DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2006

EDITED BY NANNA HVIDT AND HANS MOURITZEN

DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 2006

EDITED BY NANNA HVIDT AND HANS MOURITZEN

DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS
Strandgade 56, DK-1401 Copenhagen, Denmark
Ph: +45 32 69 87 87
Fax: +45 32 69 87 00
E-mail: diis@diis.dk
Web: www.diis.dk

Editors: Nanna Hvidt and Hans Mouritzen
Layout: Carsten Schiøler
Print: Gullanders Bogtryk a-s, Denmark
ISBN 87-7605-147-1

DIIS publications can be obtained from
the booksellers or ordered at
ekspedition@nordisk-bog-center.dk

Wholesale for booksellers:
Nordisk Bog Center A/S
Bækvej 10-12, DK-4690 Haslev, Denmark
Ph: +45 56 36 40 40
Fax: +45 56 36 40 39

Contents

PREFACE · 7

CHAPTER 1: ARTICLES · 9

Abstracts of Scholarly Articles in English and Danish · 9

The International Situation and Danish Foreign Policy 2005 · 13
Ulrik Federspiel

The 'Big Other' and the 'Small Other':
Discursive Asymmetries and Cleavages in Russian-Danish Relations · 34
Andrey S. Makarychev

Social Defense and National Security:
The Globalized Danish Welfare State · 56
Eric S. Einhorn

Truth on Demand: Denmark and the Cold War · 80
Thorsten Borring Olesen

A Hundred Years of Danish Action Space · 114
Hans Mouritzen

CHAPTER 2: SELECTED DOCUMENTS · 153

CHAPTER 3: DANISH FOREIGN POLICY IN FIGURES · 199

CHAPTER 4: OPINION POLLS · 205

CHAPTER 5: SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY · 219

Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook

Preface

Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2006 is the tenth volume of the yearbook in its present form. This year, we have recruited and organized an 'Editorial Advisory Board' consisting of 17 distinguished experts, Danish and international, on the yearbook's topic (see table). Their task is to advise the editors regarding the selection of future academic topics and authors, as well as the refereeing of submitted drafts.

As previously, the volume focuses on Danish foreign policy and Denmark's position within an international and a transnational context – at the regional as well as the global level. Apart from the official outline of Denmark's 2005 foreign policy by the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ulrik Federspiel, we have included scholarly articles by Andrey Makarychev, Eric Einhorn, Thorsten Borring Olesen, and Hans Mouritzen, who represent only themselves and their academic expertise. The scholarly articles are abstracted, both in English and Danish, at the outset of chapter one.

Then follows a small selection of official documents which we consider to be pioneering or characteristic of Danish foreign policy during 2005. This is supplemented by essential statistics on Danish foreign policy, as well as some of the most relevant polls on the attitude of the Danish population on key foreign policy questions. A bibliography then offers a limited selection of scholarly books, articles, and chapters published in 2005 in English, German or French dealing with the yearbook's topic.

The editors of *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook* are director Nanna Hvidt and senior research fellow, dr.scient.pol. Hans Mouritzen. Morten Lihn Jørgensen and Ulla Rødgaard have provided editorial assistance for this volume. Robert Parkin has been our linguistic consultant.

The editors
DIIS, Copenhagen
May 2006

Chapter 1
Articles

ABSTRACTS OF SCHOLARLY ARTICLES IN ENGLISH AND DANISH

The 'Big Other' and the 'Small Other': Discursive Asymmetries and Cleavages in Russian-Danish Relations

Andrey S. Makarychev

Russian-Danish relations are analysed from the viewpoint of a constructivist approach to the conduct of foreign policy, diplomacy and international relations. Two case studies are carried out: one regarding the concept of Europe, and one regarding security policy. Various differences notwithstanding regarding the concept of Europe, the comparison uncovers a surprisingly similar attachment to 'nation-stateness' in policy statements from the two sides. The section on security policy dissects the distinctive approaches of Denmark and Russia to terrorism and its security threats. Key policy makers in each country read the 'threat' in different ways and therefore prescribe different counter-measures. This has impacted directly and publicly upon bilateral relations. Nonetheless, the article argues that there are means by which the two sides may overcome their basic conceptual differences in developing a common language and approach.

De russisk-danske relationer analyseres med udgangspunkt i en konstruktivistisk tilgang til udenrigspolitik, diplomati og international politik. Der udføres to case-studier: en om landenes Europa-opfattelse og en om sikkerhedspolitik. En række forskelle ufor-

talt vedrørende Europa-opfattelse viser sammenligningen af udtalelser fra de to lande en overraskende lighed i bindingen til nationalstatstænkning. Studiet af sikkerhedspolitik undersøger Danmarks og Ruslands tilgange til terrorismen og dens sikkerhedstrusler. Nøglebeslutningstagere i de to lande læser 'truslen' forskelligt og anbefaler derfor forskellige modforholdsregler. Dette har direkte og synligt påvirket de bilaterale relationer. Ikke desto mindre argumenterer artiklen for, at parterne kan overvinde deres grundlæggende forskellige opfattelser i udviklingen af en fælles begrebsramme og tilgang.

Social Defense and National Security: The Globalized Danish Welfare State

Eric S. Einhorn

The complex forces of interdependence and globalization have forced Denmark and other advanced welfare states to rethink the components of national security policy. In addition to concerns about traditional threats of force are the destabilizing effects of global economic, health, migrative and other developments. A traditionally broad concept of 'social defense' – of a strong society capable of full participation in European and world affairs – contributes to an appropriate multidimensional national security policy and to sustainable economic and social policies, despite the limitations on the resources and power of a small state. As illustrated by the 'cartoon crisis' of 2005-06, adjustment to a multiethnic and globalized society will be the security issue of the coming decade.

Interdependensens og globaliseringens komplekse kræfter har tvunget Danmark og andre fremstående velfærdsstater til at gentænke den nationale sikkerhedspolitik. I tillæg til trusler om traditionel magtanvendelse er kommet de destabiliserende virkninger af global økonomi, sundhedstilstand, migration m.v. Et traditionelt bredt begreb om 'samfundsmæssigt forsvar' – et stærkt samfund, der er i stand til at deltage fuldt ud i europæiske og globale anliggender – bidrager til en hensigtsmæssig flerdimensional national sikkerhedspolitik og til bærbare økonomiske og sociale politikker, trods de ressource- og magtbegrænsninger som en småstat er bundet af. Som illustreret af 'tegningskrisen' 2005-06 vil tilpasning til et multietnisk og globalt samfund blive det næste tiårs overordnede sikkerhedsproblem.

Truth on Demand: Denmark and the Cold War

Thorsten Borring Olesen

The article is structured in two layers. The outer layer demonstrates, how the intense fight over the interpretation of the Cold War has elicited a series of government sponsored investigations into various aspects of Danish Cold War history, but also documents that this process has been accompanied by intensified and manifest attempts to mastermind and exploit these investigations for (party)political ends. The inner layer focuses on the four volume white book *Danmark under den Kolde Krig* [*Denmark during the Cold War*] produced by a research team at the 'Danish Institute for International Studies' and published in the summer of 2005. The findings of the white book are presented and discussed, and so is the heated debate which has followed in the wake of its publication.

Artiklen er struktureret i to lag. Det ydre lag demonstrerer, hvordan den intense kamp om tolkningen af den Kolde Krig har ført til nedsættelsen af adskillige kommissioner og undersøgelses- og forskningsgrupper med den opgave at kulegrave forskellige aspekter af den danske koldkrigshistorie. Denne proces har været ledsaget af åbenlyse forsøg på at påvirke og tilrettelægge undersøgelser og forskning efter (parti)politiske hensyn. Det indre lag fokuserer på den fire binds hvidbog 'Danmark under den Kolde Krig', som en forskergruppe ved DIIS fremlagde i sommeren 2005. Hvidbogen og dens konklusioner præsenteres og diskuteres, ligesom den efterfølgende, ganske ophedede, debat om rapporten behandles.

A Hundred Years of Danish Action Space

Hans Mouritzen

Facilitated by a recent publication explosion on the history of Danish foreign policy, as well by the constellation theory of state behaviour, this article investigates the ups and downs of Danish foreign policy action space. Specifically, the focus is directed at nine episodes within the last 100 years, in which it became obvious that Danish external action space had changed markedly, either for the better or the worse. What methods did decision-makers use to learn about these changes, and could they themselves expand

action space? This is supplemented by an analysis of governments' *internal* action space (vis-à-vis domestic opposition) in the episodes. The golden age for Danish foreign policy action space was the period 1990-2005. Over the last 100 years, overcautiousness seems to have been more frequent than the overplaying of Denmark's hand.

Artiklen, der udforsker op- og nedture i dansk udenrigspolitisk handlefrihed, bygger på konstellationsteorien om statsadfærd og drager nytte af den publiceringseksplosion om dansk udenrigspolitisk historie, der har fundet sted i de senere år. Fokus er specielt rettet mod ni episoder inden for de sidste 100 år, hvor dansk udenrigspolitisk handlefrihed forandrede sig markant – enten til det bedre eller værre. Hvordan bar beslutningstagerne sig ad med at erfare de stedfundne ændringer? Kunne de selv bidrage til at udvide handlefriheden? Dette suppleres med en analyse af de skiftende regeringers interne handlefrihed (over for hjemlig modstand) i episoderne. Guldalderen for dansk udenrigspolitisk handlefrihed var årene 1990-2005. Set over de sidste 100 år synes overforsigtighed at have været hyppigere end det modsatte.

The International Situation and Danish Foreign Policy 2005

Ulrik Federspiel[1]

2005 bears ample testimony to foreign policy as a 'two-level game' shaped between national and international developments. The rejection at the national level of the EU Constitutional Treaty by the French and Dutch voters had profound impact on the EU Agenda, leaving the ever closer cooperation momentarily shell-shocked. National interest also became more evident in the development of multilateral issues such as the 2005 UN World Summit and in the engagement in bilateral issues such as Iraq, Iran and the conflicts in Africa, notably Sudan.

At the same time, we saw international developments such as increasing energy prices, terrorism, migration, natural disasters and more wide-spread economic interests influencing the foreign policy of many nations to a greater extent.

In 2005, we also experienced more focus on the political dimensions of globalization. The most prominent Danish experience was the crisis with the Muslim world due to 12 caricature drawings of the Prophet Mohammed published in September 2005 in the independent Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten*. This cartoon issue illustrated the consequences of rapid spread of information – including misinformation – and the possible grave international consequences of a domestic act. The fine line between domestic and foreign politics is increasingly being wiped out.

The crisis will shape Danish foreign policy in many ways. It is too early to say how. In the short term we need to strengthen our dialogue with the

1. Ambassador Ulrik Federspiel is the Permanent Secretary in the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.

Muslim world bilaterally as well as through the EU and UN. In the longer term we need to move this dialogue forward in order to create a greater understanding between our different cultures. With regard to public diplomacy we need to increase international awareness of Danish priorities and Denmark's international engagement.

Our engagement with the world will not diminish in the future. In the light of globalization, we cannot afford to hide. We must use our active international engagement as a springboard for reaping the opportunities of globalization and for meeting international challenges.

DENMARK AS A MEMBER OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL

Denmark entered the United Nations' Security Council on 1 January 2005, as a non-permanent member for a two-year period. The overall objective for Denmark in the Security Council is two-fold: To assist the UN and the Security Council in developing effective and comprehensive responses to new threats and challenges and to take part in the daily work of the Security Council in order to maintain international peace and security.

International Law

Strengthening international law is one of Denmark's priorities during our membership of the Security Council. We aim to have a discussion in the Security Council before the end of 2006 on basic principles of international law. Denmark arranged a number of inspirational events, including a side event during the ASP of the ICC[2] on the relationship between the ICC and the Security Council. Denmark also played an important role in more specific issues on the agenda of the Council, including the historic referral of the situation in Darfur to the ICC and on the completion strategy of ICTY[3].

Regional Conflicts

Conflicts in Africa took up most of the time in the Security Council in 2005. Denmark particularly focused on Sudan and Liberia, but also on Eritrea-

2. The Assembly of State Parties of the International Criminal Court.
3. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast and DR Congo. Denmark also initiated a discussion of the humanitarian situation in Northern Uganda and Zimbabwe. In this way Denmark has contributed to raise international awareness of these ongoing conflicts.

On Iraq, Denmark contributed actively to maintaining consensus in the Security Council. During the Danish presidency in May, the mandate of the Multinational Force, as stipulated by UN Resolution 1546, was successfully reviewed. Due to the progress in the political process in Iraq, resolution 1546 was replaced by Resolution 1637. Resolution 1637 – a so-called roll-over resolution – prolonged the mandate of the Multinational Force until the end of 2006. Denmark contributed to this result by being one of the co-sponsors of the resolution.

As developments in the relations between Syria and Lebanon warranted further attention by the Security Council, Denmark actively supported the work of the Council concerning the follow-up to resolution 1559 (2004) including issuing a presidential statement on behalf of the Council on May 4. Furthermore, seconded Danish staff supported the work of the UN Investigation Commission (UNIIIC), established to investigate the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in February as set out in resolution 1595.

The 2005 World Summit

2005 was the year of review of the Millennium Declaration. World leaders met in New York in September to discuss how the UN could be strengthened and be able to better meet the great demands of the twenty-first century. The World Summit Outcome is an extensive and balanced package of UN reforms. Since September 2005 focus has been on implementing the decisions in the Summit Outcome on reforms, such as the establishment of the Peace-Building Commission, the Human Rights Council and a comprehensive terrorism convention.

The establishment of the Peace-Building Commission (PBC) was a main priority for Denmark. The aim of the PBC is to ensure a smoother transition from conflict to peace and to remedy the absence of a body in the United Nations system to help countries in the difficult transition from war to lasting peace. Today, almost half of all countries emerging from war lapse back

into violence within five years. Denmark has played a major role in establishing the PBC. During the Presidency of the Security Council in May 2005 Denmark held an open debate on post-conflict peace-building. The Danish Foreign Minister presided over the debate and the outcome was a presidential statement, which was an important step towards establishing the PBC. In October 2005 the President of the General Assembly, Jan Eliasson, asked Denmark and Tanzania to serve as Co-Chairs for the intergovernmental negotiations on the outstanding issues in relation to the establishment of the PBC. The PBC was established on December 31 by the General Assembly.

The establishment of an effective Human Rights Council as replacement for the UN Human Rights Commission was also a Danish priority issue. The concept of a permanent human rights council was in fact developed in its early stages by Denmark and together with its EU partners, Denmark has pursued a pro-active approach. A permanent council will have the ability to meet throughout the year as need arises and not as the calendar dictates. The council will deal with both thematic and country specific issues. It will have about the same number of members as the commission to be elected by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly. And the role and participation of civil society, including NGO's and national human rights institutions, will be enhanced. The Human Rights Council was established on March 15, 2006, by the General Assembly.

After the World Summit, hopes were high that the political momentum would lead to a final agreement on the comprehensive convention on international terrorism. The comprehensive convention includes a definition of terrorism that would wrap up the wide-ranging work of the UN General Assembly in this field. It would also send a very important signal from the UN that the world is united in the fight against terrorism. During the second half of 2005 common ground was found on the question of the right of peoples to struggle against foreign occupation. However, at the close of 2005 there was still disagreement on the exceptions to the convention, including how to deal with the question of armed forces' activities during an armed conflict. Denmark made several attempts to find a compromise and will continue to do so in 2006, when it will hopefully be possible to conclude the negotiations.

GLOBAL ISSUES

Trade Policy

When launched in Qatar in November 2001, the Doha Development Round of multilateral trade negotiations was foreseen to be concluded by 1 January 2005. It did not come as a surprise, however, that this did not happen. Experience tells us that trade negotiations often take longer than planned. With many more members than during the GATT days and a much more diverse negotiating agenda, this first WTO round of negotiations was bound to take more than three years.

So, instead of becoming a year of implementation, 2005 became a year of approximation in the Doha Round. However, in absence of a breakthrough it was clear already by the summer break that ambitions for the Hong Kong Summit had to be lowered. The multilateral trading system might not sustain another failure like Seattle in 1999 and Cancun in 2003. With this in mind, the result in Hong Kong was positive, because it kept the Round alive and – more importantly – sent a political signal of global commitment to the multilateral trading system.

Why has it been so difficult to make progress in these negotiations? Not least because numerous and very diverse national interests are at play. While few question the economic wisdom in trade liberalisation, the political reality – both inside and between nations – is that losers of structural change are visible, while winners are spread throughout the economy. Therefore liberalisation is easy to do in theory, but hard to do in practise.

To the Danish government, the key priority has been a positive and development-friendly approach to globalization. The basis has been the belief that wealth is not preserved by ring-fencing economies to the outside world, but by adapting to the forces shaping the world economy. Thus, the Doha talks are being conducted against the background of a changing world landscape with global trade expanding further every day. In some quarters this rapid change has created measures of protectionism – but resorting to protectionism does not help.

The concerns prompting protectionism should not be ignored: Liberalisation can have profound impact on specific communities. 2005 testified to this as the trade in textiles was liberalized – and Chinese textiles proved to be far more competitive that textiles from poorer countries. In

Lesotho, for instance, tens of thousands of textile workers lost their jobs as enterprises succumbed to world competition.

The benefits of trade liberalisation are, therefore, not automatic. In particular the poorest developing countries face multiple challenges. Among these is the lack of capacity to participate in trade negotiations and to implement trade agreements, weak productive sectors, lacking physical and social infrastructure, etc. The recent Danish strategy for promotion of trade, growth and development points out that the poorest developing countries will need transitional arrangements as well as financial and technical support in order to benefit from trade liberalisation.

2006 will now be an important year for the Doha Development Round. Much is at stake: For the world economy, enterprises and citizens all over the world, for development and for the multilateral trade system. Failure of the Doha Development Round should not be an option.

Focus on Africa

The international focus on Africa was sparked by a number of events that coincided in 2005. First and foremost it became clear in the preparations of the World Summit that while there had been a positive development on most continents, Sub-Saharan Africa was lagging behind and would not be able to achieve the Millennium Development Goals in 2015 without special support from the rest of the world.

At the end of 2004, the Danish government launched a new Africa policy with the overall objective of strengthening cooperation with Africa through a coherent and stringent policy. The new policy provided a very useful basis for Denmark's active participation in the increased international focus on Africa throughout 2005. On the basis of the new Africa policy and the substantial and longstanding Danish relationship with Africa, Denmark worked actively in multilateral fora to achieve increased support for Africa. The Prime Minister used the occasion of the visit of President George Bush in Denmark prior to the G8-summit in Gleneagles to focus attention on Africa and the importance of increased support for the continent.

The joint international efforts in 2005 in favour of Africa were rather successful. Firstly, EU Ministers for Development Cooperation agreed to increase the level of EU development assistance to 0.56 pct. of GDP by 2010.

Half of the increase will be allocated to Africa. Secondly, EU Heads of State and Government decided to elaborate a coherent Africa strategy that was adopted in December 2005. Thirdly, the G8 leaders agreed at their summit in Gleneagles to double aid by 2010 by an extra $50 billion worldwide and $25 billion for Africa and write off immediately the debts of 18 of the world's poorest countries, most of which are in Africa.

In parallel the Danish government decided to further increase its efforts in Africa by nominating Mali as a new programme country. In addition the Prime Minister devoted his intervention at the World Summit entirely to Africa and the need for increased assistance to the continent, and in October 2005 he visited Tanzania and Mozambique, where he also used the occasion to discuss the challenge of globalization.

Terrorism

Again in 2005 terrorism struck around the globe. For the second time in three years, terrorists committed mass murder in Bali. Similar carnage took place in Sharm el Sheik and in Amman. In the London July attacks we experienced domestic suicide bombers on European soil for the first time. These and other attacks can leave no-one in doubt that terrorism remains one of our main security challenges.

Terrorists exploit the possibilities offered by today's globalized world offers. They travel across open borders, communicate and spread their ideas through the internet, and channel their financial transactions through the international banking system. An efficient response requires global cooperation and a global strategy. In the fight against terrorism we need to draw upon all the tools available. Diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, financial and military capabilities each have an important role to play. Reducing the threat from terrorism requires us to combine all of these instruments.

Though we are still far from having eliminated international terrorism as a global threat, the international community has made significant progress in the fight against terrorism. Multilateral cooperation through the United Nations remains the bedrock of our efforts. In addition, cooperation among EU partners as well as transatlantic cooperation plays indispensable roles in Denmark's counter-terrorism effort.

One of the biggest successes, and one of the best examples of efficient international cooperation, remains the ousting of the Taleban regime and the efforts to secure a democratic and stable Afghanistan. The change in that country has had a crucial impact on the fight against terrorism. When the Taliban regime was removed from power, Al Qaeda was deprived of its primary sanctuary and support. Terrorist training camps were shut down.

Denmark is taking an active part in fostering international cooperation against terrorism. Our chairmanship of the Security Council's Committee on Counter-Terrorism reflects the importance we attach to the issue. We also contribute to the complementary efforts carried out in the Security Council's 1540-Committee aimed at preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors such as terrorists. Within the European Union, Denmark has taken an initiative to increase cooperation on preparedness and consequence management in the event of a terrorist attack. And through our development assistance we support a number of projects aiming at countering radicalisation and increasing the authorities' capabilities of fighting terrorism while respecting human rights.

While the international community can rightly claim a number of successes in the fight against terrorism, we must, however, recognize that the nature of the terrorist threat from the Al Qaeda network is changing. Its extremist ideology continues to stir followers and sympathizers around the world to wage a violent jihad against what they consider un-believers. Through international cooperation Al Qaeda has been weakened, but it has adapted by increasingly spreading its vision to local groups throughout the world. As the networks have been disrupted and the possibilities for planning complicated actions have been diminished, the trend is moving towards less sophisticated, but still lethal, attacks. As hard targets become better protected, the terrorists increasingly attack soft targets in the form of schools, transportation systems and any other place where large numbers of innocent persons are gathered.

Failed states used to be considered the real breeding ground for international terrorism. While we cannot afford to diminish our focus on failing or failed states, today we realize that home-grown terrorists pose another daunting challenge. Radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism also takes place in Western societies among apparently well-integrated individuals.

These developments demonstrate that the fight against terrorism will continue to require much attention and international cooperation in the years to come. The Danish government decided in 2005 to establish a Centre for Terror Analysis within the Danish Security Intelligence Service. The main purpose of the centre will be to produce analyses of threats to the Danish society on the broadest basis possible. The Centre will be staffed with personnel from various agencies, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Natural Disasters

2005 was dominated by major natural disasters – the aftermath of the Tsunami in Southeast Asia (December 26, 2004), the hurricane Katrina in New Orleans and the earthquake in Pakistan. This impacted heavily on Danish humanitarian assistance and, with regard to the Tsunami, also on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' delivery of assistance to a large number of Danish citizens directly or indirectly affected.

The Danish humanitarian assistance not only responded in great volume but also with swiftness. In these sudden crises, speed and flexibility are of utmost importance. Consequently, a number of reform initiatives for the humanitarian system were initiated.

However, in a year where major natural disasters have taken the headlines, it is also important to remember that other disasters with enormous humanitarian needs must be addressed. The so-called forgotten crises, mainly in Africa, suffered again in 2005 from lack of funds. Denmark has a long tradition for allocating un-earmarked funds to organisations exactly in order to provide the necessary flexibility for these organisations to be able to also cope with the forgotten crises. Un-earmarked funds do not give the same headlines for the politicians, but the impact on the ground is at least as big as high-profiled Danish contributions. The Minister for Development is actively promoting this viewpoint.

An evaluation of the Danish handling of the Tsunami, presented by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on 24 May 2005, has led to a strengthening of our crisis management with regard to both our humanitarian assistance and our consular services to Danes abroad. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been given both the mandate and the resources to react promptly when a cri-

sis occurs. The challenge is to ensure an efficient interaction between national and international players.

TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

After the somewhat turbulent period following the military intervention in Iraq in 2003, transatlantic relations underwent a significant revitalization in 2005. Already during the spring of 2005 this manifested itself substantially in clear American support for the EU3 approach towards Iran's nuclear programmes, American acceptance of referring possible cases of war crimes in Darfur to the ICC, and – on the other side of the Atlantic – the postponing of the EU's decision to lift the weapons embargo against China. This development took place also as a consequence of the 'outreach' of the new administration and after President Bush ice-breaker visit to Europe in February, followed by three other visits.

In order to facilitate a positive development in this critical period of the transatlantic relationship, Denmark presented a catalogue of 39 proposals for concrete EU-US cooperation in strategic areas. The aim was to help focus on areas with scope for real cooperation and with a view to benefit our citizens and avoid getting lost in differences on ideology and principles. Some of the specific proposals from this catalogue were later reflected at the ordinary EU-US Summit in Washington on June 20.

On the institutional side, Chancellor Schröder's speech at Vehrkunde in February focused on the role of NATO and the EU-US dialogue respectively. The subsequent decision to strengthen the political dimension of NATO together with the improved strategic dialogue between the EU and the United States (in particular on the situation in the Far East) and not least the resumption of informal transatlantic ministerials in the margins of the UN General Assembly and the NATO Ministerial in Brussels on December 7 testify to the dynamic and goal-oriented nature of the transatlantic partnership.

2005 was a special year in US-Denmark relations. On July 5-6 President Bush paid a successful visit to Denmark. Over the years, relations between the United States and Denmark have grown ever stronger. At the meeting between President Bush and Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, various international issues were discussed, including Iraq, climate change and

Africa. The Prime Minister also used his meeting with President Bush in Denmark to express concerns about the status of prisoners held at Guantanamo – an issue the President subsequently addressed at his press conference.

THE WIDER MIDDLE EAST

Denmark's relations with the Muslim world

With a chain of events illustrative of the potential global effects of seemingly domestic issues, Denmark's relations with the Muslim world came under serious pressure due to 12 caricature drawings of the Prophet Mohammed in the independent Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* published in September 2005. Through virtual and informal global networks, news of these drawings travelled to the furthest corners of the world and the issue gradually became internationalised. By the beginning of 2006, the issue had therefore unfortunately not been closed.

Partnership for Progress and Reform

In 2003 the Danish Government launched the programme 'Partnership for Progress and Reform' as part of a new vision for Danish foreign policy aiming at establishing the necessary basis for a wider dialogue with the countries in the Middle East and North Africa and supporting specific reform processes initiated within the region. In 2005 thematic regional programmes were initiated within media, human rights and culture – and bilateral partnership programmes took off in Yemen and Jordan, while the planning of a programme in Morocco was finalized. In Denmark a very broad range of civil society organisations, media representatives and academia, as well as government institutions and parliamentarians were involved in the programme, opening up still new channels for dialogue and enhanced mutual understanding. Through a considerable number of seminars and working visits involving Danish and Middle Eastern partners, reform issues on the Middle Eastern agenda were discussed and experience from similar processes in Denmark have been shared and analysed.

On the multilateral side, partnership activities took place within the framework of the EU through the Strategic Partnership for the

Mediterranean and Middle East and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership culminating in the Prime Minister's participation in the Euro-Mediterranean summit 27-28 November 2005. The aim was to promote democratisation and political reforms through partnerships across the Middle East.

Forum for the Future

As a direct consequence of Denmark's active role in reform efforts throughout the region, the Danish foreign minister was invited to participate in the G8's Forum for the Future foreign ministers' meeting in Bahrain in November. At this meeting Denmark's financial support was announced to the initiatives The Foundation for the Future and The Fund for the Future. The first is aiming at advancing and strengthening freedoms and democratic trends and practices in the broader Middle East. The latter is aiming at stimulating economic growth and job creation in the Broader Middle East and North Africa.

Iraq

Throughout 2005, Iraq continued to be high on both the international and the domestic Danish agenda. 2005 was marked by progress towards a democratic Iraq. In January, elections for a transitional parliament took place. In October, a large majority adopted a new democratic constitution. In December, 77 pct. of all voters participated in the parliamentary elections following the referendum on the constitution. In Denmark, around two-thirds of all Iraqi voters participated in the out-of-country voting associated with the January and December elections. This has paved the way for the formation of a democratically elected government in 2006.

Despite these successes, Iraq still needed international support. One major challenge related to the difficult security situation and the need to continued training of Iraqi Security Forces for those forces to take over more responsibility for the maintaining of security. Further, the reconstruction process was constrained by security problems and new, weak Iraqi institutions that needed continued capacity building to perform as well as the Iraqi people rightly expected.

In June 2005, the Danish Government gained broad support in

Parliament for prolonging the Danish troop contribution to the UN mandated Multinational Force until February 2006. The Parliament's adoption of the bill was based on the Government's Iraq analysis published in April 2005. Subsequently, the main findings of the analysis were implemented. Besides the need for continued support to the Multinational Force in Iraq, these were: Increased support to the training of Iraqi troops; enhanced support to reconstruction, including additional development assistance amounting to DKK 100 million taking the total to DKK 500 million for the period 2003-2008; as well as a stronger focus on human rights, rule of law and police, democratisation, infrastructure, agriculture and humanitarian assistance in the Danish reconstruction portfolio.

Throughout the year there was a massive public interest in questions related to Iraq, culminating when the Volcker Report on the UN Oil-for-Food programme published on 27 October 2005, pointed to the possible involvement of Danish companies in the Iraqi regime's manipulation of the programme.

Iran

Iran's nuclear programme remained a cause of serious concern to the international community in 2005. The resumption of enrichment-related activities and continued insufficient cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) further weakened international confidence that the Iranian programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes.

The European Union and especially the United Kingdom, France and Germany have been committed to finding a diplomatic solution. Regrettably, intense efforts over the course of the year did not bring us closer to this end. In September 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors found Iran to be in non-compliance with its international obligations. The Board clearly stated that Iran's nuclear activities were of relevance to the Security Council's maintenance of international peace and security. The Council could play a key role in achieving progress towards a diplomatic solution by applying the necessary international pressure on Iran and by bolstering the work of the IAEA. As a current member of the Security Council, Denmark is prepared to contribute actively to these efforts in 2006.

Also other developments in Iran caused uproar in 2005 both interna-

tionally and in Denmark. Soon after the presidential elections in Iran, the new President Ahmadinejad made several statements on Israel's right to exist, stating that Israel should be wiped off the map or moved to Europe. Furthermore, he questioned the historical events of the holocaust. Denmark and the international community reacted strongly against these utterly unacceptable statements.

The human rights situation in Iran continued to worsen through 2005. There were still many human rights abuses taking place such as the execution of minors, religious persecution and political persecution of journalists and human rights defenders. Denmark and the EU raised the issues on several occasions with the Iranian authorities, including during the Foreign Minister's visit in Tehran in April 2005.

Middle East Peace Process

The election of a new Palestinian President in January 2005 raised hopes of new progress in the Middle East peace process. While the international focus was on Israel's successful Gaza disengagement and the need for the Palestinian Authority to assume effective control over the Gaza strip, domestic Palestinian politics throughout the year entered a period where the militant Islamic group, Hamas, emerged on the political scene through many rounds of the Palestinian municipal elections. This exposed a dilemma for the international community: the need to search for a political way forward that took into account the political reality on the ground while simultaneously denouncing the fundamental and incompatible contradiction between terrorism and participation in democratic processes.

Lebanon and Syria

The power of the people also proved decisive in Lebanon during 2005, which saw a strong national movement in the wake of several terrorist attacks on prominent Lebanese, most famously the assassination on 14 February of former Prime Minister, Rafiq Hariri. With significant and unanimous support of the UN Security Council, events eventually led Syria to withdraw its overwhelming military and civilian presence from Lebanon, thus opening the door to democratic elections in Lebanon without the presence of a foreign power overshadowing it. The UN Independent International

Investigation Commission into the murder of Rafiq Hariri received staff support from Denmark in order to promote its work, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs paid a visit to Lebanon in order to demonstrate Danish support for the democratic currents.

Afghanistan

Security is the top priority of the citizens of Afghanistan. Considerable challenges remain in terms of building up a secure, stable and peaceful society and create the frames for the democratic development and the strengthening of a well-functioning state. However, the political process has moved forward in a positive way.

After the installing of the transitional government, the adoption of the constitution and the holding of the presidential election, the final milestone in the political transition process – the Bonn Process – was the parliamentary and local elections in September 2005. To guide the next phase of nation-building, Afghanistan has drafted a comprehensive strategy for development – the Afghan interim National Development Strategy – as well as a number of sector strategies. This will lead to a new overarching agreement to be signed in 2006.

The Danish government signed a new 5-year partnership agreement with Afghanistan. With its multi-year engagement, emphasis on Afghan development priorities and budget support, the agreement has been well received by the Afghan government. Denmark has been highlighted as a model donor who contributes positively to the Afghan government's ownership to the development process and its ability to do long-term planning.

A CHALLENGING YEAR FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION

The Constitutional Treaty

In 2005 EU member states planned to ratify the Constitutional Treaty. However, after a majority voted 'no' in referenda in France on May 29 and in the Netherlands on June 1, the European Council decided on June 16-17 to initiate a reflection period on the future of Europe. The reflection pause did not prevent member states from ratifying the Constitutional Treaty. By the

end of 2005, 13 member states had ratified the Constitutional Treaty. The referendum in Denmark scheduled for September 27 was postponed.

With reference to the European Council decision to institute a reflection period throughout the EU, the Danish Prime Minister convened meetings in August 2005 with the political parties represented in the Danish Parliament and with a number of the major NGO's engaged in the Danish EU debate. On the basis of these meetings, the parties of the Danish parliament concluded that the Parliament's European Affairs Committee should coordinate Danish activities in the reflection period.

Danish activities during the reflection period built on a tradition of EU debate developed through six EU referenda since 1972. Under the heading 'Citizens' Agenda', the Parliament's European Affairs Committee and a number of NGO's convened a so-called 'Planning Group', which agreed on a thematic, financial, and organisational framework for the debate. Debate activities in the spring of 2006 have been planned throughout the country and announced on a Parliament website. The Parliament will conclude on the Danish reflection period activities during the spring of 2006 and submit a report to the Government in due time before the June 2006 Summit.

Agenda 2007

The EU was set for yet another crisis, when the Heads of State and Government failed to reach agreement on the Union's 7-year budget for 2007-2013 (the so called financial perspectives) at the European Council in June. It was therefore with relief that the UK Presidency managed to negotiate a deal during the December Council – not least due to the need for the 10 new member states to be able to start programming the quite substantial amounts from the Structural Funds.

During the budget negotiations a number of relatively well-off EU-15 countries were concerned that the Commission's proposal for a budget amounting to app. 1.24 pct. of EU's Gross National Income would make them too big net contributors. On the other hand, former major receivers of regional aid claimed that they should not be the only ones to pay for the biggest enlargement in the history of the Union. Another cleavage was between France, who vehemently defended the agreement from 2002-2003 on the ceiling for agricultural expenditure, and the UK, who demanded

modernization in the form of further agricultural reforms in return for movement on their rebate on the budget. Behind the UK's discourse of a 'modern vs. an ancient budget' there was also a fear that the Labour government would be perceived as weak by the public opinion if it had to give in on Thatcher's hard-fought rebate negotiated all the way back in 1983. An unchanged mechanism would however leave the UK not paying to an enlargement it had whole-heartedly supported.

The UK moved on their rebate and some cuts were made in agricultural transfers which paved the way for a final compromise. The end result was a total budget of 862 billion euros equivalent to app. 1.05 of the Union's GNI. The new countries had to accept a slight decrease in the support from the structural funds. The final agreement also saw significant increases in the budget for Research and Development (an increase by 75 pct. in 2013 compared to the 2006-level), which was another main Danish priority during the negotiations.

Enlargement

Geographically, the focus of the enlargement process moved from Central and Eastern Europe to Turkey and the Western Balkans. In the meantime, Denmark as well as other Member States stressed the importance of integrating the lessons learnt from the fifth enlargement round into the set-up for future negotiations. The question of how to ensure the coherence and the effectiveness of an enlarged Union was an important element in the debate – not least regarding the rather controversial question of whether or not to initiate accession talks with Turkey.

The European leaders in December 2004 made a commitment to complete the fifth round of enlargement by receiving Bulgaria and Romania as new members in 2007. The accession treaties were signed in April 2005 and the ratification process will continue in 2006. General support behind the accession remains strong. This support, however, is conditional on Bulgaria and Romania meeting in full the standards and requirements for EU membership.

The prime event of enlargement in 2005 was the launching on 3rd October of accession negotiations with Turkey and Croatia. The launch had been preceded by intense discussion between EU and the two candidate

countries as well as within the EU itself. Should negotiations with Turkey necessarily lead to full membership or could the goal be something less? And did the Croatian government cooperate 'fully' with the International War Crimes Tribunal (ICTY) in The Hague or was it something less than that? Particularly the debate on Turkey made resonance with the public. Denmark was very satisfied with the agreement in October 2005 on a firm and fair negotiating framework in line with the conclusions of the European Council in December 2004. The framework provides for a fair and rigorous negotiation process and includes instruments such as benchmarking and the possibility of suspending negotiations.

Our efforts to extend the stability and prosperity of the EU to the states of the Western Balkans and ultimately receive them as members remained high on the agenda in 2005. It is a region in which Denmark has been engaged in a number of fields for more than a decade.

European Neighbours

With the enlargement of the EU, it became important to reach out to all the European Union's 'new' neighbours in the east, in the Western Balkans, North Africa and the Middle East. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) offers neighbours the opportunity to strengthen and deepen political, economic, cultural and security cooperation with the EU. The ENP is a very ambitious policy and will assist countries to develop stable democracies, market economies and prosperity.

A first series of action plans, key political documents for the implementation of the ENP, was concluded in December 2004 with Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Israel, Ukraine and Moldova. In 2005, action plans for Israel, Jordan, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority and Tunisia entered into force. Next steps include completing work on Action Plans for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, Egypt and Lebanon and the preparation of an ENP country report on Algeria.

The implementation of ENP action plans will lead to further integration with European structures, but it will take time and it is up to the countries to decide how hard they will work to implement solid reforms and thereby strengthen the cooperation with the EU.

Russia is not part of the ENP, but the strategic partnership between EU

and Russia was strengthened in 2005. At the summit in May, agreement was reached on road maps for further development of the EU-Russia relationship ('Four Common Spaces'). Implementation of the road maps is a process, which will lead to a high degree of practical integration between Russia and the EU. The common spaces are in line with President Putin's 'European choice', which implies, that a prosperous and democratic Russia is most easily reached through close cooperation with the EU, Russia's closest and most stable partner. At the same time Denmark is actively promoting closer bilateral relations with Russia and 2005 was marked by constructive political consultations (i.a. in relation to the work in the UN Security Council) as well as positive developments in the commercial relations.

For the Western Balkans the decision was taken in 2005 to launch negotiations on the future status of Kosovo. This was an important step for Kosovo's development and a key element in ensuring continued peace and stability in the region. Martti Ahtisaari was appointed by the UN Secretary General to lead these negotiations on behalf of the international community.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

The European Union has an obligation and a clear interest in playing an important role when dealing with global challenges – the settlement of conflict, the fight against poverty in the world's poorest countries, the struggle against violation of human rights, terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, etc.

The Constitutional Treaty had set the scene for the creation of an EU Minister of Foreign Affairs and a common Foreign Service. These instruments were meant to create greater coherence and impact in the external engagements of the EU. There are still amble challenges we have to face without the institutional framework envisaged in the Constitutional Treaty.

Besides the strategic partnerships with the United States and Russia, the broad strategic partnerships of the EU with both India and China were developing in 2005 due to the increasing importance of these two countries in the globalized world. The EU's relationship with Africa and the development challenges of the continent were also pivotal, as the new Africa Strategy bore witness to.

2005 was another landmark year for the European Security and Defence

Policy (ESDP). The EU is now undertaking a wide range of civilian and military missions on three continents and with tasks ranging from peacekeeping and -monitoring to border control and assistance in military, police and rule of law sectors.

The efforts to improve the capacity of the EU to help and react will be further developed. During 2005, the EU reached agreement on a concept for a comprehensive approach to preventive engagement and crisis management. Integrated and rapidly deployable missions are the ambition. All elements within the EU toolbox have to be applied. The ability of the EU to coordinate civilian and military instruments and thereby maximise the effect of engagement is unique. Cooperation with the US and EU-NATO cooperation is, however, essential for the success of our engagement.

In 2005, the EU delivered substantial results in several areas of foreign policy. The work aimed at creating greater cohesion and greater impact of the EU in foreign policy matters will continue in 2006. The challenge remains the achievement of concrete results in order to fulfil the wish of the citizens of the EU and the rest of the world for a more committed EU on the international scene.

CHALLENGES IN 2006 AND BEYOND

The crisis that developed in the aftermath of the drawings of the Prophet Mohammed will continue to dominate Danish foreign policy in 2006 and beyond – both in our bilateral and multilateral work. The crisis illustrated that many policy issues are interlinked and shaped by both domestic as well as international developments, and thus require a more holistic approach. This is also a challenge to diplomacy in a globalized world.

In my mind, the process of globalization will shape diplomacy in the 21st century more than any other force. Transnational networks penetrate the national state, as we have known it since its birth after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The public debate on globalization has until now mostly focused on economic globalization. But globalization also entails political as well as economic consequences. This will affect diplomacy. We witness a paradigmatic change of international politics, the result of which we are only beginning to grasp.

The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has therefore launched an analysis on this subject, which includes all fields of our work: Consular services, export promotion, development assistance, foreign and security policy and public diplomacy. This analysis will contribute to preparing our service for tomorrow's diplomacy, ensuring that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will remain a central tool for Denmark's active engagement with the world in the 21st century

The cartoon issue has clearly illustrated that it is no longer enough to address the concerns of foreign governments and international organisations. Civil society, special interests, religious groups, media etc. are becoming important political players. This has raised the importance of public diplomacy – that is getting the message out to the general public, not just foreign governments.

The increased importance of public diplomacy is only one example of a relatively new area we are going to prioritise in our work. In the future, the Danish Foreign Ministry will need to develop our toolbox even further in order to handle a much more complex international reality in the best possible way. A major challenge in 2006 will be to follow up on our Globalization analysis, which will enable us to do just that.

