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So far, so good – but there still remains an urgent need for governments to engage and create facilitating frameworks for the private sector with regard to environment and climate. Governments do hold the responsibility for planning and facilitating green growth policies that de-link prosperity from greenhouse gas emissions. As in Cancun, policymakers tend most often to focus on defending the interests of the nation-state. Existing institutions reflect this focus, be it at regional level (i.e. the EU) or at global level (i.e. the UN). The nation-state is important, but an increasing number of the challenges facing the world can no longer be solved at national level. Climate change is just one example of this – the financial crisis and increased demand for oil and food are other examples, and they literally affect every single person on Earth. The solution to all this is not to engage in security and threat analysis that outlines how a single country or region can escape or exploit these challenges by protecting itself from all the others. The ambitions and visions must be inclusive, ambitious and long term, and include other actors than governments, notably the trans-national private sector and civil society.

Researchers have realized for some time that there are other forces than states in this increasingly globalized world, and more recently, this has also been recognized by many policymakers. Much of the research at DIIS looks closer at trans-national networks and ‘non-state actors’. This is the case for our studies in Al-Qaeda as a particular form of trans-national radicalization, and our research in the migration industries, which explores the many actors associated with illegal migration – and without whom it could not take place. Furthermore, in 2010, researchers at DIIS published substantially, and also organized conferences, on the topic of ‘non-state actors’ within justice and security. States traditionally co-operate with other states; thus, working with ‘the non-state’ has significant implications for issues of sovereignty and becomes a deeply political undertaking, particularly for external actors such as donor agencies.

It can be asked whether outsiders – researchers, donor agencies etc. – can fully grasp how these non-state actors operate, and whether they can support the design of programmes that lead to enhanced provision of justice and security services. A common discourse in the development aid bureaucracy is to focus on context and stress that blueprints are not a viable route to follow. Certainly, questioning the very foundation of the state has substantial implications for what types of assistance can be rendered. However, the issue of enhancing ordinary people’s access to justice and security is of particular importance in the development work of donor agencies. In fragile states and states where the reach of bureaucracies may be limited, non-state actors are the primary justice and security providers. So they must be both identified and well understood. This also means that ‘the state’ cannot always by default be considered to be the best provider.

The world is becoming more and more complex with a multitude of new actors, both public and private, and a delightful confusion of state and non-state actors. Somehow, the existing global institutions do not seem to be able to adapt to these new circumstances, as demonstrated once more in Cancun in 2010. Accordingly, informal fora like the World Economic Forum in Davos and the World Social Forum, end up being gatherings where the creative dynamism between public and private and state and non-state actors flourishes and manages to attract the right people to sit around the table. The consequences of this for future national foreign, security and development policies should not be underestimated.

Nanna Hvidt
Director
DIIS is an independent research institution financed primarily by the Danish state. We are an institute for international studies that focuses on research and analysis of a wide range of issues within the areas of globalization, security and development. We participate in national and international debates and academic networks, and our researchers publish their findings in high-ranking academic journals in their efforts to excel in academic scholarship. At the same time, on the basis of our expertise, we assess Denmark’s foreign and political situation in order to inform the Danish media, politicians and public.

Our research and support staff comprises approximately 100 persons. The research staff has different academic backgrounds, mostly from social studies, international studies, security studies and anthropology. On a temporary basis, practitioners from Danish government ministries are transferred to the institute, and make an important contribution to our understanding of how our work is used outside academic circles and to strengthening our ability to bridge the gap between theoretical and applied research. As part of our work as researchers at DIIS, we carry out policy-relevant and policy-oriented research within our disciplines and contribute to researcher education, also in developing countries.

Our research areas are defined on the basis of what we as researchers find to be current areas of special interest, and in relation to the societal and political context. The institute is engaged in basic research, research-based consultancies, and commissioned work.

Among the clients commissioning consultancy work are national and international NGOs, the ministries and the Danish Parliament. DIIS also has the special obligation to keep the Holocaust in living memory through continual educational and informative activities on this subject.

DIIS’ current focus is on eight research areas:
- Defence and security
- Foreign policy and EU studies
- Global economy, regulation and development
- Holocaust and genocide
- The Middle East
- Migration
- Natural resources and poverty
- Politics and development

Our staff’s varied academic backgrounds and working experiences, combined with the institute’s flexible organisational structure, allow the flexibility we need to conduct valuable multidisciplinary studies, as well as to adapt smoothly to current trends without losing the continuity necessary for long-term studies.

DIIS is led by a board, the majority from academia in order to ensure that we live up to our scholarly obligations. The board appoints the director, who is responsible for the institute’s daily management. An internal research committee has an advisory capacity in relation to strategic planning.
DOES THE INTERVENTION IN LIBYA UNDERMINE UN PRINCIPLES?

The UN principles, which form the basis for the military intervention in Libya, are termed the Responsibility to Protect – ‘R2P’. The Libya intervention is the first to be implemented according to this set of principles – and it may also prove to be the last. This is because the (purposely) unclear formulation of the mandate in the UN Resolution paving the way for an intervention based on these principles – namely Resolution 1973 – has opened possibilities for other intentions than the ideal.

The intentions of the coalition/NATO with regard to Libya seem to be mixed. The West may be trying to restore some of its former influence in the region; and the wish for a regime change is also expressed – although this is not supported by the R2P and getting rid of Gaddafi might not necessarily lead to democracy; and the intervention is intended to protect civilians even though the risk is high that this will be hard to accomplish.

Thus, the need to use UN principles to legitimize the intervention may end up undermining the very same principles.

PAVING THE WAY FOR THE INTERVENTION

The approval of Resolution 1973 by the UN Security Council on 17 March 2011, based upon the R2P, was a dramatic breakthrough for humanitarian intervention in cases such as Libya. It was a breakthrough because the R2P, which was developed during the last 10-15 years – namely that a state’s sovereignty is not just a privilege but also an obligation to protect its citizens – had for the first time been backed up by a Security Council resolution based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Thus, with regard to Libya, the resolution legitimizes the use of any means necessary, except for occupation forces, to protect the Libyan civilian population against current military attacks, primarily by Muammar Gaddafi’s forces. The approval of the resolution was remarkable because the two permanent members of the Security Council, China and Russia, who have opposed every attempt to modify the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, now abstained, which made approval possible by a simple majority of the Security Council.

THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

The R2P principles were primarily developed in connection with the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and the UN’s unflattering role in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the massacre in Srebrenica had not been prevented and where NATO finally had to intervene. Against this background, the UN Secretary-General at that time, Kofi Annan, opened a debate to determine when the international community’s intervention in a humanitarian crisis situation using military means could be justified. Furthermore,
on the initiative of the Canadian government, an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty - ICISS – was established, and its report was published in December 2001. Since the concept of humanitarian intervention had a somewhat frail reputation after NATO’s intervention in the Kosovo crisis in 1999, the report now replaced it by R2P, which emphasizes the sovereign state’s obligation to protect its citizens against genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The report maintained that if a state is not capable of protecting its citizens, it becomes the responsibility of the international community to assist that state in developing the necessary capacity. This could for example include warning systems, negotiating conflicts between political groups, strengthening the security sector etc. If the state clearly fails to fulfill its obligation to protect its citizens, and peaceful means have been exhausted, the international community has the responsibility to intervene, starting by using diplomatic means followed by various types of sanctions, and finally, as the absolutely last resort, armed force.

ICISS’ report establishes guidelines for military intervention that are close to the classical doctrine of the ‘just war’. There must be a just cause, and the intervention must be motivated by correct intentions, i.e. for humanitarian reasons in order to avoid or relieve human suffering. It must be the absolutely last resort, i.e. all non-violent means must have been attempted, and an international organization, first and foremost the UN Security Council, must sanction the military intervention. ‘The military intervention must be appropriate to the actual situation – the classical principle of proportionality – and finally, it must be substantiated that the military effort can lead to the desired result. The principles in the ICISS report were accepted in the UN World Summit Outcome Report of 2005, and in 2006, parts of the latter report were adopted in the UN Security Council Resolution 1674. Development of the principles of R2P was explained further in Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s report to the UN General Assembly in 2009, “Implementing Responsibility to Protect”.

LIBYA

So, does Libya then represent an obvious case in which the international community has the responsibility to intervene?

Correct intentions and an aim to protect the civilian population are directly evident. Gaddafi’s brutal conduct, not only against the opponents of his regime who actively rebel, but most of all against the civilian population in eastern Libya, points in this direction. His bombastic verbal threats against the population of Benghazi triggered on 12 March 2011 a request by the Arab League to initiate a no-fly zone over Libya. Non-military action, such as weapons embargo, travel restrictions and freezing funds belonging to Libya’s political leaders, had already been adopted in Security Council Resolution 1970 on 26 February.

