreements.\textsuperscript{35} The individual undertakings included in the Partnership Agreement are chosen from an extensive menu of activities – sometimes referred to as the ‘PfP toolbox’ – reflecting Partnership objectives and priorities, but which are based on the individual Partner country’s ambitions and capabilities. As a result Partnership Programmes can vary considerably, although they will always contain the above commitments.

In 1997 NACC was replaced with the EAPC. The goal was to develop a forum for political consultation among all partners, a forum which would be aligned with the Partnership for Peace’s practical cooperation and which linked membership in the EAPC to participation in PfP, making the two complementary institutions.\textsuperscript{36} Today the EAPC consists of the 26 NATO countries and the 23 Partner countries. EAPC facilitates regular dialogue through monthly meetings at ambassadorial level within the EAPC Political Committee (PC). The idea behind these meetings is to offer an opportunity to develop common thinking and consider new areas of cooperation.\textsuperscript{37} The more practical focus of both the EAPC and the PfP is on increasing military interoperability between Allies and Partners. This emphasis on practical cooperation has increased as the CEE countries either achieved membership or as membership preparations were moved from the PfP into the Membership Action Plan (MAP), which was designed specifically to provide advice, assistance and practical support in the preparation for membership. In so doing, PfP and EAPC have been separated from the issue of membership. Nine countries initially signed up for MAP and Croatia joined in 2001. Seven have so far achieved membership, whilst Albania, Macedonia and Croatia continue to work within the MAP framework. The result is that only a handful of remaining Partnership countries has a realistic potential for, or the ambition to, become a member. This has effectively removed what had so far been the key driver in NATO’s largest bilateral and multilateral partnerships\textsuperscript{38}. The ‘hand of friendship’ has again been disassociated from the prospect of membership.

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\item \textsuperscript{35} NATO Handbook, 2006, 199.
\item \textsuperscript{37} Simmons Jr. op. cit.
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Relationships with countries without membership potential

It has long been recognised that security and stability in what was during the Cold War simply described as NATO’s “Southern Flank” is closely linked to security and stability in Europe. Like CEE at the beginning of the 1990s, the Mediterranean region was recognised as an area of instability with many unresolved issues that might affect Euro-Atlantic security. As a result NATO in 1994 established the “Mediterranean Dialogue” with initially 5 Mediterranean states in order to enhance security and stability in the region and to dispel mistrust towards NATO. Although initiated as a rather limited diplomatic initiative designed to promote a better understanding of the Alliance in Dialogue countries, it has gradually expanded to include cooperation in military activities, civil-emergency planning, crisis management and disaster relief. At the Istanbul Summit in 2004 the Mediterranean Dialogue was elevated to a genuine partnership: to include more practical cooperation, especially in the fight against terrorism; defence reform and joint training; and to increase interoperability with a view to improving the scope for participation by Dialogue countries in NATO-led crisis response operations. At the Istanbul Summit in 2004 the MD was supplemented with the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), which broadened the geographic scope of NATO’s relationships with a number of the Arab Gulf states.

To date, NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue has been primarily political, serving to promote a greater ‘mutual understanding’ for NATO’s policies and activities in Dialogue and now ICI countries while simultaneously exploring their security needs. Although the process has developed and expanded, and certainly has achieved some limited success, the process has been hampered throughout by contrasting expectations between NATO and the Dialogue and Initiative countries. Europe and the United States believe that political dialogue, discussions and information exchange to build confidence must be the starting point, whereas many MD and ICI countries have focused on hard issues especially the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nevertheless the initiatives in the Mediterranean and the Middle East are important aspects of NATO’s integrationist strategy even if they cannot be evaluated

41 Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.
42 Said op.cit.
by the same criteria as the integration process in CEE. In a post 9/11 security environment, the importance of developing partnerships like the MD and ICI will only increase.\footnote{Chris Donally, ‘Building a NATO partnership for the Greater Middle East’, \textit{NATO Review}, spring 2004, online at \url{http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/issue1/english/art3.html} accessed 4/1/08.}

The difference is that where much of the integration with CEE had been driven by the explicit linkage to prospective membership, no such linkage is present in the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern relationships. The challenge for NATO therefore is to find a different “driving factor” in its relations with the MD and ICI countries as well as with those Partner countries that have no aspirations for NATO membership. Therefore the past success of the PfP process in CEE cannot function as a blueprint for a reinvigorated MD and ICI process as suggested within some NATO circles, although it may well be that certain parts of the so called ‘PfP toolbox’ could be utilised.\footnote{John Colston & Phillip Fluri, \textit{Defence Cooperation between NATO and its Partners: Visions of the Future}, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, 2007, pp. 8.}