The 'Big Other' and the 'Small Other': Discursive Asymmetries and Cleavages in Russian-Danish Relations

Andrey S. Makarychev[1]

INTRODUCTION

At first sight, Denmark and Russia seem to represent two drastically different patterns of socio-political and cultural development. In constitutional terms, Russia is a presidential republic, while Denmark is a parliamentary monarchy. Economically, Denmark is one of the richest countries in the world, leaving Russia far behind in per capita income and other important indicators of well-being. Seen from the perspectives of 'good governance', Denmark is, according to yearly Transparency International reports, one of the least corrupt countries in the world, in sharp contrast to Russia's position at the opposite end of the rating list. In social terms, Denmark is one of the world's leaders in fostering gender equality, while Russia still has a lot to do to achieve international standards in this regard.

These and other gaps in domestic arrangements are translated into the spheres of foreign policy and international roles. Denmark seems optimistically to believe that the post-Cold War international environment increasingly offers more promising perspectives for a country which considers itself to be 'in a much better position to pursue foreign policy priorities'.[2] Developments in the 1990s were perceived overwhelmingly in Denmark as 'a historical healing process',[3] that is, a return from the era of Cold War conflict to a situation of cooperation. Russia, by contrast, is much more embed-

1. Andrey S. Makarychev is Professor of International Relations at Nizhny Novgorod Linguistic University.
2. Speech by former Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs Niels Helveg Petersen, 'Small States can make a difference: Denmark in Europe', delivered at Beijing Foreign Affairs College, China, 10 November 1999, in Heurlin and Mouritzen, 2000: 203.

ded in a realist understanding of world politics, with its implications of continuing rivalries between great powers based upon hard security arguments. Within this conceptual framework, Russia is widely believed to be disadvantaged and doomed to losing one battle after another.

The foreign policy machineries of the two countries are also structured differently. While Russia conducts its diplomacy exclusively by means of the state apparatus, a considerable share (about 15 pct.) of Denmark's international assistance is channelled through Danish non-governmental organizations.[4] Russia, lacking its own state-supported yet organizationally autonomous NGOs working in the sphere of international relations, is sometimes unable to find proper interlocutors for Danish NGOs developing their projects in Russia, which again leads to gaps in communication.

The contrasts between the two countries seem to leave no space for any meaningful collations, juxtapositions or parallels involving both of them. Yet even though Denmark and Russia may appear to give few reasons for feasible comparisons, what could and should be compared are the discourses grounded in each of these two countries' perceptions of major issues in world politics. This is basically the topic of this article, in which I argue that the asymmetries in the two countries' perceptions of each other are instrumental in making Russia the 'Big Other' for Denmark, while Denmark itself has turned into the 'Small Other' for Russia.

Certainly Germany used to be the 'Big Other' for Denmark; however, in this article I use this metaphor not in a geopolitical sense (and, accordingly, I do not reduce it to the question of how a big power is perceived by its much smaller neighbours), but rather in terms pertinent to social constructivism. Therefore, in applying the 'Big Other' notion in this article, I am highlighting the fact that Russia represents a country whose political argumentation and motivation contrast drastically with those that are pertinent to Denmark. By developing different attitudes to the most pressing international challenges, these two countries tend to use each other as legitimate discursive opponents, as showcases of something which is different-

3. Speech by former Danish Minister of Defence Hans Hækkerup, 'Defence Policy Report', delivered on behalf of the Nordic College of Defence Ministers at the 51st session of the Nordic Council, Stockholm, 10 November 1999, in Heurlin and Mouritzen, 2000: 204.

4. Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003a.

ly structured and/or articulated, if not inappropriate, inadequate or dubious.

For the purpose of my analysis, I have chosen two subject areas that appear to be most illustrative of the state of the Danish–Russian discursive inter-subjectivity. One is the self-positioning of each of these two countries in Europe, while the other is the different reactions to security threats. In a way, the two areas are asymmetric. The first points basically to reflections on changing political geography and does not involve a direct polemic between the two parties. What constitutes an object of comparison here is conflicting conceptualisations of Europe's political space as seen from the perspectives of marginality and centrality. The second issue, which is related to security in general and terrorism in particular, is constituted by means of a direct controversy between the two governments, each of which sticks to a particular set of approaches.

In the course of my analysis, I shall try to demonstrate that, while frequently using the same words, Danish and Russian decision-makers infuse different meanings in them. I also intend to show that mutual 'othering' has its limitations and should definitely not be taken in absolute terms. Different modalities of 'othering' leave much space for maintaining the dialogue between the two governments and peoples.

EXPLOITING RESOURCES OF MARGINALITY AND CENTRALITY IN EUROPE

Perhaps the most visible difference between the international discourses of these two countries is rooted in geography: territorially, Russia is the largest country, with strong ambitions to be one of few worldwide poles of gravitation; Denmark, on the other hand, is a small country very much inclined to ensure its security by making alliances with larger nations.

At first glance, both countries seem to share some basic ideas about what is Europe. The Danish Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, referred to the 'New Europe' as a concept that was applicable to the whole continent.[5] He stressed that 'we have left the old Europe behind us. We are in the

5. *The Washington Times,* 28 April 2004.

process of creating the new Europe, our Europe, one Europe'.[6] According to its hosts' interpretation, the Copenhagen 2002 summit of the European Union has 'firmly closed the door on the Europe of the Yalta Conference and the Cold War, the Europe of the past'.[7] A 'new Europe of the 21st Century' is to be 'characterized by freedom, peace, growth and prosperity',[8] in which capacity it might serve as 'a model for other regions'.[9] Thus, 'the New Europe' has clear connotations of the idea of an 'open Europe', that is, one uniting east and west, which is perfectly in line with the 'Charter for a New Europe' signed in Paris in November 1990.

The meaning attributed to the notion of the supposed 'New Europe' by Danish commentators and policy analysts seems to contrast to some extent with the American one, as exemplified by statements of Donald Rumsfeld's. These differences are partly reflected in Per Stig Møller's ironical highlighting of the fact that 'from a U.S. perspective, Europe may be the 'old world': sedate, inert, and tied down by century-long traditions'.[10] This statement reveals the various uses of the phrases 'new' and 'old Europe': in the Danish context they are connected with the new openings and new benefits available to the whole continent, while the American discourse is more divisive in the sense that it is grounded in demarcating the 'progressive' (and simultaneously pro-U.S.) part of Europe from what is claimed to be an 'old-fashioned' group of nations unwilling to commit itself fully to U.S.-led principles of building security.

Indeed, the Danish interpretation appears to be very close to the dominant Russian self-understanding in a wider European 'concert'. It is exactly this reading that most Russian policy-makers are striving to support and promote. Most Russian analysts tend to attribute the concept of the 'New

6. Speech by Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 'Europe after the Enlargement', delivered at the College of Europe, Poland, 28 February 2003, in Carlsen and Mouritzen, 2004: 150

7. Ibid.: 151.

8. Speech by Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 'The Danish EU Presidency and the Enlargement Deal', delivered at the Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, 24 March 2003, in Carlsen and Mouritzen, 2004: 165.

9. Article by Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs Per Stig Møller, 'European Foreign Policy in the Making', first published in *The Brown Journal of World Affairs,* vol. 9, no. 2, 2003, in Carlsen and Mouritzen, 2004: 182.

10. Ibid.: 179.

Europe' to the whole continent. The 'New Europe' is therefore frequently viewed as a joint EU–Russian project, pointing to Russian ambitions as a 'New European' actor. It comes as no surprise to find Russia choosing to equate the 'New Europe' idea with the 'Wider Europe' philosophy rather than with the geographical area covering basically the former socialist countries. This re-signification ought to mean that the 'Old Europe' is now considered irrelevant, and is to be left aside. In this interpretative version, the 'Old Europe' is attributed to the past, in which sense it is doomed to be discursively deconstructed.

Within this shared understanding, it may be assumed that the 'New Europe' will have several important new actors outside the EU, like Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, which opens up perspectives of both integration and polarization. Henceforward, the basic challenge for the 'New Europe' is not any longer to keep integrating similar countries, but to start thinking how to accommodate differences. It is this point that explains the Danish understanding of what is Europe and what is Denmark's role in it.

One vision is related to Denmark's alleged ability to play the role of a foreign policy actor *on the margins*. Within the framework of mobilizing its 'marginality resource', Denmark may – as certain other countries that are geopolitically non-centrally[11] located – echo those practices that it considers appropriate and useful, and henceforward follow the leadership of the others. In particular, it is sometimes said that Danish international conduct 'simply mirrors US policy'.[12] This perspective, by and large, corresponds to a rather traditional line of conduct by non-central actors who are supposedly destined merely to reflect and reproduce the policies of those powers that are considered to centres or cores.

However, in its different version the 'marginality approach' may be more in line with the ideas ascribing to non-central actors' special resources of their own that can be used to re-activate their foreign policies. Indeed, the mere fact of simultaneously belonging to the Baltic, Nordic and Western 'Europes' gives a meaningful advantage to Denmark in its foreign policy endeavours. In Noel Parker's comment, the Danish choices:

11. In this context, by 'central' I actually mean close to the Euro-Atlantic power pole, cf. Mouritzen and Wivel, 2005: 175, 178.
12. Jakobsen, 2000: 68.

> concern how to move from being a marginal sovereign state purporting to defend itself, to being a nation participating in shared power and obtaining its defence 'indirectly' while looking for the optimum Nordic posture within Europe ... Denmark's various adaptations can be seen as attempts ... to exploit the potential of [her] situation by exercising leverage over the centres of Europe in return for being co-operative at the margin.[13]

Yet an alternative strategy seems possible, one of negating the potential for 'marginal solutions' and, instead, joining 'the core group of countries ... that devise a strategy ... promoting change in Belarus, anchoring Ukraine and, last but certainly not least, the development of a new and updated approach to Russia'.[14] In an official Danish document, one may find clear statements that the country 'must once and for all cast aside the complexes of a small nation' and 'assume the role of initiator' of policy innovations in Eastern Europe, indeed, acting 'as the driving force behind this process'. In other words, 'we have swapped a position as a frontline state in the conflict between the East and the West for a position at the heart of a new cooperative Europe'.[15] As one scholar puts it, 'Denmark has changed from being a 'reluctant ally"[16] to being an active participant in the international scene. This turn in Danish foreign policy at the outset was very much her own initiative, while major EU states were either staying aloof or remained neutral.

This explains why it was Denmark that stood behind the attempts to rearticulate the kernel of the foreign policies of the Baltic States and offer useful guidance to the three republics in a wider Europe. The 'Caucasian turn' suggested by Per Carlsen and other top Danish diplomats for Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia could be called a policy of 'going South',[17] thus extending both the EU's and NATO's spheres of influence.

No less notorious has been the role of the Danish suggestions in redefining the mission of the Visegrad group. There is a strong opinion in Danish

13. Parker, 2000: 52, 55.
14. Asmus, 2004: 43.
15. Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003b.
16. Pilegaard, 2004: 35.
17. Carlsen, 2002: 3.

political circles that the Visegrad 4 are capable of bringing a 'new focus to the area covered by the New Neighbours Policy' by 'creating more democratic and stable regimes',[18] an allusion to Ukraine and Belarus.

These two examples of Danish activism in the Baltic – the Caucasus direction and in the two Slavic countries mentioned above – demonstrate that Denmark is bound to redefine its relations with Russia, a country which expresses a great deal of sensitivity as far as her 'near abroad' is concerned. By the same token, it should be noted that, despite the 'open Europe' vocabulary, the Danish vision contains some strong elements of distancing and separation from what might be considered 'non-Europe', apparently confirming Chantal Mouffe's thesis that 'consensus without exclusion is eradication of the political'.[19] In other words, in order to remain a political actor, Denmark might need the 'Big Other', a subject position which is radically different from her European articulations and therefore has to be kept at a distance. A good indication of these exclusionary articulations can be found in an attempt to equate belonging to 'one Europe' with an expression of support for continuing the enlargement process. The very assumption that 'the whole Europe benefits greatly from'[20] the EU enlargement obviously represents a challenge to pro-European sentiments in Russia, which has repeatedly expressed her reservations and concerns about the admission of former socialist countries into the EU (though Russian reluctance has been much more focused on NATO).

What is interesting is that to exclude Russia is one of the strongest means of recognizing her subjectivity. It is within this context that one must understand Russia's 'special status', which she is always trying to win for herself in her relations with the EU. Without causing noticeable conceptual problems for herself, Denmark has accepted the specificity of Russia, which has to be dealt with individually. Yet, somewhat ironically, Russia herself, it seems, failed to understand that this acceptance has many uses and that it might be turned in different directions, including ones that are highly uncomfortable for Moscow. For example, Russia might be treated as a coun-

18. Rasmussen, 2005: 18.

19. Mouffe, 2000: 126.

20. 'Continued EU Enlargement', website of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Online: [http://www.um.dk/en/menu/EU/EusContinuedEnlargement/] (accessed 06-04-06).

try of 'special concern' in terms of the risks of terrorists obtaining radiological materials from her.[21]

Yet what is most important is the fact that Russia perceives herself as being not on the periphery of the EU-led integration exercise, but as another core, and what is more a self-sufficient one that is capable of conducting a foreign policy of its own.[22] This world-view is a good match for the 'Europe of Two Empires' concept, developed by Michael Emerson, Alexander Rahr and some other experts.[23] Russian officials seem to share the basic assumptions of this approach, claiming, for example, that 'the great powers rarely join others' unions, but tend to form alliances of their own' to safeguard freedom and autonomy.[24] The 'imperial' version of Russian international subjectivity has spread even among the right-wing and/or pro-Western groups within elites, as evidenced by the 'liberal empire' slogan coined by Anatoly Chubais in 2003.

Even the most liberal Russian authors treat the EU's policies towards their country and, in particular, its north-west as a 'systemic challenge' aimed at 'dislodging Russia via arbitrary inclusion of its regions into transnational regions, as well as transportation and information flows that are to be subordinated to foreign countries'.[25] Not surprisingly, it is widely believed in Russia that:

> the state entity, with its centres located in Strasbourg and Brussels, is not a hotbed for those living in Kiev or Moscow, even if they think of themselves as Europeans.... In the Euro-East, Russia is acting as an initiator of new forms of European unity, and definitely is not a hindrance to it. Ultimately, Russia is in possession of a concept of Europe of its own, a wider one in comparison to what Brussels can offer. This gives us the right to pedantically object to the restrictions advocated by Brussels.[26]

21. Dalgaard-Nielsen, Friborg and Jakobsen, 2005: 4.
22. Vlasova, 2004.
23. Dura, 2004.
24. Ivanov, 2001.
25. Piotr Schedrovitskii, 'V uzlakh transportnoi seti' ('Knotted by transportation network'), website of *Future Design,* Online: [http://future-design.ru/index.cfm?id=6&materal=196].
26. 'Rossiya vsio eschio ischet svoiu rol' v mire' (Russia is still in search of its worldwide role), *Nezavisimaya gazeta,* 31 May 2004.

As a gesture of symbolic retaliation, the theme of the possible dismantling of the EU is not infrequently debated among Russian experts:

> Ultimately it is in Russia's interest to let the ambitious European monster, though it is rather elementary in its intrinsic foundations (in comparison to Japan and the USA), get trapped in unresolvable conflicts across Russia's periphery. As a compensation for temporary victims in Georgia and Moldova, Russia must reward herself in Lithuania and Poland.[27]

This statement is highly unacceptable, one may assume, to countries like Denmark.

Russia's lack of opportunities to be accepted into the EU on the one hand, and her fear of finding herself on the outskirts of Europe on the other, almost inevitably pushes Russian discourse into contrasting the EU as a supra- or post-national entity with Russia as a nation state. In the Russian understanding, being a nation state brings with it a greater ability to act autonomously in the international arena. This logic is also discernible in the assumption of Mikhail Remizov, an influential conservative writer, that 'Russia can be either an integral component of Europe, or a 'great power', but not both simultaneously'.[28] This is a sort of exceptionality, deeply rooted in Russian political traditions, which constitutes the background for a collision with the Danish interpretations of security that will be examined further below.

In concluding this section, I would like to stress that the roots of Danish foreign-policy activism must be sought in the fact that the beginning of the 21st century has challenged some of the country's most important foreign-policy dispositions. There is certainly much less space for its activity in the Baltic Sea region after Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were successfully admitted to both the EU and NATO. Under Putin's presidency, Russia has become much less vulnerable to outside pressures and less susceptible to all kinds of foreign impacts. Of course, new priorities for the EU were identified, includ-

27. Sergey Pereslegin, 'Zapadniy front: ne-strategia dlia ne-voiny' ('The Western flank: a non-strategy of non-war'), website of *Future Design,* Online: [http://future-design. ru/index. cfm?id=6&material=517] (accessed 06-04-06).

28. Remizov, 2005: 25.

ing Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, yet in this direction Poland, with its 'Eastern Dimension' idea – rather than any of the Nordic countries, including Denmark – seems to be in a much better position to become a key actor.

The problem is that Denmark's foreign-policy activism contains future potential conflicts with Russia, since the geographical priorities of the formers Neighbourhood Programme (the Baltic Sea region, Belarus, Moldova and the Caucasus) strikingly coincide with Russia's understanding of what are the spheres of her vital interests. It is highly probable that the Russian foreign-policy establishment will interpret the Danish agenda in these areas as containing strong elements of discomfort. In particular, the demands for the 'withdrawal of Russian military equipment' from Moldova and references to Chechnya in official documents of the Danish government[29] may serve as a proper illustration of this possibility and a reminder that Denmark has generally been 'the hawk' among the Nordic countries in relation to Russia, always making the sharpest statements.[30] There are already some indications that, in Russian foreign-policy thinking, Denmark is located in the same category of 'troublemakers' as Poland and the Baltic States, or the 'New Europe' in Rumsfeldian language. The construction of this type of 'New Europe' in the Russian discourse, which is marked by clear signs of negativity and criticism, only justifies Russia's leaning towards what is –again in Rumsfeldian terms – called 'Old Europe', which appears to be closer to Moscow's understanding of political loyalties and mutual responsibilities.

SECURITY: COMPETING VIEWS FROM MOSCOW AND COPENHAGEN

Until the US changed its mind, only Denmark and Iceland supported NATO membership for the Baltic countries. This is why Denmark, throughout the 1990s, acquired the reputation in Russia of a consistent frontrunner to

29. 'The Strategic Framework for the Neighbourhood Programme', edited 2004, website of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Online: [http://www.um.dk/en/menu/DevelopmentPolicy/DanishDevelopmentPolicyCountries/TheNeighbourhoodProgramme/StrategicFrameworkForTheNeighbourhoodProgramme.htm] (accessed 06-04-06).

30. Cf. Mouritzen, 1998: 64-79 or Mouritzen and Wivel, 2005: 175, 178.

bring Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia into NATO, which was perceived as an encroachment upon Russian security interests. What was unfortunately missing in the Russian discourse is the attempt to understand and somehow reinterpret the key factors explaining the security motivations of Danish policy towards the Baltic States. Two of them seem to be of particular salience. The first is that Denmark's military assistance to the Baltic States, including personnel training, is in full compliance with the UN's peace-keeping policy. Secondly, the Danish policy contains a good deal of self-interest, which was well articulated by Denmark's then Minister of Defense, who stated, for example, that the Latvian platoon had been trained ready for deployment in Croatia, which 'eventually led to the withdrawal of the Danish battalion'.[31] Neither of these two arguments, one may assume, is pointed specifically against Russia, at least in Danish eyes.

Yet the most striking gap between the Russian and Danish approaches to security issues relates to the challenges of terrorism. There are a number of deep cleavages between the Danish and the Russian anti-terrorist discourses.

First, according to the Danish reading, which is widely shared in both policy-making circles and society in general, the phenomenon of terrorism must be closely associated with the protection of 'the core values that are the foundation of free, open and democratic societies ... We should never allow terror to close our open societies ... The fight against terrorism must take place within the realm of the rule of law – not at the cost of it'.[32] Danish officials tend to link terrorism with 'fundamentalist religious groups who feel threatened by pluralist systems of thought'.[33] In other words, it is democratic governance that, first, constitutes the primordial challenge to terrorists, and secondly, therefore, has to be sustained by all possible means as the most effective instrument against all kind of intruders and transgressors.

31. Hækkerup, 1997: 24.
32. Speech by Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs Per Stig Møller, 'The Need for a Strong Global Role for the EU', delivered at the conference on 'Global Challenges to the EU', Copenhagen, 23 March 2004. Online:[http://www.um.dk/da/menu/EU/ DanmarkIEU/ Taler/TheNeedforaStrongGlobalRolefortheEU.htm] (accessed 06-04-06).
33. Article by Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs Per Stig Møller, 'European Foreign Policy in the Making', in Carlsen and Mouritzen, 2004: 184.

This way of reasoning is important, since it offers a conceptual alternative to a different pattern of anti-terrorist policy, namely the argument that pluralism in politics is not an asset but rather the weakest point in what is termed a 'global war against terror'. Obviously, in its most radical versions, this type of anti-terrorist discourse, which equates democracy with vulnerability, may justify rolling back political freedoms in countries affected by terrorism. Slavoj Zizek, Giorgio Agamben and Antonio Negri – to mention just a few of those who have lambasted this approach as inherently anti-democratic – usually ascribe it to American political leaders. Yet the truth is that Russia represents an even better case, more than the USA, of practically implementing the policy of sacrificing democratic arrangements for the sake of stronger, yet less democratic leadership.

In this respect, the Russian anti-terrorist discourse seems to contrast with the Danish one. Instead of focusing on the perspectives of preserving and maintaining the achievements of democracy, it is grounded in cementing President Putin's strategy of 'strengthening the vertical of power', including the cancellation of popular gubernatorial elections starting in 2005, the unification of electoral procedures in the regions, etc. 'If you ask me if it is possible to win the war against terror by war – my answer is no.'[34] This phrase of Per Stig Møller's could have been seen as criticism of the way Russia is tackling the issue of pandemic terror in the Caucasus. However, it could also be an indication of mild Danish disagreement with the U.S.-led 'war against terrorism' in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan.

Secondly, Danish official discourse and public opinion tend to link the roots of terrorism with issues of underdevelopment and bad governance. Therefore, according to this logic, in order to combat the causes of terrorism, the rich countries (including Denmark) are supposed to address the issues of supporting democracy, access to education, rule of law and human rights advocacy, including the improvement of women's rights. In this light, Danish foreign policy is keen to 'support the regions of the world left behind

34. Speech by Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs Per Stig Møller at the Conference on 'Development Assistance as an Instrument in the Prevention of Terrorism', Copenhagen, 4 September 2003, in Carlsen and Mouritzen, 2004: 217.

in the globalization'.[35] In its policy of development assistance, Denmark is rightly trying to capitalize on its non-colonial heritage, a strong card in dealing with developing countries. In this connection, the Danish commitments to countries that are considered potential hotbeds of terrorist activity include support for civil society, freedom of press and anti-corruption strategies – all of which are practically missing in the Russian way of reacting to the challenges of terrorism. Russia not only underestimates the importance of the linkage between terrorism and underdevelopment; what is more deplorable, it considers all talk about bad governance as an excuse for interfering in what are considered the internal affairs of sovereign nations.

Thirdly, in combating terrorism, Denmark tends to rely on a policy of 'active internationalism'. Denmark is therefore committed to framing her anti-terrorism strategy in global terms. 'In a globalized world, national interest is often not served best by national action,[36] but by international action', a statement which leads Danish diplomacy to acknowledge the 'global responsibility of the EU' and the importance of organizations like the WTO in both fostering transatlantic cooperation and addressing development issues. Russia, on the contrary, keep believing in the possibilities of unilateral actions against countries assisting terrorist networks, of which Georgia might prove one example.

Fourthly, the geographical priorities of the anti-terrorist strategies of these two countries appear to be different. Denmark emphasises the importance of the Mediterranean and the Middle East in preventing the spread of terrorism, while Russia's attention is overwhelmingly concentrated on Chechnya and the Caucasus.

Within this context, it must be noted that Denmark has always displayed sensitivity towards Russia's war in Chechnya. For example, for a period in 1995, Denmark suspended her bilateral cooperation programme with Russia for this reason.[37] The argument was that 'Danes are very anti-central-

35. Speech by Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs Per Stig Møller, 'The Need for a Strong Global Role for the EU', delivered at the conference on 'Global Challenges to the EU', Copenhagen, 23 March 2004. Online:[http://www.um.dk/da/menu/EU/DanmarkIEU/Taler/TheNeedforaStrongGlobalRolefortheEU.htm] (accessed 06-04-06).

36. Ibid.

37. Hækkerup, 1997: 22.

istic and in general find it hard to accept that people and minorities must fight over several generations for freedom and self-government without result'.[38]

This sort of tug-of-war between the two countries has revealed substantial differences between the Danish and Russian interpretations of terrorism. It might be assumed that while for Russia terrorism is rather an intrinsic problem closely associated with separatism and national integrity, for Denmark it represents a 'radical outsider'. Yet much more meaningful is the clash between the *political* and *technical* approaches identifiable in the Russian and Danish ways of dealing with terrorism respectively. The logic of the political is one pointing to the ability to take decisions based on the sovereign will. The logic of the technical, for its part, is grounded in a search for a more or less neutral field of alleged objectivity able to reconcile ideological differences for the sake of managerial efficiency.

The Russian demand for political bargaining was repeatedly expressed in Moscow's ambitions to be treated *differently* (and not like all other neighbours) by the EU. An anti-terrorist partnership, in the Russian interpretation, must involve a special type of *political* bargaining too. In this perspective, Denmark was expected to display greater compassion for Russian losses and grievances, and abstain from criticizing what is presumed to be Russia's own 'war against terror'.

It is this understanding of the political, which is grounded in the traditions of Carl Schmitt[39], which Russia had in mind when appealing to the 'political' background of the Danish authorities' non-decision concerning the convening of the Chechenian Congress in Copenhagen in 2002. Russia was trying, though hardly with success, to refer explicitly to the Danish authorities as an alleged locus of decision-making, including the power to decide *exceptions* from the legal rules regulating public meetings of this sort.

The Danish position was based in a distinction between the *political* and the *private,* since it was argued that the Congress in question was being convened and sponsored by a private institution. According to the Danish offi-

38. Lyck, 1992: 241.

39. I refer to Carl Schmitt as a political thinker whose ideas were based on equating the concept of the Political with sovereign's will and ability to take independently decisions unconstrained by existing legal rules.

cial reaction to the Russian criticism of the holding of the Congress in Copenhagen, it is not the prime minister who runs the country, but the law. However, the Danish references to the legal obstacles that prevented them from banning the Congress were interpreted in Russia not as a legal hindrance, but rather as 'political' manoeuvring.

Against this background, it becomes even more understandable that the attempts by the Danish Committee for Chechnya to make the Danish authorities arrest the former Russian Interior Minister, Anatoly Kulikov, during his visit to Copenhagen in March 2005 were met in Moscow with a great deal of irritation. This incident was portrayed by the Russian media as an indication of Ahmed Zakayev's tactics of using Denmark as a pilot country to start a campaign of legal suits against top Russian military officers who had been involved in the military campaign in Chechnya.[40]

In a political response to the lack of reaction from the Danish side, Russia ventured to treat Denmark 'in a special way'. This *specificity* had two dimensions. On the one hand, Danish companies with business interests in Russia were facing unusual restrictions artificially caused by Russian customs officials.[41] It must be noted that this 'policy of asymmetric retaliation' was met with a certain degree of scepticism by most Russian experts. Thus, the Moscow-based PSI Foundation has criticized the 'anti-Danish hysteria' as 'completely irrelevant and counter-productive'.[42]

On the other hand, officially Moscow has clearly demonstrated that it is not interested in elevating its disagreements with a particular European country to the level of Russia's relations with the entire EU.[43] This could be interpreted that Denmark, in Russian eyes, is a regrettable *exception,* if not deviation, within the EU.

There are a number of possible reasons for Russia's longing for political moves, yet the most important is that political approaches leave more room for a policy of 'give and take', compromises and political bargaining. Denmark, on the other hand, seems to be committed to a much more pro-

40. 'Daniya ne khochet arestovyvat Anatolia Kulikova' (Denmark does not wish to arrest Anatoly Kulikov), Nezavisimaya gazeta, 24 March 2005.

41. 'Danes Find Russian Trade Tricky', *St. Petersburg Times,* 823, 26 November 2002.

42. PSI, 2003.

43. *NEWSru.com,* 29 October 2002. Online: [http://www.newsru.com/russia/29oct2002/razryv.html] (accessed 06-04-06).

cedural, 'technical', administrative and de-politicized (that is, politically neutral) approach, which Russia tends to perceive as an abdication of responsibility.

In fact, the 2002 incident has focused public attention to the issues of whether anti-terrorist operations necessitate a deviation from democratic rules, and whether legal principles should be sacrificed for the sake of fighting terrorism? The divergence between the positions of the two countries was made manifest in Denmark's reluctance to exploit the issue of maintaining relations with the Chechenian émigré community within the framework of an anti-terrorist strategy.

Nonetheless there is a degree of compatibility between the two countries' anti-terrorist approaches. Thus, the Danish idea that 'we must change the developments which often drive young Muslims into religious and political extremism' sounds very close to the approach developed by Sergey Kirienko, former presidential representative in the Volga Federal District, which has traditionally had a strong Muslim community. Thus, according to Kirienko, the most effective way to counter radicalism is:

> in each and every head ... to apply traditional Islam instead of its radical versions ... Islam, like a liquid, takes the shape of the vessel it is poured into, that is to say, it is framed by local cultural traditions. According to this logic, indigenous forms of Islam are inevitable ... which is highly productive.[44]

One of Kirienko's policy advisors, Sergey Gradirovskii, promotes an idea of a 'Russian Islam', an Islam which has a flavour of Russianness but also complements Russian identity through its involvement in the Russian-speaking geo-cultural domain.[45] In other words, the 'Russian Islam' project is an attempt publicly to reformulate and 'digest' what otherwise might be perceived as a 'radical evil', thus corresponding entirely with the Danish approach to the integration of the Islamic community into local socio-cultural milieus.

44. Sergey Kirienko, 'Dialog tsivilizatsiy: istoricheskiy shans Rossii' ('Dialogue of civilizations as a historical chance for Russia'), website of *Future Design,* Online: [http://future-design.ru/index.cfm?id=6&material=57].

45. Sergey Gradirovskii, 'Vyzovy so storony novykh identichnostei' ('Challenges of New Identities'), 'Konstruirovanie buduschego', website of *Future Design.* Online: [http://future-design.ru/index.cfm?id=6&material=274].

To conclude this section, it must be admitted that both the Russian and the Danish approaches are controversial. For Denmark, the state of its bilateral relations with Russia has no bearing on the thrust of its anti-terrorist efforts being concentrated on participating in US-led coalitions. In other words, Denmark has expressed no intention to engage firmly with Russia in working on common anti-terrorist strategies.

Yet on a deeper level of enquiry, it appears that Denmark is intentionally refusing to speak with one voice in terrorism-related matters. It uses one type of language in dealing with Russia, and another, quite different vocabulary in communicating with its 'real partners'. Despite the Danish sympathies for what we called 'technical' solutions, the Danish interpretation of the Iraq war includes clear references to *'political will'*[46] as a condition of success in anti-terrorist campaigns. Danish officials also mention 'broad political agreement' and 'strong *political commitment*'[47] as factors favouring and shaping the Danish position towards enhancing the EU's international subjectivity. 'The *political will* among the Member States to reach a common EU policy as their number one objective' is considered essential.[48] By the same token, in the case of the Kosovo crisis, it was assumed that 'there are strong moral and *political arguments* for the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention without a Security Council mandate ...'[49] Thus, at least in Danish eyes, the political is basically understood in terms of leaders' 'ability to initiate and the ability to put a halt to conflict'.[50] Acting politically, for Denmark, is not so much related to taking sovereign decisions, but rather to adherence to a certain set of values grounded in liberal traditions of thought.

As far as Russia is concerned, two points must be noted. First, Russia's predisposition towards playing political cards appears to be highly selective. The most telling illustration of this is Russia's reluctance to accept the appeal by Chechnya's separatist leaders to start political negotiations with Russia. Russia, despite her leaning towards the political, is reluctant to

46. Petersen, 2004: 22.
47. Speech by Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 'The Danish EU Presidency and the Enlargement Deal', in Carlsen and Mouritzen, 2004: 167.
48. Article by Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs Per Stig Møller, 'European Foreign Policy in the Making', in Carlsen and Mouritzen, 2004: 187.
49. Petersen, 2000: 13, 17.
50. Rasch, 2000: 1.

attribute any degree of political subjectivity to the Chechenian 'resistance movement', preferring to criminalize and thus de-politicize it.

Secondly, the Danish inclination towards non-political approaches may fuel Russia's irritation in security matters, but it works much more smoothly in the area of Denmark's trans-border cooperation with Russia's north-west regions. Russia does accept technical solutions as soon as she feels that they may bring her additional resources. The Danish policy towards sub-national Russia is to some extent conceptually grounded in what the Deputy Permanent Secretary of State for Defense called a 'project approach',[51] which could be considered part of Denmark's de-securitization strategy, by and large accepted and even applauded in Russia. It could also be interpreted as a kind of 'issue discourse' that basically concentrates on a variety of practical matters related to the economy, institutions and managerial efficiency, rather than on much more inflammable matters of identity and values. The project discourse is, in a way, 'technical' because of its epistemological background – that is, it focuses on the understanding of specific instruments and mechanisms allowing for the transfer of the most successful patterns of management and governance from one part of Europe to another. This is a sort of 'project language' spoken by many EU-based foundations and governmental agencies when trying to 'avoid the politicization of economic and technical issues' and 'move away from grand political declarations' to establish an issue-based agenda in EU–Russian relations.[52]

CONCLUSIONS

One general conclusion of my analysis is that it may be assumed that the two key signifiers used to describe the state of the Danish–Russian discursive relations –those of Europe and security – may be differently articulated and loaded with different meanings. 'New Europe', 'Old Europe', 'terrorism' and other key notions embedded in the communicative field of Danish– Russian relations represent something like 'empty signifiers', to be filled out[53] by both parties.

51. Fischer, 2003: 10–14.
52. European Commission, 2004: 4, 6.
53. Zizek, 1996: 131.

Concomitantly, what could be presented as an unfriendly gesture aimed exceptionally against Russia (be it the Chechenian Congress convened in Copenhagen or the Danish foreign-policy activity in countries belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States) in fact constitutes a normal practice by the Danish government based on a particular set of well-established perceptions and approaches. This is exactly where the sources of misunderstanding come from, provoking, as a reaction to these discursive dislocations, multiple attempts to symbolize the differences and elevate them to a higher level of incompatibility.

The most meaningful constraining factor in bilateral relations is the security problematique, which is hindering the search for joint approaches and shared practices. The discursive gaps identified in the field of security are conducive to even deeper disagreements, as manifested in different interpretations of what is the political. Russia perceives an issue as being a political one as soon as it presupposes the will of the sovereign and an act of decision. For most Danish officials, 'the political' connotes a type of long-term strategy that emerged as an outcome of broad social discussions and value-ridden reflections.[54] In a sense, Denmark is committed, to a much larger extent than Russia, to the spirit of deliberative democracy, believing that continuous democratic debate 'represents the best guarantee that tougher security measures ... will be implemented without automatically resulting in permanent restrictions of civil rights ...'.[55]

This is why it is so important for the two countries to find a common language in their bilateral communications. Thus, the 'project approach' and the concomitant 'issue discourse' could in principle constitute a base for enhanced Danish–Russian dialogue on a number of practical points of mutual interest.

54. Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000: 10.
55. Dalgard-Nielsen, 2004: 12.

REFERENCES

Asmus, Ronald D. (2004), 'The Transatlantic Alliance at a New Crossroads: What Does it Mean for Denmark and Northern Europe', in Per Carlsen and Hans Mouritzen (eds.), *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2004,* Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies: 25-48.

Carlsen, Per (2002), *From the Baltic States to the Caucasus: Regional Cooperation after the Eblargements,* DUPI report, no. 8, Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs.

Carlsen, Per and Mouritzen, Hans (eds.) (2004), *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2004,* Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.

Dalgard-Nielsen, Anja (2004), *Civil Liberties and Counter-Terrorism: A European Point of View,* Washington D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations.

Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja, Selmer, Line F. and Jakobsen, Martin F. (2005), *Targeting Europe: The Threat from Dirty Bombs. Findings and Policy Recommendations,* Conference Report, DIIS and SGP (Strengthening the Global Partnership), Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.

Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2000), *Major issues in Danish NGO assistance. Civil Society in the South: Roles of the State and NGO's,* Copenhagen: Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danida. Online: [http://amg.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/87529F00-59DF-4794-8B0D-F08A37A53EAE/0/Papir17.rtf] (accessed 06-04-06).

Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003a), *A World of Difference: The Government's vision for New Priorities in Danish Development Assistance,* 2004-2008, Copenhagen: Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Online: [http://www.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/44C6C9FF-55FF-4661-AF8F-668172F16C7C/0/a_world_of_difference.pdf] (accessed 06-04-06).

Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003b), *A Changing world. The Government's Vision for New Priorities in Denmark's Foreign Policy,* Copenhagen: Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Online: [http://www.um.dk/Publikationer/UM/English/AChangingWorld/html/full_publication.htm] (accessed 06-04-06).

Dura, George (2004), *Presentation of the Wider Europe Matrix,* Centre for European Policy Studies. Online: [http://www.ceps.be/Article.php?article_id=297&] (accessed 06-04-06).

European Commission (2004), *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on relations with Russia,* Brussels: European Commission. Online: [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/russia_docs/com04_106_en.pdf] (accessed 06-04-06).

Fischer, Kristian (2003), 'Could Baltic Experiences be Applicable to the Countries of South Caucasus?', *Baltic Defense Review,* special issue.

Heurlin, Bertel and Mouritzen, Hans (eds.) (2000), *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2000,* Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.

Hækkerup, Hans (1997), 'From Adazi to Tuzla', in Rita Grönick et al. (eds.), *St. Petersburg, the Baltic Sea and European Security,* Helsinki: Nordic Forum for Security Policy.

Ivanov, Ivan (2001), 'Raschishiat' puti k zrelomu partniorstvu Rossii i Evrosoyuza' ('To clean up the roads to a mature EU–Russia partnership'), S*ovremennaya Evropa,* no. 2. Online: [http://www.ieras.ru/journal/journal2.2000/1.htm] (accessed 06-04-06).

Jakobsen, Peter V. (2000), 'Denmark at war: Turning Point or Business as Usual', in Bertel Heurlin and Hans Mouritzen (eds.), *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2000,* Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies: 61-86.

Lyck, Lise (1992), 'Denmark and the Maastricht agreement: perspectives for Denmark, EC and Europe', in Lise Lyck (ed.), *Denmark and EC Membership Evaluated,* London: Pinter Publishers and St. Martin's Press.

Mouffe, Chantal (2000), 'For an antagonistic model of democracy', in Noel O'Sullivan (ed.), *Political Theory in Transition,* London: Routledge.

Mouritzen, Hans (1998), *Theory and Reality of International Politics,* Aldershot: Ashgate.

Mouritzen, Hans and Wivel, Anders (2005), 'Comparative analysis meets theory', in Hans Mouritzen and Anders Wivel (eds.), *The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration,* London: Routledge: 167-207.

Parker, Noel (2000), 'Marginal Manouvres: Danish and British Postures in Europe', in Bertel Heurlin and Hans Mouritzen (eds.), Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2000, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies: 31-60.

Petersen, Friis A. (2000), 'The International Situation and Danish Foreign Policy 1999', in Bertel Heurlin and Hans Mouritzen (eds.), *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2000,* Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies: 11-30.

Petersen, Friis A. (2004), 'The International Situation and Danish Foreign Policy 2003', in Per Carlsen and Hans Mouritzen (eds.), *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2004,* Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies: 5-24.

Pilegaard, Jess (2004), 'The European Security and Defense Policy and the Development of a Security Strategy for Europe', in Jess Pilegaard (ed.), *The Politics of European Security,* Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies: 11-38.

PSI (2003), *Rosiya i mir: 2003 (Russia and the World: 2003),* analytical report. Online: [http://www.psifoundation.ru/publications/russia2002/page2-4.html] (accessed 06-04-06).

Rasch, William (2000), 'Conflict as a Vocation: Carl Schmitt and the Possibility of Politics', *Theory, Culture & Society,* vol. 17, no. 6: 1-32.

Rasmussen, Niels Aadal (2005), *The EU Enlargement Eastwards and the ESDP,* DIIS Report, no. 7, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.

Remizov, Mikhail (2005), 'Sud'ba rossiiskogo nasledstva' ('The Fate of the Russian Heritage'), in *Post-Sovetskii Soyuz: Model' dlia sborki* (Post-Soviet Union: a Model for Assembly), Moscow: Institute for National Strategy.

Slavoj Zizek (1996), *The Indivisible Remainder: An Essay on Schelling and Related Matters,* London: Verso.

Vlasova, Olga (2004), 'Pochemu nas razliubila Evropa' ('Why Europe has ceased to love us'), *Ekspert,* vol. 410, no. 7.

Social Defense and National Security: The Globalized Danish Welfare State

Eric S. Einhorn[1]

INTRODUCTION

One of the most striking aspects of Danish security policy over the past century has been the controversy surrounding it. Given the limited options typical of small states, however, why the protracted and often heated debates? Danish security, like that of most small states, has most frequently been threatened by external geopolitical and ideological factors quite beyond the range of Danish policy. Since the rise of Prussian and then united German power in the nineteenth century through the two world wars and other political tensions in the twentieth century, Denmark has been forced to react to the demands and actions of other powers. National security policy was primarily based on strenuous efforts to reassure neighbouring great powers that Denmark would seek to avoid any actions that would compromise their interests. This policy of adaptation and reassurance often worked: Denmark managed to co-exist with German militarism from 1864 until 1940. Although countries like France, Britain and Sweden could do no more than sympathize with Denmark's security situation, the latter's correct perception of its geopolitical position minimized the costs of its security weaknesses. This adaptive diplomacy was marked by a sober realism and an increasingly stable domestic social foundation. One might argue that creating a more prosperous and egalitarian society fulfilled the old nineteenth-century Danish political slogan, 'What is lost abroad can be won at home'.