But the situation is complicated by the fact that no matter what might be thought of Gaddafi and his government, the Libyan regime had until recently enjoyed broad international recognition, and prominent national leaders had cultivated relations with him. International law contains nothing to prevent a legitimate state leader from sidesteps had cultivated relations with him. International law contains nothing to prevent a legitimate state leader from

the principle of proportionality also applies for Gaddafi. There can be no doubt that this principle was violated by government forces and the mercenaries hired by Gaddafi, and this led to the passage in Resolution 1970, which also states that the International Criminal Court (ICC) should investigate whether he and other Libyan officials can be brought before the court on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The international community thus judged that it had a just case. But are there also hidden motives behind the intervention?

THE COALITION AND NATO’S HIDDEN AGENDA?

‘The correct intentions’, which is a prerequisite for the intervention, soon appeared to be something other and more than they originally seemed to be on the surface. ‘Regime change’ was one of the scarcely hidden agendas, an agenda that is understandable when considering the nature of the Libyan government, but which is against the ‘rules of the game’ and Resolution 1973. The coalition clearly manifested its support to the rebels. This culminated when France, as the first country, officially recognized the rebels’ revolutionary council as the Libyan people’s true representatives, in spite of the fact that there is much to indicate that Gaddafi’s support is greater than was immediately supposed (or hoped). In this respect, the situation is complicated by the fact that this is a regular civil war. By initiating a no-fly zone over Libya, support is given to the weak part, the rebels, who do not have planes and helicopters. The coalition, with USA, France and Britain in the lead and later NATO, is not only attacking the Libyan air force and air defence, which is a logical consequence of maintaining a no-fly zone. It also attacks the Libyan army’s armed vehicles, supply vehicles and logistic installations. Gaddafi’s removal is claimed to be a prerequisite for creating security for the Libyan population, a view that can be supported with good arguments, but which in the international context in general can create a quite problematic precedent.

A REGIME CHANGE DOES NOT GUARANTEE DEMOCRACY

Gaddafi’s removal should also support the way for the spread of democracy and Western values in Libya and the Middle East. The problem is, however, that it is far from clear what the revolutionary council and the rebels understand by democracy; it is not likely to have much resemblance to Western democracy. It can on the contrary be maintained with certainty that their cultural values are not identical with western values, but are based on a Muslim value system. The revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain and Libya have nourished a certain revolutionary romanticism that imagines that democracy and freedom are just around the corner, which unfortunately is more than doubtful.

THE DILEMMA OF R2P

One of the principles in R2P is that it must be substantiated that the military effort can lead to the desired result, protection of the civilian population. In the case of Libya, this principle can also be extraordinarily difficult to fulfill. Nothing indicates that Gaddafi has intentions of retreat-
This ‘nuclear renaissance’ has been elevated by claims that the atom is carbon-free and a source of ‘zero-emission energy’. It is true that nuclear fission in the reactor itself emits no carbon dioxide or other greenhouse gases; but this is the only part of the overall nuclear fuel process, which is otherwise heavily carbon-intensive. The nuclear cycle is not only completely dependent on oil for the heavy machinery required for extracting uranium, it is also highly water-intensive for fuel extraction, refining, cooling and processing, and includes the use of other carbon-intensive processes such as coal-power refineries and other industrial processes that consume electricity, fossil fuels and chemicals. One forecast suggests that within 60 years, the energy used to mine, mill, enrich and fabricate one metric ton of uranium will be the same as the energy it can produce, and by 2050, nuclear power could generate as much CO₂ as a gas-fired plant. Moreover, the crisis in Japan cautions that it is not just carbon emissions that are the challenge: one might survive the earthquake and the tsunami, but what about the cancer?

**IN EUROPE**

The world’s worst nuclear accident at Chernobyl in 1986 is now the world’s worst nuclear crisis. In March 2011, four explosions at a nuclear power plant in Japan released radiation levels damaging to human health. The fault lines of nuclear energy, however, go beyond the geological to the political; but will they have an impact on what has been termed a ‘nuclear renaissance’? As hunger for nuclear energy has increased over the past decade, the question is how will the Japanese crisis affect what has been a global resurgence toward nuclear energy.

**ENERGY HUNGRY, CLIMATICALLY CHALLENGED**

Over the past decade, increasing energy demand coupled with concerns regarding climate change and dependence on overseas supplies of fossil fuels has led many to argue the case for increased use of nuclear power. Most of this increase (of over 80 percent) would take place in countries already using nuclear power. India for example is planning to add 20-30 new reactors by 2020, while China has more than 25 plants under construction, with additional reactors planned for a ten-fold expansion of nuclear capacity over the next decades. According to the World Nuclear Association (WNA), 60 reactors are being built around the world today, with another 150 or more planned to become operational during the next decade, and 200 more in the pipeline. Approximately 25 countries are considering or have already decided to become new nuclear energy states.

This ‘nuclear renaissance’ has been elevated by claims that the atom is carbon-free and a source of ‘zero-emission energy’. It is true that nuclear fission in the reactor itself emits no carbon dioxide or other greenhouse gases; but this is the only part of the overall nuclear fuel process, which is otherwise highly carbon-intensive. The nuclear cycle is not only completely dependent on oil for the heavy machinery required for extracting uranium, it is also highly water-intensive for fuel extraction, refining, cooling and processing, and includes the use of other carbon-intensive processes such as coal-power refineries and other industrial processes that consume electricity, fossil fuels and chemicals. One forecast suggests that within 60 years, the energy used to mine, mill, enrich and fabricate one metric ton of uranium will be the same as the energy it can produce, and by 2050, nuclear power could generate as much CO₂ as a gas-fired plant. Moreover, the crisis in Japan cautions that it is not just carbon emissions that are the challenge: one might survive the earthquake and the tsunami, but what about the cancer?

**NUCLEAR FAULT LINES**

In March 2011, four explosions at a nuclear power plant in Japan released radiation levels damaging to human health. The fault lines of nuclear energy, however, go beyond the geological to the political; but will they have an impact on what has been termed a ‘nuclear renaissance’? As hunger for nuclear energy has increased over the past decade, the question is how will the Japanese crisis affect what has been a global resurgence toward nuclear energy.

The Western world believed until recently that its interests were best served by supporting Mubarak, Ben-Ali and Gaddafi. Suddenly, the positions of the men who were formerly in power were undermined by a popular revolution. The West with its many ideals was suddenly exposed as having double standards. Now, since it is necessary to find new ways to restore Western influence in North Africa and the Middle East, the West jumps on the revolutionary bandwagon, or as the French philosopher Bernard-Henri Lévy phrases it, “rattraper le train de l’histoire”, i.e. we have to catch up to the train of history, the train (and the influence!) we just missed. But disguising such hidden intentions by referring to UN principles cannot be expected to be accepted by other members of the Security Council, and it is doubtful that China and Russia will abstain from voting in similar future situations but instead impose a veto unless the mandate is abundantly clear and sharply confined.
radiation risk – a process that has to overcome the industry’s lack of transparency. Writing on the occasion of the upcoming 25th anniversary of Chernobyl, Mikhail Gorbachev highlighted the problem: “The closed nature and secrecy of the nuclear power industry, which had already experienced some 150 significant radiation leaks at nuclear power stations throughout the world before the Chernobyl fire, greatly contributed to the accident and response difficulties. We need full transparency and public oversight and regulation of the nuclear power industry today, along with complete emergency preparedness and response mechanisms.”

Coupled with the potential for the dual-use application of nuclear science for military purposes, nuclear fault lines run deep. The events in Japan remind us that nuclear power and its waste legacy require an unprecedented scientific, professional, open and public review of the long-term viability of Europe’s nuclear safety and security policy. Without it, we risk remaining on shaky ground.

Cindy Vestergaard

1986 released large quantities of radioactive isotopes into the environment, exposing 77,000 square miles, and as many as five million people in Europe and the former Soviet Union, to radioactive fallout with almost 2,000 cases of thyroid cancer registered fifteen years later. A study in 2004 was the first to note a statistical correlation between fallout from Chernobyl and an increase in the number of cancer cases in Sweden. Starting with the partial meltdown at Three Mile Island in the US in 1979 and intensified by Chernobyl, tens of thousands protested in Europe against nuclear energy (and nuclear weapons) throughout the 1980s – in effect stalling further plant building plans, but only temporarily.