The future challenge for NATO in these relationships – if they are to deepen – is to find a way of spurring integration without the promise of membership. The challenge is to achieve socialisation without the conditionality implied by the prospect of membership, or any other specific conditionality for that matter.\footnote{A point to consider in this regard is that socialization does not exclusively mean a closer relationship with NATO. An equally important logic behind these partnerships is by providing the forum, NATO can enhance regional cooperation and understanding – i.e. socialization – between the partner countries themselves.} So far, the – modest – successes of these partnerships have been confined to the more practical issues. Strengthening of this practical cooperation is probably the suggestion NATO will make in the future. Developing relations with the “won’t be/can’t be like us group” will be attempted by opening up access to the PfP-toolbox, and following the PfP principles of bilaterally agreed partnerships according to mutual interests and capabilities.\footnote{Thierry Legendre pp. 49.} This relationship will accordingly – although perhaps closer – still be an interest-based relationship. And the question remains how it will develop. One of the key conditions for successful cooperation and norms transfer through state socialisation is that the relationship is value based rather than merely interest based.\footnote{For an elaboration on the conditions for successful norms transfer see T. Flockhart, “Complex Socialization; A Framework for the Study of State Socialization”, \textit{European Journal of International Relations}, 12(1), 2006, 89-118.}
Secondly, this opening up of the individualised process in partnerships with non-PfP countries can also be viewed as a development away from a geographical or regional logic towards a functional logic, or a complementation of the regional logic with a functional one. It is the individual wishes, capabilities and interests of NATO and the partner country in question that will determine the character and intensity of the relationship, not the geographical identity of the country.

**Relationships with other liberal democracies**

Liberal democracy clearly plays a central role in NATO’s own identity and in the way NATO evaluates and categorises other countries. Still, there exists no specific institutional forum for liberal democracies who do not envision NATO membership. Finland and Sweden both joined the PfP at the outset in 1994 – because they both wanted to contribute to the integration of the CEE countries in Europe and because they saw it as in their national interest. Finland and Sweden were joined in PfP by Austria (1995), Switzerland (1996) and Ireland (1999). In most cases the European neutral and non-aligned countries decided to participate in PfP and EAPC because they wanted to contribute to the integrationist strategy, but increasingly, as NATO became involved in the Balkans and later in Afghanistan, considerations related to NATO’s interventionist strategy and work within PfP on Civil Emergency Planning became a strong rationale for PfP-membership. Partnerships were seen as in the national interest of the European non-aligned and neutral countries as PfP developed to become the main instrument for the participation of non-NATO countries in NATO-led crisis management operations such as KFOR and ISAF. In Sweden, for instance, participation in NATO-led operations and PfP exercises is seen as providing an important means for transforming Swedish national military forces to participate in international operations.  

The increasing operational role of PfP has however meant that a rather peculiar situation has arisen, where active contributors to NATO-led missions have no formal institutionalised access to decision-making and planning forums within NATO. Some European non-aligned partner countries make significant contributions on the

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48 Basic information about the EAPC and PfP [http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/5276/a/39833;jsessionid=a4_aQ7qWq0Gh_#39833 accessed on 26/11/07](http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/5276/a/39833;jsessionid=a4_aQ7qWq0Gh_#39833 accessed on 26/11/07)

49 Basic information about the EAPC and PfP [http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/5276/a/39833;jsessionid=a4_aQ7qWq0Gh_#39833 accessed on 26/11/07](http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/5276/a/39833;jsessionid=a4_aQ7qWq0Gh_#39833 accessed on 26/11/07)

50 Such partners currently have 72 hours to comment on decisions already taken in NATO. Interviews at NATO HQ
basis of political and military decisions taken independently of them within NATO’s decision-making structures. This is a problematic situation at a number of levels, not least at an operational level as NATO defines the mission and strategy, but also in relation to generating and maintaining the support of domestic public opinion. It is also with this problem in mind that the suggestion for a Security Providers Forum should be seen – i.e. as a wish to involve and integrate main providers of security to NATO-led missions who are not full members of NATO.