In an age of globalization, where the distinction between domestic and

1. Eric S. Einhorn is Professor of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

foreign policy has become exceedingly narrow, concepts such as national security, defense, and social policy have become blurred. The Scandinavian states have understood for the past 75 years that security has both domestic and international dimensions. Upon this understanding a dynamic consensus has been built: good social policy that integrates all classes and social groups into the mainstream of society is a central element of national security. Concepts like 'social defense' or the Swedish term 'total defense' merge social and economic policies with the traditional aspects of military preparedness, diplomatic engagement, and international cooperation.[2]

The German occupation of Denmark during World War II shifted the consensus in favour of alliance with the western democratic powers led by the United States through the Atlantic Pact of 1949 and the developing NATO military framework. While NATO was debated regularly in Denmark up until the last years of the Cold War, the new arrangement consistently enjoyed public support. An important source of the post-war security policy consensus was that it coexisted with, and perhaps even supported the construction of, an ambitious and comprehensive welfare state. International security and domestic social security, along with unprecedented economic prosperity, characterized the second half of the twentieth century, quite the opposite of the first half.

Since the end of the Cold War in 1990, Danish security policy has adjusted to geopolitical change, while also adopting a higher international profile. Social Democratic and non-Socialist governments have both pursued a new activism in Europe and beyond. Although Danish military spending remains modest, Danish forces have participated in multilateral forces deployed in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan, as well as Iraq. This was an ambitious expansion on earlier deployments on a variety of UN peacekeeping missions. In relative terms, Denmark remains at or near the top of the list of generous donors of international development assistance. Other tables place the country among those that are most 'globalized' and hospitable to international investment.

Most striking has been the broad political consensus supporting most of these actions. Even the increasingly controversial Iraqi deployment generat-

2. Bengt Sundelius (Sundelius, 2001) discusses concisely the similarities and differences between 'total defense' and 'social defense'.

ed little debate during the February 2005 national elections. While Danish modesty precluded too overt a celebration of these achievements, the opening months of 2006 presented the country with one of its greatest diplomatic crises in more than half a century. The so-called 'cartoon crisis' was sparked by the publication of several cartoons with either satirical images of the Prophet Mohammed or Danish views of the country's militant Islamic residents in *Jyllands-Posten,* the country's largest paper, in late September 2005.[3] Thus fifteen years after the end of the Cold War, Danish security policy has become increasingly complex.

BACKGROUND

The conventional national security situation for the Nordic states improved dramatically with the end of the Cold War in 1990 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet bloc and indeed the Soviet Union itself. Not since the 1920s had the geopolitical position of the region been so favourable. Germany was again united but under a solid democratic regime committed to European cooperation and positive relations with the emerging central and Eastern European democracies. Russia's situation was less stable, but the Yeltsin government also seemed committed to democratic and constitutional norms, despite internal tumult and instability. The Baltic states relaunched themselves as independent democracies, but committed to European integration and close regional collaboration, not least with the Nordic states. Similar goals were apparent in the new regimes in Poland, the Czech Republic and elsewhere in the region. Only the situation in the Balkans, with the collapse of Yugoslavia into hostile and violent states (Slovenia excepted), clouded the European horizon.

Ironically this new era of security, cooperation, and integration was threatened by two domestic developments that challenge the Nordic states and their famous social policy 'model'. First, they all faced economic recessions, which were especially severe in Finland and Sweden (statistically worse than the 1930s). Secondly, the consequence of incoherent but generally liberal immigration and refugee policies had turned once ethnically

3. This bizarre and complex series of events is concisely described by Ulla Holm (Holm, 2006).

homogeneous societies into pluralistic and multiethnic ones. Both developments threatened the stability and sustainability of the political economies of these countries, which was based on a successful globalization of the economy and an ambitiously generous welfare state. In addition the 'European project', launched in 1950 with minimal Scandinavian participation until Denmark joined the European Economic Community in 1973, was entering a phase of new initiatives. The traditional military strategic perspective on national security was no longer adequate to the challenges facing Scandinavian (and other) social democratic welfare states. The distinctions between domestic and foreign policy and between security and social policy became blurred.

For more than twenty-five years, a recurring theme in the comparative study of policy and political economy has been the 'Welfare State Crisis'. Any database will reveal hundreds of studies on this theme by academics, governments, and international organizations.[4] Simultaneously, both the scientific and popular social-science literature has discussed 'globalization', which has been concisely defined by two leading scholars as 'a state of the world involving networks of interdependence at intercontinental distances linked through flows and influences of capital and goods, information and ideas, people and force, as well as environmentally and biologically relevant substances (such as acid rain or pathogens)'.[5] Increasingly these two themes overlap. Much of post-1945 economic and social policy in Western Europe, not least in Scandinavia, was based on a 'closed system'. Of course the Scandinavian countries had a long tradition of dependence on European and world trade, but few expected that the regulated trade of the 1920-1960 era would yield so quickly and significantly to the largely 'open' global trading and investment patterns of recent decades. Likewise, social policy focused on resuming the uneven progress of the pre-war social reforms that laid the foundations for a welfare state. These policies would return to the social and industrial 'questions', as agrarian societies gave way to industrialized and then post-industrial societies. The progress of the first three post-

4. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has been rather obsessed with this theme, at least since its 1980 Conference and subsequent 1981 publication, *The Welfare State in Crisis* (OECD, 1981). Twenty-five years later the 'crisis' remains, but so does the welfare state.

5. Keohane and Nye, 2000: 229.

war decades was halted by the economic, resource, and ideological turmoil of the 1970s, resulting in at least two decades of agonizing reforms that still confront most western countries.

While these pervasive economic and social changes occurred, security policy – the historic priority of protecting the state – remained focused for more than forty years on the issues of the Cold War. The intersection between national security and social policy was the usual 'guns versus butter' dilemma. The Nordic region, including Finland, pursued more 'active' national policies to promote national security without sharpening East-West tensions. Each Nordic country found its own solution, which in some cases was based on a strong national consensus for non-alignment, as in Sweden and Finland, while in others it revolved around recurring domestic debates on security policy based on alliance with other countries through NATO, as in the cases of Denmark, Iceland, and Norway. The concept of a 'Nordic Balance' emphasized the interdependence of regional security and encompassed policies (or at least explanations of policies) that sought to reduce 'East-West' tensions in the region.[6]

A third element that blurred the boundary between domestic and foreign policy was global integration (globalization) in general and European integration in particular. At least three perspectives emerged by 1960. Should small trading countries like Denmark continue to rely upon the more general move toward free trade as promoted by recurring rounds of tariff reductions under the GATT (General Agreement on Tariff and Trade) system, supplemented by traditional bilateral trade agreements (as with Great Britain)? Alternatively, should 'free trade zones' be developed regionally, as in the recurring Scandinavian and Nordic discussions between 1950 and 1970, and then by the emerging European Free Trade Association led by Great Britain after 1960?[7] Or should policy focus on the most ambitious project: the development of a European Economic Community based on the 1957 Treaty of Rome, with its open-ended goal of an 'ever closer union'?

Common initially to all of these weighty issues was the neat compart-

6. Brundtland, 1994: 6-11. Arne Olav Brundtland originally introduced the concept of the 'Nordic Balance' in Brundtland, 1966. Finland's postwar security relationship with the Soviet Union made non-alignment the only positive option.

7. Haskel, 1976, is still a useful analysis of early efforts at Nordic regional cooperation.

mentalization of economic, social, and security issues. That could not last. Social security, which was built on domestic prosperity, increasingly depended on the growth in trade and investment. National resources remained paramount, but the growth of global trade engendered a revival of global investment. The Cold War, with its recurring crises and growing nuclear threat, always shadowed ever better social programs. Who could enjoy the prospect of generous retirement pensions if nuclear war threatened and defense budgets impinged on other policy concerns?

This article looks at the impact of changing international security and political issues on the functioning and continuing development of an ambitious welfare state. The focus is primarily on Denmark, but most of the issues are shared by other countries with advanced welfare systems, especially in northwest Europe. The article cannot comprehensively review new thinking about either national social policy or national security policy, but some of the interesting connections between these areas will be discussed below.

SOCIAL POLICY: A COMPONENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

The interaction between domestic and foreign policy in general and social and security policy in particular is an old concern. It is at the heart of the 'guns versus butter' debate which every modern state engages in. Defense and national security vies with social policy (especially if the latter includes health and education policy) for first or second place in every national budget. War and military preparations have historically demanded a large portion of the economic resources of the state. Only in the past century or so has 'social policy' supplanted it as the state's largest fiscal commitment. The successful policy of alliance and deterrence represented by the 'containment' policies of the Cold War was special because it demanded substantial financial resources without actual combat operations (at least in the European context). 'Preparedness' was a key element of the successful containment strategy that protected Western Europe for forty years. Denmark was not alone in facing demands from its NATO allies to 'share the burdens' of continental defense. While Denmark signed the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949

in part to develop a credible defense policy, Danish governments were concerned that NATO obligations should not overburden national economic recovery, which was often slow and uneven in the 1950s and early 1960s. Denmark was among the most modest 'spenders' on defense, with NATO statistics rarely indicating expenditures above 2 pct. of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). As will be discussed below, there is no single measure of defense or social expenditure that captures all of its political dimensions. While 'material' (especially financial) data is relatively easy to obtain and even to compare over time and between countries, the non-material aspects, such as national morale, solidarity, commitment, etc. are rarely revealed in statistical yearbooks.

For more than fifty years, 'national security' has developed as an academic discipline sharing theories, history, and methodologies with broader fields such as political science and international relations. Amid many useful definitions, that of historian Charles Maier seems especially apt. He defined national security as 'the capacity to control those domestic and foreign conditions that the public opinion of a given community believes necessary to enjoy its own self-determination or autonomy, prosperity, and well-being'.[8] Like most definitions, this hardly takes account of the realities of globalization, that is, of the mutual dependence and interpenetration of states that Keohane and Nye identified more than thirty years ago. It is, of course, possible to trace the roots of the field back to the same classical authors, such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Kant, as in international politics. In addition, the study of national security has built upon the work of military thinkers such as von Clausewitz, Mahan, and Mackinder, some of whom also rose high in national military service and contributed some of the basic works and curricula to the national military colleges that arose in the nineteenth century.

Since World War II, international relations specialists and practitioners have recognized a growing body of theoretical and applied work in national security studies. In addition to university-based research, the rise of 'think tanks' like the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, the Brookings Institution in Washington, and numerous similar institutes have

8. Cited in Romm, 1993: 6.

brought together politicians, academics, military officers, and even journalists for the sober analysis of national security issues. Moreover, international organizations such as NATO and the OECD have supported 'qualitative' as well as quantitative research into the social and political aspects of national security.

Recent theoretical and empirical research on the evolving components of national and international security has focused on the interplay between social (or human) security and the traditional military defense aspects of security policy. Especially since the 1994 *Human Development Report* of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), attention has focused on a broader definition of human security. The UNDP's annual *Human Development Index* covers nearly 200 countries. As with any 'ranking' it is possible to quibble over narrow differences between countries, but the components of the index supplement the handy but limited GDP/per capita league tables. Moreover the UNDP makes frequent reference to the 1945 statement at the founding of the UN in San Francisco by the then U.S. Secretary of State Edward Stettinius that peace requires both 'freedom from fear' (military security) and 'freedom from want' (economic and social security).[9] The UNDP has identified seven main dimensions to 'human security': economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security.[10] Interestingly each of these concerns has domestic and transnational elements that make them especially appropriate for an era of globalization and regional integration.

Academics have further developed the concept of 'securitization' as a pole along a continuum ranging from 'nonpoliticization' (private) to politicization (active governmental role) to 'securitization', where an issue is seen 'as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure'.[11] This reflects the historic position of 'security policy' as the core (existential) interest of the state. Broader views of 'human security' or 'societal security' push security policy back toward the larger 'public policy' agenda of modern states: it is no longer 'special'. Moreover, the concept of 'social defense' acquired a second

9. Cited *inter alia* in UNDP, 1994: 24.
10. Ibid.: 24-5.
11. Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998: 23-4.

meaning in the alternative defense and security debates after 1980. Scholars like Gene Sharp and Brian Martin developed a 'neo-Gandhian' version of non-violent defense involving various strategies to resist invasion or occupation. These measures have rarely been put to the test, but they share with earlier concepts of 'social defense' an emphasis on social solidarity and collective action.[12]

While this may distract attention from core security issues, it is often a more realistic setting for contemporary security policy concerns. Just as military forces can no longer focus on 'offensive' or 'defensive' strategies and tactics but must prepare for 'low-intensity conflicts,' protracted anti-terrorist campaigns, and peacekeeping operations, governments must accept a broader security policy agenda. This is not entirely new. World War II put civilians very much at the 'front' of total war, requiring economic, social, and public health concerns to be made part of civilian defense policies. Even in the United States, which was generally spared direct attacks on its civilian population, Eleanor Roosevelt, President Roosevelt's activist wife, worked directly with the Office of Civil Defense to include social, medical, nutritional, and educational programs in that rapidly expanding agency. Unfortunately military priorities and the effectiveness of anti-New Deal activists succeeded in limiting these broader initiatives,[13] but other wartime agencies made civilian security and morale part of their agenda.

The European Union and its direct predecessors have always had two main goals: economic prosperity and socio-political stability. Since the Treaty on Economic Union (Maastricht) in 1992, these tasks have been elaborated and enhanced by institutional and procedural changes to the EU structure and by EU enlargement. Social policy is not yet a direct responsibility of the EU, but since the Lisbon European Council meeting in March

12. Martin, 1993. Brian Martin's definition is as follows: 'Social defence is nonviolent community resistance to aggression as an alternative to military defence. It is based on widespread protest, persuasion, noncooperation and intervention in order to oppose military aggression or political repression. It uses methods such as boycotts, acts of disobedience, strikes, demonstrations and setting up alternative institutions' (Martin, 1993: 4). See also Sharp, 1985.

13. Eleanor Roosevelt National Historic Site, 'Office of Civilian Defense'. Online: [http://www.nps.gov/elro/glossary/office-civilian-defense.htm] (accessed 06-04-06). Later, during the Cold War, US politicians used 'security policy' as a rationale for extensive social and educational programs, including in the 1950s the 'National Defense Education Act' (aid to higher education and research), and the 'National Defense Highway Act' (interstate highways).

2000, a more direct linkage has evolved between economic and other policy goals. Originally the focus was on the elimination of poverty, but increasingly the goals have turned to economic growth, higher employment levels, and structural reforms. Elaborated as the 'Lisbon Strategy' in 2005, achievements thus far have been modest, but there is a growing awareness that modernizing and reforming social policies in relation to the welfare state have become a key issue for all European states.[14] EU expansion has made its social policy structures ever more varied and complex. Highly developed and expensive social welfare policies (e.g. in France, Germany, and Italy) obviously require different reforms than the evolving 'post-socialist' systems of central and Eastern Europe. Structural economic and social changes (e.g. the relative decline of heavy industry and rise of the high technology and service sectors of the economy) add to the complexity of the EU mix.

Despite the limited harmonization of key social programs through the EU and the exchange of best practices through the OECD, states still have the primary responsibility for providing for the security of their inhabitants. The UNDP agenda has at least two aspects. First, it recognizes the 'interdependence' of nations with respect to elements vital to national security. This is very much in line with the 'interdependence' literature. For example, for small trading states like Denmark, trade, access to resources, capital flows, labor migration, international property regimes, etc., all have a direct and significant impact on the country's economic welfare and security. The trend for all advanced OECD economies has been toward greater interdependence, which in turn has been managed (however imperfectly) by international policy regimes and for most of Europe by integration. The second UNDP agenda is more global, ambitious, and, inevitably, controversial. At issue is global human security, implying that interdependence has expanded to include an ever-wider range of human issues: health, development, human rights, etc. In addition there is the implication, accepted by most if not all OECD states, of a common responsibility for human security. Hence the original post-Westphalian motto, modified for modern policy agendas –

14. The 'social inclusion' goals have become increasingly tied to the economic growth goals of the EU following the revisions of 2002 and developments in 2005. National Action Plans are filed to monitor progress. These various statements and reports can be seen at [http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/social_inclusion/index_en.htm] (accessed 20-01-06).

'each state its own social and economic policy' – is no longer accurate or fully legitimate.

Although the consequences of social and economic interdependence have become widely recognized in recent decades, the idea that national security has social and economic components has a long history. In the Danish case, this discourse developed out of the protracted 'defense debate' that dominated Danish politics during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. At that time, the Conservative government of Chancellor J.B.S. Estrup exploited the defense issue to resist demands for parliamentary democracy. In the wake of Denmark's disastrous defeat in the 1864 war with Prussia and Austria, the issue of the country's defense and security assumed great prominence. It was intensified by the pacifist program of the rising Social Democratic movement, which saw the military and defense issue as a distraction from the social, economic, and political agenda of the rising industrial working class. The pro- and anti-defense camps even interpreted Denmark's successful neutrality during World War I differently. Denmark's fortification of Copenhagen (the Conservative project), mining of coastal waters, and mobilization of a small 'security force' may have helped keep the war from Danish territory, but opponents of defense expenditure claimed that it was the priorities and interests of the belligerents which had determined Denmark's fate. Meanwhile defense budgets were seen as bleeding resources from internal social and economic development. The argument returned again in the 1920s, despite the seeming 'threat-less' geopolitical environment of that era. Denmark became an active supporter of the League of the Nations, but the domestic 'guns versus butter' debate continued.

In the 1930s, Denmark's security situation deteriorated with the advent of the Nazi regime in Germany, the collapse of the Versailles Treaty's limitations on German rearmament, and the growing tensions between the European powers. Efforts to collect the smaller European democracies into a security coalition made little headway except as providing a common excuse not to rely on the League or larger democratic powers. National security policy in Denmark and most of the other democracies was distorted by a legacy of pacifism, cynicism about Great Power politics, and the social burdens of the global depression. Despite these negative developments, some Danish politicians, especially Peter Munch, Foreign Minister from 1929 to

1940, talked of 'social defense,' by which they meant the importance of national political and social unity and solidarity in the fight against internal and external anti-democratic forces. Democracy did not collapse in Weimar Germany because of external security threats, even though the legacy of the Treaty of Versailles proved to be a significant handicap for the legitimacy of the Weimar system. The rise of anti-system parties in Germany – particularly the National Socialists, Communists, and National Conservatives – reflected the immediate world economic crisis, as well as the country's sharp class conflicts. Similar tensions could be found throughout Europe, including 'stronger' democracies like France, Britain, and even the Scandinavian countries. Symbolic of Denmark's good sense (and good fortune) was the broad 'crisis agreement' hammered out in Prime Minister Stauning's flat on Kanslersgade between the governing Social Democratic-Social Liberal coalition and the largest opposition party, the Agrarian Liberals (Venstre). Ironically this crucial agreement occurred on 30 January 1933, the very day on which the German President, Hindenburg, appointed Adolf Hitler chancellor.

Historians have long discussed the role that internal social conflict played in undermining democratic regimes and encouraging the aggressive nationalism that led to the wars of the twentieth century, especially World War II. The failure of parliamentary democracy and economic stability after 1920 must be seen as a contributing factor. Likewise, even when these conflicts did not contribute to authoritarian militarism, they helped weaken national morale and solidarity in France, Britain, and even Scandinavia. Parliamentary democracy survived and strengthened in the Scandinavian countries during the interwar period, but there were significant anti-democratic movements and parties in all of them. Finland came closest to a democratic crisis as the legacy of its brief but bloody civil war in 1918-19 remained sharp throughout the interwar period and beyond. Communists won parliamentary seats in the 1920s and 1930s in all the Scandinavian countries except for Finland, where they were banned between 1930 and 1944. Fascist parties made less progress, but rightist nationalists and occasionally Nazis gained minimal representation. The role of the fascists, Nazis, and their sympathizers was significant in Denmark and especially Norway during the German occupations of those countries (1940-45), but their fail-

ure to gain overt public support suggests that democratic values were more deeply ingrained than in many other European countries. The view that democratic values, solidarity, constitutionalism, and national pride could mitigate the raw military power of aggressors like Germany and (in the case of Finland) the Soviet Union were increasingly accepted across the democratic political spectrum during World War II, but this did not negate the desire to base national security on more tangible sources of support after the war.

International and domestic security was increasingly seen as complimentary rather than competing policy goals in the post-war period. Like most European states, Denmark followed a post-World War II course that can be described as 'guns and butter'. A substantial political majority accepted 'collective defense' in NATO once it had become clear that the United Nations security system would be limited by Cold War politics and that a Scandinavian solution (with Norway and Sweden) was not possible. This security decision resulted in significant increases in defense spending, especially when compared to the interwar period. Annual Danish defense expenditure soared from 360 million kroner in 1949 to 1598 million kroner in 1962 (in current prices), an increase of 450 pct., a rate of increase that exceeded even that of the United States.[15] This rate could not be sustained either politically or economically, and Danish increases slowed considerably after 1960. By the 1980s Denmark was facing criticism from its alliance partners for its modest defense expenditure. There was considerable discussion of Danish (and other NATO members') defense effort after 1960, as American politicians began to demand greater 'burden sharing'. Yet there is more to defense effort and security policy than the size of the defense budget, and sophisticated studies tend to place Denmark's defense effort roughly in the middle of NATO rankings.[16]

In comparative terms, Denmark's social expenditure also soared during the same period. Consistent statistics are difficult to compare over time, but social transfer payments leaped from about 10 pct. of GDP in the 1960s to about twice that percentage (of a much larger GDP) in the 1990s. By the late

15. NATO, 1963. Danish consumer prices increased by 68 pct. between 1949 and 1963, so the real increase was still substantial.

16. See Amara, 2005: 17-18.

1990s, Denmark's gross social expenditure was about 36 pct. of GDP, but when taxes and other factors are subtracted, the level of net social expenditure was about 27 pct. of GDP.[17] This latter figure differs little from those for the other Nordic countries or major West European welfare systems. In short, Denmark has managed to maintain a consistent defense effort (less than what some would wish, but more than the pre-NATO decades), while still being able to afford a generous and viable welfare state. Can this be sustained in an era of globalization?

SOCIAL POLICY AS SECURITY POLICY: DENMARK AND THE UNDP CRITERIA

Given the traditional struggle over public budgetary priorities, military security has typically been seen as reducing the resources available for social policy. This is the 'guns versus butter' debate. There are also questions over the merits of public social programs versus private expenditure, but I shall not pursue these here. Clearly from a 'human security' perspective, the Nordic welfare state has produced many favourable outcomes, as reflected in the uniformly high standing of Denmark and its Nordic neighbours in quantitative indices like the UNDP's Human Development Index. Moreover, a brief survey of the key elements of human security, as defined above by the UNDP, clearly reflects its compatibility with nearly a century of social and economic policy.

Economic security lies at the heart of the modern welfare state. There are two dimensions to this element. First, anyone whose economic status is threatened by a significant loss of income, whether because of unemployment, age, economic restructuring, or similar events, can expect a substantial 'cushion'. Denmark has had one of the most generous welfare states in terms of replacing lost income with direct and indirect subsidies, guaranteeing almost full disposable income for average employees who become unemployed, disabled, or ill. Such programs have been 'trimmed' in recent years, but economic poverty levels remain among the lowest in the world. The second dimension has been the increased emphasis on preventing and

17. See Einhorn and Logue, 2003: 198-211; Adema, 2001: 27-8.

shortening economic insecurity through more active programs of training, education, subsidized employment, and accommodation of workers with personal or family needs. In addition, a series of reforms and new initiatives have made Danish old-age pensions among the most viable in Europe, despite the strain that the large cohorts of retirees will place upon resources for the elderly in the next three decades. Nevertheless, Denmark, along with her Nordic neighbours, has addressed the issue of 'welfare state sustainability' more directly than most European states.

Food security has rarely been a serious problem in agrarian Denmark, especially given that all its residents are guaranteed the resources to obtain adequate nutrition. During the world wars Danish agriculture was not only a valuable asset (not least to Germany), but also a source of security for the Danish population. Modern Danish agriculture prospered from its efficiency and its access to foreign markets. Since 1973 it has benefited from the European Common Agricultural Program, which was in part launched in the 1960s to guarantee Europe a stable and adequate food supply. This is a prime example of globalization or more accurately 'Europeanization' serving Danish interests. For affluent nations, food security has become primarily qualitative, since it covers issues such as food safety, food quality, and proper nutrition. Agriculture and especially the food industry have been globalized, though less efficiently than the industrial sector. Common standards on food safety are now more important than older supply and price issues. The debates about genetically modified foods, as well as the 'mad-cow' (BSE) affair, both illustrate this tendency. Moreover, concerns about food, nutrition, and health are salient examples of the linkage of food security with the larger concerns of human security.

Health security has also two aspects. Denmark's universal health care system, which is mainly provided by publicly funded practitioners and hospitals, has produced excellent results. Although not a serious problem in comparative terms, the provision of timely and convenient access has received substantial attention in recent years. The result has been increased resources channelled into the health care system, coupled with a recognition of the dilemma that health care is an almost insatiable consumer of resources. The newer and more international aspect is the renewed concern about communicable and contagious diseases, which has become a serious challenge for

open societies with significant numbers of foreign visitors and whose own citizens regularly travel to distant lands. Transnational health security involves food and the environment, as well as contagious diseases. Studies show that major health challenges, such as that caused by HIV/AIDS, have a direct impact on the political and economic stability of governments.[18]

Environmental security receives a higher priority in Denmark than in many other advanced industrial states. This is especially apparent in the energy field, where Denmark's transformation and innovation has been dramatic. Between 1945 and 1973, Denmark was nearly entirely dependent on foreign energy supplies. When such supplies were limited and threatened, as in the immediate post-war period and again during the first 'oil crisis' of 1973-4, Denmark suffered significant economic dislocations. The past quarter of a century, however, has seen the country's energy security totally transformed. The discovery and development of offshore gas and oil resources has made Denmark a net energy exporter, with real economic and security benefits. Denmark has also become a leader in energy conservation, encouraged by engineering technologies and by so-called 'green taxes' on energy consumption and in its emphasis on alternative energy production. More than fifteen pct. of Danish electricity comes from wind turbines, which have also become a major new export industry. In other environmental areas, Denmark has been active in raising European and global standards and goals for progress. Whether a small country can make a 'difference' in reducing atmospheric greenhouse gases and meeting similar major environmental challenges remains unanswered.

Personal security is a traditional domestic policy concern, including both traditional criminal threats as well as indirect social threats (where there is an overlap with environmental and economic security). Although rates of violent crime have risen in Denmark as in most European countries over the past decades, there are three new issues that concern security policy, given the dramatic transformation of Denmark from a highly ethnically homogeneous to a more multiethnic society over the past forty years and the added concerns about personal security. First, although immigrants and their

18. See Price-Smith, 2001. Although Price-Smith focuses on developing countries, health issues can quickly spill over onto developed countries through trade, travel, and migration.

immediate descendants are generally honest and law-abiding, they still account for a disproportionate share of criminal behaviour, particularly crimes that contribute to a greater sense of personal insecurity.[19] Secondly, this leads to exaggerated fears in the traditional population, hindering the integration of some immigrants and on rare occasions producing violence against ethnic minorities. A 'spiral' of distrust and fear potentially worsens the problem. Various studies indicate that people usually have an exaggerated fear of violent crime compared to other potential sources of danger (e.g. traffic). Moreover, the rise in crime in Denmark began before there was a significant immigrant community in the country. Thirdly, transnational crime has become a major global issue affecting all countries. Some estimates place the economic cost or value of criminal behaviour at 1 to 1.5 trillion U.S. dollars.[20] Clearly global crime has a proportional impact on an affluent and trading society like Denmark.

Community Security is a broad concept, which involves changing social values about community, as well the security of self-identified groups within a society, typically religious and ethnic minorities. Here complex social factors are at work. Traditional minorities in Denmark – the German-speakers of Southern Jutland, for example, or Greenlanders or Faeroese – face fewer issues: it is the nearly 6 pct. of the Danish population who are first or second generation immigrants who are the focus of greatest concern. The 'nationality' issue along the Danish-German border was extremely sensitive until after World War II. As Danish-German relations were normalized in the context of post-war German political and economic reconstruction, historic grievances faded.[21] For the past seventy years, Danish social policy has

19. Statistics on ethnicity and crime are difficult to obtain, but a recent official report recorded 'criminality' among immigrants and their descendants at about 5 pct. (of the group), while the rate among Danes was about half (Danish Ministry for Refugee, Immigration, and Integration Affairs, 2004). These statistics only record crimes committed by people resident in Denmark. Much 'transnational crime' is committed by visitors and non-residents.

20. Naim, 2005: 95-6. Money laundering and tax evasion accounts for most the value, but such activities are usually connected with personal and potentially violent crimes, such as human or drug trafficking, robbery, etc.

21. Note that after the Versailles Treaty returned southern Jutland to Danish rule (following referendums in 1920), many Danes regarded the German-speakers in this areas as still loyal to Germany, not Denmark. After Hitler's rise to power in 1933 this issue became even more sensitive, as many German-speakers saw Nazism as a way to return to German rule. See Lidegaard, 2005: 36-40.

treated all residents as equal. Judgments of who are the 'worthy recipients' of social benefits has yielded to either the principle of universal benefits or income-related criteria. In education a liberal policy of supporting private schools (for ethnic minorities, such as German-speakers, or for any Dane wanting an alternative school), followed by increasing support for 'bilingual' education in the 1970s, sought to protect the interests of minorities while guaranteeing educational standards.

The increase in non-European immigration, which started slowly in the late 1960s but which has accelerated rapidly over the past twenty years, has unleashed the largest ethnic change in Denmark (and the rest of Western Europe) in more than a century. In 2004 immigrants and their descendants were estimated to number 442.036 (8.2 pct. of the total population). About 40 pct. have Danish citizenship, but 71 pct. still retain their roots in non-western countries.[22] By 2020 the OECD estimates that immigrants and their descendants will number 749.000 (13.6 pct. of the total population), with over 60 pct. coming from non-European cultures.[23] The political and security dimensions of this social transformation of a previously exceptionally homogeneous population into a multiethnic one will depend on issues of integration and cultural accommodation. Both Danish government and international studies (e.g. OECD) have emphasized the importance of economic and educational initiatives to improve the overall integration of these 'new Danes' into the cultural mainstream. Many of the proposals for 'activation' build on reforms enacted in the 1990s to reduce long-term and youth unemployment. Whether they will be as successful with immigrants remains an important question.

Over the past decade, a series of welfare and educational reforms have challenged this liberal definition of 'community'. Most social welfare benefits now have residency requirements, immigration, asylum, and citizenship laws have been tightened, and educational standards applying to private schools have been enforced more stringently, particularly with regard to schools pursuing a 'fundamentalist Islamic' educational philosophy. Significantly Danish opinion (and public policy) now sees 'diversity' and

22. Danish Ministry for Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, 2004, Ch. 2.
23. Roseveare and Jørgensen, 2004: 6.

autonomy as a possible threat to the social cohesion and internal security of the country. So while policies aim at integration, Denmark has intensified police surveillance of minority communities and political organizations in which support for radical Islam, terrorism, or political violence may lurk.

The bizarre 'cartoon crisis' of 2005-6 illustrates the porousness of modern societies and the erosion of the traditional distinction between domestic and foreign policy. Danish political culture has long used humour and caricature in domestic debates with similar talents turned on foreign targets as well. Until recently Danes could be reasonably sure that their domestic debates would escape international attention. Even during the tense years prior to the German occupation in 1940, some Danish politicians, journalists, and cultural figures denounced and ridiculed German Nazism, even while the Danish government was following a policy of showing the utmost discretion. While pro-Nazi elements in the German minority in southern Jutland sought support from the 'fatherland', this issue was too minor to interest the megalomaniac ambitions of the Nazi leadership. Even during the first years of the so-called 'neutral occupation', censorship was mostly self-imposed. Sixty years later, however, ethnic relations inside Denmark suddenly became global issues. Not only does the issue threaten Danish economic and diplomatic interests, it could also increase Denmark's visibility to international terrorist organizations.[24]

Political Security focuses on traditional civil rights, which are guaranteed by the Danish Constitution of 1953. Like most European constitutions that have been written or revised during the past century, these guarantees include social and economic rights. Denmark has a long record of international activism on human rights, and since World War II the issue of civil rights has attracted few protracted controversies. However, contemporary concerns about internal security, international terrorism, and immigration have brought such matters onto the political agenda. Also significant, how-

24. It will take time to put the economic and other dimensions of the 'cartoon crisis' in perspective, but the widespread boycott of Danish products in many Moslem countries hit some Danish exports very hard. For example, after three months of the boycott, the Arla dairy (a Danish-Swedish cooperative) expected losses of at least 500 million Danish kroner. The reluctance of Danish and other Scandinavian tourists to visit Arab countries may cost those countries substantial sums in their turn.

ever, are Danish laws prohibiting racist and hate speech and other activities that deliberately intimidate ethnic and religious groups.

There has been broad domestic support for these policies, most of which have been implemented since 2001. Immigration and ethnic issues have been prominent in recent Danish elections, especially in 2001 and 2005. Despite traditional Danish tolerance for unpopular and even radical opinions, opposition to some domestic security measures has come from the radical leftist parties (the Socialist People's Party and the Unity List) and the centrist Social Liberal (Radikale Venstre) Party. Together these parties poll about 15 to 20 pct. of the vote. Denmark's various restrictions on immigration, asylum, and political activity by some minority groups has attracted the concerned attention of the Council of Europe, whose primary activity in recent years has been the monitoring of human rights. Oddly the Council's attention was directed mainly toward Denmark's declining German-speaking minority, but it also made references to Denmark's immigration and aliens policies.[25]

While security attention has been mainly directed at radical groups with ties to particular ethnic minorities, other, 'nativist' radical groups – neo-Nazis, 'skinheads', white supremacists, etc. – are active in many western countries. Modern communications, especially the Internet, allows them to collaborate and distribute both media and financial resources. Despite Denmark's reservations after 1992 over proposals for intensive police cooperation (the EU's so-called Trevi program), practical cooperation against radical and terrorist organizations continues.

In short, the UNDP's 'human security' criteria are appropriate for an understanding of broader 'security' concerns in a modern country like Denmark. Analysis of the various dimensions defined above suggests that Denmark shares many challenges and certain responses with other European countries with extensive welfare states. More broadly, social welfare policy in the broadest sense (that is, including health and education, as well as traditional social security policies) is an important instrument for protecting modern societies in an era of globalized economic and political activities. Obviously security threats still require the usual instruments of

25. Council of Europe, 2005a. Earlier in 2005 the Danish Government submitted a detailed commentary on the status of minorities in Denmark. See Council of Europe, 2005b.

military and police measures. No pension system will ever deter an aggressive nation or a fanatical terrorist organization. This recalls the lesson that Denmark and other European democracies had to learn in the 1930s and 1940s: national security requires both 'guns and butter'.

THE SUSTAINABLE WELFARE STATE AND SOCIETY

Like most countries with advanced welfare states, Denmark has been concerned about the long-term sustainability of its key social programs in a global society. The original social democratic welfare-state model, like many of the industrial and economic policies that supported it, was designed for an era of managed trade and national fiscal policies. What is notable about Danish domestic and security policy is that, over the past decade, successive governments have managed to strike a balance between reform, restructuring, and renewal. Reforms have been the most visible, as Denmark has accommodated both Europeanization through the 'Single Market' and other EU initiatives while maintaining national priorities. Most of the Danish 'opt-outs' from the Maastricht system have focused on national choices and priorities. Even the refusal to adopt the Euro is more symbolic than substantive: Danish economic policies are well within the Euro criteria, and the Danish krone is tightly bound to the Euro. The Danish economy has accepted liberalization without 'social dumping', which would undermine the broader Danish view of 'human security'. By participating in the EU system, Denmark has acquired vital support for key elements of its social welfare model, which differs in detail but not in its fundamental principles from those of most other EU member states. Finally, Denmark has accepted reform of its social security system to emphasize 'inclusiveness', that is, integrating the entire adult population into the workforce while continuing to provide a comprehensive and still generous social safety 'net'. It has also restored and maintained an economic balance by keeping revenues in line with expenditure and reforming its tax system so that geographic boundaries matter less. This process has by no means been completed, but there is a degree of realism that many other EU countries seeking social and economic reforms could well emulate.

Two elements provide the key to Denmark's successful balance of the components of 'human security' as the foundation for social and security policy in the 21st century. First there is an ongoing public and objective debate about the country's security threats in the new globalized environment. This does not guarantee a consensus, but it makes consensus attainable, as well as stable once achieved. Secondly, Danes across the political spectrum and in key elements of the economy all recognize that small states must adjust to realities and seize their opportunities, which may be fleeting. Small countries have no special virtues, but some like Denmark have learned – often through bitter historical experience – that delusions of grandeur and political rigidity are handicaps in maintaining true national security.

Denmark's internal 'clash of civilizations' debate has clearly become a national security issue as well as a social security one. After simmering for more than a decade, the 'cartoon crisis' of 2005-6 brought the issue to the top of the political agenda, and extremists on both sides have exploited it to win support.[26] Clearly the country's political and diplomatic leadership was surprised by the effectiveness of resident Islamists in sparking foreign reaction. Public opinion in Denmark has been polarized, with the usual critics of the government's integration and foreign policies – mainly on the extreme left – making efforts to break the policy consensus of the past decade. In March 2006, the Foreign Ministry convened a conference on ways to improve ethnic relations and to mobilize more moderate Muslim forces, both within and outside the country. It is clear, however, that the problems of adjusting to a multiethnic and globalized society will remain *the* security issue of the coming decade.[27]

It is clear from the Danish experience that social policy in the widest sense continues to have an enormous impact on a country's security. Globalization as reflected in patterns of communication, migration, social movements, and economic relations guarantees that all countries – not just traditional 'small states' – will find that social security and integration are

26. A good initial account of the crisis is Klausen, 2006. Remarkably few foreign accounts have understood the details of the cartoons, including the fact that the most provocative drawing – the imam with a lit bomb in his turban – portrays the radical imam Abu Laban and was not actually intended as an image of the Prophet.

27. 'Muslims Express Anger and Hope at Danish Conference', New York Times, 11 March 2006: A6.

central aspects of their national security policies. The Danish experience offers examples of successful responses, not just warnings of continuing challenges.

REFERENCES

Adema, Willem (2001), *Net Social Expenditure,* 2nd ed., OECD Labor Market and Social Policy Occasional Papers, no. 52, Paris: OECD.

Amara, Jomana (2005), *Evaluating NATO Long Run Defense Burdens using Unit Root Tests,* Working Paper Series, 2005/05, Monterey, CA: Defense Resources Management Institute, School of International Graduate Studies, Naval Postgraduate School.

Brundtland, Arne O. (1966), 'Nordisk balans før og nå', *Internasjonal Politikk,* 1966/5: 491-541.

Brundtland, Arne O. (1994), 'Nordic Security at the End of the Cold War: Old Legacies and New Challenges', in Arne O. Brundtland and Don M. Snider (eds.), *Nordic-Baltic Security,* Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies: 1-30.

Buzan, Barry, Wæver, Ole, and de Wilde, Jaap (1998), *Security: A New Framework for Analysis,* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Council of Europe (2005a), *Resolution ResCMN(2005)9 on the Implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by Denmark,* 14 December, Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

Council of Europe (2005b), *Comments of the Government of Denmark on the Second Opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in Denmark,* 3 May, Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

Danish Ministry for Refugee, Immigration, and Integration Affairs (2004), *Årbog om udlændinge i Danmark 2004.* Copenhagen: Danish Ministry for Refugee, Immigration, and Integration Affairs. Online:[http://www.inm.dk/publikationer/aarbog_udlaendinge_04/html/full_publication.htm#D] (accessed 12-04-06).

Einhorn, Eric S. and Logue, John (2003), *Modern Welfare States: Scandinavian Politics and Policy in the Global Age,* 2nd ed., New York: Praeger.

Haskel, Barbara (1976), *The Scandinavian Option: Opportunities and Opportunity Costs in Postwar Scandinavian Foreign Policies,* Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Holm, Ulla (2006), *The Danish Ugly Ducking and the Mohammed Cartoons,* DIIS Brief, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.

Keohane, Robert, and Nye, Joseph (2000), *Power and Interdependence,* 3rd ed., New York: Longman.

Klausen, Jytte (2006), 'A Danish Drama', *Prospect Magazine,* no. 120. Online: [http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=7363] (accessed 12-04-06).

Lidegaard, Bo (2005), *Kampen om Danmark 1933-1940,* Copenhagen: Gyldendal.

Martin, Brian (1993), *Social Defence: Social Change,* London: Freedom Press.

Naim, Moises (2005), 'It's the Illicit Economy, Stupid', *Foreign Policy,* no. 151: 95-6.

NATO (1963), *Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries,* Press Release M2(63)2, Paris: NATO.

OECD (1981), *The Welfare State in Crisis,* Paris: OECD.

Price-Smith, Andrew T. (2001), *The Health of Nations: Infectious Disease, Environmental Change, and Their Effects on National Security and Development,* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Romm, Joseph (1993), *Defining National Security,* New York: Council on Foreign Relations.

Roseveare, Deborah, and Jørgensen, Martin (2004), *Migration and Integration of Immigrants in Denmark,* OECD Economics Department Working Papers, no. 368, Paris: OECD.

Sharp, Gene (1985), *Making Europe Unconquerable: The Potential of Civilian-based Deterrence and Defence,* Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.

Sundelius, Bengt (2001), 'Totalförsvaret är överspelat: vi behöver ett samhällsförsvar!', Stockholm: Försvarsberedningen, Försvarsdepartementet. Online: [http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/01/46/96/55c15c99.pdf] (accessed 12-04-06). Summarized in *Fritt Militärt Forum,* no. 3.

UNDP (1994), Human Development Report 1994, New York: Oxford University Press.

Truth on Demand: Denmark and the Cold War

Thorsten Borring Olesen[1]

It is hardly a new and revolutionary insight to suggest that the past is a complex raw material, which, long after the passage of history, can be reactivated and mobilized in order to legitimize or de-legitimize later historical developments. As we know, Nazism sought to profit from the longing for purity and simplicity of a bygone peasant past, while the fascist mother regime in Italy regarded and presented itself as the natural and historic heir to the earlier days of Rome's glory under the emperors of antiquity and the popes of the Renaissance. Everyone who has studied the history of national independence movements past and present will acknowledge how much energy is always mobilized to underpin their claims to legitimacy by producing and exploiting more or less convincing historical references.