Today, 195 nuclear power plant units are in operation, and another 19 are under construction in Europe. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Romania, Slovenia and Turkey are already constructing or have plans to construct new power plants, while Sweden, Hungary, Slovakia and Spain have been planning to extend the life of existing plants. Poland, Estonia and Latvia are considering developing nuclear programmes, while the UK in 2008 noted plans to build up to ten new reactors, and France with a total of 58 power plants – Europe’s largest concentration – agreed in January to a two-year study to assess the feasibility of underwater nuclear stations off its coast. Russia’s nuclear programme is also expanding, and some are even proposing floating nuclear power plants in the sensitive Arctic.

Italy has revived its scrapped nuclear programme, and despite its long history of earthquakes and the Japan crisis, Italy’s government says it is still forging ahead with its nuclear energy plan. Germany has however suspended its (politically unpopular) 2010 decision to extend the operation years of its 17 aging nuclear power stations. Similarly, the Swiss have also suspended nuclear plans, while the EU called an emergency meeting in March to review safety measures at all nuclear reactors across Europe – an ongoing review that will have to address environmental and public health and safety concerns, for today and the future.

THE SEISMIC FAULT LINES

The International Atomic Energy Agency’s document, “Basic Safety Principles for Nuclear Power Plants,” proposes that a plant can be protected from earthquakes by placing it far from areas of active faulting and by designing physical barriers and safety systems that can bear "the vibratory loads associated with the most severe earthquake that could be expected to occur in its vicinity ..."; however, the challenge is to assess the seismic and unknown destructive potential for earthquakes, which is a highly complex problem. The Ignalina nuclear power plant in Lithuania, for example, was originally built for the lowest seismic risk conditions, which were re-evaluated when a magnitude 5.0 earthquake hit Kaliningrad in 2004. The majority of earthquakes in Europe have generally been minor, apart from the 6.3 magnitude quake in Italy in 2009; but they do raise a cautionary warning for the industry and the continent as a whole, particularly when considering that a 3.6 tremor in the UK in December 2010 occurred in an area that had been picked for storing decades worth of nuclear waste.

THE NUCLEAR FAULT LINES

The European dialogue on nuclear safety must therefore openly address not only the carbon issue but the radiation risk – a process that has to overcome the industry’s lack of transparency. Writing on the occasion of the upcoming 25th anniversary of Chernobyl, Mikhail Gorbachev highlighted the problem: “The closed nature and secrecy of the nuclear power industry, which had already experienced some 150 significant radiation leaks at nuclear power stations throughout the world before the Chernobyl fire, greatly contributed to the accident and response difficulties. We need full transparency and public oversight and regulation of the nuclear power industry today, along with complete emergency preparedness and response mechanisms.”
HUMAN RIGHTS FOR SALE

Are European democracies still founded on an unwavering respect for human rights? In 2010, several UN institutions criticized Denmark for not fulfilling its obligations under international conventions. Denmark was held to have violated its obligations in three individual cases under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention Against Torture, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. In addition, the annual report of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child regretfully noted, among other things, Denmark’s lowering of the minimum age for criminal liability to 14 years, and incarceraion of minors along with adults. Finally, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees voiced in 2010 its strongest criticism so far in regard to Denmark’s immigration legislation, pointing out that new rules on expulsion of refugees are contrary to the 1951 Refugee Convention.

International criticism in relation to human rights is not unusual. Even though the scope and bluntness of this criticism in the case of Denmark may raise eyebrows, all countries – even the most rights respecting – undergo criticism in the case of Denmark may raise eyebrows, all countries – even the most rights respecting – undergo criticism in relation to human rights. In recent years, a number of countries have increasingly questioned human rights obligations and the role of international human rights institutions in supervising them. Different dynamics however seem to be at play. In particular, the erosion of human rights protection revolve around recurring topics such as anti-terrorism legislation, asylum and immigration, minority rights and human rights in situations of armed conflict overseas. All of the individual petitions where Denmark was criticized by the UN human rights committees in 2010 concerned foreigners’ rights – two of them expulsion cases and one discrimination of Somalis.

The political debate about how to deal with human rights in the ordinary modus operandi. At the same time, international cooperation and outsourcing may be used to move the less palatable human rights obligations may first of all be linked to specific policy issues. A significant number of individual petitions and national reports involving the traditional frontrunner countries when it comes to human rights and human rights instruments contain explicit clauses extending the geographical scope of each state’s human rights obligations. Similarly, the scope of current-day privatization was hardly foreseen at the time of drafting, and the present human rights regime focuses almost exclusively on states’ accountability.

HUMAN RIGHTS EXCEPTIONALISM

Denmark’s refusal to comply with international human rights obligations may first of all be linked to specific policy issues. A significant number of individual petitions and national reports involving the traditional frontrunner countries when it comes to human rights protection revolve around recurring topics such as anti-terrorism legislation, asylum and immigration, minority rights and human rights in situations of armed conflict overseas. All of the individual petitions where Denmark was criticized by the UN human rights committees in 2010 concerned foreigners’ rights – two of them expulsion cases and one discrimination of Somalis.

The implicit argument made by those denying the overarching importance of human rights in these cases seems to be that certain issues are simply too important to be constrained by the game rules laid down by human rights. In other words, where an issue attains a certain level of importance and is politically constructed as being of vital interest for the sovereignty and survival of the state, the end occasionally justifies the means. This should not be confused with a denial of human rights per se however. On the contrary, adherence to human rights obligations may be high in other areas. Yet, specific incidents, like a perceived threat of mass immigration or imminent terrorist attacks, are used to justify exceptions to the ordinary modus operandi.

OUT OF SIGHT, OUT OF MIND

Another trend has been to limit the scope of human rights by shifting the exercise of power away from government itself. In recent years, there has been an increasing trend to privatize hitherto exclusively govern-ment tasks like national health care, prisons and military operations. At the same time, increasing international cooperation means that more and more issues may be moved outside the state’s territory. The problem with these policies is that human rights obligations do not necessarily move along as easily. Few human rights instruments contain explicit clauses extending the geographical scope of each state’s human rights obligations. Similarly, the scope of current-day privatization was hardly foreseen at the time of drafting, and the present human rights regime focuses almost exclusively on states’ accountability.

Denmark has been an active supporter of the EU’s border agency, Frontex, which today carries out operations to stop migrants and asylum-seekers inside African territorial waters; and Denmark was one of the first countries in the world to introduce financial penalties on airlines for taking undocumented passengers onboard. Both policies entail at least a de facto denial of the right to seek asylum for any refugees that are equally persecuted; a right that would have been uncontested had the same control been carried out inside the state’s own territory and by government officials. In these cases, respect for human rights remains important. Yet, specific incidents, like a perceived threat of mass immigration or imminent terrorist attacks, are used to justify exceptions to the ordinary modus operandi.
Although some people are proclaiming a global human rights crisis, none of the above trends amount to a direct denial of human rights as such. If anything, the notion of human rights has perhaps been so deeply entrenched in European political systems that it has become almost unthinkable for most politicians to argue that they should be abolished. Yet, and perhaps exactly because of this, opposition to the obligations imposed by international human rights has grown from within. Increasingly, European states are denying either the scope of human rights or the legitimacy of the institutions guarding them. Denmark is a case in point. Increasing concern over such problems as immigration and terrorism has sparked debate about whether certain political issues simply trump concurrent human rights obligations. Denmark's strong parliamentarian tradition has similarly been invoked to reject the intervention of international institutions and courts as essentially 'undemocratic'.

Taken together, the developments outlined above may herald the advent of what could be called 'human rights light'; that is, a political-legal human rights regime that applies more narrowly, only in certain areas and with less certainty. Like 'Coke light', it retains its brand name, but the content has substantially fewer calories. Such a notion of human rights may nonetheless end up eroding the core pillars upon which the human rights regime is founded. Both politically and legally, the strength of human rights is linked to their characteristics of absolute and universal. Arguing that some issues are too important to be constrained by the obligations set out in international conventions or that states are free to circumvent refugee and human rights obligations by shifting migration control to the high seas or outsourcing it to neighbouring countries, necessarily undermines these characteristics and removes human rights protection from exactly where it matters the most.

Similarly, systematically questioning the authority of international organisations and human rights bodies may have a devastating impact on the already struggling human rights machinery. The recent backtracking in Europe on the progressive commitments to human rights enforcement over the last sixty years not only seems at odds with the stated values and shared foundation of the European Union, it also makes it inherently more difficult to criticize poor human rights performance anywhere else in the world.

Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen
FORGETTING AND REMEMBERING – ROMA IN EUROPEAN HOLOCAUST MEMORY

An estimated one million Roma lived in Europe during the interwar years. Experts believe that between 250,000 and 500,000 of those were killed during the era of the Holocaust. The failure to include the Romani genocide into the general Holocaust memory, as well as into countries’ national narratives, affects Roma identity today as Europe’s largest transnational, stateless minority.

The Romani victims of Nazi-era policies are usually not incorporated in the history of the Holocaust. But studying the Roma genocide does more than simply add data to the historical narrative of the Holocaust. First of all, it can be seen as part of recognizing the Roma as a people. In addition, it provides the possibility of scholarly comparison between victims’ experiences during the Holocaust and generally in genocide studies. It also substantially informs us about the role which social status plays in post-genocide memory culture and in the acknowledgement of victim groups of mass atrocities. What is evident from present day politics directed towards the Roma is how such memories might be recast in different periods depending on the given political currents and structures.

In American and European scholarly conceptions, the Holocaust is often represented as the paradigmatic genocide, but it is unclear which victim groups are included in the term, and the Roma are rarely included. Why has there been so little scholarship on the fate of the Roma during the Holocaust? The answer to this is complex, as the omission of the Romani genocide in both research and memory culture is linked to post-war history, current politics, the low socio-economic status of the Roma, and ethnic tensions between the Roma and the majority population in many European countries. The image of the Roma as victims also does not fit well with long-held, negative stereotypes about the Roma as criminals or perpetrators – an image that in fact contributed to their wartime tragedy and still lies today at the root of the discrimination against Roma.

As the economic crisis has raged, some countries have seen an increase in anti-Roma attitudes, prompting some politicians, ultra-nationalist groups and others to once again scapegoat Roma as ‘outsiders’ in their own societies. In the last few years, countries such as Italy and France have issued special laws targeting Roma. France has been especially criticized for deporting thousands of Roma from illegal camps and sending them back to Romania and Bulgaria. These politics highlight the continued position of Roma as a marginalized and stateless ethnic group, which makes them an easy target for populists and xenophobic actions. From time to time, anti-Roma sentiments turn into attacks. Some Eastern European countries with large Roma populations, as well as Italy, Ireland and France have witnessed anti-Roma violence. In some cases the violence has led to ethnically motivated killings of Roma.

In order to understand the present struggles of Roma, we find that it is necessary to view the very placement of Roma as the ‘excluded other’ in a historical perspective. Modern anti-Roma sentiments must be addressed and contextualized with special emphasis on the history of Nazi-era policies toward this minority as it laid the ground for postwar treatment of Roma in some countries. While Germany in the immediate postwar years officially acknowledged the racially motivated persecutions of Jews, granting survivors reparations, the government denied restitution to Romani survivors. Recognition for the racially motivated persecution of Roma came as late as in 1979 when West Germany granted most Roma the right to apply for compensation.

In former communist countries, acknowledgement of Romani persecution during the Second World War came only after democratic transition. In Romania, home to one of the largest Romani populations in Europe, the country’s president officially recognized only in 2007 the role of Romania’s wartime pro-fascist regime in the destruction of part of its Roma community. President Traian Basescu publicly apologized to Romani survivors for their horrific suffering at the hands of the “unforgiving” former regime. In his speech, Basescu told the nation that it was their duty to remember and discuss what happened to the Roma, saying: “We must tell Romanian mothers that the Romanian state killed
Romani mothers through enslavement and misery.” He indicated that the education system bore the responsibility to teach about the miseries of the Romani-authored genocide so that no one would forget.

The American scholar Michelle Kelso has done research on Romanian collective memory and the Holocaust, and she has found a discrepancy between theory and practice within the Romanian education system when referring to Romani suffering during the Holocaust. Kelso finds that due to prejudicial attitudes in the majority population Roma are often ignored in the curriculum. Likewise the incorporation of Roma in the national narrative and history texts is yet unrealized. Thus the very attitudes that led to the annihilation of Roma during the Second World War often exclude the Roma from their country’s history and in the broader political structures. This is not a feature unique to Romania. The omission of the Roma in the historical records, whether conscious or not, affects Roma identity as well as it affects the relations between the Roma and majority groups in their countries.

In January 2011 at the 66th commemoration of the liberation of Auschwitz, Dutch-born Roma Zoni Weisz, 73, stated in his speech before the Bundestag in Berlin: “We are Europeans, let me remind you, and must have the same rights as any other resident, with the same opportunities available to every European. It is untenable that a people that has been discriminated and oppressed for centuries is today, in the 21st century, denied a future.” Weisz’s statement points to the need for acknowledging basic human and civil rights for the Roma. Furthermore, the choice of a Roma as keynote speaker makes it evident, how historical injustices can be used to address current patterns of discrimination and prejudice. It is vital however, that such events are not merely symbolic, but are followed by political action.

As misrecognition of Romani suffering in history unfortunately continues, international organizations promote various programs to resolve silence around former Roma victimization under fascist rule. These endeavors also attempt to foster a more humane political stand towards Roma, many of whom still face discrimination and marginalization due to their current weak social and structural status. Through education and research initiatives institutions such as The Council of Europe (CoE), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) and the International Task Force for Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research (ITF) work to create a greater understanding of the Roma minority to challenge the often ingrained prejudices against them. Serious scholarship on the Romani genocide and educational dissemination of those findings can reveal more about this absconded part of history, which, in turn, can lead to a re-evaluation of the relationship between Roma minorities and their compatriots today.

Everybody in Pakistan hates Raymond Davis, an American who on January 27, 2011 fired ten bullets at two Pakistani youths in a crowded market in the bustling, populous city of Lahore, Punjab. While the US claims Raymond to be an embassy official, some American sources suggest him to be a CIA contractor. Just about every Pakistani believes Raymond to be an American spy operating with impunity in their homeland. The incident has ignited a bitter diplomatic row between the US and Pakistan - one that represents the tip of the iceberg. Underlying this spy saga and the hullabaloo surrounding it are the intricate details of regional politics and the demand that Islamabad play an ever-greater part in countering terrorist trends emanating from the Af-Pak war theatre. US policy in the region and the future of its relations vis-à-vis Pakistan bear ramifications for the security landscape, since a close inspection of events reveals that undermining Pakistan’s sense of security eventually makes it evident, how historical injustices can be used towards terror trends emanating from the Af-Pak war theatre. US policy in the region and the future of its relations vis-à-vis Pakistan bear ramifications for the security landscape, since a close inspection of events reveals that undermining Pakistan’s sense of security eventually comes to undermine that of South Asia, particularly Afghanistan and India. Perceived US interference in Pakistan – one that represents the tip of the iceberg. Underlying this spy saga and the hullabaloo surrounding it are the intricate details of regional politics and the demand that Islamabad play an ever-greater part in countering terrorist trends emanating from the Af-Pak war theatre. 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Cecilie F. S. Banké, Tine Brøndum and Michelle Kelso (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum)
coloured the overall demographics of the TTP with a markedly sectarian tinge.

In light of recent political and military manoeuvres along Pakistan’s Northwestern Pashtun belt, however, the dynamics of “Talibanization” – i.e. jihadist activity and enforcement of a parallel administrative system and social code – are expected. Yet the extent of this alternation remains questionable, since Pakistan continues its hesitation in combating militants holed up in North Waziristan – most of whom are focused on waging a jihad in Afghanistan alongside the Afghan Taliban. This is also the root of American frustration with Pakistan and explains why 104 of the 118 US drone strikes in 2010 were aimed at North Waziristan. A White House report from October 2010 pointed out the Pak Army’s reluctance in conducting military operations that would “put it in direct conflict with Afghan Taliban or al-Qaeda’s forces in North Waziristan”.

Meanwhile, the civilian leadership lacks legitimacy and faces a multitude of challenges – ranging from terrorist threats to flood relief efforts to widespread poverty – all of which can have deleterious effects on the stability of the state. Furthermore, it is perceived as a corrupt puppet regime run by a foreign power, namely the United States. With anti-Americanism peaking, any coercion tactics from Washington under present circumstances are likely to further disrupt the political landscape at home.

The Pakistani sense of sovereignty needs a political revamping before it is able to play an effective role in fighting extremism or fighting for regional cooperation. Part and parcel of this endeavour entails a cessation of US hampered US legitimacy in the eyes of the local populace, who increasingly view western forces as foreign occupiers. This is partly due to the collateral damage and general chaos and displacement which results from such strikes.