The issue is also regarded as a problem in relation to the so-called ‘triple non-countries’ or ‘Contact Countries’. These are countries who participate in NATO-led missions, but who are non-European, non-Partners and non-NATO members. These are currently Australia and New Zealand, who each contribute to ISAF with forces on the ground, and includes Japan, who recently decided to resume its refuelling mission in the Indian Ocean51 as well as South Korea. The logic is that because Sweden, Finland, Australia and New Zealand are in Afghanistan in significant numbers,52 they ought also to be in Brussels. The problem was discussed at Riga in 2006, but it proved impossible to get agreement on establishing a new category of partners with more formal ties to NATO, as the proposal was met with limited interest – even from those it was supposed to benefit. Reactions ranged from the very pragmatic ones given by Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer; ‘I don’t think ... we want to be travelling over to Brussels week by week for formal meetings and arrangements. It’s just a logistical nightmare for us,’53 to strategic concerns that a more formal relationship with NATO would have negative consequences on other strategically important relationships, such as Australia’s and New Zealand’s relationships in Asia, and South Korea’s relationship with North Korea. As a result the suggestion for Global Partnerships at the 2006 Riga Summit was met with an all round “thumbs down” among precisely those countries it was meant to include.54 Equally, European members were afraid to be drawn into far away security problems, or saw it as a shrewd attempt at strengthening the US position in NATO by integrating ‘its’ other allies.55 The outcome at Riga was therefore

51 On the reversal of Japan see: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7182449.stm accessed online 16/01/08
52 Austria, Ireland or Switzerland all have very small (less than 10) numbers deployed under ISAF command in Afghanistan.
53 Quoted in 'U.S. "global NATO" plan to get summit thumbs-down', 24 Nov 2006, Reuters
only a general commitment to developing “the political and practical potential of NATO’s existing cooperation programmes: EAPC/Partnership for Peace ( PfP), MD and ICI, and its relations with Contact Countries”56 and “enabling the Alliance to call ad-hoc meetings as events arise with those countries who contribute to or support our operations and missions”.57 However, with the recent change of government in Australia, it seems that the issue is on the table again and that Australia may well want a more formal institutional role in the decision-making concerning operations that Australia makes a contribution to.

Suggestions for “closer relationships” between non-celebrities rarely make the headlines. The fact that the suggestion for closer relationships with “Contact Countries” became a news item at all probably has more to do with the slogan ‘Global NATO’ and the simultaneous and more far reaching discussion launched by the American NATO Ambassador Victoria Nuland. Nuland stated in January 2006 that NATO should “focus on deepening its cooperation with countries such as Australia and Japan and becoming a genuine globally deployable military force”.58 Although the Riga Summit for the time being put an end to plans for a global NATO with much closer ties to “likeminded countries”, regardless of geographic location, the plans were only shelved. The idea of some form of security providers’ forum appears to be alive and kicking within American circles. Although seriously rebuked at the Riga Summit the issue is reportedly still on the American agenda for the summit in Bucharest in 2008:

“We look forward to enhancing NATO global partnerships by working more closely with security-providing nations around the globe, such as with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. Surely there are other democratic security providers with whom we can build partnerships.”59

Accordingly, global partnerships are still on the agenda in NATO, and will be there for some time. The same will be true of NATO’s other partnership-arrangements.60

56 Riga Summit Declaration 29/11/06 http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150c.htm accessed 27/11/07
57 Riga Summit Declaration 29/11/06 http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm accessed 27/11/07
60 Interviews at NATO HQ, October 2007.
**NATO Partnerships: towards pragmatism as organising principle?**

In sum, the above has shown great development in all of NATO’s partnership relations: both presently and historically. At the same time, it has painted a both murky and complicated picture, where different kinds of partner countries and different forms of rationalities guide different kinds of institutional arrangements. Still, some overarching developments and dynamics stand out.

Historically, the most important issue is that the ‘hand of friendship’ has been extended out from any European regionalist confines to be in essence global. This – together with developments in Europe – has had the effect that prospective membership has to a large extent vanished as an organising principle. This in a way has changed the dynamic of NATO’s partnerships, instead of the underlying teleology of membership – ‘management’ is now driving the development. It is (friendly) management of a wide range of specific security issues that is organising much of the partnerships today. This explains – together with the global character of the security issues – the move from a regionalist to a more functionalist approach. From this stems the increasing employment of 26+1 arrangements, the increasing introduction of flexibility to for instance MD and ICI, and the increasing discussion of how – if indeed – to establish cooperation with other liberal democracies.