However, it is not only ancient regimes or movements or states in the middle of a process of national formation which struggle with history. Since the end of the Cold War in both the USA and Europe, history has been reactivated – carried along by a critical and often sensation-prone press – as the raw material of judicial, party-political or cultural battles. Thus, American and European archives have been swarmed over by so-called search teams of historians and lawyers combing every inch of them in order to produce material for various cases for damages against public authorities, organisations or individuals, both within and outside the US.

True to its own political tradition, the European picture is somewhat different. Here experts, often historians, appointed by governments or parlia-

1. Thorsten Borring Olesen is Jean Monnet Professor and an Associate Professor at the Department of History and Area Studies, University of Aarhus.

ments have been called in to investigate controversial areas of national history, Cold War history in particular, but also both newer and older history. Outside Denmark, in the rest of Western Europe, we have seen such investigations examining the discrepancies between formal and informal security policy during the Cold War (Sweden), economic transactions between neutral countries and Nazi Germany (Sweden and Switzerland), the role of UN forces during the Srebrenica massacre in 1995 (the Netherlands), British military violence in Northern Ireland (the 'Bloody Sunday' Inquiry), and brutality, crime and exploitation in the former colonies (Belgium, but not France, despite heated national debates over war crimes committed during the Algerian War). Most common, however, have been commissions set up to scrutinize the activities of the secret services during the Cold War (Norway, Sweden and Italy). In Eastern Europe the fall of Communism has naturally also fuelled a strong urge to come to terms with the recent past, but here the drive has been so profound and all-embracing that permanent research institutions like the German Stiftung zur *Aufarbeitung der SED-Diktatur* have been set up in several countries.

Thus, the trend of the day is 'history – or even truth – on political demand' and the result 'history – and truth – on delivery'. This is probably truer of Denmark than anywhere else in Western Europe.[2] This article will present the latest product of this process in Denmark, the newly published four-volume white book (i.e. a status report), *Denmark During the Cold War*.[3] However, this will certainly not be the last manifestation of government-commissioned research on the Cold War to appear, as several more projects are in the oven or being prepared for baking. This article will therefore first give a brief sketch of the recent tradition in Denmark of 'Truth on Demand', this being important in understanding the background to the commissioning of *Denmark During the Cold War*. The following section will then present the findings of the white book, before another section presents the reception which it has enjoyed so far. The final section will then return to the truth–on-demand theme, which has been further intensified since the white book appeared.

2. More general presentations of post-Cold War historiography on the Cold War in Denmark and in the other Nordic states can be found in Olesen, 2004.

3. DIIS, 2005a.

TRUTH ON DEMAND (1): THE HISTORY

Denmark joined the trend in officially commissioned research into the Cold War period in 1995, when the Social Democrat-led Nyrup Rasmussen government decided to commission the newly established Danish Institute of International Affairs (DUPI) to conduct an investigation into Danish and American policy concerning the stationing of nuclear weapons in Greenland. This move came in response to a series of critical enquiries by independent researchers and subsequent attention by and discussion in the media as to whether nuclear weapons had in fact been present in Greenland during the early Cold War, contrary to official Danish policy, and if so, whether this had been sanctioned by Danish governments. In carrying out its assignment, the DUPI set up a research team composed of staff members and externally recruited researchers, among them the author of this article. After a good year's work, on 17 January 1997 the DUPI handed over the final report, often just called the Thule report, to the government.[4]

Both during the actual research period and immediately after the report was published, the investigation and the whole topic were subject to much debate and scrutiny, not least in the newspapers. Some newspapers even initiated a new research strategy, which caught on in the years that followed, by sending journalists to examine the archives themselves. All the same, the media's attention quickly fizzled out when no one, press or experts, seriously challenged the report's findings. From the point of view of the researchers themselves, it was nevertheless a disappointment to discover that their findings had not stimulated a more general and more profound debate on some of the 'big' issues which they had touched upon. One of these related to the treatment of Greenland during the Cold War and how the 'right' balance was sought between openness and secrecy in matters of security policy in a small democratic state in the middle of great power conflict.

In 1999, a new Nyrup Rasmussen government set up yet another commission following the disclosure of material held by the Danish Security Intelligence Service (abbreviated PET in Danish), hinting that, contrary to a government statement of 30 September 1968, left-wing activists had been

4. DUPI, 1997.

placed under secret surveillance and records kept on them even after that date. In the light of such accusations, the government decided that the whole affair should be investigated by a commission, a decision also made urgent by newspaper allegations that PET records had been copied and handed over to the CIA. According to the government brief, the Commission was to consider the judicial and historical dimensions. The former aimed at verifying whether PET surveillance activities during the period 1968-89 had been carried out according to the regulations stipulated by government and parliament whereas the latter was to establish the historical background by analyzing the activities of political parties, trade union conflicts and radical political-ideological movements during the whole Cold War period. The historical brief was included in order to make the bourgeois parties support the investigation and in fact also gave it a foundation quite similar to so-called Lund-Commission in Norway, which had finalized its report the year before.[5]

The bourgeois opposition did not take the bait, however, and was generally very critical of the need for the PET investigation. The feeling in these quarters was that the PET Commission was putting the telescope in front of the wrong eye by directing attention towards those who had tried to protect Denmark against Cold War threats rather than those left-wing groups who, whether willingly or unwillingly, played Moscow's game. As a counter move, therefore, during spring 2000 the opposition started to exert pressure for an additional investigation looking into the whole conflict and threat scenario facing Denmark during the Cold War. Central to this proposed investigation would also be an analysis of the internal threat scenario originating from the suspected cooperation between communist regimes and Danish parties, organizations and individuals.[6]

In May 2000 Prime Minister Nyrup Rasmussen bowed to this pressure and agreed to entrust the DUPI with this assignment, but with the limited brief to produce a white book only on the external threat to Danish securi-

5. Lund Kommisjonen, 1996; The full report of the PET Commission is reprinted in: [www.folketinget.dk/?/samling/20051/MENU/00000002.htm]. The Commission has five members, three jurists and two historians. It is still working, but is expected to hand its report in 2006.

6. 'Kold krig mellem partier', *Jyllands-Posten,* 10 February 2000; 'Kritisk lys på den kolde krig', *Berlingske Tidende,* 11 February 2000.

ty coming from the Warsaw Pact. According to the government, the internal security dimension was already being dealt with sufficiently by the PET Commission. The leading figure in the bourgeois campaign – Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the leader of the liberal party *Venstre* – commented on the Prime Minister's decision as follows:

> We are still of the opinion that the PET investigation is not the relevant forum for investigating the internal threat. But the Prime Minister stressed in his letter [to the opposition agreeing to a new investigation] that the PET investigation will also look into the cooperation of Danish fellow-travellers with the communist enemy in the Warsaw Pact. The two investigations will now supplement each other so that we can obtain an adequate picture of Denmark during the Cold War.[7]

Fogh Rasmussen's remarks seemed to indicate that the opposition was now satisfied with the way Danish Cold War history would be unravelled in due course by the two official commissions. But the conservative leader, Bendt Bendtsen, was still doubtful whether the PET Commission would really bring the activities of left-wing fellow travellers to light. Against this background, it is hardly surprising that the whole issue surfaced again when, in 2001, *Venstre* and the Conservative Party took the leap from the opposition to the government benches. All the same, matters grew complicated, mainly because the Liberal and Conservative parties did not have a majority in parliament, but depended on the support of the Danish People's Party, which had an agenda of its own. While the government mainly pondered over whether a third commission should be named or the mandate for the DUPI investigation be widened, the Danish People's Party did not like any of these alternatives. As MP Jesper Langballe, pastor and cousin of Søren Krarup, another MP and pastor, and both spokesmen for their party in this matter, put it: 'Both the PET and the DUPI Commissions have been politically appointed as escape manoeuvres to avoid the truth from surfacing. And if we proceed by enlarging the DUPI mandate, we will only get a civil servant's

7. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, quoted from, 'Den Kolde Krig skal under lup', *Berlingske Tidende,* 5 May 2000.

report, except a bit thicker. It will not be a piece of independent historical research'.[8]

However, the Danish People's Party's care for independent historical research was somewhat tainted by the fact that, in a meeting with Fogh Rasmussen, now Prime Minister, in August 2002, Langballe and Krarup told him that they had the right man for the assignment, namely Bent Jensen, a history professor at the University of Southern Denmark, a well-known Soviet expert, Cold War traditionalist and outspoken critic of what he considered Danish left-wing accommodation of the Soviet Union. Jensen had himself called publicly for an independent investigation. This kind of politically motivated choice was obviously more than Fogh Rasmussen was willing to stomach, and instead he listened to advice given by his predecessor as leader of Venstre and former Foreign Minister during the 1980s, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, who advocated widening the DUPI commission.[9]

However, Ellemann-Jensen's advice also proved controversial, owing to the fact that a central part of the new investigation would be treating one of the most contested periods of Danish Cold War history, the so-called 'footnote period' of the 1980s. Between 1982 and 1988, an alternative majority in parliament, consisting of Social Democrats, the left-liberal party Det Radikale Venstre (a party which normally backed the government in its economic austerity policies during the same period) and the left-wing parties, forced the bourgeois government against its will to insert Danish exemptions from NATO policies in the form of footnotes into NATO documents. It also tabled other far-reaching proposals that the government considered detrimental to Danish security interests and NATO solidarity. This situation was allowed to continue for six years because the government refused to step down when it suffered defeat in the Folketing. The 1980s thus saw a split in the traditional majority consisting of the Social Democrats, *Venstre*

8. Jesper Langballe, quote from 'Venstrefløjen skal undersøges', *Politiken,* 31 August 2002. For Bendt Bendtsen, see 'Danmarks fjender skal frem i lyset', *Jyllands-Posten,* 5 May 2000. See also 'Intet skal fejes ind under jerntæppet', *Berlingske Tidende,* 21. August 2002, and 'Lys på venstrefløjen', *Weekendavisen, 30* August 2002.

9. 'DF vil samle ind til kommunistundersøgelse', *Information,* 21 August 2002; 'Kommunistundersøgelse på vej', 'Uffe mod undersøgelse' and 'Venstrefløjen skal undersøges', *Politiken,* 17, 20 and 21 August 2002; 'Røde danskere under lup', *Jyllands-Posten,* 21 August 2002. For Bent Jensen's views, ses 'Historie: Undersøgelse hilses velkommen', and 'Debat: Uafhængig undersøgelse', both in *Jyllands-Posten,* 18 and 20 August 2002, and 'Eftermæle', *Weekendavisen,* 23 August 2002.

and the Conservative Party that had backed Danish security and NATO policies since the beginning of the Cold War.[10]

Both in the 1980s as Foreign Minister and later after 1992, in his period as bourgeois opposition leader, and further into his retirement from parliament, Ellemann-Jensen had been an ardent critic of what he considered the political betrayal of the Danish left in general and the Social Democrats in particular during the footnote period. Ellemann-Jensen's accusations have been highly charged, but what made them controversial in the context of the widening of the DUPI mandate was the fact that, from the beginning of 2003, the DUPI would be reorganised under the title of the *Danish Institute for International Studies* (DIIS), with Ellemann-Jensen as Chairman of the Board of DCISM, the Danish Centre of International Studies and Human Rights, under whose authority DIIS would be established. Against this background, representatives of the opposition claimed that he was disqualified, especially as the opposition was generally sceptical of the fundamental need for a new and broader mandate in addition to the two investigations that were already in progress. The People's Party for their part felt betrayed because Ellemann-Jensen and the Prime Minister did not support the idea of an 'independent' investigation. Ellemann-Jensen's response was to maintain that he was not disqualified and that the DIIS researchers would have a completely free hand within the mandate to conduct the investigation independently of any political interference. Looking back from today, one may safely conclude that in fact the DIIS researchers have enjoyed a free hand of this sort.[11]

Prime Minister Fogh Rasmussen's decision to follow the advice of Ellemann-Jensen resulted in a supplementary mandate stressing that the DIIS investigation – alongside the original commissioned investigation into the military threat to Danish and Western Europe stemming from the

10. The footnote period is extensively treated in DIIS, 2005d. The long-term features of post-1945 Danish security policy, including the footnote period, can be followed in the newly-released vols. 5 and 6 of *Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Historie (Danish Foreign Policy History)* (Olesen and Villaume 2005; Petersen 2004).

11. Ellemann-Jensen has treated the whole footnote affair in numerous articles and books. His latest and most up-to-date view can be found in Elleman-Jensen, 2005. See also 'Den kolde krig: Historien, der kom ind fra kulden', *Jyllands-Posten,* 25 August 2002; 'Venstrefløjen skal undersøges' og 'Ellemann afviser inhabilitet', Politiken, 21 and 27 August 2002; 'Lys på venstrefløjen', *Weekendavisen,* 30 August 2002.

Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact – would also have to concentrate on 'an analysis of official Danish security policy and the Danish security policy debate, with special emphasis on the period towards the end of the Cold War [i.e. the footnote period]. The attempts by Warsaw Pact countries to exert direct or indirect influence, also through Danish parties and organisations etc., on Danish debates and policy formulation in the areas of foreign and security policy are of particular interest in this context.' With this mandate it became clear that the domestic conflict of the footnote period would move to the centre of the investigation, as would the nature of Eastern Bloc contacts and relationships with Danish political parties and organisations.[12]

The Danish People's Party was so disappointed by this result that Jesper Langballe announced that the party would head a national fund-raising exercise to pay for a proper historical investigation. Maybe it proved too difficult to raise the money because a year later Langballe changed his tactics and now started suggesting that the Danish Centre for Humanistic Research should host a research project on the Soviet Gulag headed by Bent Jensen. The Centre, which was financed by individual state budgetary grants, applauded the idea, but demanded that the project should be staffed through the normal academic application procedures and not earmarked for pre-chosen candidates. Langballe did not pursue this idea further, and the Humanistic Centre was itself killed off when the government and the People's Party failed to find the money to prolong its existence in the ensuing budget negotiations the same year.[13]

The budget nonetheless earmarked approximately DKK 4 m. for an investigation into 'Gulag: the extinction camps of Stalinism', the money being allocated to the University of Southern Denmark (SDU), which thus acquired research funding it had never applied for. But the SDU had one advantage: it was the home university of Bent Jensen. However, Jensen had just published a book on the Gulag and was more interested in examining the external and internal dimensions of the Cold War in Denmark. Perhaps not surprisingly, on the insistence of the Danish People's Party, the title of

12. Supplementary mandate quoted form DIIS, 2005b: 15. See also Nikolaj Petersen, 'Historien sat på plads', *Weekendavisen,* 10 February 2006.

13. 'Institut skal beskæftige sig yderligere med den kolde krig', *Kristeligt Dagblad*, 24 August 2002; 'Langballe afviser afpresning', *Information,* 15 November 2003.

the project was eventually changed to 'Domestic Conflicts during the Cold War' before the grant was transferred to the SDU. In the end Jensen's project 'only' managed to receive DKK 1.7 m. due to the fact that the SDU launched an open research competition for the money, from which other projects were funded as well.[14]

The whole episode resembled what could be termed budgetary blackmail – a well-known phenomenon in Denmark, due to the fact that governments often need the support of non-government coalition partners. It is rare, however, for such wheeling-and-dealing during the budget negotiations to be applied to research funding for specific projects, even though this trend had been initiated during the Social Democratic reign of Nyrup Rasmussen. This happened when his government decided to spend up to DKK 5 m. on a history project on the relationship of Danish industry with Nazi Germany inside and outside Denmark during World War II, a last-minute sop to the left-wing party Enhedslisten during the budget negotiations of 1999. There was no hand-picking of researchers, however, as the Danish Research Council for the Humanities was entrusted with disbursing the money among qualified projects.[15]

The Danish People's Party's partial success in applying the budget blackmail strategy must also be viewed against the background that, despite the widening of the DIIS mandate, many people within the ruling two-party coalition of Liberals and Conservatives, including the Prime Minister himself, were strongly in favour of stepping up research activities into the Cold War. In the introduction to a book of 1999 edited by one of his present cabinet ministers, Bertel Haarder, Fogh Rasmussen had made it clear that he considered the time of reckoning to be nigh: 'There must be a reckoning with those forces which, during the Cold War, played the games of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact – a reckoning with those who were not able to distinguish between friend and foe'. Such views were often absorbed into the more general claim that a clash of values or Kulturkampf was needed in

14. 'Dansk Folkeparti får sin vilje', *Kristeligt Dagblad,* 19 November 2003; 'Fem skarpe: Jensen i orkanens øje', *Berlinske Tidende,* 22 November 2003; 'Sortlistet' professor har fået millioner til forskning', *Politiken,* 25 November 2003; 'Bent Jensen er i forvejen blevet forgyldt', *Information,* 26 November 2003; 'Bevillinger: Den følsomme forskning', *Jyllands-Posten,* 30 November 2003. See also Jensen, 2002.

15. 'Industriens krigsrolle undersøges', *Berlingske Tidende,* 21 November 1999.

Denmark in order to change the Danish (social democratic) mentality and conquer the Danish mind.[16] And in this clash, what was important was the struggle over history, which has thus come to occupy centre stage in the contemporary political contest between the left and the right in Denmark – a battlefield which the right seems to be much more comfortable with.[17]

In the light of these experiences, the Danish People's Party tried its luck again during the budget negotiations of 2004. By that time it had become clear that the DIIS white book would be completed sometime during early 2005. However, the party anticipated that the coming conclusions of the report would not have the 'right touch', and therefore – in a rare act of pre-discrediting – it made the government agree to a proposal that, when the DIIS report was completed, the parties backing the budget would assess whether there was a need for any further studies of Denmark during the Cold War. As the opposition daily *Politiken* put it in a later analysis, this act was tantamount to saying that, if Jesper Langballe did not like the DIIS report, a new one must be commissioned.[18]

THE DIIS REPORT: DENMARK DURING THE COLD WAR

Before pursuing the 'Truth on Demand' perspective further, it is worth first presenting the DIIS report and the more specific debate over its research design and findings that has been going on since it was presented on 30 June 2005.

The report is a white book in four volumes totalling 2350 pages. The leader and coordinator of the project was DIIS senior researcher Svend Aage Christensen. Also involved have been senior researchers Frede Jensen and

16. Fogh Rasmussen, quoted from 'Venstrefløjen og Den Kolde Krig', *Jyllands-Posten,* 12 May 1999. See also interview with Fogh Rasmussen, 'De nye værdier', *Jyllands-Posten,* 5 October 2003.

17. Since 2003, Fogh Rasmussen has also been passionately engaged in a critique of Danish cooperation policies during World War II. This topic creates just as much emotion as the Cold War debate, not least because Fogh Rasmussen has never shied away from drawing explicit parallels – or rather contrasts – between passive Danish policies during the occupation and his own government's active and pro-American policies in the contemporary war in Iraq; see, for instance, his introduction to a teaching pamphlet for school children, (Folk og Forsvar, 2003: 2). See also Nikolaj Petersen, 'Historien sat på plads', *Weekendavisen,* 10 February 2006.

18. 'Kampen om historien: Den Kolde Krig er stadig varm', *Politiken,* 12 November 2005.

Erik Beukel, as well as a great number of project researchers and research assistants. Work started in 2000 and was stepped up when the mandate was widened in 2002. The final report was submitted on behalf of the board of DIIS, consisting of representatives from the relevant ministries, universities and other research institutions. The board chairman was Professor Georg Sørensen, of the Department of Political Science at the University of Aarhus. DIIS presents itself as independent in professional matters and is also the publisher of the present yearbook.

The DIIS research group has consulted an impressive range of source material from domestic and foreign archives, as well as a great variety of published sources and research literature. Not least the visits to East German and Polish archives have produced material and subsequent analysis of relevance not only for the Danish context, but also for the wider European scene. Through this material, new insights into Warsaw Pact intelligence activities and assessments and military plans and exercises have been obtained, which otherwise due to the lack of access to Russian military archives have been difficult to obtain. The project has also cooperated very closely with the Cold War International History Project (CHIWP) in Washington and the Parallel History Project (PHP) in Zurich. All in all the international background for understanding the Danish situation is very well covered in the report.

In Denmark the DIIS group has had access to material which is still not de-classified. It has shared information from the Danish Security Intelligence Service with the PET Commission and has been able to draw on material from the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (abbreviated FE in Danish), although there have been limitations on access to some still classified groups of material. In addition, numerous interviews have been conducted with politicians, civil servants and journalists. The exploitation of these and other material groups from, among others, the Foreign Ministry, the Defence Ministry and the Prime Minister's Office means that, even on the Danish side, there is much material included that has never been used by researchers before.

The white book is organized chronologically into three main periods: 1945-1962 (Vol. 1), 1963-1978 (Vol. 2) and 1979-1991 (Vol. 3). For each period, there are detailed analyses of the Danish security policy debate and of

the formulation of official security policy. Equally detailed are the studies into Warsaw Pact intelligence and infiltration activities directed at Denmark. The third grand theme, also pursued through all three periods, is an analysis and evaluation of the Eastern Bloc military threat, the aim of which is to present and assess threat perceptions as they appeared in the contemporary setting – for instance, how did the Defence Intelligence Service perceive of the threat in the 1960s – and to evaluate the threat on the basis of the material and knowledge at our disposal today. The last volume of the white book, Vol. 4, contains appendixes, indexes, and lists of material and literature, as well as the full conclusions of the whole report in about a hundred pages. This fine, well-presented summary of the report can be recommended as the first part to be read by those who are not sure they can manage to plough through all 2350 pages.

A particular and somewhat unusual aspect of a white book is its presentation and use of international relations (IR) theory. In Part I of Vol. 1, nearly fifty pages are used to present key theoretical concepts and assumptions, and throughout the analysis the conclusions are not only confined to empirical matters, but also cover theory.[19] This approach, in combination with the report's massive size, does not help make the white book an easy read, especially given the tendency to employ high-brow and academic language. These aspects have been criticized by Bent Jensen in particular.[20] The good thing about the systematic theoretical approach, on the other hand, is that it holds the analysis together through its many pages, helping the reader to identify and understand the more structural and systemic aspects of the Cold War, including the more structural determinants and constraints influencing Danish Cold War decision-making, as well as the overall character or orientation of Danish security policy. As such it is also a welcome antidote to the easy political catchword interpretations of Cold War policy dilemmas, precisely because it insists on evaluating and interpreting developments and actions against well-defined criteria.

There are two main theoretical or conceptual approaches applied in the report. One relates to the international level and focuses on understanding

19. DIIS, 2005b: 57 ff.

20. Bent Jensen, 'Tungen lige i munden: eller ud af vinduet', *Jyllands-Posten,* 16 September 2005.

Cold War policies in the context of the two competing concepts of system conflict and security dilemma. The second is directed towards explaining the specific character of Danish foreign policy and how it was laid down through the interplay of internal and external factors. This is done by employing adaptation theory and alliance theory.

The concepts of system conflict and security dilemma form a background for explaining why Cold War policies at the international level have been characterized by both conflict and deténte.[21] The understanding of the Cold War as a system conflict which could only be solved by overcoming the adversary has been pronounced in both East and West. Strategic doctrines and policies were designed against the background of this understanding, but for most of the conflict this approach was also – again in both East and West – mitigated by a recognition of the need to consider the costs of conflict, not least because a Cold War conflict risked escalating into a nuclear one. The report takes the view that, due to its weaker military position, Western Europe generally paid more attention and gave a higher priority to the security dilemma aspect than the USA. This difference became very acute during the 1980s, when, by applying the so-called 'Victory Strategy', the Reagan administration started to give a much higher priority to an offensive system conflict strategy, while most of NATO in Western Europe was still predominantly anchored in the formula laid down by the Harmel report of the late 1960s, stipulating that NATO policies would have both a conflict (containment) and a deténte perspective. The report shows that the Victory Strategy was never fully communicated to or endorsed by the Western European allies and that the strategy itself was highly risky – in fact, so risky that from the mid-1980s the Reagan administration started to tone it down again.[22] There are elements in this analysis which have been severely criticized, to which I return below, but generally speaking the application of the concepts of system conflict and security dilemma has functioned admirably and has created an excellent platform for understanding the different orientations within NATO, not least during the first half of the 1980s.

On the Eastern side, Warsaw Pact policies were determined by the fact

21. DIIS, 2005b: 58-79; 2005e: 14 ff.
22. DIIS, 2005d: 469-495, 629 ff.; 2005e: 52 ff.

that the Satellites realized that the Soviet Union would not tolerate any political defection which threatened its grip over Eastern Europe. Seen from Moscow control over Eastern Europe was a vital national security interest. This view had been shaped by historical experience, but it was also rooted in a Soviet understanding of the Cold War as a system conflict between East and West, between socialism and capitalism. However, as in the West, Soviet policy was not immune to the security dilemma, and despite the fact that official doctrine continued to regard the two systems as irreconcilable, Khruschev's doctrine of peaceful co-existence developed an ideological platform for a security policy paying attention to the security dilemma. In practice the Soviet Union had done that even under Stalin.

Seen from the overall perspective, it is the conclusion of the DIIS report that in general the Soviet Union pursued a rather cautious policy towards the West.[23] The report found no indication that the Warsaw Pact at any time intended to launch an unprovoked attack. Warsaw Pact strategy was first and foremost directed towards reacting to an attack from the West. However, any such reaction would have to be swift and offensive by projecting the core battle into NATO territory. In the 1960s this strategy involved the use of heavy nuclear weapons from the outset, including against Denmark, the occupation of which as the report details on the basis on many new findings – was entrusted to Polish forces. In the 1970s, DIIS concludes, the Warsaw Pact seems to have changed its nuclear strategy, making the use of nuclear weapons conditional on actual or intended Western first use.

Various elements of this general interpretation have also encountered strong criticism, as will be demonstrated below. This is equally true of the report's grand interpretation of what ended the Cold War. Internationally, this is a large and still ongoing debate, involving politicians, high-ranking military personnel and civil servants, as well as historians and political scientists from various theoretical and historiographical schools. It is not entirely clear why the research group has decided to take a stake in this debate, as it is hardly called for in its mandate, and it is obvious that its interpretation will not be the last word. However, the basic tenets of the report's interpretation appear generally sound, namely that the main explanation

23. See the conclusions on Soviet policy in DIIS, 2005e: 14 ff., 47-58.

for the end of the conflict must be found in the long years of stagnation and the growing technological backwardness of the Soviet economy. This explanation is accompanied by two subsidiary ones focusing on the impact of Western political ideas and the USA policy of strength. The first took the form of CSCE policies and Brandt's Ostpolitik, which induced the Soviet leadership to be more accommodating and to have more confidence in Western policies. US strength policies, on the other hand, by insisting on the modernisation of nuclear weapons, the development of the SDI ('Star Wars') project and a general increase in the economic, political and psychological pressure applied to the Evil Empire, undermined the Soviet elite's belief in its own system's ability to cope with the challenges of the West, not least the technological challenges created by the revolution in information technology.[24]

Turning to Danish security policy, the theoretical tools applied here are adaptation theory in a modified version of the classic model developed by James Rosenau, combined with Glenn Snyder's alliance theory.[25] According to the modified adaptation theory, the foreign policy of a given state may take four main forms (modes): balance policy, dominance policy, quiescence policy or acquiescence policy. These different policy modes are conditioned by a state's ability to influence the external environment (its influence capability) and its ability to neutralize or encapsulate external pressures (its stress sensitivity), and are composed of a number of specific strategies. The report links this notion to Snyder's concept of the alliance dilemma, as it applies the various modes and their associated strategies to policies within his two policy games: the alliance game and the adversary game, i.e. policies towards one's allies and towards the perceived enemy respectively. This coupling establishes a relatively firm criterion for measuring the character of Danish security policy in comparison with the policies of other states, as well as when comparing policy changes over time, i.e. through the three time periods into which the report subdivides its analysis.

The report's conclusion is that, throughout the entire period, Danish security policy rested firmly within a balance mode in both the alliance game

24. DIIS, 2005d: 35-69; 2005e: 39 f.
25. DIIS, 2005b: 79 ff.; 2005e: 17 ff.

and the adversary game. Within each of the four main modes, a state can pursue several security strategies – which may at times be contradictory both within each of the two games and in the interplay between the two game situations. For instance, a commitment strategy in the alliance game may be combined with a (limited) defection strategy within that same game, as well as with a (limited) concession strategy in the adversary game. But there is a big difference according to whether such policies are pursued within the overall setting of a balance policy or within an acquiescence policy. A balance policy entails a large element of 'quid pro quo' and is therefore neither passive nor acquiescent. According to the DIIS report, concessions to the Soviet Union and defections from alliance policies – for instance, the ban on US bases or nuclear weapons on Danish soil – were eclipsed by Denmark's manifest backing of NATO policies in general and its rejection of Soviet Union pressure, so that Danish policy, although balancing, tended to become increasingly integrated into the Western alliance over time, both politically and militarily.[26]

All the same, the report also concludes that the approach to Danish security policy changed over time, among other things in response to international Cold War temperatures and the perceived level of threat to Danish security. Thus, security policy during the confrontational phase of the First Cold War from 1949 to 1962 is described as being based on an instinctive consensus, whereas consensus during the détente-oriented period from 1963 to 1978 is branded rational consensus because consensus in this period was less dominant, more diffuse and quite ad hoc in orientation. In the third period from 1979 to 1991, the international threat level escalated again, but without a corresponding tightening of consensus. As the report sees it, a minimal consensus on NATO membership and defence policy was upheld, but otherwise two different approaches and policy formulations took shape, defined by different assessments of the Cold War threat and therefore also of the responses to it. One is represented by the bourgeois Schlüter government (from 1982), who still perceived the Warsaw Pact as the biggest threat and therefore wanted to strengthen Denmark's solidarity with NATO. The second is represented mainly by the Social Democrats (and

26. DIIS, 2005b: 719 f.; 2005c: 731 ff.; 2005d: 632 ff.; 2005e: 17 ff., 87-103.

the left generally), which regarded the arms race and the increasing tensions between the power blocs as the main threats to peace and stability.[27]

This major division was linked first and foremost to NATO's INF double-track decision of 1979, with the Schlüter government being more accommodating to the American push for deployment of new intermediate nuclear missiles, and with the Social Democrats – cooperating intensely on this issue with other European socialist parties in the so-called Scandilux cooperation – insisting on bringing the second leg of the double-track decision into play.[28] According to this second leg, INF deployment would only happen if East-West negotiations failed to ease tensions and resolve the INF problem. In the eyes of the Social Democrats, the USA and NATO were not taking their commitment to negotiate seriously enough, while the latter, supported by the Danish government, saw deployment as the only way of countering the new generation of Soviet SS 20 INFs, as well as bringing the Soviet Union to a realistic negotiating stance. It was on the basis of this divide that the Danish government, as a minority government, was instructed to have footnotes inserted into NATO documents.

The recurring clash over the footnote policy, both past and present, owes much to the fact that a Social Democratic government was in charge when the double-track decision was originally agreed in NATO in 1979 – without Danish opposition or footnotes. Therefore vociferous accusations have been made that the Social Democrats were acting from party-political motives when they opposed NATO polices once they had left the government, or alternatively or additionally that the party's policy was an outright example of appeasement of the Soviet Union. The report does not endorse these accusations or interpretations, at least not unconditionally, but writes instead:

> On the question whether the Danish INF footnotes represented an appeasement or acquiescence policy in relation to the Soviet Union, it is

27. DIIS, 2005e: 87-103. The report claims (ibid.:89) that the left-wing approach can in fact be dissolved into three approaches: one represented by the Danish Communist Party, being more or less an echo of Soviet policy; a second represented by the non-Social Democratic left-wing and the peace movements, sharing a fundamentally anti-militaristic attitude; and a third one represented by the Social Democrats. It is the Social Democratic variant which is presented here in this article.

28. The INF intermezzo is treated in great detail in DIIS, 2005d: 71-131, 203-285.

> the view of the report that this was not the case. The INF footnotes may, of course, be analysed in the context of both domestic policy and of the negotiation strategy of the alliance – which they have also been – but they may also be seen as a reaction to Reagan's rhetoric and the US policy of strength, which were then the visible signs of that Victory Strategy we can discern today. Thus, the footnotes may be interpreted as an indirect attempt to support the equilibrium and cooperation strategy which, during the last couple of decades, had functioned as NATO acquis and had been, especially for the Europeans, the preferred grand strategy – a strategy that cannot be seen as an expression of appeasement.[29]

Apart from the fact that this quote gives an indication of the rather 'difficult' language that is often used in the report, the overall assessment presented here inserts the Danish footnote policy into a larger international framework which downgrades domestic policy as a major explanation for the policy and in reality rejects the accusation that the footnotes can be seen as a form of appeasement of the Soviet Union. The report also stressed that a plausible explanation for the Social Democratic shift to a more critical stance towards the double-track decision is related to the very fact that American policy changed rather dramatically from the period between 1979, when the Social Democratic government had endorsed the decision, and 1981-82, when the party went into opposition. As mentioned above, the report also stresses that the increasing level of scepticism towards the implementation of the double-track decision was not a uniquely Danish response, but had its parallels among many other West European Social Democratic parties.

On the other hand, on other controversial issues, such as the establishment of a Nordic nuclear-free zone or the increased pressure on NATO vessels visiting Danish harbours to declare whether they carried nuclear weapons, the confrontation had no international parallel. Here the report is more severe in its judgement of the alternative majority, and especially Social Democratic policies. With regard to the first policy, it argues that the party increasingly found itself in a position of 'argumentative self-fixation',

29. DIIS, 2005e: 93 f.

without any international backing. With regard to the second policy, domestic partisan politics is emphasised as a key factor in explaining how the party came to support a policy which, if carried through, would have meant the ending of allied visits to Danish ports. This would have threatened essential plans to send allied help to Denmark in the event of war and thus maybe even the country's NATO membership. In 1988 this latter controversy finally made the government declare that enough was enough when it called parliamentary elections, which eventually produced a new bourgeois government with the participation of *Det Radikale Venstre,* leading to the collapse of the alternative majority.[30]

It is hardly surprising, therefore, if the report concludes that the INF debacle in Denmark did not have any impact on the international development of the Cold War. More interesting is the conclusion that the breakdown of the security policy consensus in the 1980s 'to some degree' negatively affected Denmark's position and influence within NATO.[31] This is a guarded verdict that may be altered or expressed more firmly when Western archives covering the period are opened. Despite the very impressive and solid documentary basis of the report, interpretations and conclusions will undoubtedly be modified or strengthened when, in five to ten years' time, decision-making documents from NATO and the great allied powers will begin to be declassified. However, until then, and looking even further ahead, this white book will be indispensable for students of Danish debates and policy during the Cold War. Through the localization and use of new and wide-ranging archival material, as well as a much more systematic analysis of many published sources such as the public debate in Denmark during the footnote period, the report has erased more than a couple of black spots on the Danish Cold War map. At the same time, with its nearly 2500 pages, it offers the most comprehensive coverage of Danish Cold War history to be found, and it is difficult at present to imagine any work in the future being able to challenge that position.

30. DIIS, 2005e: 94 ff.
31. DIIS, 2005e: 102.

'PEACE AND NO DANGER': THE DEBATE ON THE WHITE BOOK

The publication of the DIIS white book has generated an enormous and intense debate. There are two main reasons for this. The first is related to the fact that, as shown above, part of the history of the Cold War still forms part of contemporary party politics. The largest daily in Denmark, Jyllands-Posten, which has been prominent in the bourgeois Kulturkampf mobilization, produced a series of long articles in the weeks leading up to the publication of the report on 30 June, reminding everybody directly or indirectly that the scene was set for a detailed mapping out of Warsaw Pact espionage activities and infiltration in Denmark, as well as a reckoning with the Pact's alleged left-wing fellow-travellers. The second reason for the intensity of the debate lies precisely in the fact that the report did not really deliver what was expected by Jyllands-Posten and other Kulturkämpfer. As the newspaper weekly Weekendavisen saw it, it conveyed rather a picture of Denmark living in 'peace and no danger' during the Cold War.[32]

This last allegation is a gross exaggeration because the report scrutinizes the threats to Danish security in great detail. On the other hand, it also supports the view that the Soviet Union was not unambiguously aggressive, that the US Victory Strategy of the 1980s was dangerous from a security point of view, that the Eastern Bloc was not very successful in recruiting Danish informers and spies, nor influencing the Danish political agenda, and that the footnote policy was not primarily the product of appeasement and partisan politics, at least not concerning the showdown over the INF. Thus, the general picture conveyed by the report is that it takes two to tango, and that the origins and dynamics of the Cold War cannot be adequately explained by just singling out the Soviet Union as the bad boy in the school playground. This is so even though the report by no means downplays the importance of the fact that one side in the systemic conflict was headed by a totalitarian superpower dictatorship, the other by a superpower democracy. The tango metaphor is also applied to the domestic scene, since the footnote clash is treated as a dance performed and perpetuated by two different parties. The consequent insistence by the report that Danish developments should be

32. 'Fred og ingen fare', *Weekendavisen,* 1-7 July 2005.

linked to the international agenda, and that events in Denmark itself were not all that exceptional and important, have probably also contributed to a feeling that the lines between right and wrong, between black and white, had been blurred.

Immediately on publication the Social Democrats and the left felt that they had been vindicated by the report, especially concerning the footnote period.[33] Some even used the occasion to demand that the Prime Minister, Fogh Rasmussen, issue a public apology for his earlier statements on left-wing betrayal and fellow travelling, a gesture he adamantly refused to make.[34] However, it was quite obvious, judged by the reaction of the bourgeois parties and the media, that they had taken a blow, if only because the report did not deliver what they had expected. Former Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen was uncharacteristically thrown on to the defensive and had to argue that the report gave ample proof of the fact that, had it not been for his and his government's firm pro-alliance policy during the footnote period, Denmark's loss of prestige and influence in the Western alliance would have been much greater. To support his claim, he was especially fond of quoting from the conclusion to Vol. 4, where it was stated that 'the government, especially in the eyes of its major allies, was considered a bulwark against the 'chaos power' [exercised] by the security policy majority'.[35] The most extreme rhetorical assault on the report was delivered by one of Denmark's leading military historians, Michael Clemmesen, who, at a press conference at the Defence Academy in Copenhagen, characterized it as being so utterly senseless that one was tempted to believe that the research group had been smoking pot while writing it.[36]

Such strong denunciation is more telling of the emotional disappoint-

33. Erik Beukel, who as a senior researcher participated in the DIIS investigation, has published an excellent presentation of the DIIS Report and the debate on it during the first four months after publication (Beukel, 2005).

34. 'Den Kolde Krig: Politisk opgør om kold krig', *Politiken,* 1 July 2005; 'Venstrefløj til modangreb efter koldkrigsrapport', *Berlingske Tidende,* 1 July 2005; 'Den kolde krig: Fogh: 'Glem alt' om undskyldning', *Jyllands-Posten,* 5 July 2005.

35. Quote from DIIS, 2005e: 101. See also interview with Ellemann-Jensen, 'Man skal bedømme vores handlinger ud fra det, vi troede at vide', *Politiken,* 1 July 2005. Of the many politicians of the footnote period who have commented on the report, Ellemann-Jensen and the former chairman of the Socialist People's Party, Gert Petersen, have been the most nuanced in their reception of it, maybe because they actually seem to have read most of it.

36. 'Den kolde krig er blevet varm mellem forskere', *Berlingske Tidende,* 1 September 2005.

ment with the report in some quarters than of the quality of its research. In the initial phase after publication, there was no lack of strong rhetorical criticism, though often a pronounced lack of substance to back it. However, gradually a more serious and interesting challenge of some of its findings surfaced. Such a challenge was in any case to be expected, as it is rare for researchers producing such a massive work on a controversial historical topic not to encounter criticism and opposition. It is impossible to go into detail regarding this discussion, but four items will briefly be touched on. Two of these relate to the criticism directed against two of the more general interpretations in the report concerning the footnotes and the threats emanating from Soviet strategic planning. Two minor and more specific issues, the reaction to the consequences of the so-called Able Archer NATO exercise in 1983 and the interpretation of an interview with the former Danish Ambassador to the USA, Eigil Jørgensen, will also be discussed.

The grand old man of research into Danish security policy during the Cold War, Professor Emeritus Nikolaj Petersen, who is also the author of Vol. 6 of the recently published Danish Foreign Policy History, has criticised the report for paying too little attention to the Soviet threat and for being too apologetic and imprecise in dealing with Social Democratic policy during the footnote period.[37] Petersen makes some particularly strong observations regarding the second issue. In his view, it is too simplistic to act as if there were only two security policy cultures or grand strategies in the West during the 1980s. In addition to the US Victory Strategy and the European equilibrium and détente strategy, one must add a third – a revisionist strategy like the American one – namely that of the Euro-Social Democrats. Whereas the strategy pursued by European governments tried to strike a balance between system conflict and the security dilemma, Petersen makes the valuable point that the Social Democrats of the period were so eager to give priority to the security dilemma that they more or less forgot about the system conflict aspects. The weak Social Democratic support for the dissidents in Eastern Europe, a tendency to equate the goals and behaviour of the two superpowers and a growing discontent with NATO's nuclear strategies are given as examples of this tendency.

37. Nikolaj Petersen, 'Koldkrigskrigen', *Politiken,* 10 January 2006.

As Petersen concludes, these observations are not trivial because they have a bearing on the whole discussion of whether the Social Democrats, and Danes in general, could be considered loyal NATO allies. It is a great achievement of the DIIS report to have demonstrated that the divergence between US and European strategic concepts of the 1980s made it difficult to pinpoint what exactly NATO doctrine consisted of and therefore also made it harder to align oneself with the core of NATO policies. But Petersen also certainly has a point when he stresses that the report, 'in a nearly post-modern way', complicates away the meaning of alliance solidarity.

A somewhat similar trend is noticeable in relation to the analysis of the domestic side of the footnote policy. It is Petersen's view that internal, party-political factors do not receive the attention they deserve. This allegation is misleading if by it is meant that this dimension is treated cursorily or superficially by the research group. On the contrary, it is treated in great detail in Vol. 3, Chapters 61 to 72. The problem again is, rather, that the analysis is so nuanced, with so much detail, that the thread of the argument tends to disappear. Thus, it is very difficult to reach a clear understanding of the precise role of party-political considerations as a determinant of the Social Democratic security policy of the 1980s. The picture is much clearer, in fact, in the interpretation Petersen offers in his history of foreign policy.[38]

Following his initial, very strong rhetorical attacks on the report, Clemmesen eventually produced a long paper entitled (in translation) 'The Cold War White Book and Denmark in the Cold War'.[39] The paper is very loose and tentative in its structure, and a large part of the criticism it voices is rather difficult to assess due to a lack of substantiation. However, it is clear that Clemmesen would have liked the research group to have included the views of more military and strategic experts and would also have preferred it to have undertaken a more military operative-dynamic analysis to supplement the analysis of the military threat scenarios. Nobody, not even the DIIS group it self, denies that these two demands could have added to

38. Petersen, 2004: 270-359. In some respects DIIS senior researcher Erik Beukel's presentation (Beukel, 2005) of the DIIS report also contains a clearer interpretation of the domestic aspects related to the footnote period.