Domestically, Pakistan is in a precarious position, where it remains engaged in a battle against an indigenous Taliban movement – Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan – which considers the Pakistani establishment to be apostate. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan’s presence and influence appears to be spread across the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and parts of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. Pockets within Punjab and Sind provinces have also been affected by TTP. The levels of jihadist violence remained high throughout 2010, despite the presence of the Pakistani Army in six of the seven federally administered tribal agencies that border Afghanistan. Security forces and symbols of state remain the preferred targets of jihadi wrath; however, sectarian violence – underpinned by a fresh, al-Qaeda inspired vigour – is also on the rise. This is symbolic of the growing momentum of the Punjabi Taliban – consisting mainly of segments of sectarian groups and outfits previously focused on Kashmir/India – and its strengthening links to TTP, which have
operations on Pakistani territory. The question remains how long Pakistan will continue its double-game tactic – tacitly supporting some extremist elements whilst being a key player in tackling terrorism. It is questionable how much longer Pakistan’s double-game tactic can last, as it labours under a crisis of confidence from the US and the international community at large.

Pakistan has hitherto struggled to prove its central role in the Afghan conflict and relevance for regional security, mainly out of fear of being internationally marginalized and losing its alliance with the US and money. Since 2001, Pakistan has been the recipient of up to $18 billion in aid from the US. In October 2010, the US announced a $2 billion military and security aid package that was to complement a $7.5 billion civilian aid deal approved in 2009, both spanning five years.

For Pakistan, most, if not all, regional policy equals a zero-sum game with India. US involvement in the region is also to be viewed in this context. Pakistan vies to remain the preferential ally of the US, a position from which it feels gradually dethroned as US–India relations – specifically over military/defence cooperation – appear to strengthen. Fruil in stature compared to India, Pakistan is likely to continue. Therefore, the future of US–Pak relations is an important aspect in determining the future of terrorism emanating from the Indian subcontinent.

An amicable resolution to the lingering Raymond Davis case would be the first step. As it stands, Raymond’s release will open the floodgates of Pakistani resentment against the US as well as the Pakistani government. Pakistan is likely to come out in violent protest. Yet, if Raymond’s release will open the floodgates of Pakistani resentment against the US as well as the Pakistani government, Pakistanis are likely to be faced with the same challenges. Brussels has ended up accepting the standard alibi made by Arab autocrats – opening the political system would pave the way for takeovers by Islamic extremists. The EU has thus called the “freedom deficit” of the region – severe restrictions of political rights and civil liberties, coupled with corrupt regimes – which has now been openly challenged by events from Algiers to Sana’a in Yemen. Faced with these challenges, Brussels has ended up accepting the standard alibi made by Arab autocrats – opening the political system would pave the way fortakeovers by Islamic extremists. The EU has thus called the “freedom deficit” of the region – severe restrictions of political rights and civil liberties, coupled with corrupt regimes – which has now been openly challenged by events from Algiers to Sana’a in Yemen.
Any talk of penalties or sanctions is associated with the complex historical legacies of European oppression and colonization. However, these punitive conditions are crucial to send a signal to governments moving away from their commitments.

At the height of America’s occupation of Iraq, European diplomats were quite keen to privately remark that their more modest framework was still wiser than ‘regime change’. It has introduced a regional praxis of dialogue and consultation where previously there was none. The North African states have not followed Iran on a theocratic path. All this is true, except that the original plan was not damage-limitation. Europe aimed at inspiring comprehensive political and economic reforms; its stated ambition was region-building, widespread stability and prosperity. None of this has happened and the revolutions in North Africa have called Europe’s bluff.

Above all, the dramatic events which opened 2011 should elicit profound reflection inside Europe about how the EU portrays itself on the world stage, and how it is perceived by its counterparts. The Lisbon Treaty has raised the stakes of EU's foreign policy ambitions. However, one year after its entry into force, what EU scholars have termed the ‘capability-expectations gap’ seems only to have widened dangerously.

European policy makers and opinion makers have openly complained about the performance of the new High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton. They have expressed misgivings about the slow pace that characterizes the formation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) — the EU’s putative diplomatic corps. But while both Lady Ashton and the EEAS have been endowed with instruments and means to qualitatively improve the standing of the EU in the world arena, criticisms seem to lack a sense of perspective.

It is not realistic to expect that the number of kilometers that Lady Ashton will manage to travel can affect the ongoing reshaping of the world order. Nor is it plausible that a higher number of diplomats fielded by the EU on the ground can arrest Europe’s relative decline. What we can expect is that institutional innovations will in due course get Brussels to streamline a great deal of the things that the EU already does: from crisis management to civil society support, to development assistance.

More optimistically, closer coordination among the myriad agencies and actors involved in European foreign policy making should lead the EU to identify thematic and geographical niches where European priorities and values can be best promoted. It is precisely in this respect that the events still unfolding in North Africa may well end up constituting the first test case of post-Lisbon EU foreign policy.

Fabrizio Tassinari
The 2010 UN Climate Change Conference in Cancun saw the return of some optimism for the future of global climate change mechanisms. During and after the meeting, reference was often made to the potential of picking the so-called 'low-hanging fruits', i.e. options that are immediately doable and can provide quick results. This sounds good, but it also suggests that shortcuts exist to addressing climate change. Is this actually the case?

One of the most frequently quoted examples of such 'low-hanging fruit' is the scheme known as REDD – Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation. Put briefly, the idea behind REDD is that countries or companies in the North should compensate countries in the South for protecting their forests rather than logging them or converting them to farmland and plantations. Because deforestation and forest degradation currently account for some 15-20 percent of global carbon emissions, this mechanism could contribute significantly to reducing future climate change. In return for their payments, countries and companies in the North would potentially be awarded carbon credits.

The principle of REDD is deceptively simple, and several major programmes have been initiated to provide multilateral assistance to help prepare countries in the South for the REDD mechanism. However, the reality of REDD has proved to be a rather complicated affair. Quite apart from the scientific challenges of measuring and monitoring the reduction of emissions from forest conservation, it has prompted an extensive debate among governments, civil society organizations and academics on 1) how the mechanism is to be funded – for instance whether it should be market-based or financed through a fund; 2) whether it should be accounted nationally or locally; and 3) what and who should be rewarded – for instance, timber companies or communities. Meanwhile, policy studies have highlighted how the distribution of REDD benefits might not reach the poorest if the wrong approaches are used. Some indigenous peoples have also raised strong concerns over the possible implications of REDD for their territorial rights and use of forests; and critical voices have argued that the scheme is simply an easy way for the North to avoid addressing its own emission problems.

The political and technical challenges for REDD illustrate that there really are no 'low-hanging fruits' in relation to addressing climate change and development. While schemes such as REDD certainly have potential, they address fundamental aspects of resource allocation, political sovereignty and funding flows, and therefore require time to develop, like any other global mechanism. Importantly, this does not mean that donors should simply sit around and wait. While larger global schemes develop, support for so-called ‘no regret’ options represents a key. Such interventions may eventually complement larger global schemes, but they also produce results of their own, even if the global schemes should not materialize. For instance, support to development of accountable and democratic local forest governance institutions will have a positive impact on forest management and poverty alleviation, regardless of whether schemes such as REDD turn out to be successful or not.

Mikkel Funder
domestic use. In some cases, when the poor did try to complain to local water committees, they made little progress because the committees were dominated by the very same people who abused their rights. The poor sometimes tried to assert their claims discretely, for example through relatives or other contacts, but while this worked occasionally, the outcome was often uncertain. Such situations suggest a need to ensure that local water governance provide alternative spaces where grievances can be handled confidentially. More fundamentally, efforts to address pro-poor water governance turn out to make little real progress if they do not also address the basic livelihood issues that make the poor dependent on those who are better off.

Mikkel Funder

DIIS’ collaborative research programme ‘Competing for Water’ works with partners in Bolivia, Mali, Nicaragua, Vietnam and Zambia to map and examine local water conflicts and cooperation in rural areas.

One of the programme’s components explores the particular role of the poorest in these water conflicts. Findings show that the poor tend to be faced with an unfortunate paradox: Often, their main opponents in the water conflicts are the very same people that they depend on for labour, loans and political representation.

In Vietnam, for example, wealthy households in one village appropriated water from a communally owned water supply system. This was a major problem for the poorest households in the village, who relied heavily on the collective water supply. They could not risk opposing the better-off households, since they were dependent on them for loans and labour during hard times. Instead, they had to go long distances to look for natural water sources of poorer quality.

Similar situations were found in Bolivia, Nicaragua and Zambia, where poor households’ dependency on those who were better off meant that they were unable effectively to defend their access rights to water for irrigation and domestic use. In some cases, when the poor did try to complain to local water committees, they made little progress because the committees were dominated by the very same people who abused their rights. The poor sometimes tried to assert their claims discretely, for example through relatives or other contacts, but while this worked occasionally, the outcome was often uncertain.