This development, on the other hand, is also a reflection, perhaps, of a change in emphasis in the two strategies of intervention and integration. Although both are still present, one could argue that what we are witnessing is an increased focus on intervention, or perhaps it is the other way around, a decreased focus on integration. This is of course a reflection of the operation in Afghanistan, but it is also a reflection of the changed rationality expressed above. Partnerships are perhaps changing from having primarily value in themselves (i.e. creating security by integration) to having value as a function of their concrete results. However, although being a change of emphasis, this development still operates within the confines of the three categories of partners outlined earlier. It might, in fact, even strengthen them. Toning up the interventionist perspective on behalf of the integrationist actually reinforces the distinction. It puts a limit on how existing cooperation will develop in an ad-hoc, pragmatic interest driven manner. NATO is, in a fashion, running out of countries with ‘membership potential’.

This perhaps explains why the American proposal – at least in its more outlandish versions – for enhanced institutionalised cooperation with liberal democracies in
general is regarded with scepticism. It is introducing a new possible interpretation of ‘membership potential’. Exposing NATO to globalisation i.e. ‘acting globally’, inevitably makes it possible to argue for globalised integration. But global integration not only reintroduces the integration logic and not only questions the current institutional arrangement, it questions the value of the essential identity of the organisation, and it potentially promises to fundamentally change it. But it in fact does more than that. This discussion reflects, and is a reflection of, a larger discussion about the organisation of force and justice in international affairs.
4. Liberal ideas and the question of when and who should intervene

The analysis has revealed that developments in NATO can be understood as two simultaneous strategies of intervention and integration. Although the two responses have both been seen as rather pragmatic responses to changes in the international environment, the development of NATO since the end of the Cold War raises important questions about rights and obligations, justice and order, as well as legitimacy and legality.61 Clearly ‘when the shooting starts’62 as in Kosovo and Afghanistan, moral and ethical questions will inevitably be raised, asking when and under what circumstances, in what manner, and with what restraint NATO should act?63 Furthermore the question of who should act under a NATO flag lurks importantly in the background as NATO Partner countries and Contact countries increasingly are integrated in NATO missions.

These questions are intricately linked to what NATO is and what it should become; whether NATO should be a “Global Alliance” or an “Alliance acting Globally” because the two options provide very different answers. The issue in fact goes straight to the core of one of the most central and enduring questions in international relations – the question of when force may be used, and who has the right to use it. At a legal level the answer is clear as the use of force is limited to self-defence, or collective action to uphold international peace and security. In situations other than self-defence, the decision to use force rests solely with the Security Council of the United Nations.64 Added to that, a set of principles has evolved which implicitly guide when force may be used. Firstly, international society is premised on the principle that all recognised states are held to be legal equals. Secondly, that all recognised states have the rights of domestic autonomy, expressed in the dual principles of self-determination and non-intervention.65 These principles regulating the use of force, is what Christian

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61 A vigorous scholarly debate already exists which deals with these moral and ethical questions. See for example the special issue of Review of International Relations, Force and Legitimacy in International Relations vol.31, 2005, R. Keohane, ‘Governance in a Partially Globalized World’ American Political Science Review, vol. 95,1, 2001.
65 Reus-Smit.
Reus-Smit refers to as the ‘equalitarian regime’, essentially built on the liberal notion of separating political rights from material might.

The problem in relation to NATO being global or acting globally, is that the ‘equalitarian regime’ is currently being undermined from two directions, both of which are of direct relevance to NATO’s global role, and in which NATO is deeply involved. In the first instance, the issue of when NATO has the right (or the duty) to intervene in third countries raises questions about justice versus order. In the other instance, the issue of who should participate in NATO decision-making and in NATO missions raises the question of hierarchy versus equality in the international society – right versus might. Although the issues are intertwined it nevertheless can be argued that a ‘NATO acting globally’ to defend against widely perceived global threats and which acts to protect human security is likely to increase NATO’s legitimacy, whereas a ‘Global NATO’ based on liberal democratic values – a ‘Concert of Democracies’ would likely be seen widely as illegitimate. Paradoxically the “soft-sounding” integration strategy, taken to its logical conclusion is likely to reduce NATO’s legitimacy, whereas the “harsh-sounding” intervention strategy could increase NATO’s legitimacy.