39. Clemmesen, 2005.

the quality of the analysis.[40] But due to a lack of access to both Russian military archives and classified Danish operational material, the DIIS group decided not to include an operative-dynamic analysis. What the DIIS has basically done is to analyse capabilities, plans and intentions, which, everything being considered, seems a reasonable priority.

However, Clemmesen raises one major objection which it is worth considering further. In his view the report does not properly address the inherent dangers and threats emanating from the very offensive character of the Warsaw Pact's strategy. Clemmesen also agrees that during the Cold War the Soviet Union was not aiming to launch an unprovoked war or planning preemptive attacks. All the same, as the DIIS report demonstrates in much detail, in a conflict situation the Eastern strategy was to seize the initiative from the start and project the battle into NATO territory. Until the 1970s such a conflict might have involved the use of nuclear weapons from the outset, but the Warsaw Pact then modified its nuclear approach, making the use of such weapons conditional on NATO first use or preparations for first use.

Clemmesen is not fully convinced that the Warsaw Pact actually modified their planning concerning the first use of nuclear weapons in the 1970s, though he produces no conclusive evidence undermining the DIIS interpretation.[41] However, he is on firmer ground when he draws attention to the fact that wars do not necessarily erupt on the basis of orderly analysis and planning. As he argues, it is perfectly conceivable that a war might arise out of miscalculation and a misreading of the adversary's intentions, in which case the Eastern strategy would be a problem. Thus, the offensive strategy might in fact have led the Warsaw Pact to escalate a conflict situation into actual warfare as a means of seizing the initiative from the very start. According to Clemmesen such a scenario is made more plausible by the fundamental inclination of the Soviet military and strategic culture, which was very offensively oriented and could have proved very critical during the heightened tension of the first half of 1980s, when weak political leadership was unlikely to have been able to control the military fully. This same type of argument can be applied to the question of the first use of nuclear

40. In response to Michael Clemmesen's initial criticism of the report, the DIIS group produced a reply in paper form (DIIS, 2005f).

41. Clemmesen, 2005: 43 ff.

weapons. In a conflict situation escalating into war like the one just mentioned, the Warsaw Pact's generals might easily have found themselves in a situation in which a combination of informational uncertainty about the nuclear responses of the West and its offensive inclinations would have induced them to use nuclear weapons first.[42]

This type of reasoning merits further investigation and more than is allocated to it by the DIIS report, but it would be doing an injustice to the DIIS researchers to claim that they do not address these aspects. Actually, in the conclusion to Vol. 4, this is made very clear: 'As a consequence of the fact that Soviet Union war plans were based on an offensive strategy, Denmark, Norway and West Germany came to live with the fact that a potential military threat was a basic condition for those states located in the operational area of the Soviet war machine. If the Soviet Union had opted for a more defensive model as it did under Gorbachev from 1987... the Warsaw Pact would have been perceived as much less of a threat'.[43]

This discussion of potential Soviet reactions is especially pertinent to the period of tension during the so-called Second Cold War of the 1980s. The DIIS report convincingly demonstrates how the USA shifted during this phase to the offensive grand strategy called the Victory Strategy. The year 1983 is singled out by the DIIS report as a year of particular tension and confrontation, and a great deal of attention is dedicated to analysing the Soviet reaction to the so-called Able Archer NATO nuclear exercise of that year.[44] The report concludes that the Able Archer exercise so alarmed the Soviet military that nuclear air forces in East Germany, Poland and the Baltic military district were put on heightened alert. This interpretation has been vigorously challenged by Jens Gregersen, a former analyst of the FE and an active participant on the bourgeois side in the Cold War media clash. Gregersen claims that the DIIS lacks the source evidence to argue that Warsaw Pact forces were actually put on nuclear alert in response to Able Archer 1983, just as he does not believe in the theory of widespread panic and crisis in Moscow due to Able Archer 1983 in particular, nor to the heightened tensions in general during the early 1980s.

42. Clemmesen, 2005: 35-55.
43. DIIS, 2005e: 64.
44. The Able Archer exercise is mainly treated by DIIS, 2005d, Chapters 59, 78 and 79.

Gregersen's views are set out in their greatest detail in a paper published by the Danish Defence Academy.[45] In this Gregersen convincingly demonstrates that a great deal of the international literature on the Able Archer incident – literature which is also essential as sources for the DIIS interpretation – is to a great extent a victim to what one must term 'circle reference dependency'. Although researchers of the incident often refer to the analysis of other researchers, all the analyses are really based on more or less the same scanty evidence. The DIIS researchers also rely strongly on a CIA intelligence estimate from 1984[46] mentioning the alert, but again the validity of the estimate, not least concerning the causal link between the alert and Able Archer, has been seriously questioned, even by the CIA itself. Renowned Cold War experts like Woytech Mastny and Raymond Garthoff also have serious doubts today about how the whole affair should be understood. In combining all these details, Gregersen makes a strong case when he insists that the DIIS has treated the incident too uncritically.[47]

While the DIIS interpretation of the Able Archer exercise must be considered rather shaky, Gregersen has less to support him when he claims that his findings must also result in a complete re-evaluation by DIIS of its account of the feeling of crisis and encirclement that arose in Moscow due to the intensification of the Cold War conflict in this period. Gregersen is particularly critical of the interpretation given to the large-scale Soviet intelligence operation initiated in 1981 under the code name RYAN. The DIIS interpretation sees the operation as being mainly determined by Soviet fear of increasing American aggressiveness, but Gregersen makes the interesting suggestion that the operation was mainly a propaganda exercise initiated for domestic political reasons. This interpretation is definitely worth pursuing further, though Gregersen has by no means convincingly documented his position. He claims that the DIIS research group gets things embarrassing-

45. Gregersen, 2005.

46. CIA intelligence estimate, SNIE 11-10-84/JX.

47. A similar criticism of jumping to conclusions without reliable documentation has been raised against the report's treatment of the so-called Swedish submarine affair (see DIIS, 2005d: 487-492; 2005e: 53). Based on comments by former US Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger and research carried out by Swedish peace researcher Ole Tunander, the report accepts that Western submarines operated in Swedish waters in order to test Swedish anti-submarine defences and that the Soviet Union was therefore, at least partly, unjustly blamed for the intrusions. Danish and Swedish navy officers have categorically rejected this interpretation.

ly wrong because it analyses RYAN without any regard for the domestic Soviet context, but he himself seems to be singularly blind to the fact that some of the Russian sources that support the domestic ploy theory may be equally biased, due to a wish to establish a distance from the Moscow paranoia of the early 1980s. At the present level of documentation there is ample evidence, as conveyed by the DIIS report, to suggest that the Soviet leadership in fact became increasingly preoccupied and alarmed over the Reagan administration's new-found willingness to challenge and provoke the Evil Empire and that RYAN must be seen in the light of this development. On the other hand, it is well recognised that historical events are often better explained multi-causally than mono-causally, which leaves room for further research into the relevance of the Soviet domestic dimensions of RYAN.

In one instance, an objection to the analysis led DIIS to change, or rather delete, five lines of the report. Concluding its account of the dilemma of the Schlüter government over how to navigate between its own political inclinations to safeguard Denmark's position within NATO and the demands of the alternative majority, the report claims: 'It can be documented that, in order to cut itself loose from the dilemma, it [the Schlüter government] was active in fostering a stronger foreign critique (of Denmark) and that briefings of (Parliament's) Foreign Policy Committee were biased in the direction of negatively exaggerating the responses of foreign governments'.[48] Indirectly this interpretation indicates that the Schlüter government was manipulating and misinforming public opinion and the parliament. Therefore, it is hardly a surprise that it has been countered although the report in the overall conclusion of vol. 4 does not claim that the government pursued a policy of general manipulation and misinformation.

It was the former Danish Ambassador to the USA, Eigil Jørgensen, who openly challenged this interpretation. He did so during a meeting organised by the Danish Association for Contemporary History Research (abbreviated SSF in Danish), at which the DIIS researchers were invited to present their report and to debate its contents with other scholars and with former 'practitioners' like Jørgensen. The latter opposed the interpretation because he had the feeling that it was based at least partly on an interview he had given

48. DIIS, 2005d: 600.

to the DIIS research group. Assuming this to be the case, he considered the interpretation to be a misrepresentation of what he had said. DIIS admitted that Jørgensen's interview had indeed been an important reference for the interpretation and therefore decided in consultation with the DIIS board to disown it and to delete it from future editions of the report.[49]

This episode is interesting because it represents an example of how eyewitnesses may, after the event, influence the interpretation of an interview they have granted previously. Such an intervention may, of course, do justice to the truth by correcting an obvious interpretative mistake by historians or by clarifying something which was left imprecise in the interview. But the possibility also exists that an eyewitness may become frightened of his own shadow when he sees what his statements have achieved and therefore finds it opportune to distance himself from the interview and interpretations of it. In this specific case the DIIS distanced itself from its own interpretation, and indeed it could hardly do anything else because Jørgensen is still the main witness to the policies Denmark pursued in Washington. But again it is not impossible that the original interpretation may be reactivated when US archive material covering the period is de-classified and we can test Jørgensen's version of the story against it.

This incident highlights the fact that historical research and writing constitute an on-going process, a view also stressed by many of those who have engaged in the debate over the DIIS report in the hope that their interpretations will be vindicated by further research. Perhaps they will, perhaps not. Cold War studies are still far from matching John Gaddis's 1997 end-of-history research claim that 'We now know'.[50] In fact, there is still a great deal we do not know about either the Cold War internationally or – despite the tremendous efforts of the DIIS – its implications for Denmark specifically.

49. This author was present when, on 16 September 2005 at the SSF meeting in Copenhagen, Jørgensen criticised the use made of his statements in the interview with DIIS. See also the coverage of the event in 'Konklusioner på et for tyndt grundlag', *Jyllands-Posten,* 17 September 2005; 'Rapport om den kolde krig ændres', *Politiken,* 18 September 2005.

50. Gaddis, 1997.

TRUTH ON DEMAND (2): THE RECENT ROUND

During the budget negotiations in 2004, the Danish People's Party and Jesper Langballe committed the government to discussing the need for further Cold War research after the DIIS report had been published. This agreement was, as claimed above, tantamount to giving Langballe a right of veto if he did not like the report. And indeed, he did not like what he read in it when it was finally published on 30 June 2005, or rather, he did not like what he heard about it. To Politiken he stated his view as follows:

> The report has met scathing criticism. That's no wonder. It's a boring book. None of us have bothered to read it. It has some valuable information, but it is so strangely devoid of perspective. It treats the external threat scenario, but it does not treat what I consider exciting, namely the state of opinion – from top to bottom in Denmark.[51]

Against the background of this denunciation, it was hardly surprising that the Danish People's Party invoked the 2004 Budget agreement as the basis for claiming more funding for research into the situation of Denmark in the Cold War. Despite the fact that the results of the PET Commission were still to be published and that Professor Bent Jensen had not completed his work either – as well as the fact that historians financed by the Carlsberg Foundation had just published two major volumes on the history of Danish foreign policy covering the period 1945-2003 – Langballe and the Danish People's Party claimed that there was still an urgent need for a free and independent study of the Cold War in Denmark. As a result the budget negotiations in the autumn of 2005 produced DKK 10 m. for further Cold War studies. This time there was no obvious candidate to bestow the money on, but the idea to create a Cold War Research Centre caught the imagination. Thus, a group of historians from all the universities sent a letter of interest to the Ministry for Science, Technology and Innovation, indicating that they would cooperate to create such a centre, as did the Defence Academy.[52]

51. 'Kampen om historien: Den Kolde Krig er stadig varm', *Politiken,* 12 November 2005.
52. 'Nyt bud på et koldkrigscenter', *Jyllands-Posten,* 17 December 2005; Nikolaj Petersen, 'Historien sat på plads', *Weekendavisen,* 10 February 2006.

The final outcome, decided on in late January, was a most peculiar compromise adding new dimensions to the understanding of the word 'Innovation' in the title of the Ministry. Thus, in consultations with the Danish People's Party, the following commission was thrashed out, which it is worth quoting at some length:

> The aim is to produce a clear and easy (overskuelig) piece of work which can be profitably read by non-experts and thus provide the general public with an insight into the results of the research. The work must be based on historical research of the highest international standards.
> Particular attention must be devoted to the differences of principle in politics, the media, including the cultural debate in its widest understanding – or in short, into opinion formation, its domestic and foreign sources of inspiration, and its development during the period.
> In consideration of the results produced by the DIIS report on Denmark during the Cold War (2005), research must, among other things, further clarify Eastern bloc influence on Danish decision-makers and aspects of the military threat directed against Denmark and the Baltic. However, the military threat scenario is not to be researched specifically, but should be based on existing Danish and international research.[53]

In itself it is, of course, quite remarkable that this mandate replicates in many ways what is already covered by the DIIS report, including especially Eastern Bloc attempts to influence opinion formation in Denmark, as well as what is being covered by the other, still ongoing projects. Even more striking is the very detailed prescription of how the differences in principle of politics and opinion-building must be focused, as well as how research should be conducted according to 'the highest international standards', while aspects related to the 'military threat scenario' are not to be researched 'specifically' through the exploitation of primary sources. This mandate is at best inconsistent and at worst represents an ambition to mastermind the research outcome politically.

53. Press release of 26 January 2006, quoted from the homepage of the Danish Ministry for Science, Technology and Innovation. Online: [http://www.videnskabsministeriet.dk/cgi-bin/doc-show.cgi?doc_id=266590&doc_type=35] (accessed 06-04-06).

However, the most peculiar thing about this saga is that the Ministry and Langballe decided to hand the project over to the yet to be established Danish Institute for Military Studies at the Defence Academy, a Ministry of Defence institution. There is no advance, in-house expertise on the civil and domestic side of the political-cultural and opinion-building aspects of the Cold War conflict in this environment. Certainly the Defence Academy had previously voiced its interest in accommodating the project, but that interest was based on the assumption that the military threat scenario would be the main focus of the project, as stated in the original budget decision of early November 2005. In that decision, the military threat scenario in the Baltic and Eastern Bloc influence on Danish decision-makers were singled out as the two main topics for investigation.[54] In light of the final mandate, the former Brigader General and military historian at the Defence Academy, Michael Clemmesen, has expressed his disappointment that the new Centre will not be directing primary research into the military threat scenarios in the Baltic, as well as his bafflement that the planned Cold War Centre will be located in an institution that does not specialize in the area that is the primary focus of the mandate.[55]

The real reason for the Defence Academy being singled out to host the new centre is probably that Langballe did not want to risk having it transferred to one of the universities. As Langballe has put it, the aim this time is to ensure that the research is 'totally free', because, he argues: 'If it were located in the universities, it would be subjected to control by the University Boards and thus the research would be less free. Now the Centre will have its own Board guaranteeing independence, and we will have the free and wide-ranging investigation we have been aiming at from the start'.[56]

The reader may be excused for thinking that the repeated use of words like 'free' and 'independent' recalls Orwellian Newspeak. How a board of five individuals appointed by Defence Minister Søren Gade will be a firmer guarantee of 'free and independent' research than university researchers appointed by their peers on the basis of professional merit is obviously difficult to

54. 'Historieskrivning: Udsigt til flere koldkrigsundersøgelser', *Jyllands-Posten,* 8 November 2005.

55. 'Fri forskning: Mystik om koldkrigscenter', *Information,* 2 February 2006.

56. Quoted from 'Fri forskning: Mystik om koldkrigscenter', *Information*, 2 February 2006.

grasp. In itself this is, of course, a strong testimony to how far the declared Kulturkampf has moved in the direction of shattering confidence between the politicians and the universities and in undermining the so-called 'arm's length' principle which has traditionally ensured that political interference in research activities in Denmark has been kept at bay.

On the other hand, one must also acknowledge that the actual research that has been carried out so far under the present 'History on Demand regime' has fully lived up to non-political, professional research standards. And not only that, the strong attention given to Cold War History has produced excellent reports and publications in a short time – of which the DIIS report is merely the latest – which have greatly enriched our understanding of the Cold War conflict and Denmark's involvement in it. What this research has not clarified, nor should it try to, is which security positions and policies were morally right. Historians should be encouraged to engage in such debates, but like the heated discussion over which policy should have prevailed during the German occupation of Denmark in 1940-1945, the debate over which were the 'right' or 'correct' Cold War policies cannot be solved unequivocally or conclusively by historians. They can merely qualify the debate by marking out the playing field and analysing – some would say 'de-constructing' – the rules and choreography of the game. Even if they do no more, it still leaves ample room for discussion among 'free and independent' researchers.

It would be a great step forward if present-day politicians could accept this and show sufficient confidence in the profession that research allocation might return to the principle of the best woman first rather than the 'right' man first.

REFERENCES

Beukel, Erik (2005), 'DIIS' udredning om Danmark under den kolde krig og den efterfølgende mediedebat', *Politologiske skrifter,* vol. 14, Odense: University of Southern Denmark. Online: [http://www.sam.sdu.dk/politics/publikationer/05Beukel14.pdf] (accessed 05-04-2006).

Clemmesen, Michael (2005), 'Koldkrigsudredningen og Danmark i Den Kolde Krig', *Forum for Forsvarsstudier,* Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence

College. Online: [http://forsvaret.dk/NR/rdonlyres/E04493CE-7365-46F9-8074-760AF30723CA/0/Koldkrigsudredningen_samlet_net.pdf] (accessed 05-04-2006).

DIIS (2005a), *Danmark under den Kolde Krig. Den sikkerhedspolitiske situation 1945-1991* (Denmark During the Cold War. National Security Policy and the International Environment 1945-1991), DIIS Report, vols. 1-4, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). Online: [http://www.koldkrigsudredningen.dk/] (accessed 05-04-2006). A short summary in English is available and may be obtained from DIIS.

DIIS (2005b), '1945-1962', vol. 1 in the DIIS Report *Danmark under den kolde krig: den sikkerhedspolitiske situation 1945-1991,* Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS).

DIIS (2005c), '1963-1978', vol. 2 in the DIIS Report *Danmark under den kolde krig: den sikkerhedspolitiske situation 1945-1991,* Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS).

DIIS (2005d), '1979-1991, vol. 3 in the DIIS Report *Danmark under den kolde krig: den sikkerhedspolitiske situation 1945-1991,* Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS).

DIIS (2005e), 'Konklusioner og Bilag', vol. 4 in the DIIS Report *Danmark under den kolde krig: den sikkerhedspolitiske situation 1945-1991,* Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS).

DIIS (2005f), 'DIIS's svar på kritik af udredningen om 'Danmark under den kolde krig", presented at a seminar on the report on September 16 organised by the Danish Association for Contemporary History Research, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). Online: [http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Books2005/Koldkrig/diis_svar_paa_kritik3.pdf] (accessed 05-04-2006).

DUPI (1997), *Grønland under den kolde krig: Dansk og amerikansk sikkerhedspolitik 1945-1968* (Greenland During the Cold War: Danish and American Security Policy, 1945-1968), vol. 1 (Presentation) and vol. 2 (Documents), Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs (DUPI). See also separate English summary (51 p.) entitled *Greenland During the Cold War: Danish and American Security Policy, 1945-1968.*

Ellemann-Jensen, Uffe (2005), Fodfejl: *Da Danmark svigtede under Den Kolde Krig,* 2. ed., Copenhagen: Gyldendal.

Gaddis, John L. (1997), *We now Know: Rethinking Cold War History,* New York: Oxford University Press.

Gregersen, Jens (2005), 'Able Archer 1983 og koldkrigsudredningen', *Forum for Forsvarsstudier,* December 2005, Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College. Online: [http://forsvaret.dk/NR/rdonlyres/B7245A21-461C-465E-ABE6-4249E2220B1A/0/AbleArcher1983ogKoldkrigsudredningenNET.pdf] (accessed 05-04-2006).

Jensen, Bent (2002), *GULAG og glemsel. Ruslands tragedie og Vestens hukommelsestab i det 20. århundrede,* Copenhagen: Gyldendal.

Lund-Kommisjonen (1996), *Rapport til Stortinget fra kommisjonen som ble nedsatt av Stortinget for å granske påstander om ulovlig overvåking av norske borgere,* Oslo: Stortinget. Online: [http://www.stortinget.no/lund/httoc.htm] (accessed 05-04-2006).

Olesen, Thorsten B. (ed.) (2004), *The Cold War and the Nordic Countries: Historiography at a Crossroads,* Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark.

Olesen, Thorsten B. and Villaume, Poul (2005), 'I blokopdelingens tegn, 1945-1972' ('The Challenge of Bloc-Building, 1945-1972'), *Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Historie,* vol. 5, Copenhagen: Gyldendal.

Petersen, Nikolaj (2004), 'Europæisk og globalt engagement 1973-2003' ('European and Global Engagement, 1973-2003'), *Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Historie,* vol. 6, Copenhagen: Gyldendal.

A Hundred Years of Danish Action Space*

Hans Mouritzen[1]

The 2005-06 Muslim crisis has raised the question of Danish foreign policy action space, which has almost been taken for granted since the end of the Cold War. The historical period, when one foreign minister slip of the tongue could entail disaster, seems to have returned – with the addition that the globalized interactions of different civil societies may prove explosive as well. It is a crucial topic in Danish public debate, what the internal and external limits are to Danish governmental action space. Rather than offer an answer to this question, however, the present article will situate it in a theoretical and a hundred years' perspective.

Specifically, the focus will be directed at nine foreign-policy episodes within the last hundred years, in which Danish external action space has changed markedly, for either the better or the worse. They therefore challenged decision-makers with the task of *learning* about this change. What methods did they use to learn about action space, and could they even expand it?

The task is facilitated by a virtual publication explosion in recent years on the history of Danish foreign policy. By 2005 a foreign policy history in six volumes was completed.[2] Moreover, at the request of the government,

* In memory of the historian dr. phil. Henrik S. Nissen, who first made me realize the limits of theorizing.

1. I am grateful to Clive Archer and Hans Branner, who have served as referees in relation to this article. Of course, I alone carry responsibility for any errors or misinterpretations.

2. Due-Nielsen, Feldbæk and Petersen, 2001-05 (in Danish).

DIIS published a report in four volumes on 'Denmark during the Cold War'[3].

Whereas overt policy is visible to the contemporary public eye, the underlying levels of strategy and tactics are hidden. Often, these levels are crucial to the proper interpretation of overt policy. By examining non-public sources, therefore, historical research typically provides essential insights in this regard. Whereas the volumes on the history of Danish foreign policy are to a large extent based on previous research, they do present the most up-to-date knowledge available, as well as longitudinal perspectives on Danish foreign policy.

It is essential to exploit this rich new pool of knowledge for the purpose of theorizing, in case about the ups and downs of Danish action space. Obviously, several theoretical approaches can be tested or applied in this way; the present article, based on geopolitical constellation theory, only represents one such approach.[4]

ACTION SPACE: WHAT DO WE MEAN, AND WHAT DO WE KNOW?

Action space and its ambitious twin sister

There are two aspects to a state's power: its offensive power and its defensive power, also labelled 'influence-capability' and 'action space' ('freedom of manoeuvre') respectively.[5] While influence-capability means the ability to modify others' behaviour, action space denotes influence over one's *own* behaviour, in other words the ability to prevent *others'* influence over it (a question of degree). The two aspects of power usually go hand-in-hand, but not always. Action space is the most basic of the two, the one that will normally be prioritized under 'foul weather' conditions. With more favourable action space, however, the state becomes more ambitious and is encouraged to increase its radius of activity by boosting its influence-capability.

3. DIIS, 2005 (in Danish). For an in-depth analysis of the report and the debate surrounding it, cf. the article by Thorsten Borring Olesen in the present volume.
4. Cf. Mouritzen, 1998; or Mouritzen and Wivel, 2005. For reasons of space and readability, I shall keep both the theoretical and empirical references to the necessary minimum.
5. This is a generally established distinction in political science theorizing, cf. already Organski, 1960: 111-12, operating with the terms 'positive' and 'negative' power.

It may be self-evident, formally speaking, that a state has 100 pct. influence over its own behaviour ('sovereignty'). However, this is seldom the case in practice. Consider an example at the level of human beings: philosophically speaking, a man with a gun at his back has the freedom not to do what he is told. However, this may imply an 'unacceptable cost' to him: him being killed. Therefore, his action space is virtually zero, unless, of course, the gunman is known to be a 'bluffer'. The credibility of any threat is, in other words, essential. Since states are generally cautious and engage in worst case thinking more than do individual human beings, even a modest probability of unacceptable costs is enough to disqualify certain modes of behaviour. The more such options are disqualified, the lower a state's action space - and vice versa.

What, then, are the 'unacceptable costs' to states? These are, basically, costs that will supersede almost *any* conceivable future gains: war (if one is not good at it) or other physical destruction, foreign occupation, significant welfare reduction, or identity infringements endangering social or state cohesion.[6] If one or more of these evils materialize in the short term, there may be no long term to bother about. Under favourable conditions, some less ultimate disasters may be construed as 'unacceptable', and vice versa during exceptionally unfavourable conditions. For instance, the fact that Denmark fell under foreign occupation from 9 April 1940 meant that the next 'unacceptable cost' to avoid was Danish Nazi rule or direct German rule. In short, there is a certain elasticity involved regarding these evils.

As assumed here, action space is only to a limited extent what states or their decision-makers 'make of it'.[7] The fact that the limits of action space are often blurred, both to decision-makers and to analysts with hindsight, does not make the phenomenon less objective. Even if it cannot be measured, rough comparison is meaningful, whether between states or for one state over time.

6. Identity values, be they western, socialist or Islamic, are the ones that are likely to vary the most between states. The official rhetoric of state leaders is a convenient source in this regard. Also, the priority placed on different 'unacceptable costs' may vary.

7. To counter-paraphrase Alexander Wendt (Wendt, 1992): 'Anarchy is what states make of it'.

The external conditioners: the Copenhagen polarity and Great Power tension

Action space for non-great powers is essentially conditioned by two external factors: first the balance of power between the strongest proximate powers and secondly the tension between them.[8] The first factor is here called the 'Copenhagen polarity', because it denotes the great power balance in *Danish* territory. Instead of the great powers' total capabilities, we are dealing with their abilities to project power in relation to Denmark. This is the power constellation that Denmark faces.[9] Even if the global or European balance of power is multipolar, the balance may very well be bipolar or unipolar in Denmark's salient environment. The balance includes an estimate of any visible *trend* within it – the 'shadow of the future'.

To put it briefly, Danish action space is at low ebb in the case of Copenhagen unipolarity, other things being equal. Denmark is then dependent on one single great power. The more pronounced the unipolarity, the more restricted is Danish action space (depending also, however, on Danish value compatibility with the pole). Normally, it is better to be dependent on two or three great powers than one. Under bi- or tripolarity, Denmark may benefit from such dependency spreading, including the possibility to play off different great powers against each other. Bipolarity may be experienced from a symmetric or asymmetric constellation, depending on Denmark's exact location between two power spheres. Asymmetric bipolarity may be benign or malign, depending on Danish value compatibility with the prevailing power.

Action space also varies with the prevailing tension (the level of conflict) between the relevant great powers.[10] The higher the tension, the lower the action space of a frontline state (but the higher its influence capability, because of greater competition over its resources).

How is action space interpreted?

Decision-makers interpret and internalize external action space and act thereupon. We can distinguish between 'real' action space as construed *post*

8. Cf. Mouritzen, 1998, Ch. 5.
9. Therefore also the term 'constellation theory' for the analytical approach involved here.
10. Cf. Goldmann, 1979.

hoc by the analyst and one or more interpretations of it by contemporary decision-makers.

The nine foreign-policy episodes in this article represent those situations within the last hundred years, in which Danish external action space has changed markedly, for either the better or the worse. They therefore challenged decision-makers with the task of *learning* about this change. This is generally a difficult task, due to the strategic nature of international politics. Decisions have to be made under conditions of more or less uncertainty; it is not possible to wait for a 'thorough investigation'. What methods did Danish decision-makers, nonetheless, use to learn about action space in the above episodes? By anticipating the great powers' limits of tolerance, cooperating with other states in corresponding situations, learning from previous 'similar' situations, or what?

Where action space as interpreted by decision-makers deviates from real action space, there are logically two possibilities: the state overplaying its hand, or the state being over-cautious. In the former case, the government may – or may not – learn about action space the 'hard way', through subsequent unfortunate consequences. In the latter case, the government has failed to exploit available opportunities. In evaluating these possible shortcomings, I shall allow myself a degree of 'wisdom after the event'. Even though 'bad' decisions do not always lead to 'bad' outcomes (or 'good' decisions to 'good' outcomes), such hindsight is indeed heuristically helpful.[11]

Internal action space: the voice of the 'people'

Governments are not only constrained externally. Domestic forces, such as the parliamentary opposition, the press, or public opinion, may also wish to exert their influence in a given foreign policy episode. The normal picture, though, is one of popular/parliamentary docility or consensus. In case of diverging views, it is assumed here that external constraints have primacy in relation to internal ones. This means that external constraints may *allow* more or less domestic influence, depending on the external urgency. In rare situations (at least in conventional foreign policy), a policy permitted

11. The trick is to sort out the interference of exogenous factors, including sheer good or bad luck.

according to external action space may be overruled by internal pressure. The governmental action space then emerges by subtracting the internal 'vetos' from the external action space.

BEFORE AND DURING WORLD WAR I: MALIGN ASYMMETRIC BIPOLARITY

From the unification of Germany in 1870 till the end of World War I, Germany was not only a European power pole, but also the dominant power projector in Denmark's salient environment (Denmark having ceded Schleswig in 1864). Britain with its strong navy was also a relevant power pole, but not quite strong enough to match Germany in this sphere (the importance of Russia had waned after the turn of the century). Therefore, the Copenhagen polarity was bipolar, albeit asymmetrically so. With significant territorial and other conflicts of interest vis-à-vis Germany, Danish action space was modest. Even though some rearmament had taken place, Danish forces were not designed to fight Germany. Danish foreign policy was pro-German most of the time, but there were also periods of quiescence, when Denmark managed to steer free of the two poles.

August 1914: A replica pistol in the back

In the hectic days of early August 1914, when European war broke out, the Danish government was approached by the German ambassador in Copenhagen wishing a clarification of Denmark's position.[12] Denmark was forced by Germany to choose side; neutrality was not an option and would not be respected by Germany. The Danish response was that Denmark would strive for neutrality, but would – if this proved unrealistic – under no circumstances align itself with Germany's enemies. War with Germany was not an option, whereas British infringements of Danish neutrality would be resisted.

This response came to be tested already a few days later (5 August), as Germany asked Denmark to lay mines in the Great Belt, thus blocking the entrance to the Baltic Sea (Germany had already laid mines elsewhere in

12. Cf. Bjørn and Due-Nielsen, 2003: 496-501; Branner, 1972.

Danish waters that very morning). The mines were laid, but only after crisis deliberations involving key ministers, party leaders and the King, as well as the army and navy chiefs. The laying of mines would not only conflict with the Danish strait policy, it would also not be neutral by being biased in favour of German defense against a possible British intrusion into the Baltic. Even worse, it followed an explicit German demand. Against this, however, was held that Denmark by refusing would risk a German attack and an occupation of militarily salient territories. Britain would surely disapprove of Danish acquiescence, but was not in a position to demonstrate this militarily in the situation. In the terminology used here, a refusal might imply 'unacceptable costs'; it transgressed, in other words, Danish external action space. Acquiescence was in no way a pleasant decision, but it did not entail unacceptable costs.[13]

There were internal constraints on the government, but they were not insurmountable. The Liberal and Conservative opposition party leaders resisting the mine-laying were overruled with the important assistance of the King, and public opinion was not informed at the time. The decision might create problems in the event of an allied victory, but that was a luxury problem for the future. First things came first.

It later became apparent that Danish external action space in this particular situation had actually been greater than decision-makers at the time perceived.[14] The British had no plans for an intrusion into the Baltic Sea, while the Germans were giving a priority to the main fronts and did not want to provoke conflicts in secondary arenas. However, such plans might change in the course of the war, and did actually change on the German side in 1917.[15] It is obvious that the key Danish decision-makers used worst-case thinking and chose to act with a considerable margin of safety in August

13. The King actually went behind the back of his own government by informing his cousin, the British King, that the mines were non-armoured and therefore a bluff. It later turned out that they were in fact fully operative; the Danish King had apparently misunderstood his navy chief in a private conversation.

14. Cf. Branner, 1972, ch. 6.

15. The severest danger to Danish territory came in the first half of 1917, where a partial occupation of Denmark was considered by the German military and political leadership. The Danish foreign minister, Scavenius – presumably the only Dane who was aware of this – argued energetically to convince the Germans of the pointlessness of such an enterprise (Lidegaard, 2003: 92-8).

1914. From an admittedly speculative point of view, it is likely that the reassurances of August 1914 (or of previous negotiations in 1906-07) were marginally useful in 1917 by underscoring Danish long-term credibility in Berlin. In other words, the Danish 1914 misperception possibly had fortunate consequences.

POST-WORLD WAR I: VICTORS' BENIGN UNIPOLARITY – WITH A 'SHADOW OF THE FUTURE'

Regaining lost territory 1918-20

With the first signs of German defeat in World War I – visible also from Copenhagen – various political actors began to think and act on the assumption of a new balance of power in Denmark's salient environment. Denmark's interest in regaining lost territory in Schleswig, having been more or less suppressed since its cession in 1864, now came to the surface.[16] With the rapid disappearance of the shadow of German power, Denmark's freedom of action was grossly enlarged. But exactly how much became subject of domestic political strife, which also involved influential grassroots movements.

In early October 1918, about a month before the ceasefire of 11 November, the German ambassador in Copenhagen explored in conversations with foreign minister Scavenius, if Denmark was interested in a quick bilateral revision of the border. Scavenius, who shared the ambassador's fear of leaving the question to future multilateral peace negotiations, played the ball back by suggesting that Germany could go public with a proposal for a bilateral settlement (which never materialized, however). It could be (rightly) anticipated that in particular a victorious France, as part of a comprehensive peace settlement, would like to give the Danes a too generous 'gift' – i.e. offering Denmark areas with a German popular majority. Such a border might remain an open wound for generations and make Denmark dependent on continuous French support against the power of a reinvigorated Germany. The Danish government, like in general the British, sup-

16. Cf. Lidegaard, 2003: 108-9, 120-41, 146-62.

ported US President Wilson's principle of the 'national self-determination' of peoples. The principle meant that a border like the Danish-German one should be fixed according to a local referendum.

Already before the ceasefire, the Danish Social Liberal government had managed to commit the political parties to the application of the nationality principle to any Danish-German border settlement (Parliamentary Resolution of 23 October 1918). The representative of the Danes in Germany also agreed to this. Moreover, according to Scavenius it was not for the Danish state to take a stand regarding border revision, until the Danes presently under German jurisdiction came knocking at the door. Denmark as a state should not work for the recovery of lost territory and population.

However, grassroots movements with ambitious border visions gained popular momentum during 1919-20 (the 'Dannevirke' and 'Flensborg' movements, etc.). Military, strategic and historical arguments were marshalled in support of their aims, and they cooperated and lobbied the British and, notably, French embassies in Copenhagen.

The Versailles conference in the spring of 1919 decided in favour of a referendum, but its specifics, such as the number of voting zones, gave rise to bitter Danish domestic strife. As it came from sounds to things, the previous philosophical party consensus disappeared, and the King also became involved in support of a more ambitious position. After an appeal from the Danish government (with narrow parliamentary support), the Versailles conference reduced the number of voting zones from three to two, thus reducing the 'risk' of a more ambitious border further to the south. The Danish modesty appeal was supported by the US and Britain.

The twin votes in February and March 1920 gave a solid vote for Denmark in the first zone (North Schleswig) and a solid vote for Germany in the second (Mid-Schleswig, including the city of Flensborg). On this basis the peace conference decided (26 May 1920) in favour of a border between the two zones, identical to the present one. This sounds undramatic, but in the meantime the domestic quarrels provoked by the border question had culminated in a *coup d'état* by the King that almost cost the monarchy its existence (the 'Easter crisis'). After an election, a Liberal-Conservative government came to power, but too late to affect the peace conference.

Whereas the Danish government had continuously worked to ensure

German acceptance of a new border (and thus hopefully a permanent solution to the issue), this never materialized. Since, using the pretext of a government crisis, Germany avoided signing the border treaty, legally the border was based solely on the Versailles Treaty. This later became a cause of much Danish concern.

As should appear, Danish short-term action space, i.e. in relation to the World War winners, was considerable. The Danish-German border was no high priority issue to them. However, the long term action space, i.e. in relation to a future reinvigorated Germany, was limited, as was effectively demonstrated by developments to the south in the 1930s. By realizing this 'shadow of the future' already in 1918, the government's foresight was impressive. However, the suitability of its principle of state passivity regarding the regaining of territory, which had functioned well in the shadow of German power, was questionable in the new situation.

Simultaneously, the government's *internal* action space was severely limited. However, the government was unfamiliar with domestic 'interference' in its external affairs and chose, by and large, to follow its own head – thus fuelling domestic turmoil.

The epoch that followed

Even though the Schleswig issue was somewhat special, its considerable external action space lasted throughout the 1920s. There were no powers with aggressive intentions vis-à-vis Denmark. Britain and France, the World War winners, who dominated the League of Nations, constituted a benign unipolarity in relation to Denmark (pace the 'shadow of the future'). Denmark typically followed the British lead. It was essential for Denmark to try to socialize Germany to the League (an early example of *Einbindung;* cf. below) and thus make it part of the 'good company' in Europe.

THE LATE 1930s: MALIGN ASYMMETRIC BIPOLARITY REVISITED

The League of Nations 1935: failed invisibility

On 16 March 1935, Hitler announced that Germany would introduce compulsory conscription as part of its rearmament programme, in defiance of

the Versailles Treaty. Between 1933 and 1936, Denmark was a member of the League Council.[17] In this forum a resolution by the Western powers concerning the German decision was to be discussed and decided upon in mid-April 1935.[18]

In a parliamentary Foreign Policy Committee[19] meeting, foreign minister P. Munch delineated the Danish dilemma: on the one hand, Denmark could not participate in an encirclement of Germany; on the other hand, Denmark might later on be in need of support from members of the 'circle'. However, since Denmark ought not to arouse distrust in Germany, it would be best to take an 'impartial' position on the Western resolution and abstain from voting. This was supported by all political parties. In a meeting with the press a few days later, the chief editors were asked to treat the matter with caution and restraint. The world situation was characterized as 'dangerous', not least for Denmark, which was more exposed than the other Nordic countries.

In the preparatory discussions in Geneva, it became obvious that Munch could not vote for the resolution, as it had visible French fingerprints. On the other hand, the prospect of being the only representative out of fourteen who could not vote for it was discomforting. It could imply the beginning of a Danish satellite image. Munch tried to get the resolution reformulated, avoiding a condemnation of the 'one-sided German step' – but in vain. As avoiding distrust in Germany was, after all, priority no. 1, Munch abstained from voting. As had been feared, the voting came out as 13-1-0. Whereas invisibility had been important both vis-à-vis Germany and the West, this pattern made Denmark visible and 'interesting' to both camps. Denmark got some short-term rewards from Berlin, including reassurances that Hitler wanted tranquillity with respect to the border question, but the German press was more grateful and enthusiastic than was comfortable.[20] Unlike

17. Denmark informally represented the Nordic countries and the Netherlands. Denmark was not committed by this group, being moreover split over this matter. Controversially, Munch did not invite Finland to the group's meeting, probably because Finland was known for its staunch support of the strict 'French' interpretation of the League's system of sanctions. Cf. Sjøqvist, 1966: 99-100.
18. On Denmark's role in this episode, cf. Lidegaard, 2003: 291-4; Sjøqvist, 1966: 98-107; or, in a theoretical adaptation perspective, Mouritzen, 1988: Ch. 10.
19. *Udenrigspolitisk Nævn,* meeting on 26 March 1935.
20. Munch at the Foreign Policy Committee, 25 April 1935.

some critical Western reactions, Britain expressed its 'understanding' of the Danish position.

The situation analysed here implied the first Danish foreign-policy concession to Nazi Germany, apart from press restraint since Hitler's coming to power. It should be obvious that we are back in a situation with low external action space, though slightly greater than in August 1914, when war had already broken out. It turned out to be a correct assessment that Germany was extremely sensitive to the voting pattern. On the other hand, the long-term effects were more dubious, since goodwill liquidity in Berlin was a volatile commodity that was not necessarily related to Denmark's fate in a future war. As should be obvious, there was a consensus domestically and therefore no internal restrictions on Munch's action space.

The epoch that followed

The logic of the present episode represents the whole period until the German occupation of Denmark five years later. Denmark now revisited a previous Copenhagen polarity – malign asymmetric bipolarity – whereby action space was again utterly restricted. This was underlined by the German-British naval agreement shortly after the above episode, in practice implying that the Baltic Sea, and thereby probably Denmark, was acknowledged as German sphere.

A German initiative regarding the 1920 border in Schleswig was feared; it was not anticipated that Hitler had more wide-ranging plans. The course became one of extreme non-provocation in relation to Berlin (e.g. regarding the German march into the Rhineland in 1936 or the 1939 signing of a non-aggression treaty with Germany, unlike the other Nordic countries). This was the overriding axiom. Still, Denmark did not leave the League, for instance, which would have been warmly welcomed in Berlin. This would have raised German expectations unduly, and it would have created a satellite image elsewhere. Invisibility was the code word.

GERMAN OCCUPATION: MALIGN UNIPOLARITY

In spite of the peace occupation of Denmark from 9 April 1940,[21] Danish democracy managed to survive, albeit with infringements. As a first symbol of national cohesion, a coalition government comprising all democratic parties was formed on 10 April. Formally speaking, Denmark retained a foreign policy relation to Germany in the new situation.