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Mikkel Funder

One of the ambitions of DIIS’ Competing for Water research programme is to reach out to policy makers and practitioners engaged in and supporting water governance in Denmark and abroad. As a means to this end we have produced three videos with cases from Vietnam, Zambia and Nicaragua. The videos document the local-level conflict and cooperation that when competition for water intensifies.

The Vietnam case illustrates what happens when new – and powerful – water users emerge. The Zambia video shows how increased water supply can lead to conflict, and the case from Nicaragua shows what can happen when local water-governance institutions are neglected. All three videos suggest possible implications for policy and practice.

The videos have been uploaded to Vimeo.com, YouTube.com, and TheWaterChannel.tv, and they have been promoted by the Global Water Partnership. To date they have been viewed more than 3000 times in more than 40 countries.

Helle Munk Ravnborg

As part of the programme, these conference papers have presented during 2010


3. “Local Water Conflict and Cooperation, the case of Zambia” SADC IWRM Seminar, Capetown, 26/01 2010


For selected DIIS working papers on the subject, see page 70-71.
GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 2.0

INTRODUCTION
To many, the G20 Seoul summit in November 2010 was the real test of the G20. The outcome of the summit would show whether the G20 continued to have viability and relevance. The result was disappointing – in the words of the Financial Times, the G20 had shown “how not to run the world”. In the following, I argue that the time has now come for the G20 Leaders Forum to be superseded by a Global Economic Council.

A Global Economic Council embedded in a revised Bretton Woods system would not only overcome the considerable legitimacy problems of the G20, but would also be likely to be more effective in addressing the key challenges of the global economy, such as global imbalances, climate change, and rising poverty.

THE ILLEGITIMACY OF THE G20
The claim by the G20 that its “economic weight and broad membership gives it a high degree of legitimacy” is not convincing. It permanently excludes 173 countries. This fact alone undercuts its claim to representational legitimacy.

In addition to this fundamental problem, the composition of the membership of the G20 is problematic from a representational perspective, because (i) the African region is grossly under-represented (South Africa is the only African member country), and (ii) low-income countries and small, open economies are completely absent.

The absence of objective criteria of membership constitutes a problem not only in terms of the existing membership, but also in terms of the G20’s ability to retain a relevant forum in a rapidly evolving global economy: looking forward, how is membership of the G20 to be adjusted to inevitable shifts in the global distribution of economic power?

Champions of the G20 say that it cannot sensibly be criticized because it is so obviously an improvement vis-à-vis the G7. Some form of multi-polar deliberation and dialogue is indeed a sine qua non for global economic governance today, given the rapidly rising share of middle-income countries in global output, trade, investment and foreign exchange reserves. But the G20 is the wrong format for several reasons:

First, the G20 continues and reinforces a troubling trend towards ‘pluri-lateralism-of-the-big’, by which the vast majority of nations lose voice and influence on matters that affect them crucially.

Second, the G20 effectively undermines the existing system of multilateral cooperation in institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and the United Nations, causing resentment towards the G20 in those institutions in general and among non-G20 countries in particular.

Third, what is needed to address the key problems today – such as global imbalances, climate change, and rising poverty – is not an informal leaders’ forum, but binding deliberations in a truly multilateral framework.

BRETTON WOODS 2.0
The way forward is to create a (truly) multilateral Global Economic Council that can function as the primary forum for deliberation and leadership on matters of global economic governance. Its members would be heads of governments, and it should be embedded in the existing institutional framework of the Bretton Woods institutions.

The creation of the Global Economic Council would address a serious shortcoming of the Bretton Woods system – which in the first place caused the coordination of an international response to the global financial crisis to be located outside the Bretton Woods institutions - namely, the absence of a Heads of State forum in the Bretton Woods system, which makes it suffer from lack of ‘political weight’.

The Global Economic Council must also address the other major deficiencies of the existing Bretton Woods institutions – the discrepancy between the increased economic weight of dynamic emerging market economies and their significant under-representation in terms of voting power, and the lack of any mechanism for periodic re-adjustment.

The Bretton Woods institutions should be reformed so that they are able to operate effectively as key pillars in a multilateral system of global economic governance, under the stewardship of the proposed Global Economic Council. More specifically, three key reforms should be undertaken:

1. Creation of a heads of state forum: the Global Economic Council
2. Reform of the voting power systems of the Bretton Woods institutions
3. Reconfiguration of the systems of country constituencies in the Bretton Woods institutions.

ESTABLISHING A GLOBAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL
The cornerstone of a revised Bretton Woods system should be the proposed Global Economic Council. The council should consist of 25 country constituencies, in an arrangement similar to those of the Boards of the IMF and the World Bank, with procedures for consultation and rotation to ensure that all member countries have a voice in the process in proportion to their GDP.

A Global Economic Council based on country constituencies – with the relevant 25 Heads of State meeting twice a year on the basis of prior consultation with their country constituencies – would have the benefits of multilateral legitimacy and the advantages of being embedded in the existing institutional framework of the IMF and the World Bank.
REFORMING THE EXISTING VOTING POWER SYSTEMS

The current systems of voting power in the Bretton Woods institutions do not adequately reflect the geopolitical realities of the world economy. The principle that voting power should reflect countries’ economic weight in the global economy is theory more than practice. Therefore, it is of paramount importance to the legitimacy of the Bretton Woods institutions that their voting power systems be revised in a manner that restores a fundamental balance between voting power and GDP. The proposal here is to simply allocate to countries a share of voting power equal to their share of world GDP.

REVISE THE SYSTEM OF COUNTRY CONSTITUENCIES

The country constituencies of a Global Economic Council should be in congruence with the country constituencies of the IMF and the World Bank. Therefore, a revised system of country constituencies should be formed on the basis of new principles for the allocation of the 25 chairs, both among regions and within regions.

Allocation of chairs among the world’s four main regions should be based on the following two principles:

First, the allocation of chairs among regions should be undertaken so as to achieve reasonable representation of all the world’s four main regions: Africa, Asia, the Americas and Australasia (Americas+), and Europe. (Dividing the world in these four regions is based on the principle of trying to achieve the highest possible homogeneity of size, both in terms of population and in terms of GDP.) 16 seats in the council should be distributed evenly among each of these four main regions, four seats for each region.

Second, additional seats should be allocated to the four regions in proportion to their weight in the world economy. This would mean that all four regions except Africa would get an additional three seats.

Together, the application of these two principles would give Africa four seats and the three other regions seven seats each. Dividing the majority of the seats (sixteen) equally among the four regions, irrespective of their regional share of world GDP, ensures that the African region has significant voice and participation in world economic affairs. Dividing the remaining seats (nine) on the basis of regional shares of world GDP ensures that major shifts in regions’ economic power are reflected in the composition of the Global Economic Council. This is essential for it to remain legitimate as the global economy evolves.

Allocation of these seats within the four different regions should be based on the following two principles:

First, country constituencies should be formed within the regions on the basis of negotiations in which countries have voting power in proportion to their GDP. Country constituencies should consist of between three and sixteen countries.

Second, all country constituencies should have mechanisms for rotation to ensure consultation and dialogue. Each constituency should have one Director and two Alternates, and decide internally whether there should be rotation on both levels or only at the level of Alternates.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Revising the existing Bretton Woods system by addressing its weaknesses and making it responsive to the geopolitical realities of a rapidly changing global economy would have several advantages.

It would embed a much needed leaders’ forum within the institutional framework of the existing – well-established and recognized as legitimate – Bretton Woods institutions, while at the same time bringing Bretton Woods up to date.

But more importantly, it would provide long-term durability to global economic governance: the system would be responsive to the rise and fall of nations and regions through a transparent, automatically updated system of weighted voting (based on GDP), while ensuring at the same time inter-regional legitimacy and stability by means of balanced allocation of seats to all the world’s main regions.

A Bretton Woods system revised along these lines would not only allow for a better balance between established and rising powers, and hence a more durable way of changing the governing balance as the economic balance changes; it would also be more likely to be effective than an informal G20 leaders’ forum would, whether revised or not.

Jakob Vestergaard
There is no bilateral relationship more important than that between the upcoming superpower, China, and the traditional superpower, the US. It is a complex, multifaceted, and ambiguous relationship, however, that defies conceptualization in a single theory.

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS: FINDING COMMON GROUND?