**Intervention**

The mission in Afghanistan is a clear example of a NATO mission to deal with a perceived threat to international security under a UN mandate. NATO’s campaign against Serbia during the Kosovo war in 1999 is more complicated, however. It was a humanitarian intervention to prevent atrocities committed towards the Kosovo Albanians. Without a UN mandate, the war was illegal according to the ‘equalitarian regime’. It has therefore subsequently given rise to the question of whether to intervene when major human rights abuses take place within sovereign states.

The consequence of inactivity in Rwanda in 1994 and in Srebrenica in 1995 weighed heavily on liberal consciences, as did the legal wrangling over Kosovo in 1999. In the case of Kosovo, legitimacy in the end won over legality. The ‘right’ thing to do was not

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66 Reus-Smit.
67 The term ‘Concert of Democracies’ is a key component of the Princeton Project, *Forging a World of Liberty under Law*. However, the idea of an association of liberal democracies with special rights in global governance is also part of the neo-conservative agenda. The difference between the two political camps is that for neo-conservatives ‘special rights’ in global governance stand alone, whereas the liberal camp see the ‘Concert of Democracies’ as part of an over all institutional order embracing multilateralism.
necessarily the legal option. This view was backed up in December 2001 in a report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which concluded that states have a responsibility to protect69 (R2P) when sovereign states fail to live up to their obligation to protect their citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.70

The ‘responsibility to protect’ principle can be seen as part of an evolving democratic global governance discourse, where human rights are seen as part of a new standard of international legitimacy.71 Current developments are, accordingly, contributing to a weakening of the ‘egalitarian regime’ by undermining the principle of non-intervention. It must be anticipated that so called ‘liberal wars’ – wars that are fought to protect the weak – will be a demand that NATO as an alliance founded on shared liberal values, will have to honour, sometimes without a UN mandate, and within a global geography. NATO will, by default become an Alliance acting globally, although the experience of Afghanistan may well temper its willingness to do so.

**Who should intervene?**

Related to the question of when and why to intervene is the question of *who*. Which countries with what characteristics should participate in NATO missions and what should their precise relationship with NATO be? This question is as problematic as the question of when to intervene because it implicitly contains an assumption that some countries have more rights and more obligations in international society and in relation to NATO operations than others. The question therefore not only raises fundamental questions of hierarchy and equality in international relations, it also asks whether the willingness and ability to contribute to NATO operations confers special rights to the participants.

As already discussed, the pragmatic origin of the ‘Global NATO’ debate is based on the dual premise that NATO’s expanded role requires force contributions from outside NATO, and that such force contributors need to be involved in the planning and decision-making process. In that sense ‘Global Security Providers’ and ‘Global NATO’ can simply be seen as a pragmatic solution to the problem that some of the most active contributors to NATO’s operations are not full NATO members.

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70 www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4521
71 Reus-Smit op.cit. p. 71.
Parallel to the pragmatic discussion in NATO, however, circles within academia are also debating the legitimate use of force in world politics, where not only neo-conservatives see an enhanced role for liberal democracies. Also prominent liberal thinkers such as Robert Keohane, Allen Buchanan, John Rawls and David Held have been arguing for a re-hierarchisation of international society. In this re-hierarchisation a ‘coalition of democratic states’ would act in case a deadlocked Security Council would fail to act in the face of ‘significant risk of sudden and very serious harms on a massive scale’. The idea of an enhanced role for liberal democracies is also part of the Princeton Project; ‘Forging a World of Liberty under Law’ under the direction of liberal scholars such as Anne-Marie Slaughter and G. John Ikenberry. In other words a meeting of liberal and neo-conservative minds appears to have taken place.

The paradox is that this liberal-based discussion of re-hierarchisation of the international society inherently runs the risk of undermining the equally liberal assumption of equality in the international society. A coalition of democracies as envisaged by the above liberal thinkers, or a NATO that accepts members based on the nature of their political system and value system as suggested by Ambassador Nuland as well as Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeir, simply cannot avoid alienating those left on the outside.

The practical implications of such a global NATO could well be a net loss of legitimacy vis-à-vis precisely the states that NATO wants to engage through its partnership and dialogue initiatives, and could also hamper operations in what is likely to be a more hostile environment constructed increasingly in a “them/us” dichotomy. The likely victim is the principle of equality in the international system and thereby also legitimacy vis-à-vis those de facto excluded from a ‘Global NATO’.