July 1940: desperately clinging to the 'iron fist'

With the defeats of Norway and France in June 1940 and the prospect of a German-dominated Europe, the Danish coalition government feared for its own existence.[22] It was hypersensitive to certain rumours that it would somehow be toppled by the occupation power and replaced by a non-parliamentary 'expert government' or even a Danish Quisling (Nazi) regime.

As an indication of the prevailing desperation, both the prime minister and foreign minister went to visit the German ambassador in order to obtain a denial of the rumours (24 June). The ambassador was only willing to provide his anxious visitors with vague semi-denials. As he had previously indicated, he would prefer a 'transitory', less parliamentary based, cabinet.

In early July, a dramatic cabinet reconstruction took place, in which the politicians temporarily feared that the King was about to repeat his 1920 coup and appoint a non-parliamentary government. This was probably unjustified.[23] In the final outcome, the cabinet still had its roots in Parliament and thereby the democratic political parties (there were now three non-parliamentary ministers, though). The main element of the reconstruction was the replacement of foreign minister Munch with the career diplomat Scavenius, who, as we have seen, had served as foreign minister in critical periods and thus gained a reputation for being able to 'handle' the Germans. Indeed, Munch himself, too much associated with 'invisible neutrality' since the mid-1930s, persuaded Scavenius to take on the post.

21. On Danish action space in connection with the events of 9 April and the preceding days and weeks, cf. Branner, 1987.
22. On this episode, cf. Lidegaard, 2003: 421-35, 443-7; Nissen, 1973: 198-284; or Nissen, 1983. For an adaptive politics interpretation, cf. Mouritzen, 1988, Ch. 11.
23. Cf. Nissen, 1973: 250-2.

Scavenius believed in a more accommodating and activist strategy vis-à-vis the occupation power. It would not do to lean back and wait for German demands to be made; in order to win goodwill, it was essential to anticipate German wishes and suggest measures that could satisfy them. This could forestall drastic and humiliating demands at a later stage.

According to Scavenius's declaration on his assumption of office on 8 July, Denmark was ready to find its place in the 'new Europe' under German leadership. In the process, 'the Danish people trust ... that it will be able to keep its independence ... and traditional peaceful political and social development'.[24] here was apparently no Danish parliamentary or press opposition to the declaration - at the time! Mainly on Danish initiative, it was followed up by a solemn notification at a ceremony in Berlin. At about the same time, a 'private' 'Danish-German Friendship Association' was established on the Danish government's initiative in order to prevent that the Danish Nazis got a monopoly on contacts with Germany (Scavenius's later explanation).

Apart from adopting Scavenius's accommodating strategy, it should be obvious that the Danish government almost clung to the danger in this episode by catching at any straw of negotiation. This may sound like a self-destructive tactic, but it was used in a desperate situation, when the threat of the government being replaced seemed imminent. It was essential to establish and institutionalize channels of communication by negotiating over almost anything that might interest the Germans.

In the episode analysed here, the external action space was at a historical low point. The strategy of accommodation was dangerous, because it raised German expectations. However, it could win time – and it did. On the premise that a continued Danish parliamentary government was desirable (which, of course, may be debated),[25] nobody, whether at the time or later, has come up with any less dangerous option for the country in June-July

24. The declaration has been remembered mostly for its flattering remark about the recent German military victories. Cf. Nissen, 1972: 271-7.

25. A non-parliamentary 'expert' government, like the 'Prince Aksel government' suggested by the rightist 'Højgaard circle' a few months later, would soon have been *verbraucht*. With its lack of popular support, it would exist solely at the mercy of the occupation power and soon become a mere puppet regime. Moreover, it would have compromised the Danish monarchy, later so useful to national cohesion.

1940. After the war, Danish collaboration in general and Scavenius in particular were criticized. Still, with the reputation won by the resistance movement among the Allied powers, Denmark managed to become a founding member of the United Nations, the 'good company'. Collaboration did not have the long-term unacceptable costs that could have been feared.

The epoch that followed

From the beginning of 1941 the situation stabilized somewhat, as Nazi rule in Norway proved disappointing to Germany, the national reawakening of the Danish population was channelled into support for the parliamentary-based government, and Berlin became aware of the importance of the Danish economy as a stable supplier requiring peaceful conditions. Action space improved a little, albeit varying from situation to situation. At the end of August 1943 the government lost its grip on popular dissatisfaction, and it was forced to say no to German demands in order to cope with the unrest. The small space between external and internal pressures disappeared, and the government had to resign. Denmark remained without political leadership until liberation in May 1945.

POST-WORLD WAR II: FROM VICTORS' UNIPOLARITY TO BIPOLAR GREY ZONE

As long as the victorious powers held reasonably together, Denmark faced unipolarity with very low influence and action space. This could be seen, in particular, with respect to the US presence in Greenland and the Soviet presence (till March 1946) on the island of Bornholm. In the second round of the Schleswig issue, however, Denmark's position was better, since it was not high priority to the great powers. However, with the emergence of bipolarity from 1946, in which Danish territory became a grey zone, action space declined also in this issue.

South Schleswig: a new opportunity 1945-49

From the German collapse in May 1945 and for some years ahead, there was a tremendous surge in 'Danishness' in South Schleswig, the area that had

remained under German rule in 1920.[26] Danish associations in the area grew exponentially, and requests for reunion with Denmark were made repeatedly, indicating more or less ambitious border revisions. Many Germans converted to Danish identity.

The foreign minister in the Danish Liberation government had declared already on 9 May 1945 that the border was not an issue. However, the above developments naturally reawakened the bitter domestic strife in Denmark predating the 1920 revision. Pressure groups gained momentum. The Conservative and Liberal parties were split. Many of their parliamentarians found that Denmark ought to listen to Danes south of the border and that this, moreover, was a historic opportunity to win South Schleswig back. Even though the surge in the area was partly opportunistic and presumably temporary in nature, a new referendum ought to be written into any future peace treaty and be held at a future date. The nationalist 'Dansk Samling' also supported this view as, most importantly, did the prime minister in the Liberal-Conservative government of 1945-47, Knud Kristensen – though only as a 'private citizen'. In speech after speech in village halls, he repeatedly floated trial balloons.

By contrast, the centre and left political parties argued that border revision was adventurous and irresponsible. One day Germany would again be not only sovereign, but also a great power. A vast German minority within Denmark would be dangerous. The border issue had been solved once and for all in 1920, and in a longer time perspective it would be self-defeating for Denmark to exploit the current exceptional situation. The Social Liberal party, which was strongly behind this view, was indispensable to the parliamentary basis for the Kristensen government. So officially, the government was bound to a policy of 'no revision'. After much pulling and pushing, the Social Liberals lost patience with the prime minister's 'private foreign policy' and toppled the government (4 October 1947).

Denmark's external action space was provided, formally speaking, by the Allied Control Commission over Germany. In practice, however, the significant actor was Britain, the occupation power in northern Germany. It seems that Denmark had considerable action space in the basic question of border

26. Cf. Olesen and Villaume, 2005: 56-67, 276-87; Frederiksen, 1971.

revision until October 1946, when the British forced Denmark to issue a clear statement.[27] After that, it disappeared. Still, activism continued. British irritation grew with recurrent Danish interference in British administration and the 'private' signals of the Danish prime minister.[28] Not only might Danish 'special rights' have precedence on other areas and thereby sabotage long-term planning; they might also prevent good relations with a future German state. The most important factor working against Danish activism, however, was the emerging bipolarity. In need of allies against the Soviet Union, Denmark could not afford an enduring border conflict to the south and, equally important, an irritated Great Britain.

The Danish Social Democratic government adapted to these considerations, and domestic strife simmered over a slow fire. However, after the signing of the Atlantic Treaty in April 1949 and a feeling of 'relief' had spread, serious turmoil, initiated by the Liberal party, broke out again with the prospect of a German constitution.[29] This was terminated, by and large, with the note of 29 June 1949 (signed by all democratic parties) that was sent to the Allied powers. Its essence in the present context was that any requests for a border revision were now definitely given up.

Taken together, Danish external action space in this issue was considerable. It gradually declined, however, especially with the advent of tense bipolarity (although action space remained in subsidiary and more detailed questions in the region). Internal action space in this issue was very limited during the whole 1945-49 period.

THE COLD WAR: ALLIED FRONTLINE STATE (BIPOLARITY)

Between friend and foe 1952-53: NATO bases in Denmark?

During the coldest Cold War, in the spring of 1952, NATO requested

27. According to the British memo to the Danish government of 9 September 1946, the British were ready to consider a border revision with or without a referendum, but it should happen quickly. Cf. also the Danish answer of 19 October 1946, both printed in Jensen and Pedersen, 1978: 74-6.

28. By contrast, Stalin – like the French after World War I – was much more generous.

29. This was not due to any misperception of real Danish action space, but seems to have been 'pure' party politics (e.g. Christmas-Møller, 1993: 230-43, 274).

Denmark to initiate bilateral negotiations with the US concerning the peacetime stationing of US fighter planes on Danish territory (as well as the development of Danish airfields for this purpose).[30] This brought Danish decision-makers in an extremely delicate situation, which was seen as unsuitable for public debate. In security and defence matters, the parliamentary majority of the Liberal-Conservative government was supplied by the Social Democratic opposition party. Its leader, the former prime minister, Hans Hedtoft, got a key role in the issue. Close contacts were held with Norwegian decision-makers, since Norway had received a similar request. Just as the Liberal and Conservative decision-makers (successfully) hid behind Hedtoft's back, they all in turn tried to hide behind Norway's back and follow its lead – though partly in vain.[31]

During most of 1952, Danish decision-makers were cautiously positive regarding the request. Perhaps out of wishful thinking, it was interpreted as implying that the fighter planes would be committed exclusively to the defence of Danish territory and its salient environment. At any rate, it was felt that an early refusal would harm Denmark's alliance reputation. As Hedtoft expressed it: 'The Americans won't understand a word of it'.[32]

On several occasions during the process, the Soviet Union sent intimidating signals through diplomatic notes or planted 'opinions' in the press. Pre-emptive Soviet action was hinted at between the lines. Specifically, the island of Bornholm (liberated by Soviet forces in 1945-46) was ominously drawn into the picture, with the obviously intended effect on Danish .[33] Moreover, the Swedish prime minister advised Hedtoft against accepting American fighters, referring to possible Soviet countermeasures vis-à-vis

30. On this episode, cf. DIIS, 2005, vol. 1: 249-91; Olesen and Villaume, 2005: 179-93; Beukel, 1974.

31. The early Norwegian decision to refuse the request created a precedent for Denmark. Moreover, it was assumed that Danish public opinion would be affected by the Norwegian stand. Still, Denmark had not committed itself a priori as fully as Norway to a 'no foreign bases' posture (exchanges of notes in 1949 and 1951). Therefore, there were limits to the precedent.

32. Letter, August 1952. Translated from DIIS, 2005, vol. 1: 259.

33. Their worst fear was a Soviet coup on the island, presenting NATO with a *fait accompli*. According to an interpretation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the main Soviet fear or belief was that the island would become host to a NATO base. To forestall this (erroneous) belief, the Danish foreign minister declared that there were no such plans and that Denmark was aware of the special considerations required by the island's location (speech in Rønne, 11 April 1953; cf. DIIS, 2005, vol. 1: 282-3).

Finland and ensuing consequences for the whole Nordic region (the later 'Nordic balance').[34]

In the secret Danish-American negotiations of January 1953, the Danish side presented a 'laundry list' of preconditions, formulated essentially by Hedtoft and the Social Democrats.[35] The most important one was that the fighter planes should be earmarked to the defence of Danish territory. The country could not live with an increased risk of attack without an assurance that the planes would be used to defend Denmark. With the recent election of a new US administration committed to 'rolling back' the Soviet empire, it was not unlikely that they would be used in 'faraway battles' and that Denmark would be entrapped in these. With the Red Army stationed next to Lübeck and no *Bundeswehr* yet in place, a Soviet occupation of Danish territory could be imminent.[36] However, the US negotiators found that the Danish view ran contrary to the spirit of NATO; Denmark under attack would presumably also appreciate help from other NATO members. Committing the aircraft to Denmark alone would create a dangerous precedent for NATO defence policy in general.

With this fundamental disagreement, the project was placed on ice in late January. With Stalin's death in March and the détente aspirations it created, an extra argument was added against a commitment to permanent bases. The issue was officially decided when Hedtoft, prime minister again from September 1953, declared that a stationing would not take place under the 'prevailing conditions'.

In the present episode, Denmark was still a military grey zone, in spite of her newly acquired NATO membership. The lack of ground coverage to the south and the strategic outpost of Bornholm meant that action space in relation to the Soviet Union was strictly limited to 'defensive' measures. There was a certain freedom of manoeuvre in relation to the US and NATO. It was not possible to modify the offer, but it could be turned down without 'unacceptable consequences' (although this was done hesitantly compared to Norway). The inter-governmental nature of the alliance as stipulated in

34. Cf. Brundtland, 1966.

35. Cf. DIIS, 2005, vol. 1: 277-8.

36. A related fear was that the Soviet Union would carry out a pre-emptive attack on Denmark before the planes had arrived. In particular, it was feared that the Soviets might believe that Denmark had already decided to accommodate the NATO request.

the Atlantic Treaty turned out to be more than a formality, also for small countries. This was the first important Danish 'no', and together with Norway's corresponding decision, it created a precedent for possible future use. Simultaneously, it created a 'base card' vis-à-vis the Soviets: the base policy might be reversed in the future, if 'conditions' changed for the worse. This would probably presuppose, though, that Danish ground security had been safeguarded in the meantime. It was essential, at any rate, that the Soviets did not see Danish restraint in this episode as a victory for their tactics of intimidation. Taken together, even if action space had been low in the situation with respect to both friend and foe, it would presumably be greater in both directions the next time such a situation arose.

Flight stationing was rejected due to external constraints,[37] primarily the direct 'Soviet connection'. Possibly, this connection was exacerbated by the early Nordic balance, including the Norwegian precedent. Whereas decision-makers, rightly or wrongly, were concerned about the popular view of foreign bases,[38] there were no such problems in relation to the chosen course.

The epoch that followed

It is striking how similar the logic of the above decision was to subsequent Danish NATO decisions throughout the Cold War. The parameters were the direct Soviet connection on the one hand (perhaps as mediated through the Nordic balance) and alliance solidarity on the other. As a small frontline state, Denmark placed a high priority on détente in its salient environment throughout the period. Parallel action with Norway was essential in the whole Cold War era.[39]

Action space in relation to the Soviet Union improved somewhat with West German rearmament and the stationing of ground forces in Schleswig-

37. As formulated by Villaume, 'There was no obvious party internal, parliamentary, or electoral pressure for a no on the Social Democratic leadership' (Olesen and Villaume, 2005: 190).

38. Concern for public reaction may to a large extent have been used as a negotiating card in relation to the Americans. It was said, for instance, that foreign bases might weaken support for NATO membership. According to a non-public Gallup poll of February 1952, 20 pct. of the population were for and 57 pct. against the fighters (DIIS, 2005, vol. 1: 285). Needless to say, given the lack of information and public debate, the value of these figures is highly questionable.

39. On parallel action, based on a mixture of cooperative and competitive incentives, cf. Mouritzen, 1997: 37-47.

Holstein. Action space in NATO remained considerable in the whole period. In the 1980s in particular, domestic action space was limited by the popular fear of nuclear weapons, which influenced some of the political parties. The domestic consensus was broken, and opposition parties managed to overrule the government on several occasions in relation to the stationing of nuclear missiles in Western Europe (the Conservative-Liberal government remained in office, since it gave a higher priority to economic policy). This led to a strong détente element in the 'footnote policy', so called after the several footnotes (reservations) that Denmark inserted into NATO communiqués.

THE POST-COLD WAR ERA (THE CONVENTIONAL TRACK): FROM BENIGN DIMNESS TO EURO-ATLANTIC UNIPOLARITY

From 1988, the Red Army began to withdraw from the GDR and Poland, and with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the East European revolutions, Denmark's geopolitical situation had improved dramatically.

Initiating the Baltic offensive 1989-91

The national re-awakenings in the Baltic countries were followed with interest and engagement in the Nordic countries.[40] From about 1989, the Danish government encouraged non-governmental contacts with the Baltic countries, trying to circumscribe the Soviet authorities. Culture was used as a convenient excuse for sensitive contacts, as illustrated by the establishment of a Danish Culture Institute in Riga in 1990.

As the newly elected Lithuanian parliament unilaterally issued a declaration of re-established independence on 11 March 1990, the Danish foreign minister Ellemann- Jensen welcomed this and reminded the public that Denmark had never legally recognized the incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union (which had been largely forgotten over the last fifty years, also in Denmark). However, he added in the same breath that Lithuania

40. Cf. Petersen, 2004: 482-95; Mouritzen, 1998: 50-79 (a geopolitical interpretation of events).

should now enter difficult negotiations with Moscow concerning its Union withdrawal, so that 'its formal independent status could also acquire substantial content'. In the Foreign Policy Committee, the foreign minister adopted a position of 'wait and see' and 'non-provocation'. Less than two weeks later, however, Denmark reacted sharply – more so than other Western countries – to a Soviet show of military force in Vilnius. The Soviet foreign minister, in his reply to the Danish complaint, expressed his consternation over Denmark's avant guard criticism, which was not 'normal' Danish behaviour (a correct analysis). Among the European great powers support for Gorbachev's reform course was still the guiding principle, and the 'Lithuanian trouble' was not welcomed at all. At the EC summit in Dublin on 28 April Danish behaviour caused polite surprise, and the Danish foreign minister was encouraged instead to teach the Lithuanians some moderation.

Not unexpectedly, Denmark's attempt, along with Iceland, to give the Baltic countries official status at the CSCE summit in Paris in November 1990 failed. However, Denmark sponsored a press meeting with the three Baltic foreign ministers outside the conference hall. Moscow responded with a forceful protest. Nonetheless, Danish activism continued unaffected. The next step was the establishment of a Baltic 'Information Office' in Copenhagen. A Nordic-Baltic foreign ministers' meeting was held in connection with its inauguration on 20 December. The violent events in Riga and Vilnius in January 1991 caused protests from many Western countries; Denmark advocated EPC[41] sanctions and started preparations to establish Baltic exile governments in Copenhagen.

In February 1991, as a new Lithuanian government appealed for international recognition, only Iceland responded positively. Copenhagen saw this as an empty gesture as long as the physical establishment of embassies was impossible (although there were Danish press voices in favour of such a step). More important, however, bilateral political cooperation agreements between Denmark and each of the three countries were signed in February and March with crucial symbolic value. They included the formulation that 'diplomatic relations will be re-established as soon as the situation allows'.

41. 'European Political Cooperation', i.e., the common foreign policy of the EC.

This was, as correctly pointed out in the Soviet reaction, nothing less than an 'unfriendly step'.

The failed communist coup of 19-21 August 1991 actually seemed to succeed on its first day. Both as regards condemnations of the coup and the restorations of diplomatic relations with the Baltic States, Denmark and Iceland were at the forefront in Europe and the West (not without ingredients of mutual competition).[42] As soon as the coup's failure became apparent and Swedish and notably Finnish geopolitical inhibitions had disappeared, a virtual 'bicycle race' between the two for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Baltic States took place. As with Denmark and Iceland, conservative criteria of recognition under international law were set aside in favour of more 'political' recognitions. This, together with Russia's (Jeltsin's) recognition, undoubtedly helped the Baltic States by drawing further recognitions after them.

It should be evident from this initial phase of Denmark's Baltic offensive that old habits were discarded – to put it mildly. The decisive point in time seems to have been mid-March 1990, when the Danish protest proved to be the start of a new and (until this date) enduring avant guard position when it came to criticizing the Soviet Union/Russia. From this time on, Denmark remained unmoved by one sharp Soviet protest after the other. This was not because Danish policy planners were quicker than others to grasp the approaching breakdown of the Soviet Union. The Danish foreign minister and his advisors believed at this time in the long-term persistence of the Union, but hopefully with a gradual development towards democracy and a willingness to accept Baltic States in the not too distant future.[43] It was essential that Baltic politicians and their followers fighting for state restorations were not left alone by the Western community; this could tempt them to act in desperation vis-à-vis intransigent Soviet authorities.[44]

Denmark combined a Nordic small state engagement with the geopolitical freedom to work openly for the re-establishment of Baltic States at the critical time (the Red Army had withdrawn from Denmark's salient envi-

42. For a detailed study of the chain of events surrounding the failed coup, cf. Mouritzen, 1998: 50-64.

43. Author's interview with Uffe Ellemann-Jensen (27 March 2006).

44. Ibid.

ronment). In a longer time-perspective, with stable Baltic States, Denmark would have a buffer to the great power in the east. Formulated in provocative terms, Denmark could obtain its own 'near abroad' of grateful neighbours, willing to adopt a Western and Scandinavian value system.

It should be obvious that through this episode Denmark filled and even expanded its new action space. The space was tested by action, by setting down its foot and seeing what happened. Denmark did this on its own initiative: there were no Western great powers encouraging its moves – quite the contrary. Denmark had a dynamic foreign minister, who was willing and able to 'elbow' for a greater action space. In this process, the domestic scene was permissive, with general goodwill for the Baltic cause, both in public opinion and across all political parties.

Danish activism amounted not only to needle pricks that could irritate a great power. The forceful Soviet reactions were understandable, since interference in its 'internal affairs' ultimately contributed to its demise. Not only did the Baltic countries regain their independence, but this set in motion a self-reinforcing process that was to undermine the Soviet Union by the end of 1991.

The action space that followed

Danish action space, as demonstrated in this pioneering episode, came to characterize the epoch that followed (and prevailed until 2005-06). Unlike France, Germany or Italy, for instance, the former Danish 'dove' and frontline state has displayed persistent intransigence regarding Russian geopolitical concerns (NATO membership for the Baltic states, defence cooperation with Central Asian states, the Kosovo war, Kaliningrad, or Chechnia, for example).

With the breakdown of bipolarity and German unification, the binding *(Einbindung)* of Germany within both a European Union and NATO became essential to Danish foreign policy (as well as to other countries, including Germany itself). The purpose was to prevent Denmark from becoming bilaterally dependent on and marginalized by its big neighbour as in previous epochs. It succeeded, though hardly due to any Danish effort (cf. the episode below).

The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union left the EC unchallenged as the main provider of economic and political power in

Europe. This tendency was reinforced by the prevailing momentum in European integration. For a short interregnum, the polarity was one of benign 'dimness' in Europe and in Copenhagen. However, the beginning of the Yugoslav civil war made it evident that the EU did not have the coherence or military power to act alone, even on its own 'doorstep'. Today, the EU continues to be dependent on the United States for its military security.[45]

At any rate, Denmark would have preferred this Euro-Atlantic unipolarity anyway, with the US taking the lead and often the UK as a suitable link. Having one's powerful friend across an ocean was still (and is today) the guiding geopolitical principle of Atlanticism. Moreover, value identification with these two powers paved the way for common interests, as previously, and made action space even bigger. Denmark's unprecedented action space was even combined with considerable influence-capability. With the increased space available, it was also desirable to improve capabilities to fill it out. After September 11 and the advent of large-scale terrorism, one might even operate with Danish 'superatlanticism', entailing engagements also in more controversial initiatives like the Iraq war, with questionable UN legitimacy, in close cooperation with the US-UK.

The Fogh Rasmussen government (Liberal-Conservative) has placed greater emphasis on a 'demonstration policy', i.e. demonstrating both externally and internally Denmark's newly acquired action space (together with its influence and identity values). As expressed by the prime minister: 'Denmark intervenes in many things, and this also means, of course, that we cannot agree with other countries about everything' (disagreements with Russia, the US-UK, France, Germany and the other Nordic countries were mentioned).[46] By making a deed out of disagreements and the possibility thereof, he was demonstrating that Denmark had now, apparently, an almost unlimited action space. No state or other actor should prevent Denmark from expressing, also publicly, what it thinks.

There was generally a remarkable internal consensus, at both the popular and parliamentary levels, during the post-Cold War era. Regarding the

45. Cf. Mouritzen and Wivel, 2005: 22-9.

46. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 'Hvad kan det nytte?', *Berlingske Tidende,* 26 March 2003. Danish behaviour in several of the episodes analysed in this article was characterized as 'hypocritical', 'mean', and 'embarrassing'. It was hinted that old sins should now be redressed.

Iraq war, however, with its questionable UN legitimacy, there was a good deal of opposition (though not as forceful as in London, Rome or Madrid). It could be largely overruled by the government. In the transnational track, to which we now turn, the Danish public has been much less permissive.

THE POST-COLD WAR ERA (THE TRANSNATIONAL TRACK): THE DANISH PEOPLE AS 'SUPERPOWER'

It is reasonable to distinguish two foreign policy tracks regarding the post-Cold War era, since widely different preconditions have been at stake: the conventional track as analysed above, and the transnational (including supranational) track. Since peoples' everyday lives are affected by transnational politics in a more direct and tangible way than by conventional foreign policy, popular involvement is normally stronger.[47]

Of course, Denmark's involvement in transnational relations and state management of them is nothing new (cf. the Nordic community or the EC – the paradigm example of controlled trans- and supranational relations). These relations were important in low politics, but they did not constitute Denmark's position in the prevailing (high politics) bipolarity. With the disappearance of the Cold War overlay, however, the EU became the 'good European company', and EU affiliation became tantamount to the country's high politics position (on a par with its Atlantic relation, of course).

The interregnum from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the Maastricht negotiations in late 1991 was a period of Europhoria. As it became clear, from the spring of 1990, that German unification would actually happen, the major Danish political parties suddenly became much more pro-integration (*Einbindung* or 'binding' of Germany as analysed above).[48] In April the EC decided to convene a government conference on the creation of a European Political Union that should also encompass the already planned Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Denmark played an unusually active and

47. Goldmann et al. 1986

48. This is not to deny that gradual developments in this direction had taken place during the late 1980s to the left in the political spectrum, inspired by the prospects for a 'social Europe' in the wake of the 'Single European Act'.

influential part in this conference, culminating in the agreement on the Maastricht Treaty of December 1991. The ratification of the treaty, however, required unanimity. In some member states, ratification would be decided by popular referendums. In recognition of their supranational and domestic implications, Danish politicians have traditionally used referendums as the prevailing mode of decision-making regarding EC/EU affiliation, whether constitutionally required or not. This time, however, it meant that the Danes would be voting directly about high politics, including foreign and security policy. This had never happened before.[49]

Adapting to 2 June 1992: on a knife's edge

The Danish people's 'no' to the Maastricht Treaty on 2 June 1992 meant a rejection of the Treaty for the whole EC, formally speaking. The future of the newly reinvigorated European integration process was suddenly in doubt, not to mention Denmark's position in it.[50]

The referendum result – 50.7 pct. against and 49.3 pct. in favour – gave rise to feverish and turbulent political activity, among both Danish political parties and in EC capitals. Perhaps due to wishful thinking, nothing had been planned for the situation that had arisen. The other eleven EC members declared, with Danish acceptance, that the Maastricht ratification process would go on. In return, Denmark was allowed to make the first move regarding a solution to the so-called 'Danish' problem. The horror scenario for Danish pro-Union politicians was that Denmark would end up with merely associated status, resembling that of the EEA states (being part of the internal market, but cut off from influence).[51]

In October, seven Danish political parties – including the 'Socialist People's Party' (SF), which had been opposed to the Maastricht Treaty during the referendum campaign – agreed to a 'national compromise'. It was vital to the pro-Union parties to encourage the SF to join their side in order to ensure a 'yes' vote in an upcoming referendum regarding a revised agree-

49. Except indirectly, in connection with the parliamentary election of 1988, which was called on an issue of security policy.

50. On this episode, cf. Petersen, 2004: 496-520. For an adaptation interpretation of the process, cf. Mouritzen, 1993: 373-402.

51. The EEA, the European Economic Area, had been negotiated between the EC and EFTA, the European Free Trade Area.

ment (accommodating Social Democratic 'no' voters was also essential in this regard). The price was a range of amendments to the Maastricht Treaty, both of a general nature and pertaining to Denmark specifically.

The crucial question now was whether this Danish initiative could be translated to the European level. Several drafts went back and forth between the Danish government and the British EC Presidency. Contrary to the expectations of many observers, a solution was found at a dramatic summit in Edinburgh in December. It did not deviate significantly from the Danish national compromise, though. Some *general* amendments to Maastricht were agreed on concerning subsidiarity (decentralization, roughly speaking) and openness (more transparency for EC institutions, for example). A decision of the Council approved two *specific* Danish arrangements within the confines of the European Union: (1) no Danish participation in any common defence or defence policy (including the Western European Union); and (2) no Danish participation in the third phase of the EMU, entailing a common currency and common economic policy obligations. To this should be added a unilateral Danish declaration emphasising that the proposed Union citizenship could in no way replace Danish citizenship, and that Denmark would not agree to transfer its sovereignty over justice and police affairs to the supranational level. The other eleven members 'took note' of this.[52]Even though the Council's decisions were legally binding,[53] they did not require a renewed ratification process in EC capitals.

In return for these concessions, Denmark abstained from her formal right of blocking the Union process and preventing other members' further cooperation in the opt-out areas. To several members, Germany in particular, this was seen as self-evident.[54] Moreover, it was feared that Danish opt-outs could become a political precedent and thus undermine Union homogeneity and coherence in the longer term. However, the Danish position was strengthened by the fact that the UK had made its ratification dependent

52. Although several of them allegedly had difficulties understanding the exact meaning of these formulations.

53. Germany and other countries wanted a 'solemn declaration' instead of a 'decision', but eventually gave in.

54. In previous conversations, foreign minister Elleman-Jensen had emphasised to his German colleague Klaus Kinkel that Denmark could, if necessary, 'kill' the Maastricht Treaty and stick to the Treaty of Rome.

upon a prior solution to the 'Danish problem'. This made Danish use of the unanimity argument more than a formality. To this could be added that an EC overruling of Denmark by semi-legal methods would have been characterized as 'great power arrogance', 'disrespect for the rules', etc. – both inside and outside the Community. As regards the *general* amendments, these were probably made easier by the unexpectedly close nature of the French popular 'yes' vote on Maastricht. Both the Danish and the French referendums were interpreted (probably erroneously) as mainly reflecting popular dissatisfaction with the EC's democratic deficit. The amendments concerning subsidiarity and openness were believed to appease these feelings.

The increased economic support for Southern Europe, also agreed at the Edinburgh summit, may be interpreted as part of an overall give-and-take, i.e. as the southerners' price for not blocking a solution to the 'Danish' problem. But clearly, this bill was not going to be paid by Denmark alone. At any rate, the Edinburgh solution was approved by Danish voters in a second referendum on 18 May 2003, in which 56.8 pct. voted for and 43.2 pct. against.

In adapting to the 2 June 'earthquake', Danish pro-Union politicians – mainly together with the SF and the British EC Presidency – managed almost to square the circle. The difficulty of the task was due to the narrow, at times seemingly non-existent, path between the government's external and internal constraints. Moreover, given the ratification rules and the peculiarities of the situation, the balance between the two was turned on its head compared to the historical habit. In meetings with their European colleagues, Danish decision-makers could credibly argue that their domestic action space was minimal.

The 'unacceptable consequence' in this episode, which would probably have materialized in the wake of a second Danish 'no', was an EEA status for Denmark. Although this would have been a modest disaster compared to those that had been risked historically, it would surely have led to a significant Danish marginalization in Europe (e.g. switching places with Sweden, Finland and Austria, which were all moving towards membership).

The action space that followed

Danish pro-Union politicians had learnt it the hard way – not to overestimate their internal action space. They had thought that the people shared,

or could be brought to share, their arguments pertaining to the new European situation, and they had underestimated its affection for the symbols of Danish statehood: defence, the police, the currency, citizenship, etc. Now they were pushed back to a posture resembling the foot-dragging of the 1970s and most of the 1980s, where action space was more important than influence. Since 2 June (and still at the time of writing), the internal constraints on governmental Union policy are axiomatic. The government attempted to free itself of the popular grip through a referendum in September 2000 regarding the EMU 3. phase, but in vain.

Externally, the apparent paradox is that a no voting Denmark in the short run – contrary to what pro-Union politicians had predicted during the campaign – got an unprecedented European influence and action space (partly due to the achievements of these same politicians). In the longer term, after the ratification had been completed, the picture was different. Evidently, Denmark lost influence within the unfolding opt-out areas, as well as some European reputation in broader terms. Still, the wider implications of this, if any, are uncertain.[55] By contrast, Danish external action space increased. According to the Edinburgh agreement, Denmark could enter the opt-out areas any time it wished. In other words, there was no EU quarantine or other 'punishment'.[56]

A second transnational issue that has become part of high politics is the so-called 'aliens policy', including refugee policy and the regulation of immigration. This has developed with the increasing level of human globalization, the increasing fear of terrorism, and domestic political developments in Denmark. Exactly the same pattern is visible as regards EU affiliation, although no referendums are held. The Gallup supremacy is evident and has been pushing mainstream political parties towards an increasingly restrictive policy; this appears, not least, from the fact that aliens policy has become priority no. 1 in all parliamentary and municipal elections since 1997. Foreign criticisms, including reports from international organiza-

55. Cf. Olsen and Pilegaard, 2005; DUPI, 2000. For instance, Denmark has not been excluded from the prestigious hosting of EC/EU Presidencies in spite of its opt-outs, and the US has continued to see Denmark as 'full blood' European.

56. At the internal arena, by contrast, decision-makers had to promise that the opt-outs could only be cancelled after yet another referendum. Moreover, to the explicit regret of Ellemann-Jensen, they should last beyond the duration of the Maastricht Treaty.

tions, have had a negligible impact by comparison.[57] If a Danish 'aliens opt-out' is established in relation to a future Constitutional Treaty, the parallel will be even more clear-cut. Only this time, such an opt-out has been suggested by mainstream politicians themselves, in *anticipation* of the people's voice in a future referendum.[58] An opinion-guiding role in this field has been seen as futile and probably even dangerous. In transnational high politics, be it regarding Denmark's EU affiliation or aliens policy, the internal constraints on governmental policy are axiomatic. The Danish people is, metaphorically speaking, a 'superpower' – even the sole superpower.

This state of affairs, however, may have changed with the Muslim crisis 2005-06. It originated in the transnational track with – in the Muslim perception – a 'smearing campaign' against Islam by Danish public and private representatives, including newspaper cartoons of the prophet Muhammad. After a period of escalation, it culminated in trade boycotts and hate demonstrations (e.g. flag burnings) against Denmark all over the Muslim world. With its enormous and explosive proportions, it spilled over into the conventional foreign policy track (cf. below). The government was subject to intense cross pressure between, on the one hand, the Muslim and the international community and, on the other hand, its parliamentary support party, the 'Danish People's Party', gaining significantly in opinion polls. An analysis of this situation can only be premature at the time of writing, of course, but it seems that the epoch with the Danish people as the only 'superpower' in transnational high politics has come to an end.

57. 'That does not bother me very much. Self-righteousness also exists internationally... I strongly disagree with their [European human rights organizations'] criticisms' (Fogh Rasmussen in interview with *Jyllands-Posten,* 'Foghs forvandling', 26 December 2005).

58. In negotiations in the autumn of 2003 regarding the (now frozen) EU constitution, the Italian EU presidency accepted that Denmark could keep its existing opt-outs and also 'modernize' the one on Justice and Home affairs, making it possible to participate in some respects (the fighting of international crime and terrorism), but also to retain its own aliens policy. The Danish negotiation posture was supported by the Social Democrats, the major opposition party. In his presentation of the posture, the prime minister made explicit reference to a Gallup poll indicating popular resistance to leaving aliens policy to the EU. Cf. Iver Houmark Andersen, 'Regeringen gør EU sværere at sælge', *Information* 12 Januar 2004; Kornø Rasmussen, 2006.

FILLING OUT THE SPACE – OR MORE?

Whereas the definition should be clear ('the ability to prevent other actors' influence on one's own behaviour'), the limits of external action space, as a phenomenon, are admittedly blurred. This is so also for the analyst, working with the benefits of hindsight and of historians' prior investigations. It is more blurred in some cases than in others, though. Especially in cases of significant action space, the limits may be rather elastic, meaning that decision-makers' own pushing may make the space even more significant. Still, action space is not just what the politicians involved 'make of it'; there are objective differences between periods and situations. For survey purposes, the Danish action space in the nine foreign policy episodes have been depicted graphically with some over precision in fig. 1.

Fig 1: Danish Action Space



Learning about action space

The episodes analysed in this article represent the situations within the last century, in which Danish external action space changed markedly – for the better or the worse. 'Same procedure as last time' therefore hardly applied. The situations challenged decision-makers with the task of *learning* about this change. Let us summarize how decision-makers attempted to learn about external action space. Several methods have been identified:

- *anticipation* of the relevant great power(s)' likely responses, including sometimes the 'shadow of the future': August 1914: A replica pistol in the back; Regaining lost territory 1918-20; The League of Nations 1935: failed invisibility; July 1940: Desperately clinging to the 'Iron Fist'; South Schleswig: a new opportunity 1945-49; Between friend and foe 1952-53: NATO bases in Denmark?

- *parallel action:* imitation of or cooperation/competition with a state in a corresponding situation: Between friend and foe 1952-53: NATO bases in Denmark? (Norway); Initiating the Baltic offensive 1989-91 (Iceland)

- flying a *trial balloon,* i.e. observe the response to a corresponding, but less important issue: South Schleswig: a new opportunity 1945-49

- *learning by doing, taking controversial action:* Initiating the Baltic offensive 1989-91; Adapting to 2 June 1992: on a knife's edge

- applying a *foreign policy lesson,* i.e. from a previous success or, as supposed here, a failure ('learning the hard way'):[59] August 1914: a replica pistol in the back; regaining lost territory 1918-20; The League of Nations 1935: failed invisibility; South Schleswig: a new opportunity 1945-49

Two or more of these methods may be combined, though hardly anticipation and 'learning by doing'.

59. It may be hypothesized that Danish decision-makers in these episodes were strongly affected by the 1864 *débacle;* cf. below.

Coping with the internal constraints

In the episodes at hand, we have identified the following government relationships with the people or with Parliament:

- *popular/parliamentary docility or consensus:* The League of Nations 1935: failed invisibility; July 1940: desperately clinging to the 'Iron Fist';[60] Between friend and foe 1952-53: NATO bases in Denmark?;[61] Initiating the Baltic offensive 1989-91

- *government overcomes popular/parliamentary resistance:* August 1914: a replica pistol in the back;[62] Regaining lost territory 1918-20; South Schleswig: a new opportunity 1945-49

- *government is overruled by popular opposition to revise its decision:* Adapting to 2 June 1992: on a knife's edge

The first relationship, of course, entails the most internal action space; the third entails the least.

Has Denmark overplayed its hand?

In most of the episodes, it seems that decision-makers, in rough outline, managed to fill out the external action space adequately. Among the failures to do so, there are logically two possibilities: overplaying their hand, or being overcautious.

Denmark overplayed its hand in 1863-64, giving the Prussian Chancellor Bismarck an opportunity to attack and conquer Denmark militarily. However, Danish governments have not overplayed their hand externally in any of the nine episodes analysed here. One may speculate whether this is due to a systematic over-cautiousness, perhaps induced by the 1864 'lesson

60. Although the public was uninformed about the negotiations, its anticipated reaction to the composition of the Cabinet was not unimportant to the politicians.

61. As we saw, there was some concern among politicians about popular reactions, but they were hardly more than secondary.

62. The public was not informed about this episode, as it happened. The Liberal and Conservative parliamentary opposition was overruled.

of history' (cf. below). Even as Denmark pro-actively expanded its action space in the Baltic offensive from 1990, it did not have negative repercussions – quite to the contrary. Going beyond our nine [63], it may be asserted that the Fogh Rasmussen government went beyond its external action space by letting its domestic 'culture battle', with its idealistic and ideological ingredients (e.g. downplaying political correctness[64] and encouraging 'tough talk' as a Danish virtue) affect foreign policy. The prime minister's refusal to meet Muslim ambassadors in the prelude to the Muslim crisis[65] is a case in point. It hardly requires justification to assert that Denmark clashed with an external reality and was exposed to 'unacceptable consequences' in the ensuing storm (e.g. an unprecedented loss of international reputation, apparently also among allies). What is more open to debate is whether the prime minister's (value) demonstration policy and principle of almost unlimited action space were co-responsible for this clash. The case is still too recent for any firm interpretation.

Has Denmark been overcautious?

Historically, over-cautiousness seems to be more of a problem than its opposite. In the process of regaining North Schleswig in 1918-20, the government, accustomed to living in the shadow of German power, exhibited a curious passivity. Its argument concerning the 'shadow of the future' (fearing revenge from a future strong Germany) was basically sound. However, the idea that Denmark as a state should not work for the regaining of lost

63. Another case, subject to intense strife then and now, was Denmark's 'footnote policy' in NATO in the 1980s: did the parliamentary majority overplay Denmark's hand, damaging its NATO reputation and thus the country's prospects of assistance in a crisis situation? Cf. DIIS, 2005, vol. 3, and Thorsten Borring Olesen's contribution to the present volume.

64. Cf. interview with Fogh Rasmussen in *Jyllands-Posten,* 'Foghs forvandling', 26 December 2005.

65. In their letter to the prime minister of 12 October 2005, the ambassadors had asked him to take those responsible for the alleged anti-Islamic 'smearing campaign' in Denmark, including the Minister of Culture, 'to task under law of the land'. This formulation was interpreted by Fogh Rasmussen as indicating that the ambassadors wanted him to take them to court and thus did not respect Danish free speech. 'Certain countries suffer from a basic lack of insight in and understanding for true democracy' (interview in *Jyllands-Posten,* 'Ytringsfriheden skal bruges til provokation', 30 October 2005). The historical counterpart to this is foreign minister Munch's 'tea parties' with the chief editors in the 1930s, in the wake of 'warnings' from the German ambassador in Copenhagen. For instance, caricatures of German politicians ought to be avoided. Possibly, Fogh Rasmussen has drawn a historical counter-lesson from this.

territory and population must have been due to an over-interpretation of a lesson from the past.[66]

The second Schleswig round in 1945-49 was also a mess domestically, to say the least. Decisive action in relation to the British before September 1946 could have led to the regaining of parts or the whole of South Schleswig. The 'shadow of the future' argument, of course, was understandable in view of the recently experienced revival of German power in the 1930s. With a good deal of wisdom after the event, however, it is possible to assert today that the blow to German identity after World War II was much more fundamental than after World War I and of lasting significance. Moreover, with the decreasing importance of borders within the EC/EU, Danish territorial enlargement after World War II could have proved to be an early exercise in multiculturalism.