When President Hu Jintao visited the US in January 2011, the White House announced $45 billion worth of American export deals with China, which were said to support 235,000 jobs in the US. Many of these deals had been made all of three years ago, but both the American and Chinese presidents were eager to claim credit and emphasize that they sought to build a positive, cooperative and comprehensive relationship, after a year marked by disputes and tensions over such diverse issues as currency control, trade relations, human rights, Taiwan, North Korea, and Chinese claims in the South China Sea. Hu Jintao stressed that the US and China could benefit mutually by finding “common ground” on issues ranging from fighting terrorism, to nuclear proliferation, cooperating on clean energy, and development of infrastructure.

For Hu Jintao, what really mattered was to win American acknowledgement of China’s global stature: for that purpose, it was good to be seen as the country bringing relief to the limping American economy. The fact that President Hu stated at a White House news conference that “a lot still needs to be done in China in terms of human rights” also helped gain American acceptance; this was also a rather unusual admission from a Chinese president.

At the Beijing summit in November 2009, President Obama had a deferential attitude towards his Chinese interlocutor, but later, other members of his team emphasized the conflictive aspects of Sino-American relations. A few days before President Hu came to Washington, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gave a major speech on US-China relations in which she introduced China’s repression of peaceful dissent and its cruel treatment of political prisoners as major themes in the Obama administration’s public diplomacy toward China. This American assertiveness was newfound – but how do you talk tough to your banker?

ECONOMIC ENTANGLEMENT

Given its relatively low savings rate, the US economy depends heavily on foreign capital inflows. And China is the largest holder of US bonds, namely about $900 billion of the American government debt. The dependency between the US – as the world’s biggest debtor – and
China - its biggest creditor - works both ways however, since the Chinese economy is heavily dependent on export to the US.

To use a term from old Cold War theory, the economic relations between the incumbent American superpower and the upcoming Chinese superpower could be considered a kind of economic ‘Mutual Assured Destruction’ (MAD) - a parallel to the Cold War nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and the United States. China cannot risk a run on the dollar, because it would be a blow to China itself, slashing the value of its vast holding of US bonds. The US, on the other hand, cannot cut off its Chinese imports without running the risk that China will begin to unload a part of its US security holdings. In the end, both the US and China will hesitate implementing their ‘threats’ and approaching the economic abyss.

Especially two factors arouse American suspicion towards the Chinese – the lack of transparency in the Chinese decision-making process, and the Chinese censorship institution, which leave Americans with an unclear idea of where China actually stands and what they can expect from China.

In January this year, American Defense Secretary Robert Gates visited China. On the day of his talk with President Hu Jintao, the Chinese military had just staged a test of a new stealth fighter plane. The Chinese President - who is also chairman of the Chinese Central Military Commission – apparently learned of the test when Secretary Gates mentioned it to him.

As to the Chinese censorship system, this is widespread and operates in a way that repeatedly displays China’s leaders’ insecurity and lack of self-confidence, their fear of domestic instability and social dislocation. Overall, it reveals China to be fragile as a coming superpower. A peculiar example of this unfolded in August 2010, when Premier Wen Jiabao, during a visit to the economically most vibrant city of Shenzhen in southern China, talked about the need for political reform. His remarks were covered extensively in the media of neighbouring Hong Kong, but they were never reported in the strictly controlled central media. The same happened when Mr. Wen gave an interview to CNN. His remarks about democracy and political reform were omitted by Xinhua, the state-run news media. China analysts and veteran China watchers advocate very different China policies.

Adding to the Chinese suspicion is the fact that while China’s smaller neighbours in Southeast Asia do engage with China economically, they also look to the US to make sure that China cannot convert its economic weight into a lopsided military and diplomatic advantage in the region. Thus, formal and informal bilateral alliances with the US have become more attractive to China’s neighbours, and China continues to grow as China’s power continues to grow; however, this does not mean that China’s foreign policy goals are predetermined and that their content and range are fixed. The specific character of China’s operational goals will be determined not simply by China’s power capabilities, but also by the policy choices made by the Chinese decision makers as well as the choices made by other states, especially the United States and China’s neighbours in East Asia, with regard to China. Thus, to understand Sino-American relations and the recurrent swings between rivalry and cooperation displayed during the last few years, it is especially necessary to study American foreign policy, China’s foreign policy, China and East Asian regionalism, international political economy, and the role of nationalism in China.

Ersk Beakel
GOOD GOVERNANCE – A GOOD DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY?

Most people in the world prefer to live in a country that is governed by the rule of law, has a non-corrupt bureaucracy and has established democratic mechanisms for selecting the country’s leaders. The issue in this brief article is whether good governance – besides its intrinsic qualities – can also serve as a good development strategy. Does good governance serve as the obvious starting point for a low-income country that wants to initiate economic growth? According to DANIDA’s 2010 development strategy, good governance is decisive for economic growth and employment: “Good governance is essential to ensure favourable conditions for the private sector and efficient delivery of services.” In the following, I argue that this is probably not the case, and thus that good governance is not a good development strategy.

Prior to the introduction of the good governance strategy in the mid-1990s, orthodox development thinking was about ‘getting policies right’. It was argued that misguided state intervention had not just led to a suboptimal allocation of resources, but also created corruption in most developing countries. The subsequent good-governance strategy was aimed at ‘getting institutions right’, partly because it was believed that good governance institutions themselves could spur economic growth. The package of good institutions has been varied and varied from one set of recommendations to the next and across agencies. It frequently includes a lean, clean and efficient administration, an independent and properly resourced court system, an independent central bank, strong protection of property rights, rules concerning bankruptcy and information disclosure, democracy and social safety nets. There is thus a general emphasis on formal institutions (rules and procedures) that can sustain an efficient market, minimize corruption and ensure the provision of basic public goods. A number of governance indicator indexes have been constructed, and countries have been listed according to how big the gap is between the idealized model of institutions and the actual existing institutions. The basic policy idea is then to use development aid to help developing countries ‘fill their institutional gap’.

The link between good-governance reforms and economic growth has been at the centre of a range of studies – both comprehensive studies involving a large group of countries, and case studies of individual countries. All research shows that rich countries generally have better institutions (more good governance) than poor countries. The crucial question is of course whether they are rich because they have good institutions or whether they have good institutions because they are rich. If the latter is the case, the good governance strategy is misplaced as a development strategy. Even though donors during the last fifteen years have been involved in ‘institutional therapy’ in less developed countries, there is today no strong research evidence to support the claim that good governance has to come first and that ‘all good things go together’. In contrast, there are good reasons to think of good governance as a consequence of, rather than a condition for, economic development.

Among the good reasons behind the latter view, we can just mention the following four: First, there seem to be only slight differences in good governance in high-growth and low-growth developing countries. Thus, ‘bad institutions’ have been the norm rather than the exception in high-growth countries such as China or Vietnam. Second, when we look at the past in the now developed countries, we find that institutional development was historically actually slow and rocky. Money politics and corruption prevailed even after the historical growth spurt in the United States. Third, in high-growth developing countries, a diverse range of informal institutions seems to have been present and much more important than the (formal) institutions of the good-governance agenda. Finally, the studies that still claim to have found a positive causality between good-governance institutions and economic growth are loaded with severe problems of concept vagueness, measurement and causality.

In short, although popular in the donor community, the getting-institutions-right-first agenda does not seem to find strong support in the academic research community. Good governance does not seem to be a good development strategy. From an economic growth perspective, poor countries may not need, nor can they probably afford, good governance packages. Furthermore, governance reform is not a technocratic but a dynamic and socio-political embedded process, so bad governance in poor countries prevails due to deep structural and political factors. This is partly a reflection of the fact that such countries are underdeveloped and are still in the early process of state building. Therefore, even if governance reforms succeeded in establishing ‘good institutions’, they may not be enforced, and may not last over time.

While there is a long-term relationship between good governance and high incomes, with causality probably running both ways in a complex manner, there is no strong evidence that good governance reforms are necessary for economic growth to take off. Hence, institutional quality as measured by the protection of property rights, bureaucratic efficiency, absence of corruption and the rule of law seem to fail to capture the factors that are relevant to dynamic economic development. Therefore, future research on institutions and economic development has to move beyond good governance and focus on ‘developmental’ rather than ‘good’ institutions. It also has to take informal institutions more seriously and bring politics to the forefront. Such research has already taken place at DIIS in 2010, and future research programmes are in the pipeline. Whether practitioners will follow up on the research remains to be seen, but the Great Recession has opened an important window of opportunity for rethinking the determinants of growth and employment.
Such threats as inter-state conflicts appear to be declining in frequency, whilst new and different threats are emerging. The new threats differ in that the actors need no longer only be states, and the issues may often have little or nothing to do with traditional power. At the same time, the institutional framework and political bargains that have underpinned the international order since the end of World War II appear to be challenged in numerous ways.