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72 Reus-Smit, pp. 81.
5. Conclusion: Re-hierarchisation and the question of NATO Partnerships

In sum, NATO has – as shown above – used partnerships through its integration strategy extensively as a means for creating security. One can however discern two logics in the partnerships that have been established as part of the integration strategy. First, “a common values logic”, which views the practice – or politics – of partnerships as in itself providing security, by eventually giving rise to an enlarged security community. However, also within the integration strategy is “a shared capabilities logic” seeing partnerships as a means to provide capabilities: to provide security by adding capabilities. Both, in various combinations and configurations and interplaying with each other, have been successful in the past. However, when seen in relation to the strategy of intervention (as they should) the story becomes complicated. As especially the Kosovo war showed, events are taking place involving NATO, which are pressuring the equalitarian regime because the ‘responsibility to protect’ principle is in the process of undermining the bases of the equalitarian regime. Simultaneously, partnerships in NATO strategised around democracy is from another angle pressuring equality by introducing differentiation as an organising principle in international affairs and conveying special rights to democracies.

The two together cannot avoid having detrimental effects on NATO’s legitimacy vis-à-vis those that are left outside the NATO circle. It is especially the vision of ‘global NATO’ that is problematic. It takes legitimacy away from actions – in opposition to the R2P-principle, which legitimises actions – and confers it to the identity of the actors, who through their identity maintain the right to intervene. It, in fact, combines the two pressures. In the more radical visions of global NATO re-hierarchisation in terms of the right to intervention, by virtue of being democratic, is present. This combination potentially leads to an exclusionary and dichotomous relationship between a Global NATO and non-participating actors. This potential future is an expression of the ‘partnership as capability’ logic monopolising NATO on behalf of the integrationist logic.

NATO has to find a place for itself in a globalising world. The dichotomy between ‘NATO acting globally’ and ‘Global NATO’ reflects well that this process is ongoing. NATO’s search for itself is on the other hand both a reflection of, and reflected in, more general discussions about world order. What we are witnessing presently – in NATO as well as outside of it – is a conflict between two different liberal visions of
world order. One based on some form of conditional equality and the other based on hierarchy legitimised through democracy. We have advocated against going too far down the road of hierarchy; it will lead to conflict. But that does not translate into an altogether positive embrace of equality. The (paradoxical) challenge is to find a legitimate form of hierarchisation.

In 1967 NATO adopted the recommendations of the Harmel Report\(^73\) as the foundation for its actions towards the Soviet Union. The strength and the novelty of the Harmel Report is that it combines the strategy of defence with the strategy of détente, arguing that one is necessary for the other to succeed and *vice versa*, and only by giving both due weight, can peace be assured.\(^74\) In a sense, the ‘move beyond containment’ envisioned by George Bush in 1989 was already part of NATO orthodoxy as the Harmel Report was precisely an attempt at moving around or beyond containment. The logic of Harmel lived on after the Cold War. The dual strategy of integration and intervention employed by NATO in Post-Cold War Europe easily traces its legacy to Harmel; not only its duality, but its dual focus on political engagement and integration combined with military power can be seen as an expression of thoughts in line with the thinking of the Harmel report.

In finding its place in a globalising world, perhaps NATO could learn some lessons from its own past. The obvious lesson from the above is that hybridity works; NATO’s successes have been formed out of combining strategies otherwise thought incompatible: combining defence with détente and combining integration with intervention. The challenge is to find the hybrid of today. This report has shown that to a large extent the discussion of whether NATO should ‘be’ global or merely ‘act’ globally is a reflection of different visions of NATO’s future partnership strategies. The answer following the lessons of history is that success lies in the combination; making the right hybrid will make it possible for NATO to find its place in the world. This means that, in relation to partnerships and continued integration, NATO should focus on both ‘partnership as shared capabilities’ and ‘partnership as shared values’. Focusing solely on the first, moving NATO towards something of an ‘alliance of democracies’\(^75\),


\(^74\) And thus ensuring the continued centrality of the Alliance during a period of reduced tension in Europe.

\(^75\) As for instance suggested by Presidential Candidate Rudy Giuliani, ‘Mayor Giuliani’s Remarks To The NATO Supreme Allied Command Transformation Seminar, Norfolk, VA, 10/11/07’ accessed online at: http://www.joinrudy2008.com/article/pr/891
will be self-defeating. It will undermine the transformative potential in the other partnership logic. As defence and détente went hand in hand during the cold war, so must the focus on further cooperation with other liberal democracies not create barriers for the political and diplomatic engagement with other actors.
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