REFERENCES

Beukel, Erik (1974), *Socialdemokratiet og stationeringsproblemet 1952-53. En sikkerhedspolitisk beslutning,* Odense: Odense University Press.

Bjørn, Claus and Due-Nielsen, Carsten (2003), 'Fra Helstat til Nationalstat, 1814-1914', *Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Historie,* vol. 3, Copenhagen: Gyldendal.

Borring Olesen, Thorsten and Villaume, Poul (2005), 'I blokopdelingens tegn, 1945-72', *Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Historie,* vol. 5, Copenhagen: Gyldendal.

Branner, Hans (1972), *Småstat mellem stormagter. Beslutningen om mineudlægning august 1914,* Copenhagen: Munksgaard.

Branner, Hans (1987), *9. april 1940 – et politisk lærestykke?,* Copenhagen: DJØF.

Brundtland, Arne Olav (1966), 'Nordisk balanse før og nå', *Internasjonal Politikk,* no. 5: 491-541.

Christmas-Møller, Wilhelm (1993), *Christmas,* vol. 2, Copenhagen: Gyldendal.

DIIS (2005), *Danmark under den Kolde Krig. Den sikkerhedspolitiske situation 1945-1991,* DIIS Report, vols. 1-4, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). Online: [http://www.koldkrigsudrednin-

66. Cf. Lidegaard 2003: 161-2.

gen.dk/] (accessed 05-04-2006). A short summary in English is available and may be obtained from DIIS.

Due-Nielsen, Carsten, Feldbæk, Ole and Petersen, Nikolaj, (eds.) (2001-05), *Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Historie,* vols. 1-6, Copenhagen: Gyldendal.

DUPI, (2000), *Udviklingen i EU siden 1992 på de områder, der er omfattet af de danske forbehold,* udredning, Copenhagen: DUPI.

Frederiksen, Bjarne (1971), *Danmarks sydslesvigspolitik efter det tyske sammenbrud i 1945,* Copenhagen: Munksgaard.

Goldmann, Kjell (1979), 'Tension Between the Strong, and the Power of the Weak: Is the Relation Positive or Negative?', in Kjell Goldmann and Gunnar Sjöstedt (eds.), *Power, Capabilities, Interdependence. Problems in the Study of International Influence,* London: Sage: 115-41.

Goldmann, Kjell et al. (1986), *Democracy and Foreign Policy. The Case of Sweden,* Aldershot: Gower.

Jensen, Jack and Pedersen, Søren (1978), *Dansk udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik 1945-49,* Copenhagen: Gyldendal.

Kornø Rasmussen, Hans (2006), *Mellem kontrol og afmagt: EU's asyl- og indvandrerpolitik,* Copenhagen: DIIS.

Lidegaard, Bo (2003), 'Overleveren, 1914-45', *Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Historie,* vol. 4, Copenhagen: Gyldendal.

Mouritzen, Hans (1988), *Finlandization. Towards a General Theory of Adaptive Politics,* Aldershot: Gower.

Mouritzen, Hans (1993), 'The Two Musterknaben and the Naughty Boy: Sweden, Finland, and Denmark in the Process of European Integration', *Cooperation and Conflict,* no. 4: 373-402.

Mouritzen, Hans (1997), 'Denmark in the Post-Cold War Era: the Salient Action Spheres', in Bertel Heurlin and Hans Mouritzen (eds.), *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 1997,* Copenhagen: DUPI: 33-52.

Mouritzen, Hans (1998), *Theory and Reality of International Politics,* Aldershot: Ashgate.

Mouritzen, Hans and Wivel, Anders (2005), 'Constellation Theory', in Hans Mouritzen and Anders Wivel (eds.), *The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration,* London: Routledge: 15-43.

Nissen, Henrik S. (1973), *1940. Studier i forhandlingspolitikken og samarbejdspolitikken,* Copenhagen: Gyldendal.

Nissen, Henrik S. (1983), 'Adjusting to German Domination', in Henrik Nissen (ed.), *Scandinavia during the Second World War,* Minneapolis: State University of Michigan Press: 98-138

Olsen, Gorm Rye and Pilegaard, Jess (2005), 'The Cost of Non-Europe? Denmark and the Common Security and Defence Policy', *European Security,* vol. 14, no. 3: 339-50.

Organski, Abramo F. K. (1960), *World Politics,* New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Petersen, Nikolaj (2004), 'Europæisk og globalt engagement, 1973-2003', *Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Historie,* vol. 6, Copenhagen: Gyldendal.

Sjøqvist, Viggo (1966), *Danmarks udenrigspolitik 1933-1940,* Copenhagen: Gyldendal.

Wendt, Alexander (1992), 'Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics', *International Organization,* vol. 46, no. 2: 391-425.

Chapter 2
Selected Documents

Speech by Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen
at Yad Vashem, Jerusalem · 155

Speech by Minister of Defence Søren Gade
at the conference 'Homeland Security – the Nordic Challenges'
· 157

Speech by Minister of Foreign Affairs Per Stig Møller
at the third summit of the Council of Europe · 164

President Bush's Visit to Denmark
Remarks by Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen
and President George Bush · 167

Minister for Foreign Affairs Per Stig Møller
'Working Even Closer: the EU, the United Nations and the
Reform of the Security Council'
Article in European View · 173

Speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs Per Stig Møller
at the conference 'A Free Market Vision for Europe' · 182

Speech by Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen
at the Summit Meeting of the UN Security Council · 189

Correspondence between eleven Muslim Ambassadors/ Representatives and Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen · 191

Speech by Minister for the Environment Connie Hedegaard at a UN conference in Montreal · 194

Speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs Per Stig Møller at the Hong Kong WTO Ministerial Conference · 196

SPEECH BY PRIME MINISTER ANDERS FOGH RASMUSSEN YAD VASHEM, JERUSALEM, 16 MARCH 2005

President Katsav, esteemed Heads of State, honoured colleagues; Ladies and gentlemen,

Standing here today, at Yad Vashem, I cannot but feel a sense of the enormity of the events which these surroundings commemorate. The suffering, the loss, the despair are almost impossible to imagine. But looking at these long lists of names we are only too aware that these things did happen and must never be forgotten.

Yesterday, when we dedicated the new museum, we committed ourselves not only to remembering the Holocaust but also to continuing the fight against anti-Semitism, racism and bigotry.

Soon, the last survivors and witnesses of the Holocaust will have passed away into history. Which makes the task of explaining its sombre significance to the youth of today, and tomorrow, all the more urgent.

Five years ago the Stockholm International Forum declared 27th January, the date of the liberation of Auschwitz in 1945, to be an annual day of remembrance. Denmark has since adopted this day as Auschwitz Day. A Danish government sponsored institute carries out public educational activities and research into events surrounding the Holocaust.

As the declaration adopted at the Stockholm Forum says, the unprecedented character of the Holocaust will always hold universal meaning.

But merely remembering is not enough. We must take an uncompromising stand against all present-day attitudes and statements that could lead the way to new crimes against humanity, to new victims sharing the fate of those whose memory we commemorate today.

And, regretably, recent events show that we must never relax our vigilance. Anti-semitism is by no means extinct, even in enlightened Europe.

In my own country, Denmark, the situation is not perfect. We grapple with the integration of immigrants of many different cultures and religions. Instances of xenophobia do occur. Fortunately, without boiling over into violence or abuse. I am glad to say that, for Denmark, anti-semitism is not an issue.

But we have our own way of tackling problems. We have chosen open debate, not bans, to fight expressions of left or right wing extremism, of racism and bigotry. Our laws concerning Libel and Blasphemy, must be obeyed. But we see no benefit in driving the deniers of the Holocaust, neonazis and Islamic fundamentalists and their incitement to violence and hatred underground. When exposed to the light their case becomes weak.

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,
There is no Holocaust Museum in Denmark. Modern history fortunately spared us the need to build one. But last year, a new museum, designed by the renowned architect Daniel Liebeskind and dedicated to our Jewish citizens, was opened at a central location in Copenhagen. It is a testimony to a small but living and vibrant community. Well integrated while not assimilated, since it retains its religious and cultural distinctiveness.

The relationship of the Danes to their Jewish fellow-citizens, is illustrated by the rescue of almost all of Denmark's Jews from Nazi persecution in October 1943. Our Swedish neighbours assisted by generously receiving thousands of refugees.

At the commemoration of the 60th anniversary of this event at the Copenhagen Synagoge, I said that the organised persecution and unprecedented systematic attempt to exterminate the Jewish people is a shameful and indelible stain on European history. I can only repeat this here at Yad Vashem today.

To all of you here today, I say that we have a common responsibility to do our utmost to prevent any such horrors recurring in any shape or form. Both now and in the future.

For, though we must move on, we must never forget.

Thank you for your attention.

SPEECH BY MINISTER OF DEFENCE SØREN GADE AT THE CONFERENCE 'HOMELAND SECURITY – THE NORDIC CHALLEGES' 18 APRIL 2005

Introduction

Thank you for the invitation. I'm pleased to be given this opportunity to speak to you about Homeland Security, seen from my point of view.

Homeland Security is a concept we've all grown very familiar with during the last couple of years. In face of the rising threat from terrorism, the protection of society has thus become an imminent focus for politicians, the media and society at large.

The threats and risks of today

The threat we face is diffuse and enormously varied. The possible targets are basically infinite, and the list of potential tools or weapons is close to endless as well. So, let there be no doubt – terrorism is a potent challenge.

Yet terrorism is by no means the only threat, we are faced with. Industrial accidents – such as the accident in fireworks storehouse in Kolding last year, natural disasters such as hurricanes, and unintentional breakdowns of one sort or the other are other very realistic and potentially just as harmful threats, which we need to be able to deal with.

As minister with responsibility for not just the military defence but also the rescue preparedness – and to top it off a coordinating role with regard to general preparedness in the civil sector in Denmark, I can assure you that Homeland Security and society's general resilience are items high on my agenda.

The vulnerability assessment

In January 2004 we issued a national vulnerability assessment. The report

offers an analysis of the balance between – on the one hand risks and vulnerabilities, – and on the other hand the preparedness in place in a number of crucial sectors of society. The analysis, for instance, looks into the areas of IT- and energy supply, transportation, the health sector and the emergency and crisis management structures.

The conclusion of the analysis is that Denmark has a well-functioning preparedness; yet it also concludes that the threat- and risk-landscape is radically different than earlier – and that it is in constant development.

As a result of the globalised and open society of today, the rapid technological development, the specialisation of services and the interdependencies between central sectors and systems – for instance the financial sectors dependency on the electricity sector –society's resilience to day depends on much more than just robust rescue preparedness, police and defence forces.

The various civil sectors and systems need their own preparedness structures, and we need an overview over the way the sectors depend on one another.

Furthermore, it is a fact that many risks and threats are today international in nature. The amount and speed of global internet exchange, and the amount of physical transportation of goods, services and people exemplify, why for instance the break-out of illnesses, the transportation of oil or the spreading of cyber viruses are international safety problems – rather than national or regional ones.

With regard to security treats, it is likewise a fact that they are international. Terrorism is for instance a general threat to the western world – and to the publics feeling of security all over the world.

This internationalisation of these security and safety issues underscores that the interdependency is not just between sectors in Denmark but indeed a cross- border dependency. This means that the factors, which secure the robustness of our society, are much more complex to day than earlier. It also means that the solutions are also in many instances international. With regard to homeland security issues, I want to mention that the EU Commission is for example working on creating a programme for the protection of cross border critical infrastructure. Cross border critical infrastructure is for instance transportation routes, electricity supply and the like. We have not yet seen the actual proposal, but it serves as an exam-

ple of how international cooperation may be instrumental in elevating national safety.

The conclusion of the vulnerability assessment from 2004 led to a series of recommendations, which we are now in the process of implementing. A central one is that we need to enable ourselves to monitor the development of risks and vulnerabilities facing the civil sectors much closer and what is more; we need a central overview over the cross sector risk-landscape.

The traditional intelligence services are useful and crucial, yet they need to be supplemented with information on other sorts of risks, and we thus need a capacity to gather these types of information.

So far, we've established a capacity in the Danish Emergency Management Agency. The tasks will be monitoring, assessment and counselling. The output will be yearly cross-sector vulnerability reports and focused counselling of specific actors.

One of the other central recommendations in the vulnerability assessment from January 2004 is that the cross-sector coordination needs to be better. This we've tried to accomplish by creating various forums. Firstly, we've set up a national coordinating forum, where all the central authorities will meet and coordinate the operative response to a given crisis or catastrophe.

Secondly, we've created a number of sector forums, where associated authorities and actors meet to be informed and inform each other on matters regarding preparedness and resilience. Thirdly, I will mention that we've gathered both the civil emergency management and the military defence under one ministry – the ministry of Defence. This is meant to create more coordination and synergy. The transfer happened about a year ago, and the preliminary results are good. With regard to both operative and strategic cooperation we've seen a positive development.

As an example, I could mention the huge amount of support and assistance from the military defence to the rescue preparedness during the accident in Kolding last year. I'm sure that the fact that the two systems are now under one ministry has helped pave the way for this joint effort, where the rescue preparedness received extensive assistance from the military and the home guard.

As minister, I'm pleased to see that both the military defence and the rescue preparedness have decided to engage in making the most of the new

partnership. Needless to say, we expect much more from the partnership in the coming years. A strong partnership combined with a close cooperation with the other central actors – not least the police – is definitely needed in order to successfully meet the challenges of the present and the future.

Now naturally, the good will and the organisational set-up help to promote cooperation and coordination, yet we also want to ensure a suitable technical platform for cooperation.

Technical challenges

Technically, there are demanding challenges ahead with regard to Homeland Security, which we have to address in order to create more cross-sector coordination, full situation awareness etc. Fortunately, however, technology is not only a problem; it is in many instances also part of the solution.

One of the most obvious technological challenges is the speed with which technology is developing. Today, technical performance is doubled every 18 months. Advances in communication technology are even faster. Even though the technology to process and disperse information in many cases will be available where needed, it takes a lot of effort to keep up with the speed of the development of especially communications technology.

Most nations tend to develop their own Command and Communication Information Systems (CCIS) using national industry. These projects are very often complicated and time consuming. Before the system meets the users, it is in many cases already technologically out of date. Therefore, I find it appropriate henceforward to use 'Commercial off the shelf products' to a greater extent – simply to be able to keep track with the technological development. These products may form a cost effective alternative to expensive, from scratch developed systems.

Furthermore, transmission capacity will in few, but important, cases remain an obstacle for many years. This is particularly true in situations such as responses to humanitarian crises, natural catastrophes, and of course military operations. For mobile communications another obstacle is the supply of electrical energy. Battery capacity does not increase nearly at the same rate as information and communications technology, but advances in the so-called 'fuel cell technology' may change that in a foreseeable future.

Networks and Network Based Operations

Another big technological challenge is to create and maintain networks that match the demands of today.

Networks have always been important for society. Think of railways, roads, pipelines, power grids and the like. But now they are perhaps more important than ever. In fact the technology based infrastructures are today so important for our lives and our safety that in stead of talking about an information society, or a post industrial society, we might just as well speak of a network society.

The fast development of information and communication technology leads to new vulnerabilities in society as a whole, and especially in the communication and IT infrastructure. As the infrastructure networks extend far beyond national borders, many of the networks of today are vulnerable to a knowledgeable, resourceful and determined opponent, and this is one of the challenges we have to address in the near future. However, by utilising progress in our understanding of these complex structures, and our knowledge of countermeasures it is possible in a foreseeable future to build robust, secure and flexible infrastructure networks that will serve as the backbone for security both nationally and internationally.

The military concept of 'Network Based Operations' that is focus on information and network centricity may be seen as a military response to the technological development in our societies. It is simply the application of information technology to increase mission effectiveness and efficiency. The whole idea is to create an information infrastructure that in principle allows all relevant parties to be connected to a network of networks. This allows for sharing of timely, relevant and trustworthy information. This same concept is of course also applicable to Homeland Security.

Presently, we are in the Danish Defence working on extending the concept of 'Network Centric Warfare' to the Danish concept of Homeland security'. We are also in the process of considering how to form a Homeland Security network of networks, that includes emergency services (police, ambulance, fire fighting etc.) and military services.

Architecture and security

When talking about networks it is important to make sure that info-struc-

ture investments are not wasted. This could be done by creating and maintaining an architecture which identifies components and interfaces, and which allows us to acquire communications equipment that at a certain level is interoperable. To achieve this interoperability Command and Communication Information Systems (CCIS) must be based on 'plug and play' modules, which can easily be incorporated in the architecture. An increased cooperation with other nations must be established. It is in my opinion not necessary to reinvent the wheel, as other nations or companies have already developed an CCIS architecture and other communication solutions.

When connected to the network one may serve as a service provider – that is to put information at the disposal of other participants, or as a service consumer, the ultimate user of information or other services. Even though this service orientation is more flexible than the usual rigid 'push technology' used in many military and emergency communication setups, it never the less creates new vulnerabilities. First and foremost, because communications networks must be accessible to all the different players with relations to Homeland Security.

The safe transmittal of sensitive, and, in some cases, classified, information among a variety of parties requires the development and implementation of communication networks with adequate security.

This leaves us with one tough challenge: Can our desire for privacy and the needs of National Security be mutually satisfied, and is it possible to have a free exchange of information, while still maintaining the balance of secrecy required for National Security? It is in my opinion merely a question of time, before this is technical possible – if it isn't already possible today?

Interoperability

Different technological standards among operating systems, technical architecture, etc. for computers and within information technology make for big challenges with regard to interoperability.

The physical interoperability of radios has always been a problem, simply because different incompatible technologies serve different purposes. In Denmark we are working hard on solving this problem. We have for example recently formed a cross-sector Committee on radio communication

whose main task is to come up with a draft to a technical solution on radio communication for the actors in the preparedness in Denmark. The Committee must look at the new technology to find and investigate true multirole, multiband radios which are mutually compatible. In the future these software radios may be a host for many waveforms and frequencies and thus be an effective bridge between otherwise incompatible networks.

It is, however important to bear in mind, that the problem of interoperability is much more than a technological issue. It has also something to do with political will, resource allocation etc.

Way ahead

The technological challenges presented by Homeland Security are vast, multi-disciplined and multi-dimensional. Some of these tough challenges we are already addressing and have for some time, while others we are just starting to address.

However, we have – as I mentioned earlier – taken the first steps to being 'Net Centric', we are presently considering how to solve the problems of security and we are working on improving our ability to communicate by providing a new radio communications system to the actors of the preparedness in Denmark. So all in all, we are trying to meet the different challenges to the best of our ability and will keep on doing this in the foreseeable future.

These were some of my thoughts on homeland security issues.

I'm sure that homeland security will continue to be an area of development and focus is the coming years. I do, however, feel that we've taken some very important steps, and that we will be able to match the challenges of the future with appropriate solutions.

Thank you.

SPEECH BY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS PER STIG MØLLER AT THE THIRD SUMMIT OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE WARSAW, 16-17 MAY 2005

Presidents, Prime Ministers, Distinguished Participants,

All over Europe we have just commemorated the 60th anniversary of the end of the Second World War. In those days 60 years ago, and in the years that followed, one thought prevailed in the minds of all European citizens: This must never happen again! Idealistic and innovative thinking arose out of the catastrophe. A number of the European and other international institutions which still serve us well were founded in that period – one of them being the Council of Europe. What was then regarded radical thinking, namely that internal matters in one state could be a legitimate concern for the International Community, is widely accepted today. So is the wisdom that one of the best guarantees for a state to live at peace with its neighbours is that also the neighbours are democratic states, ruled by law and respecting human rights.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall these fundamental values enshrined in the Statute of the Council of Europe have truly become a common European heritage. Today's solemn reaffirmation of these values and the commitment to safeguard them by means of reinforced standard-setting and implementation activities are therefore key. Denmark remains committed to this work.

Of key importance is also the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and our commitment to ensure an efficiently functioning Court of Human Rights with its unique protection of the individual. We welcome the decision to establish a group of wise persons to look into the capacity problems of the Court, and we urge all states to rat-

ify Protocol 14, aimed at easing these problems, in order for it to enter into force as soon as possible.

The Council of Europe has done a remarkable job in promoting and consolidating democracy in the states that became members of the Council in the 1990's. Democracy is a dynamic process for all states, and we all face challenges from new developments. Looking at the Council of Europe's many activities in the field of democracy, we agree that there is a need for more coherence and probably also a more creative approach. We welcome the Council of Europe Forum for the Future of Democracy and believe that it can, in a non-bureaucratic way, stimulate the ongoing process of improving and safeguarding our democracies. It is important that the Forum will act in close co-operation with the Venice Commission, which in itself has proven to be an efficient instrument offering valuable advice, often under rather difficult political circumstances. Other Council of Europe institutions and activities with the aim to promote good governance should likewise be given our full support. The valuable work of the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) is but one example.

The Council of Europe has proven to be able to adapt and define relevant responses to new challenges facing our societies. Good examples are the instruments drawn up in the field of countering international terrorism. It is satisfactory that the Council has been able to react quickly and to finalize in time for the Summit two new conventions in this field. These new instruments will make the Council of Europe a relevant partner in the worldwide anti-terrorism efforts under the leadership of the United Nations. We also welcome the opening for signature of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings.

Denmark supports the Council of Europe's increasing co-operation with other international organisations. The guidelines we adopt at this Summit will refocus the important relationship between the Council of Europe and the EU. We also move forward concerning enhanced co-operation between the Council of Europe and the OSCE, starting in four commonly identified areas of work. We must ensure better use of resources by building on the individual organisations' key competencies.

Seen through modern management glasses, Europe, with its many institutions for co-operation, may seem to be over-organized. History decided

this development. But time has proven the value of these institutions. We have a multifaceted European architecture with organisations mastering special competencies. Let us respect and nurse these important and relevant competencies and never lose sight of the overall context. Our organisations must co-operate and support each other, each one based on its field of speciality. We have come a long way already in getting rid of unnecessary duplication of work. Let's continue work in that direction. All European organisations will benefit from this! And it will be beneficial to all Europeans, who are better protected through the conventions which this Council has created over the years.

Thank you.

PRESIDENT BUSH'S VISIT TO DENMARK

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT BUSH AND PRIME MINISTER ANDERS FOGH RASMUSSEN (EXTRACT) AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICIAL RESIDENCE 'MARIENBORG' 6 JULY 2005

Prime Minister Rasmussen:

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I am delighted to be here today with my good friend, the President of the United States. Even more so because you chose to visit us, your friends in Denmark, on this very special day, your 59th birthday. So happy birthday, Mr. President. We have already celebrated the event in a small way with a traditional Danish birthday breakfast, together with our families.

Denmark and the United States have long been close friends and allies. We share the same fundamental goals and values. The close personal ties between the Danes and the Americans are highlighted every year when the biggest Fourth of July celebration outside the United States takes place here in Denmark. Thousands of Danish Americans gather in the Rebild Hills to manifest not just family ties, but also shared beliefs. It's our common desire to spread liberty and promote democracy. We do not accept the thesis that certain peoples and nations are not yet ready for democracy, and therefore, better suited for dictatorship. We share the belief that freedom is universal, and we share the belief that in the struggle between democracy and dictatorship, you cannot stay neutral.

This is why Denmark contributes with more than 500 troops in Iraq; why we make an active contribution to the joint allied effort in Afghanistan; why we wish to promote democracy and reform in the Middle East; and why we urge all parties to find a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

On these and other global challenges, the United States needs the European Union as a strong and active partner. The present internal diffi-

culties must not distract the European Union from its global responsibilities.

Nobody needs a strong and generous Europe more than Africa. As other regions progress, Africa remains haunted by poverty, war and epidemics. I feel a strong obligation to focus more on Africa, and I'm going to pay an official visit to the region in October. The President and I share the view that the upcoming G8 summit should focus on how to make poverty history in Africa. I see five main challenges.

Firstly, Africa needs to overcome epidemic diseases. AIDS in Africa is a fully-blown disaster. The Copenhagen Consensus meeting last year concluded that combating AIDS should be the world's absolute top priority. It is a fight we must win. During the last four years, Denmark has increased funding for the combat of AIDS with more than 60 percent. I urge the G8 to make a similar extra effort.

Secondly, Africa needs trade. Free trade and better access to the world market provide the means to improve economic growth and fight poverty. When trade advances, poverty retreats. The European Union and the United States have already granted very generous access to their markets for the poorest African countries. We should go further, and dismantle trade distorting agricultural subsidies. I urge the G8 to do their part in creating a new, balanced and fair trade regime to benefit Africa.

Thirdly, Africa needs peace. No peace, no progress. Africans, themselves, must prevent conflicts and manage crisis. But we must help them to do this. That is why Denmark has developed a new African Program for Peace, to support the promising endeavors of the African Union. I urge the G8 to support this program and the peacekeeping efforts of the African Union.

Fourthly, Africa needs more aid – help to self-help. It, therefore, pleases me greatly that you, President Bush, has just announced your intention to double American assistance to Africa. Denmark is one of the most generous donors and we're going to focus even more on Africa in the future. In fact, if all G8 countries matched our effort, Africa would get $90 billion a year, instead of only $25 billion. I, therefore, urge all G8 countries to follow our good example.

And, finally, Africa needs better governance. All our aid will come to nothing if countries are ruled by corrupt dictators. When aid and trade are linked to good policies, more people are lifted out of poverty. We should

generously reward countries that fight corruption, ensure political liberty and economic freedom, invest in health and education of their people, and promote women's rights. And we should not be afraid to stop aid to dictators like Zimbabwe's Mugabe. I urge the G8 to make no compromise in the demand for good governance.

We must all join efforts to make poverty history. We must fight poverty because human decency requires it, because hope for each individual is essential for human dignity. We must take action so that despair and darkness can be replaced with hope and light for hundreds of millions of people. The ball is in our court. Let us not waste our chances. The G8 should not miss this golden opportunity.

President Bush:

Thank you, Mr. Prime Minister. Thanks for the birthday breakfast. I would strongly recommend the Danish birthday cake. (Laughter.) I am really honored to be here in Copenhagen. I appreciate your friendship, and I appreciate the friendship the Danish people have for my country, and vice versa.

Denmark is a close ally and a partner of the United States. Mr. Prime Minister, America values its longstanding relationship with Denmark, and that's why I've come. I've come to reaffirm my nation's respect for Denmark, and our ties that bind us forever, and the fact that we share common values. I've also come because I want to let the people know how much I admire your leadership and your character and your vision.

I appreciate your nation's support in advancing freedom in Eastern Europe and the broader Middle East and around the world. We are grateful for your understanding, and the people's understanding, that freedom is a universal right, and that, as we promote freedom and democracy, we'll lay the foundation for peace for generations to come. Under your leadership, Mr. Prime Minister, your commitment has been steadfast and strong in the fight against terror.

You know, for some in Europe, September the 11th was a tragic date, a terrible moment. For me, and many in the American public, September the 11th was a change of attitude, a recognition that we're involved with a global war against ideological extremists who will kill the innocent in order to achieve their objectives.

I want to thank you very much for your steadfast support for freedom and peace in Afghanistan and Iraq. I particularly want to thank the loved ones, the family members of the troops stationed abroad for the sake of peace and freedom, for their sacrifice. I know many miss their loved ones, and I know how hard it is for families during times of deployment. And I appreciate them very much. I also want to thank you very much for being such a key contributor to our common security within NATO.

You know, one of the interesting initiatives that we worked together on, and I don't think a lot of people pay attention to, is what's called the Proliferation Security Initiative. It's a group of free nations that have bound together to help interdict the transport of weapons of mass destruction. One of the most harmful aspects of the war on terror could be if these killers were able to gain weapons of mass destruction, which in my mind – no doubt in my mind, they'd use on a moment's notice. And the Proliferation Security Initiative is an attempt by free countries to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. And you've played a leading role.

We had a great discussion today. We talked about the upcoming G8 meeting. We talked about Africa and climate change. As well, we talked about Guantanamo. The Prime Minister is concerned about what the situation on Guantanamo says about America and our view of liberty. Let me tell you what I told him. I said, first, the prisoners are well-treated in Guantanamo. There's total transparency. The International Red Cross can inspect any time, any day. And you're welcome to go. The press, of course, is welcome to go down to Guantanamo.

Secondly, we have sent many home. These people were picked up on the battlefield. They didn't wear uniforms, they weren't associated with a government, but they were on the battlefield. And so we put them in Guantanamo. We wanted to find out as much as we could about what they knew about this war on terror in order to protect our citizens. Many, it turned out, were sent home.

Thirdly, I assured the Prime Minister there's got to be a way forward for people held in Guantanamo, and there will be. The reason why you haven't seen any adjudication of individuals is because our court system is determining where best to try people, whether it be in a military tribunal where a person would have all – lawyers and rights, or whether it be in the civilian

courts. And once the judicial branch of our government makes its decision, then we'll proceed forward with giving people fair and open trials.

I just want you to remember we are in a war against these terrorists. My most solemn obligation is to protect the American people from further attack. These people are being treated humanely. There's very few prison systems around the world that have seen such scrutiny as this one. And for those of you here on the continent of Europe who have doubt, I'd suggest buying an airplane ticket and going down and look – take a look for yourself.

We also talked about Africa. I told the Prime Minister I was proud of my country's tripling of aid to Africa since I've been the President. And as he mentioned, I proposed to double aid to Africa once again.

Our primary focus in Africa is going to be to focus efforts on solving people's problems. They've got a problem in HIV/AIDS, and we're leading the world when it comes to contributions – along with Denmark, by the way – in making sure antiretroviral drugs get to people who need help; and helping set up an infrastructure so that prevention programs begin to work; and follow up with programs that will help the orphans of HIV/AIDS families. Denmark has put a robust effort in place, as had the United States, and I'm proud of our efforts.

Over a million people die of malaria on the continent of Africa on an annual basis, most of whom are under five years old. This is a problem we can solve. I laid out an initiative the other day for $1.2 billion to help eradicate the scourges of malaria on the continent of Africa. This is an area where we can work together. And I agree strongly with what the Prime Minister said: We expect there to be good governance on the continent of Africa. I don't know how we can look our taxpayers in the eye and say, this is a good deal to give money to countries that are corrupt. What we're interested in, in countries is helping people, and, therefore, we have said that we'll give aid, absolutely; we'll cancel debt, you bet – but we want to make sure that the governments invest in their people; invest in the health of their people, the education of their people; and fight corruption.

And then we talked about climate change, as well. I'm looking forward to going to the G8. Listen, I recognize that the surface of the Earth is warmer and that an increase in greenhouse gases caused by humans is contributing to the problem. Kyoto didn't work for the United States and it, frankly, did-

n't work for the world. The reason it didn't work for the world is many developing nations weren't included in Kyoto.

I've also told our friends in Europe that Kyoto would have wrecked our economy. I don't see how you can be President of the United States and sign and agree to an agreement that would have put a lot of people out of work. See, I think there's a better way forward. I would call it the post-Kyoto era, where we can work together to share technologies, to control greenhouse gases as best as possible.

Listen, the United States, for national security reasons and economic security reasons, needs to diversify away from fossil fuels. And so we've put out a strategy to do just that, and I can't wait to share with our G8 friends, just like I shared with the Prime Minister, our strategy. We spent about over $20 billion last year on research and development on new technologies that we are willing to share with the world.

There's no doubt in my mind that we'll be driving a different kind of automobile within a reasonable period of time – one powered by hydrogen. And the Prime Minister is most interested in this subject, and I look forward to sharing technologies, not only with our G8 friends, but also with countries like India and China, who will be at the G8.

I want to thank you again, Mr. Prime Minister, for being such a steadfast person. You know, a lot of times people in politics chase opinion polls. I don't know if you poll this much in Denmark ... we poll way too much in America, seems like to me. (Laughter.) It's a growth industry. (Laughter.) What I appreciate is a leader who has a vision and the strength of character to do what he thinks is right. And that's what your Prime Minister has done. I'm proud to call him, friend. And thanks for hosting me today.

WORKING EVEN CLOSER: THE EU, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE REFORM OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Article by Minister for Foreign Affairs Per Stig Møller
European View, Vol. 2, Autumn 2005

2005 is the year of review of the United Nations' Millennium Declaration and of dealing with reforms of the United Nations. 2005 is therefore also the year where the need for clear European Union positions on engagement in the United Nations' agenda is of obvious importance: for the European Union, for the United Nations and for the world. The European Union's size, its values and partnerships, and its foreign policy instruments all warrant a crucial role. The United Nations and the world community face unprecedented challenges, and the European Union is particularly well-equipped to handle them. The present cooperation between the two must therefore be intensified, and to this end we need stronger political will and courage within both the European Union and the United Nations.

In its Security Strategy, 'A Secure European Union in a Better World', from December 2003, the European Union presented the case for an international order based on effective multilateralism with a stronger United Nations as a key component: 'In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system (...) Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European Union priority.'

Whether we strive to fight poverty, terrorism and crime or to prevent crises and stop conflicts, it is not a question of using the European Union at the expense of the United Nations – it is a question of strengthening both.

European Union – a global actor

With approximately 450 million citizens and the world's largest internal market, the European Union represents a quarter of the world's Gross National Product. Compared to other international actors, the European Union has a unique capacity to make its weight felt on the global stage through a broad spectrum of different policy instruments: aid, trade, political dialogue, diplomacy and crisis management, among other. The economic weight of the European Union's development aid and its share of global development aid underlines its potential role as a global political actor. The European Union and its Member States donate more than half of the world's development aid and earlier this year the European Union agreed to reach a collective goal of 0.56 per cent of GNP by 2010.

Despite being a superpower in terms of economy and development aid, the European Union is only slowly transforming itself into a global political player and, with its increasing political clout, it is gradually defining its role on the global scene. We need to speed up this process. The fate of the Constitutional Treaty does not change the need for European engagement on the global scene. Despite the two 'no-votes', the European Union can still be a driving force in many fields, such as the WTO negotiations and the ODA targets, and it must continue to play this role. We must continue to strengthen our ties across the Atlantic and with Asia in order to keep the focus on the long-term solutions to the present day and future challenges.

The need for Europe's involvement on the global scene is indisputable, but our cooperation is not always that simple and important differences still exist between the European Union Member States. It is therefore essential that we all genuinely seek to work together in an open, inclusive and transparent manner with a view to finding sustainable solutions. Such an approach not only reinforces European Union positions, but also safeguards the perception of the European Union as a serious and reliable international partner.

The present Treaties offer many opportunities for strengthening our global role, but the nature of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (unanimity) asks for strong will on the part of the Member States. This should not be too difficult, if we realise that everybody benefits from a strong European voice. When 25 States speak with one voice, our external relations

policies gather more strength than any Member State can mobilise alone. Furthermore, we gained firm evidence during the Iraqi crisis that the expectations of the Europeans for a unified European Union position are high. The fate of the Constitutional Treaty won't change that either. The European Union must mobilise the necessary will in order to live up to its potential and these expectations. It's the only way to move forward and strengthen our cooperation with and support of the United Nations.

Closer EU/UN cooperation

While growing into the role of a stronger global player, the European Union has taken on greater responsibility, and the following five areas show how the European Union, in concrete terms, may assist in further strengthening the work of the United Nations.

1. Strengthening the European Union's crisis management capacity is also a means to make the United Nations stronger. Over the last couple of years, important progress has been made in the European Union's capacity to engage in international peacekeeping operations. This progress has taken place within the framework of the European Union Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). In total, eight civil and military missions have been successfully launched since the beginning of 2003, and some have been launched after an explicit request from the United Nations Security Council.

At the same time it is clear that the European Union needs to strengthen its capacities further if the European Union is to carry out more intensive tasks for the United Nations. Here, the creation of European Union Battle Groups is central. The United Nations Secretary-General recently stated in his report, 'In larger freedom': 'Decisions by the European Union to create stand-by Battle Groups, for instance, and by the African Union to create African reserve capacities, are a valuable complement to our own efforts.' Quick action is often of crucial importance. A European Union Battle Group on stand-by is to be an important first choice in the time it takes to gather a traditional United Nations peacekeeping force.

In September 2003 the United Nations and the European Union agreed on a 'Joint Declaration on UN/EU Co-operation in Crisis Management' in order to deepen the cooperation in this area. The declaration describes further practical steps to be taken, building on the momentum of the positive

cooperation between the two partners. The idea behind the declaration is that in order for the United Nations to carry out its peacekeeping operations, it needs regional organisations and players to strengthen their capacity to carry out crisis management missions and, in turn, strengthen United Nations operations.

2. In this vein, Denmark and the European Union strongly support the establishment of the Peace-Building Commission (PBC), which is to remedy the absence of a body in the United Nations system to help countries through the difficult transition from war to lasting peace by coordinating the work of all relevant actors. The fact is that almost half of all countries that emerge from war lapse back into violence within five years. Consistent, coordinated and better-funded strategies for peace building are crucial to sustainable peace and long-term development. Denmark strongly supports filling-in this institutional gap in the United Nations system.

The PBC will provide advice on peace-building strategies for countries emerging from conflict. Notwithstanding this, it will be for other participants; international financial institutions, regional organisations etc., to use the conclusions of the PBC's discussions in adapting their own policies and activities towards the country in question.

3. The shared acceptance of and respect for international law is a prerequisite for strengthening peace and security on the global stage. The problem is not open disagreement about specific aspects of international law. Such disagreements have always existed and are completely normal in any legal system. But we must realise that the world has changed significantly in the last couple of decades, and that there is need to reaffirm the understanding and support for the existing basic principles of international law.

To this end, Denmark has initiated a number of national and international initiatives designed to promote the issue of strengthening international law. During the Danish Presidency of the Security Council in the second half of 2006 we intend to launch a debate on the need to reaffirm our commitment to fundamental principles and rules of international law, focusing on a number of key areas.

The European Union is a good starting point for reaffirming international law. One aspect of the international legal order – where the European Union already plays an important role – is the fight against impunity for

international crimes. European Union Member States were instrumental in the historic creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998; a truly global, permanent judicial institution with a mandate to prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Almost 100 States have ratified the ICC statute and the ICC has already started investigations into a number of cases. In April 2005, partly through strong lobbying by European Union Member States in the United Nations Security Council, the Council referred the horrific crimes committed in Darfur, Sudan, to the ICC; the first such referral ever to take place and a significant boost for the ICC.

4. In the area of counter-terrorism, the European Union is a privileged partner to the United Nations. They each have areas of comparative advantage and benefit vastly of the actions of the other partner. The United Nations provides the general framework for the international efforts to combat terrorism. This ensures that the fight against terrorism has global reach and legitimacy. The United Nations' actions are supported and supplemented by the European Union just as the European Union member states implement a large share of the United Nations obligations through European Union legislation. Moreover, the European Union Member States are often able to undertake stronger, more detailed commitments in their common implementation of the United Nations obligations than what is possible to find in the 'global' United Nations Security Council resolutions.

Another good illustration of the partnership between the United Nations and the European Union in counter-terrorism is the current work undertaken to ensure all countries have the adequate means to counter terrorist networks. A lot of this work springs from the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) under the Security Council. Denmark chairs this committee in 2005-6 and during our presidency, a key priority will be to facilitate technical assistance to those countries which lack the resources and know-how to fight terrorism effectively. An important task of the CTC is therefore to identify the need of these countries and relay the request for technical assistance to donors with the required know-how. Not least due to its first-hand experience with international terrorism, the European Union supports this work vigorously and offers its technical expertise, for instance in regard to border control or terrorist financing, to a number of the countries identified by CTC.

In this manner, the European Union's efforts to bolster third countries' capacities to combat terrorism make a valuable contribution to the work of the Counter Terrorism Committee and the United Nations. Consequently, the European Union is and will continue to be a strong partner for the United Nations in the fight against terrorism.

5. The European Union is founded upon the principles of liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. For many years, the European Union has continuously played a central role in the international efforts to promote and protect these principles worldwide. In these endeavours, the European Union bases itself on a comprehensive human rights policy developed and refined over time to become one of the priorities of its foreign and security policy.

The European Union welcomes the prominent place given to human rights in the process of United Nations reform. It unreservedly supports the proposal to replace the United Nations Human rights Commission with a standing Human Rights Council, which should be able to meet whenever the need arises rather than as the calendar dictates.

The European Union strongly believes that the establishment of a Human Rights Council will contribute to a strengthening of the United Nations human rights mechanisms, thus reflecting the universality of human rights and their central position in the United Nations system. With a strong mandate, such a council would improve the ability of the international community to effectively address thematic issues and country-specific human rights issues as well as urgent human rights crises. A Human Rights Council would also contribute to the streamlining of human rights issues throughout the UN system.

It goes without saying that the replacement of the Human Rights Commission with a permanent Human Rights Council should go hand in hand with the strengthened role for the Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights, combined with the agreed doubling of its regular budget funding. The creation of a standing Human Rights Council is an idea that Denmark has promoted for some time and to which we attach major importance.

Reform of the United Nations Security Council

At the beginning of the 21st Century, the international community needs a

United Nations that is capable of handling the new challenges and threats the world is facing today. To this end, it is crucial that the Security Council continues to play a decisive role in maintaining international peace and security. The present composition of the Security Council reflects the balance of power of the world immediately after the Second World War – a world that no longer exists. A broader representation is therefore needed with a more balanced geographical representation. For this reason, a broad majority of the United Nations Member States have, over the last months, demonstrated clear support for reform and enlargement of the Security Council.

In Denmark's view, such enlargement should be enacted by increasing the number of permanent and non-permanent members and by including developing and developed countries as permanent members. The draft General Assembly resolution of the Group of Four (G4), which consists of Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, reflects this view. Denmark therefore supports the proposal and has offered its co-sponsorship. In addition, we have expressed our support to Germany and Japan as new permanent Security Council members.

With an enlarged Security Council as outlined in the draft resolution, voices representing the whole world will be much stronger and thereby enhance the legitimacy, credibility and effectiveness of Security Council decisions. Effectiveness in the sense that the collective pressure to adhere to Security Council decisions will increase. Broader representation will also enhance the Council's responsiveness to the views and needs of all Member States.

As this Security Council reform has already been on the agenda of the General Assembly for more than 12 years, it is now time to decide on the issue. The G4's draft resolution provides us with a unique opportunity to take action, and without reliable alternatives, a rejection would mean no to change, no to reform and yes to the status quo. In addition, a decision would be a great leap forward in our common effort to make progress on the comprehensive United Nations reform agenda. However, the reform of the Security Council must not develop into a prerequisite or an obstacle to our common ambition as to strengthening and modernising the entire United Nations system.

At the same time, adoption and implementation of the resolution will not mark a conclusion to the Security Council reform process, but rather the beginning of a new and reinvigorated debate. The envisaged review clause is an excellent mechanism to maintain a continued dialogue within the General Assembly on the Security Council reform issue. Hence, the performance of the new permanent members is to be appraised fifteen years after their admission to the Security Council. The review will also include the question of whether new permanent members should be granted a right to veto. Denmark opposes any such extension of the veto right as it would seriously hamper the effectiveness of the Security Council.

In a long-term perspective, Denmark favours a permanent seat for the European Union in the Security Council to represent the interests of all European Union Member States. Close European Union cooperation on Security Council affairs has already proven highly valuable and important to reach comprehensive peace solutions, e.g. as demonstrated during the process of adopting the three Security Council resolutions on Sudan in March 2005.

A European Union speaking with one voice in the Security Council would reinforce the normative and operational capacities of the Security Council, and increase the global importance of common European Union fundamental values such as democracy, rule of law, and human rights. As mentioned above, a key prerequisite would be strengthening the existing cooperation under the scope of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Conclusion

The European Union still punches below its weight on the global political scene. We have a great idea to sell and help implement – namely that integration promotes peace and stability. Peace and stability are on the top of the United Nations' agenda, and the European Union has an obligation to contribute through cooperation with the United Nations.

The cooperation between the two is close today and there is no shortage of ideas on how to intensify this cooperation. In order to do so, we need willpower within both the European Union and the United Nations – the will to make better use of the European Union's potential on the global

scene and the will to make the necessary reforms within the United Nations. Solid cooperation between the European Union and the United Nations can contribute to stability and progress in our unstable world.

SPEECH BY MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS PER STIG MØLLER AT THE CONFERENCE 'A FREE MARKET VISION FOR EUROPE' CEPOS, COPENHAGEN, 9 SEPTEMBER 2005

Fellow speakers, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen,

Many thanks to Director Martin Ågerup and his staff at CEPOS for organising this timely and important debate. Europe finds itself at a crossroads, and we need a meeting of minds like this today to help push Europe in the right direction.

The British statesman, Edmund Burke, once said that change is necessary in order to preserve. The question today is: What kind of European Union do we want to preserve and why do we want to preserve it? The French and the Dutch referenda have reminded us that we urgently need to find a clear and straightforward answer to this question. That is the reason, why we have the reflection period.

The short version of the answer is that we need to preserve the basic features of the EU. That is the contractual and rule-based nature of a European co-operation that has served as an excellent framework for relations between Europe's independent nation states for more than fifty years. In other words, we need to preserve the community method.

Why? The answer to that question deserves to be put into a historical context.

The ancient Greek historian and geographer, Strabo, began his Geographica of the known world with Europe, because as he said 'it is both varied in form and admirably adapted by nature for the development of excellence in men and governments.' Flattering words. History has, however, shown that peace does not result from a common territory, a common religion or a common system of government, and not even from excellent men!

In fact, for the past millennium, countless wars over religion, territory and power have been waged in Europe. The period until the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 was marked by religious wars between Catholics, Muslims and Protestants. That was followed by endless hostilities between European monarchs who often regarded war for territory as their own private enterprise. In the 20th century, Europe witnessed the much more bloody conflicts between nation states, which culminated in the biggest manslaughter of all time – the Second World War.

It was against this background that the dream of a peaceful and prosperous Europe was born. The ruins of Berlin, the carnage on the beaches of Normandy, and the unspeakable sight that met allied forces, when they opened the gates to Auschwitz, finally made European politicians say: enough is enough!

Of course, more visionary people in Europe had all along proposed various roadmaps for peace. In 1310, a German monk by the name of Engelbert of Admont suggested the creation of one European kingdom with one single leader. In 1464, King Podiebrad of Bohemia almost proposed a sort of EU in the form of a European league of princes with common coins and armies. Denmark was happy to join, France was not, and that was the end of it. In the 18th century, it became fashionable among intellectuals to write books about 'the eternal peace'. But all the good intentions made no real difference.

Unfortunately, the ultimate wake-up call only came in 1945. It was clear that something new was required in order to avoid past failures like the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations. Understandably, there was little appetite for new ideological projects after such a hard fought victory over Hitler's Neuropa. A completely different approach was therefore taken. One of piecemeal engineering and practical politics, starting with the European Coal and Steel Community.

There is no doubt that the extraordinary development from this humble beginning in 1952 to the enlarged European Union today was helped along by some key historical events. Most notably the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. But the fundamental objective remained the same. To build a peaceful, secure and prosperous Europe. Placed in a historical context, the past fifty years in Europe have therefore been an unbe-

lievable success story and the EU has been the most important factor underpinning it.

With the enlargement with 8 Central and East European countries, which used to be under Soviet rule, the bloody history of the 20th century has ended. A whole and free Europe has emerged. The Constitutional Treaty should have been the crowning achievement of this European co-operation. It was supposed to help us achieve the necessary momentum to continue our political and economic progress in the globalized world of the 21st century.

But something went wrong! It appears that for many European citizens, the EU has somehow lost its purpose. Why?

The analysis of the French 'Non' and the Dutch 'Nee' to the Constitutional Treaty suggests a mixed bag of reasons. Economic concerns, disaffection with political leaders, lack of information, opposition to further enlargement and fear of losing national sovereignty were among the main reasons.

In the bigger picture, however, I believe that the public dissatisfation with Europe today stems from the death of a great narrative. The narrative about the EU as a common project for peace between the nation states of Europe. The one I have just outlined for you. One can say that the European Union today suffers from a 'postmodern condition', where the great narrative has disintegrated or rather been deconstructed into a hotchpotch of different stories that do not inspire people or evoke any solidarity.

I heard a French farmer put this in simple terms after the referendum. He had voted for the Maaastricht Treaty in 1992, because he believed in the EU as peacemaker, but against the Constitutional Treaty, because he considered peace a certainty. What mattered for him now was his own economic interests. He was afraid that the new treaty would lead to a loss in income and allow more competition from abroad.

This change of heart by the French farmer points towards what I would call tomorrow's Europe of realism in contrast to yesterday's Europe of idealism. People in Europe today take peace and security for granted. Increasingly, they focus on how the EU can benefit their daily life. What's in it for me, they ask!

Fortunately, the answer to that question is – a great deal! The benefits of

the single market influence our lives in many ways. Thanks to the EU, we enjoy safer and cheaper food, a European health insurance, better environmental protection, cheaper airline tickets, higher safety standards at work, more mobility for students and retired people, cheaper phone calls, a co-ordinated fight against cross-border crime and the list goes on. And the single market has for the last fifty years had an unparallel ability to generate jobs.

Jacques Delors once said: 'You can't fall in love with the single market'. But looking at the numbers, you must be a rather cold-hearted person not to like what you see. According to the European Commission, the single market has created 2.5 million new jobs since 1993 and generated more than 800 billion euro of additional wealth.

Like the stock market, many Europeans are, however, less preoccupied with the present and more focused on the future. They are concerned about the challenges of globalisation and what that will mean for them. Anxiety about outsourcing and competition from low-cost countries like China and India prevail among many voters. Where is my job tomorrow? Taken by a Polish plummer, they ask in France.

The threat from international terrorism, drug trafficking and illegal immigration add to a sense of insecurity among many Europeans. And they do not view the European Union as an instrument to help them against the negative consequences of globalisation.

The governments in Member States together with the Commission have a crucial job to do in this respect. We need to communicate much better with the public about EU issues and what kind of results European co-operation actually provides for ordinary citizens. It is essential to achieve stronger public support for the European project. The politicians in EU capitals should also resist the temptation of putting the blame on Brussels for something negative, and monopolizing the reward when something goes down well with the public. If politicians critizise Brussels six days a week, it is hard to imagine their voters saying yes to the EU come Sunday.

At the EU summit in June, we acknowledged the importance of this job in front of us. We decided therefore to begin a period of reflection in order to carry out a thorough debate about the EU at the national level. During 2006, EU-leaders will evaluate the results of the various national EU-debates

and decide on the next steps ahead. France and the Netherlands have a special responsibility in the reflection period. I would expect them next year to present some ideas on how they believe the EU can move on.

What about the Constitutional Treaty in this process? Is it dead, on permanent life support, or is it just in a temporary state of coma? The situation is that 13 member states have ratified it, while 2 member states have rejected it.

Does this mean that France and the Netherlands will ratify in the end? Will there be some sort of renegotiation or additional protocols to convince the French and the Dutch? Will there be an effort to salvage some key elements in the treaty like the double majority or the EU foreign minister? Will we just go on with the Nice Treaty or some sort of Nice Treaty+? Nobody knows, and I doubt whether it is worth while at this early stage to engage in such speculation, when there are so many ifs and buts.

What is important now, is to make active use of the reflection period. In Denmark, we intend to do just that in the coming months. The European Affairs Committee in the Parliament has been charged with organising an open and inclusive debate about the EU. There will probably be two tracks in the debate – a formal one with participation of the political parties – and a parallel track, which will include a wide range of organisations and actors from civil society. Later on, the European Affairs Committee aims to submit a report to Parliament, which in turn might adopt a resolution on the debate in Denmark before the EU summit next year.

Denmark has an important role to play in the reflection period. As European champion in EU referenda – a total of six since 1972 – Denmark has something to offer when it comes to engaging with the public on EU issues. The aim is to discuss how we can achieve a European co-operation in the future, which is more in line with people's expectations. We need an effective EU that provides added value to people's lives. And we need a democratic EU that is in constant dialogue with European citizens.

To this end, Denmark will continue to push an EU agenda focused on more transparency, better involvement of national parliaments and stronger interaction between the various EU-institutions and the individual citizen. We believe in change in order to preserve.

Only a tiny minority in Denmark actually wants us to leave the EU alto-

gether. The Danish People's Party for example would like to preserve the EU, but only as a free trade area. I disagree with such a position. I believe that the European success story for the past fifty years depends on the EU being something more than just a free trade area. There is no doubt in my mind that the contractual and rule-based nature of EU co-operation has played a fundamental part in maintaining a peaceful Europe during this period.

And here I return to my initial question about why we need to preserve the EU-institutions and the community method. It is simply in defiance of history to believe that peace and prosperity in Europe are just selfsustaining entities that will go on forever. European history clearly shows that peace and prosperity need to be underpinned by a firm set of rules and common obligations between independent nation states. That is why we need the Council, the Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice as well as many of the common policies that we have been able to agree on over the years.

We must learn from history in order not to repeat it. To know the past, is to see the future, but as we don't like this past, we have to change our political behaviour. And we do that through the construction and development of the EU.

The EU ensures the absence of the traditional great power politics in Europe. It ensures that we will not return to the familiar zero-sum game of the past, where big military powers carved up Europe into different spheres of influence. The smaller European states often became the biggest losers in this game, as they were dominated or subdued by larger neighbours. The small countries were in principle sovereign states, but they dared not do, what their neighbours did not like!

This is why we need to preserve the EU.

Let me conclude by saying that the European Union has gone through many crises before. There is nothing new to that. Some might remember the crisis in '65, when France refused to participate in the meetings in Brussels, because of displeasure with the direction of the co-operation. Or the crisis in '84, when Mrs. Thatcher wanted her money back from the EU budget. Now we haggle over the British rebate, but we will manage to find a solution sooner or later. The necessity of a close and contractual co-operation across national borders in Europe has always made member states find a compro-

mise and move on.

On the other hand, we must not lean back and take European co-operation for granted. Contrary to what many euro-sceptics believe, the EU is a fragile creature, which needs attentive care. It is an irony of history that the enlargement with ten new Member States has taken place in a situation, where the two biggest economies on the continent, Germany and France, are going through a rough patch. That is simply an unfortunate coincidence. And allegations about the EU being a European Superstate or a grand ideological scheme to remake Europe in a certain way could not be further off the mark.

If we don't make a common effort to change the EU in order to preserve it, we might end up in the same situation, which Ivan Krylov, who is often referred to as Russia's Hans Christian Andersen, has described in his fable about a crayfish, a swan and a pike.

It goes like this:

Once a crayfish, a swan and a pike set out to pull a wagon,
And all together they settled in their traces;
They pulled with all their might, but still the wagon refused to budge.
The load it seemed was not too much for them;
Yet the crayfish kept crawling backwards, the swan headed for the sky, and the pike moved towards the sea.
Who is guilty here and who is right – that is not for us to say;
But the wagon is still there today.

Thank you.

SPEECH BY PRIME MINISTER ANDERS FOGH RASMUSSEN AT THE SUMMIT MEETING OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 14 SEPTEMBER 2005

Thank you, Mr. Chairman,

Our discussion here is timely and relevant. Terror attacks in several countries during the last years have underlined our obligation to joint, efficient action against this major scourge of our generation.

Let me be very clear: Terrorism can never be justified. Terrorism is never a legitimate weapon. The targeting and deliberate killing of civilians is unacceptable. Full stop.

I therefore find it appalling that today, four years after two passenger planes created havoc in this very city, a few countries are still blocking agreement on a common definition of terrorism.

There ought to be absolutely no doubt or ambiguity about the obligation of each and every Government to destroy terror-networks, to dismantle training facilities and to cut off the supply of money and recruits.

It must be made completely clear to our citizens what is acceptable and what is not.

Freedom of speech and expression is the very foundation of any modern, democratic society. But it must never be an excuse for inciting terrorism and fostering hatred.

I see a major role for the United Nations in this battle. And I welcome the Secretary General's outline of a counter terrorism strategy. But this is not enough. We need to empower the United Nations so that it can fulfil its obligation to ensure security for all in the age of global terrorism.

All Member States need to sign, ratify and implement the UN terrorism conventions. All countries must incorporate the relevant provisions into

their national legislations in order to hamper the terrorists' room of manoeuvre.

And the UN should constantly monitor that Member States fulfil their obligations.

Countries that lack the necessary capacity to enforce the new legislation deserve our full and generous assistance. Countries that lack the necessary political will deserve our wrath.

The threat of terrorists or irresponsible dictators armed with weapons of mass destruction is a shared nightmare for all mankind. This Council has the obligation to ensure that the nightmare will never materialize.

The nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea are a particular and urgent concern. We shall be ready to deal with them here at this table, if other avenues fail. Acquiring nuclear weapons does not enhance the security of any state – it only decreases it for us all.

Mr. Chairman,

70 percent of all conflicts discussed by this Council take place in Africa. The impact on civilians on this continent is particularly devastating: Africa alone has around 20 million refugees and internally displaced people.

For that reason, the draft resolution put forward here today by the Council's three African members is an important one. I hope that the adoption of this resolution will enable the international community to better prevent international disputes and internal crises from spilling over into armed conflicts – in particular in Africa.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN ELEVEN MUSLIM AMBASSADORS/ REPRESENTATIVES AND PRIME MINISTER ANDERS FOGH RASMUSSEN 12 AND 21 OCTOBER 2005

12 October 2005

His Excellency
Mr. Anders Fogh Rasmussen
Prime Minister
Kingdom of Denmark

Excellency,

The undersigned ambassadors, Cd'a.i. and Head of Palestinian General Delegation accredited to Denmark take this opportunity to draw your attention to an urgent matter.

This pertains to on-going smearing campaign in Danish public circles and media against Islam and Muslims. Radio Holger's remarks for which it was indicted, DF MP and Mayoral candidate Louise Frevert's derogatory remarks, Culture Minister Brian Mikkelsen's statement on war against Muslims and Daily Jyllands-Posten's cultural page inviting people to draw sketches of Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) are some recent examples.

We strongly feel that casting aspersions on Islam as a religion and publishing demeaning caricatures of Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) goes against the spirit of Danish values of tolerance and civil society. This is on the whole a very discrimatory tendency and does not bode well with the high human rights standards of Denmark. We may underline that it can also cause reactions in Muslim countries and among Muslim communities in Europe.

In your speech at the opening of Danish Parliament, Your Excellency rightly underlined that terrorists should not be allowed to abuse Islam for their crimes. In the same token, Danish press and public representatives should not be allowed to abuse Islam in the name of Democracy, freedom of expression and human rights, the values that we all share.

We deplore these statements and publications and urge Your Excellency's government to take all those responsible to task under law of the land in the interrest of inter-faith harmony, better integration and Denmark's overall relations with Muslim world. We rest assured that you will take all steps necessary.

Given the sensitive nature of the matter, we request an urgent meeting at Your convenience. An early response would be greatly appreciated.

Please accept, Excellency, best wishes and assurances of our highest consideration.

(signed by eleven Ambassadors/Representatives)

CC: H.E. Mr. Per Stig Møller, Foreign Minister, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Copenhagen, Denmark.

(Seal) THE PRIME MINISTER
Copenhagen, 21 October 2005
List of recipients attached

Your Excellencies
Thank you very much for your letter of 12 October 2005.

The Danish society is based on respect for the freedom of expression, on religious tolerance and on equal standards for all religions. The freedom of expression is the very foundation of the Danish democracy. The freedom of expression has a wide scope and the Danish government has no means of influencing the press. However, Danish legislation prohibits acts or expressions of a blasphemous or discriminatory nature. The offended party may bring such acts or expressions to court, and it is for the courts to decide in individual cases.

I share your view that dialogue between cultures and religions needs to be based on mutual respect and understanding. There is indeed room for increasing mutual understanding between different cultures and religions.

In this regard, I have personally taken the initiative to enter into a dialogue with representatives from the Muslim communities in Denmark.

Furthermore, I would like to see the dialogue between Denmark and the Muslim world strengthened. Indeed, one of the principal objectives of the initiative 'Partnership for Progress and Reform', launched by the Danish Government in 2003, is to stimulate the dialogue between Denmark, the EU and countries in North Africa and the Middle East. The initiative explicitly aims to engage a broad spectrum of Danish institutions and organisations in partnerships with their sister organisations in the Arab world and Iran. The Partnership will in this way nurture institutional and personal friendships among our societies and increase mutual understanding of the values on which we base our societies.

Yours sincerely,
(sign) Anders Fogh Rasmussen

SPEECH BY MINISTER FOR THE ENVIRONMENT CONNIE HEDEGAARD AT A UN CONFERENCE IN MONTREAL, 7 DECEMBER 2005

Mr. President, Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen.
Why are we all here?

Why have around 10.000 people from all over the world come to this place?

Well, we are all here with a hope to contribute to tackle one of the most urgent environmental challenges of our generation: To combat climate change – and every single one of us has a responsibility. A common but differentiated responsibility.

Developed countries of course do have a historical responsibility to take the lead in the global emissions reduction efforts. And by implementing the Kyoto Protocol the first step is being taken.

Denmark intends to fully comply with our substantial reduction commitments of 21 %. We have already implemented comprehensive policies and measures, and we will continue to do so.

But we all need to initiate a fundamental shift towards a low carbon economy. This will require substantial efforts from all parts of society. However, I firmly believe that these efforts will entail long-term economical and environmental benefits.

The informal ministerial dialogue that Denmark initiated in Greenland this summer showed the readiness of key ministers from all over the world to engage in an open-minded discussion on the future climate regime.

In Greenland we concluded that the world cannot afford inaction. The choice we face is only between various different courses of action. We also recommended that a process for the future should be established here in Montreal.

In order to accomplish our common goal we need to recognise that a major share of the world emissions are not covered by the commitments by Annex 1 Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. And this share is likely to increase in the future, not least because of the legitimate economical development in developing countries.

We look forward to engage in a discussion with all Parties, including the US and major developing countries such as China and India, with the aim of preparing further credible steps towards reaching the ultimate objective of the Convention. And we need decisions to be taken in good time before 2012 as we need to decide on a time table.

Current and future globally leading countries – economically and politically – have an obligation to take on responsibility – they also need to show the way.

Luckily there are movements in the right direction. And on behalf of the Danish government I would like to thank developing countries such as Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Mexico and China for positive messages it is of great importance to the future process.

A few days ago a Danish film director addressed the notion of urgency here. How to make the world act according to the urgency? And used a picture: 'If', he said, 'we knew that the globe would explode tomorrow unless we all turned off the light, all of us would rush to do so immediately'.

Now, to avoid devastating effects of climate change, there is an urgent need to act now and in the years and decades to come. If not, consequences will be devastating for generations to come.

The globe is not 'exploding' tomorrow – but the role of you and me as politicians is clear. We are the ones to take leadership. We are the ones to act according to the urgency.

Because climate change is here – it is not a theoretical threat, some of us saw it at first hand in Greenland and we experience it all over. We cannot afford to hesitate.

So let us unite in a forward looking vision that we can all be proud of.

I thank you very much for your attention.

SPEECH BY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS PER STIG MØLLER AT THE HONG KONG WTO MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE 16 DECEMBER 2005

Speaking on behalf of the Kingdom of Denmark including Greenland and the Faeroe Islands, I would like to thank the Authorities of Hong Kong for hosting this conference.

In a little more than 48 hours our meeting will be over. We must all work hard to get a positive result. People and enterprises all over the world stand to gain – in particular in developing countries. And concluding this Round would strengthen the multilateral trading system – strengthen the WTO as one of the cornerstones of the international political scene, contributing to a more peaceful and stable world.

In short: The Doha Development Round is a historic opportunity for embracing globalisation, which is easy to do in theory, but much harder to do in practise. This goes for both developed and developing countries. Thus, this ministerial is being conducted against a changing world landscape, with neo-protectionism looming – and with unequal opportunities for reaping the benefits of globalisation.

The answer is not resorting to protectionism because: Protectionism impedes growth, stifles competition and innovation – and is simply a short-term unfair solution, which in the end leads to no positive result.

The answer is to grasp the new opportunities, which free and fair trade will give. We must use the development package to secure that also the least developed countries will profit from these new opportunities of free and fair trade.

Obviously, to many developing countries protectionism is not even an option. In fact, some of these countries barely have anything to protect.

Therefore, in order to lift the world out of poverty and as we strive for the Millennium Goals, we must make sure this Round becomes a true development round contributing to a reduction of inequality among states. We must decide already at this meeting on a substantial development package, which can assist governments in developing trade capacity and in combating poverty and, where necessary, ensure the relevant compensations.

Such a package should include a decision on duty and quota free market access for all Least Developed Countries – as the EU has already offered in its Everything But Arms initiative. Not least because of this initiative, the EU is today by far the biggest importer of products from the LDCs. We would like to see all developed countries too commit themselves here in Hong Kong to a similar undertaking, including all products and all LDC's.

Another important element of a Hong Kong Development package should be a commitment from developed countries on more and a better coordinated trade related technical assistance. Without such assistance, in particular many LDCs might not be able to exploit better market opportunities and truly integrate into the global economy.

However, agreeing on such a development package would not be enough. We need to see a clear Roadmap for further negotiations on all issues, including environment and sustainable development in fisheries, and other sectors, which must be concluded next year. We would also like to see further progress on the dialogue between the WTO and the ILO on workers' rights.

On agriculture, we must strike a balance between the diverse interests of all WTO members. The European Union has put forward a very substantial proposal, in order to ensure a much more liberal world trade in agricultural products.

However, modern societies do not only consist of agriculture. Industry and in particular services are becoming more and more important sectors in our economies. A free world trade must therefore also deal with NAMA and services, but on NAMA and services in particular, negotiations have not yet progressed sufficiently. A final agreement on the Doha round should also lead to an intensified South-South trade and to trade facilitation in general.

The aim of this conference is not to make the rich richer and the poor poorer. The aim is to secure that everybody benefits and poverty is reduced.

According to some economists, the Uruguay Round added around 400 billion USD to world GDP. A successful Doha Round could achieve increase in global incomes of more than 500 billion USD. Here in Hong Kong, we have a possibility to work for a rise in common welfare and a common cause. Let us not close this window of opportunity.

Thank you for your attention.

Chapter 3
Danish Foreign Policy in Figures

Danish Official Development Assistance

Danish ODA · 200

Danish ODA (by category, gross) · 200

Danish Bilateral Assistance (by country category) · 200

Assistance to Eastern Europe

Danish Official Development Assistance to Eastern Europe (by country) · 201

Danish Official Development Assistance to Eastern Europe (by main sector) · 202

Defence

Defence Expenditures to International Missions · 203

EU

Financing of the EU Budget · 204

DANISH OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Danish Official Development Assistance (ODA) 2002-2005

(Current prices – million DKK)	2002	2003	2004	2005
ODA net disbursement	10,621.8	10,453.2	10,349.3	10,973.5

Danish ODA – by category (gross): The Finance Act 2005

	Million DKK	Percentage
Bilateral assistance	6,379.2	59.6
Multilateral assistance	4,329.1	40.4
Administration costs	-	-
Total	**10,708.3**	**100**

Danish Bilateral Assistance (by country category) 2002-2005

		2002	2003	2004	2005
Least developed Countries	Million DKK	2,772.7	2,838.4	2,861.4	3,088.4
	Per cent	47.2%	49.0%	47.3%	42.7%
Low income Countries	Million DKK	1,532.6	1,585.5	1,823.0	2,329.2
	Per cent	26.1%	27.4%	30.1%	32.2%
Other developing Countries	Million DKK	713.0	531,4	730.7	285.0
	Per cent	14.3%	9.2%	12.1%	3.9%
Other	Million DKK	858.1	834.7	639.7	1,527.3
	Per cent	14.6%	14.4%	10.5%	21.2%
Total	**Million DKK**	**5,876.4**	**5,789.9**	**6,054.8**	**7,229.9**
	Per cent	**100.0%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100.0%**

NOTE: From the fiscal year of 2005 onward, extraordinary humanitarian assistance is included in the bilateral assistance.
Source: Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

ASSISTANCE TO EASTERN EUROPE

Danish Official Development Assistance to Eastern Europe (by country)

Disbursements 2005

Recipient Country	DKK	Percentage
Albania	2.033.742	2.0%
Belarus	4.766.365	4.8%
Bosnia-Herzegovina	6.813.011	6.9%
Croatia	3.917.215	3.9%
FYROM	96.637	0.1%
Georgia	2.647.560	2.7%
Moldova	5.462.628	5.5%
Serbia-Montenegro	47.556.116	47.8%
Turkey	6.718.865	6.8%
Ukraine	19.444.887	19.6%
Total	**99.457.026**	**100.0%**

Source: *Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs*
The figures do not include development assistance administered by parts of the Neighbourhood Programme outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

ASSISTANCE TO EASTERN EUROPE

Danish Official Development Assistance to Eastern Europe (by main sector)

Disbursements 2005

Of this:	DKK
Environmental assistance	12.754.554
Business-related assistance	15.640.193
Technical and Administrative assistance	71.062.279
Total bilateral assistance	99.457.026

Percentage



Source: Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The figures do not include development assistance administered by parts of the Neighbourhood Programme outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

DEFENCE

Defence Expenditures to International Missions

Disbursements 2005

(This year's prices – million DKK)	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Participation in UN, OSCE, NATO and other multilateral missions[1]	1.045,2	1.090,4	1.009,6	900	914,4
NATO[2]	650,8	726,0	717,9	772,4	714,2
International Security Cooperation[3]	104,2	92,5	124,3	90	85,8
International expenditures in total	**1.800,20**	**1.908,90**	**1.851,80**	**1.762,40**	**1.714,40**

Notes:
1. From 2005 only additional expenditures are included in the figures, excluding notably basic salaries;
2. Includes 'special expenditures regarding NATO' plus expenditures for NATO staff (net).
3. The 2004 figure includes budget figures and accumulated reserves from previous years. For 2002-2004 account numbers have been used. For 2005-2006 budget numbers have been used.

Source: The Danish Ministry of Defence

EU

Financing of the EU Budget 2006 (official exchange rate)

	Billion euro	Percentage
Austria	2,381	2.15%
Belgium	4,442	4.01%
Cyprus	0,171	0.16%
Czech Republic	1,132	1.02%
Denmark	**2,225**	**2.01%**
Estonia	0,112	0.10%
Finland	1,638	1.48%
France	18,185	16.43%
Germany	22,755	20.56%
Greece	2,039	1.84%
Hungary	1,002	0.91%
Ireland	1,528	1.38%
Italy	15,155	13.69%
Latvia	0,144	0.13%
Lithuania	0,238	0.22%
Luxembourg	0,262	0.24%
Malta	0,054	0.05%
Netherlands	5,757	5.20%
Poland	2,595	2.34%
Portugal	1,501	1.36%
Slovakia	0,424	0.38%
Slovenia	0,315	0.29%
Spain	9,888	8.93%
Sweden	3,008	2.72%
United Kingdom	13,706	12.38%
Total	**110,671**	**100%**

Source: *EU-Tidende*

Chapter 4
Opinion Polls

EU · 206

The Constitutional Treaty · 207

The Period of Reflection · 210

The Danish EU Opt-Outs · 212

Enlargement of the EU · 213

Iraq · 214

Terrorism · 215

President Bush Visiting Denmark · 217

Danish Foreign Policy and the US · 218

EU

Since 1972, *Gallup* in cooperation with *Berlingske Tidende* has polled a representative sample of the Danish population (717 respondents aged 18 or older in 2005) concerning their attitude towards Danish membership of the EC/EU. The latest opinion poll was undertaken during the period 1-3 March 2005.

Question:

Are you for or against Danish membership of the European Union?



Source: *Gallup* for *Berlingske Tidende*

THE CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY (1)

During the period 26 April - 18 May 2005, *Gallup* in cooperation with *Berlingske Tidende* polled a representative sample of the Danish population (3023 people aged 18 or older) concerning their attitude towards the EU Constitutional Treaty.

Question 1:

On the 27th of September 2005 a referendum is held concerning Denmark's accession to the treaty on the EU Constitution. Will you vote yes or no for Denmark acceding to the Treaty on the EU Constitution?

Question 2 [to voters who answered 'Don't know']:

Even though you don't know whether you will vote yes or no, is it possible for you to say whether it is most likely that you will vote yes or no?



THE CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY (2)

During the period 31 May - 2 June 2005, *Gallup* in cooperation with *Berlingske Tidende* polled a representative sample of the Danish population (984 people aged 18 or older) concerning their attitude towards the EU Constitutional Treaty after the French no.

Question 1:

On the 27th of September 2005 a referendum is held concerning Denmark's accession to the treaty on the EU Constitution. Will you vote yes or no for Denmark acceding to the Treaty on the EU Constitution?

Question 2 [to voters who answered 'Don't know']:

Even though you don't know whether you will vote yes or no, is it possible for you to say whether it is most likely that you will vote yes or no?



THE CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY (3)

Question 3:

Sunday, May the 29th, a majority of the French voters rejected the EU-constitution.

Has this result influenced your opinion about the EU-constitution?

All:



Yes voters:



No voters:



In doubt:



THE PERIOD OF REFLECTION (1)

In December 2005, *Catinét* in cooperation with *Ritzau* polled a representative sample of the Danish population (1052 people aged 18 or older) concerning their attitude towards a new Constitutional Treaty.

Question:

Do you think the EU needs a new Constitutional Treaty?

	A Social Democrats	B Social Liberals	C Conservative Party	F Socialist People's Party	O Danish People'sParty	V Liberal Party	Ø Red-Green Alliance	Other answers	Total
Yes	43.8 %	58,7 %	53.3 %	54.7 %	45.3 %	45.4 %	31.3 %	37.3 %	**46.1 %**
No	21.4 %	20.8 %	12.8 %	25.8 %	31.3 %	24.7 %	48.6 %	26.9 %	**23.9 %**
Don't know	34.8 %	20.6 %	33.8 %	19.5 %	23.4 %	29.9 %	20.1 %	35.8 %	**30.1 %**

THE PERIOD OF REFLECTION (2)

Question:

Question: Do you think a new Constitutional Treaty will …

	A Social Democrats	B Social Liberals	C Conservative Party	F Socialist People's Party	O Danish People'sParty	V Liberal Party	Ø Red-Green Alliance	Other answers	Total
Strenghten Denmark in the EU	21.0 %	28.4 %	29.1 %	22.3 %	18.3 %	27.5 %	18.1 %	15.3 %	**23.0 %**
Weaken Denmark in the EU	18.9 %	9.7 %	12.7 %	29.1 %	27.5 %	16.4 %	47.1%	13.8 %	**18.0 %**
Neither nor	39.5 %	50.6 %	37.8 %	33.3 %	31.8 %	40.6 %	34.8 %	38.6 %	**39.2 %**
Don't kvow	20.7 %	11.3 %	20.4 %	15.3 %	22.4 %	15.5 %	-	32.3 %	**19.8 %**

THE DANISH EU OPT-OUTS

During the period 1-3 March 2005, Gallup in cooperation with Berlingske Tidende polled a representative sample of the Danish population (717 people aged 18 or older) concerning their attitudes towards the four Danish opt-outs ...

Question:

Are you for or against Denmark's participation in the …

Single European Currency?



The Common Defence?



Justice and Immigration Policy?



Union Citizenship?



ENLARGEMENT OF THE EU

In September 2005, *Catinét,* in cooperation with *Ritzau,* polled a representative sample of the Danish population (1063 people aged 18 or older) concerning their attitudes towards the European Union's membership negotiations with Turkey.ew Constitutional Treaty.

Question:

Do you think the European Union the on 3 October shall start negotiations with Turkey on accession to the EU?

	A Social Democrats	B Social Liberals	C Conservative Party	F Socialist People's Party	O Danish People'sParty	V Liberal Party	Ø Red-Green Alliance	Other answers	Total
Yes	33.6 %	64.0 %	38.9 %	46.4 %	12.0 %	29.3 %	55.2 %	24.8 %	**33.1 %**
No	54.4 %	23.6 %	45.6 %	43.4 %	79.2 %	55.6 %	42.5 %	56.0 %	**52.4 %**
Don't know	12.0 %	12.5 %	15.6 %	10.2 %	8.9 %	15.1 %	2.3 %	19.2 %	**14.5 %**

IRAQ

During the period 8-10 July 2005, *Gallup* in cooperation with *Berlingske Tidende* polled a representative sample of the Danish population (1004 people aged 18 or older) concerning their attitudes towards the situation in Iraq.

Question:

Do you think it was the right decision to participate actively in the war against Iraq with soldiers and materials?



Question:

Do you think it was the right decision to participate actively in the war against Iraq with soldiers and materials?



Source: *Gallup* for *Berlingske Tidende*

TERRORISM (1)

During the period 8-10 July 2005, *Gallup* in cooperation with *Berlingske Tidende* polled a representative sample of the Danish population (1004 persons aged 18 or older) concerning their attitudes towards terror.

Denmark as a target for terrorist acts

Question:

How likely do you think it is that Denmark will be a target for terrorist acts conducted by fundamentalist, Islamic groups within the next couple of years?



Denmark as a target for terrorist acts

Question:

How likely do you think it is that Denmark will be a target for terrorist acts conducted by fundamentalist, Islamic groups within the next couple of years?



TERRORISM (2)

The scope of the conflict

Question:

Question: How likely do you think it is that the conflict between parts of the western world and fundamentalist Islamic groups develops into a global crisis with war in more areas than today?



PRESIDENT BUSH VISITING DENMARK

During the period 8-10 July 2005, *Gallup* in cooperation with *Berlingske Tidende* polled a representative sample of the Danish population (1004 persons aged 18 or older) concerning their attitudes towards the visit to Denmark by President Bush.

Terror

Question:

Do you think that the chance of Denmark being hit by terrorist acts has grown because of the visit to Denmark by President Bush earlier this week?



The feelings towards President Bush

Question:

Did you become more positive or more negative towards President Bush after his visit to Denmark



DANISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE US

In June 2005, *Catinét* in cooperation with *Ritzau* polled a representative sample of the Danish population (1020 persons aged 15 or older) concerning their attitudes regarding Danish foreign policy towards the US.

Question:

What is your opinion on Denmark's foreign policy towards USA?



Chapter 5
Selected Bibliography

The following bibliography is a limited selection of scholarly books, articles, and chapters published in 2005 in English, German or French dealing with various elements of Danish foreign policy.

Archer, Clive (2005), 'Still Nordic After All These Years: Nordic Security in the Post-Cold War Period', *Security Dialogue,* vol. 36, no. 3: 397-401.

Carlsen, Per and Hans Mouritzen (eds.) (2005), *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2005,* Copenhagen: DIIS.

Christensen, Jørgen G. and Nikolaj Petersen (2005), 'Managing foreign affairs: a comparative perspective', *DIIS Report,* no. 15, Copenhagen: DIIS.

Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja (2005), 'Homeland Security and the Role of the Armed Forces: A Scandinavian Perspective', in Heiko Borchert (ed.), *Weniger Souveränität - Mehr Sicherheit. Schutz der Heimat im Informationszeitalter und die Rolle der Streitkräfte,* Hamburg: Verlag E. S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH: 59-75.

Egelyng, Henrik et al. (2005), 'Integrating environment as a cross-cutting issue in Danish development assistance', *DIIS Report,* no. 10, Copenhagen: DIIS.

Flockhart, Trine (2005), 'Critical Junctures and Social Identity Theory: Explaining the Gap between Danish Mass and Elite Attitudes to Europeanization', *Journal of Common Market Studies,* Vol. 43, no. 2: 251-73.

Gstöhl, Sieglinde (2005), 'Scandinavia and Switzerland: Small, Successful and Stubborn towards the EU', in Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (eds.), *The Politics of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches,* London: Routledge: 33-51.

Götz, Norbert (2005), 'Danish participation in the United Nations and the Security Council', *Militært Tidsskrift,* vol. 134, no. 3: 311-33.

Götz, Norbert (2005), 'On the Origins of "Parliamentary Diplomacy": Scandinavian "Bloc Politics" and Delegation Policy in the League of Nations', *Cooperation and Conflict,* vol. 40, no. 3: 263-79.

Hamilton, Daniel (2005), 'Transforming wider Europe: Ten Lessons from Transatlantic-Nordic-Baltic Cooperation', in Per Carlsen and Hans Mouritzen (eds.), *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2005,* Copenhagen: DIIS: 5-28.

Heikka, Henrikki and Iver Neumann (2005), 'Grand Strategy, Strategic Culture, Practice: The Social Roots of Nordic Defence', *Cooperation and Conflict,* vol. 40, no. 1: 5-23.

Jakobsen, Peter Viggo (2005), 'Stealing the Show: Peace Operations and Danish Defence Transformation after the Cold War', in Timothy Edmunds and Marjan Male_i_ (eds.), *Defence Transformation in Europe: Evolving Military Roles,* Amsterdam: IOS Press: 35-45.

Krunke, Helle (2005), 'From Maastricht to Edinburgh: The Danish Solution', *European Constitutional Law Review,* vol. 1, no. 3: 339-56.

Kuipers, Sanneke and Torsten Selck (2005), 'Shared hesitance, joint success: Denmark, Finland, and Sweden in the European Union policy process', *Journal of European Public Policy,* vol. 12, no. 1: 157-76.

Laursen, Finn (2005), 'Dänemark', in Werner Wiedenfeld and Wolfgang Wessels (eds.), *Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2005,* Baden-Baden: Nomos: 317-320.

Laursen, Finn (2005), 'The Role of National Parliamentary Committees in European Scrutiny: Reflections Based on the Danish Case', *The Journal of Legislative Studies,* vol. 11, no. 3/4: 412-27.

Larsen, Henrik (2005), *Analysing Small State Foreign Policy in the EU: The Case of Denmark,* Houndmills: Palgrave/Macmillan.

Miles, Lee (2005), 'The North', in Hans Mouritzen and Anders Wivel (eds.), *The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration,* London: Routledge: 92-110.

Mouritzen, Hans and Anders Wivel (2005), 'Comparative analysis meets theory', in Hans Mouritzen and Anders Wivel (eds.), *The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration,* London: Routledge: 167-207.

Olsen, Gorm Rye (2005), 'Danish Aid Policy in the Post-Cold War Period: Increasing Resources and Minor Adjustments', in Paul Hoebink and Olav Stokke (eds.), *Perspectives on European Development Co-operation. Policy and performance of individual donor countries and the EU,* London: Routledge: 184-214.

Olsen, Gorm Rye (2005), 'Does It Really Matter? The Danish Opt Out from the ESDP', *CFSP Forum,* vol. 3, no. 6: 9-12.

Olsen, Gorm Rye and Jess Pilegaard (2005), 'The Costs of Non-Europe? Denmark and the Common Security and Defence Policy', *European Security,* vol. 14, no. 3: 339-60.

Pilegaard, Jess (2005), 'Danmark', *CFSP Watch 2005,* FORNET.

Rasmussen, Mikkel Vedby (2005), 'Camp Eden: The 2004 Defence Agreement, Military Power and Danish Values', in Per Carlsen and Hans Mouritzen (eds.), *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2005,* Copenhagen: DIIS: 29-40.

Rasmussen, Mikkel Vedby (2005) '"What's the use of it?": Danish Strategic Culture and the Utility of Armed Forces', *Cooperation and Conflict,* vol. 40, no. 1: 67-89.

Sørensen, Catharina (2005), 'Denmark, the EU and Public Opinion – Scepticism Mixed with Pro-Integrationist Sentiments', in Michael Herslund and Ramona Samson (eds.), *United in Diversity,* Copenhagen: CBS Press: 133-58.

Sørensen, Catharina and Anne Mette Vestergaard (2005), 'A Perilous Democratic Exercise: The Referendum on the Constitutional Treaty in Denmark', *Country report: Denmark, EPIN Ratification Monitor,* EPIN.

Vestergaard, Anne Mette (2005), 'Denmark may cause a surprise', *EU Constitution Newsletter,* February, London: The Federal Trust: 5-6.

Wivel, Anders (2005), 'Between Paradise and Power: Denmark's Transatlantic Dilemma', *Security Dialogue,* vol. 36, no. 3: 417-21.

Østergård, Uffe (2005), 'Denmark and the New International Politics of Morality and Remembrance', in Per Carlsen and Hans Mouritzen (eds.), *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2005,* Copenhagen: DIIS: 65-102.