Our observations give rise to a number of questions related to the character, current status and effect of both the new threats and the so-called liberal order. We investigate the new threats to the international security and defence agenda and the claim of crisis in the liberal order.

Our focus is especially on the trans-Atlantic relationship, as well as relations between the United States and new and old partners in Asia and emerging ones in Africa. We are concerned with how the absence of a common threat and the emergence of new and often very differently perceived threats impact on international security and on the conceptual and institutional foundations of the liberal order.
Our research focuses on foreign policy analysis, as seen from different theoretical perspectives and with different empirical foci in the foreign policies of several European countries (e.g., Denmark, Germany, Italy, France, and Finland). Our basic research aims to further develop neo-classical realist, constructivist and discursive analytical models for foreign policy analysis. Our empirical focus covers European relations, both past and present, to US and Russia as well as other world actors, analysed in relation to both individual national foreign policies and the EU. In terms of EU external relations, our work focuses on selected issues relevant to foreign policy, such as EU’s enlargement and neighbourhood, development, migration, the European Security and Defence Policy, and EU-NATO relations. As the EU institutional architecture becomes operational following the Lisbon Treaty, the functioning of and prospects for EU external relations will also relate more closely to the foreign policies of individual EU member states – and especially Denmark, which shall take over the rotating EU presidency for the first half of 2012.
GLOBAL ECONOMY, REGULATION AND DEVELOPMENT

In this research unit, we examine international development in the setting of current transformations in the global economy. Since the onset of the global financial crisis, widespread consensus has emerged that the previous two decades of de-regulation and related institutional dismantling bear a considerable part of the burden of responsibility for the crisis. As a result, a wide range of proposals have emerged to re-regulate the financial sector and the global economy more generally. Of particular interest to our research agenda are:

1. the nature, scope and limitations of these re-regulation efforts
2. the kinds of tools, expertise and knowledge that are being mobilized in the process; and 3) the specific role that standards (for products, practices, corporate organization, policy) may be playing in re-regulatory efforts.

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS


SELECTED PUBLICATIONS


Schott, Robin May: “Natality and destruction: Arendtian reflections on war rape”. In Robin May Schott (ed.): Birth, death and femininity: philosophies of embodiment. Bloomington, Indiana University Press.

Schott, Robin May: “Sexual violence, sacrifice, and narratives of political origins”. In Robin May Schott (ed.): Birth, death and femininity: philosophies of embodiment. Bloomington, Indiana University Press.


DIIS’s research unit on Holocaust and Genocide is the only research unit in Denmark dedicated to research, dissemination and teaching on the subject of Holocaust, genocidal processes and political mass murder. We investigate the processes that lead to genocide – with special focus on the role of the state, both in relation to committing genocide and to combating it – and the international community’s possibilities for intervention. Furthermore, we work with the culture of remembrance and commemoration that has evolved in the wake of the Holocaust and other instances of genocide.

We have a special interest in post-war efforts to eliminate genocide, with focus on the significance of the Holocaust in European society since World War II. Our research includes studies of European reactions to genocide, both historically and in the present; it includes the commemoration culture and the significance of the past in current policies; and it includes philosophical studies of the role and responsibility of the state in relation to genocidal processes.
The focus of this research unit is on socio-political dynamics, transnational links and international relations in and with the Middle East – from Morocco in the west to Afghanistan and Pakistan in the east. The study of socio-political dynamics covers mainly three aspects: namely, processes of radicalization; the relationship between incumbents and opposition; and the use of religion as a source of identity and legitimacy among both state and non-state actors. The study of transnational links concerns a wide array of connections between state and non-state actors, which encompass relations among terrorist organizations and projects promoting cooperation and dialogue between the Western World and the Middle East. In the study of international relations, the primary focus is on the regional structures of security and alliances and the relationship between the Middle Eastern states, the US and Europe.

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS
Andersen, Lars Erslev: "Terrorism and the return of just war: American order as world order". In Gry Ardel and Jacob Bock (eds.): *Spheres of exemption, figures of Exclusion. Analysis of Power, Order and Exclusion*. Aarhus, NSU Press/Aarhus University Press.
Migration has become a significant issue in the public debate – both in Denmark and the rest of the world. Millions of people are fleeing from conflicts, undemocratic regimes, natural calamities, failed states and poverty. In both sending and receiving countries, governments and populations see migrants as a potential threat to security and stability. Poor countries in the South fear that their best talents are leaving, while rich countries in the North fear that welfare, security and cultural identity are threatened by increasing immigration. At the same time, migrant remittances are celebrated as important development finances, sometimes without considering the personal and familial costs involved.

The migration research unit questions some of the assumptions that are currently influencing the migration debate. We examine how on the one hand states and international organizations seek to control, regulate and optimize international migration, and how on the other hand, migrants and migration industries circumvent control efforts. We explore migration from the perspectives of both sending and receiving countries – as well as from a migrant perspective.

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS


Adler-Nissen, Rebecca and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen: “Straitjacket or sovereignty shield? The Danish opt-out on justice and home affairs and prospects after the Treaty of Lisbon”. In Nanna Hvidt and Hans Mouritzen (eds.): *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2010*.


Around the world, poor people in the countryside depend directly on natural resources. Yet, their access is often limited and insecure and this is one reason they stay poor. On top of that, in the country side in developing countries, poor people’s access to land, water and forest is getting more and more insecure, as a result of societal changes and climate change. We examine poor people’s access from two interrelated perspectives: 1) The perspective of agency. We examine the means, strategies and relations which the rural poor people use when they seek to establish and secure access, and 2) The perspective of inequality. We examine how the problems of social, economic, political and cultural inequality shape poor people’s ability to secure their access to natural resources, and we examine the outcome of their agency.

Our research unit brings together different activities – ranging from comparative research programmes to individual research projects – on particular issues, such as land tenure, forest and landscape management, and water governance. Each of these activities helps to understand how the rural poor seek to establish and secure access to natural resources, and how different patterns of inequality shape their agency and its outcome.

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS


New development crises and new actors in the field of development have changed the context of national policy-making processes in the developing countries. Development is less a consequence of nationally adopted policies than we normally expect. Rather, it is the outcome of political processes in which substantially different actors engage and pursue their own agendas. These actors range from private global foundations, to non-OECD donors, multinational corporations, customary authorities, warlords, economic elites and Diaspora associations. As a result, policy responses to crises are to be found in the daily practices of diverse groupings that consist of both state and non-state actors. This research unit strives to understand how politics influence practices, where states and other actors interact to create alliances, negotiate and contest each other in the processes of policy implementation.
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got appointed Sapere Aude Elite Researchers by DFF
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**DIIS IN FIGURES**

**INCOME** 74.1 MILL. DKK

- Income-generating activities: 21.8% - 16.2%
- Allocated grants, Finance Act: 9.9% - 7.3%
- Core grant, Finance Act: 52.5% - 38.9%
- Other grant-financed activities: 15% - 11.1%

**EXPENDITURES** 73.5 MILL. DKK

- Research and analysis: 55.9% - 41.1%
- Office rent, administration, IT: 22.1% - 16.2%
- DCISM library: 6.3% - 4.6%
- Management and support: 7.5% - 5.5%
- Dissemination and outreach: 8.3% - 6.1%

**STAFF**

- Research staff: 52
- PhD candidates: 19
- Technical-administrative staff: 19
- Student assistants and interns: 12

**EXTERNAL PUBLICATIONS**

- 30 Peer-reviewed articles in academic journals
- 23 Peer-reviewed book chapters
- 2 Non-Danish monographs
- 4 Non-Danish edited volumes
- 13 Editor-reviewed articles in academic journals
- 16 Editor-reviewed book chapters
Albrecht, Peter: Transforming Internal Security in Sierra Leone: Sierra Leone police and broader justice sector reform, DIIS Report 2010:07

Andersen, Lars Enlov: Victims and Rebel: Al-Qaida’s Salafist Rhetoric and the Pitfalls of Anti-Terrorism, DIIS Report 2010:10


Engberg-Pedersen, Lars and Heite Munk Ravborg: Conceptualisations of Poverty, DIIS Report 2010:01

Gammeltoft-Hansen, Thomas and Tanja Albors: Sovereignty at Sea: The law and politics of saving lives in the Mare Liberum, DIIS Working Paper 2010:18

Gibbon, Peter: Stefano Poncione, Lone Risgaard, Simon Bolwig and Sam Jones: Donors and Agro-food Standards – Lessons Learnt from Recent Research, DIIS Policy Brief


Hvidt, Nanna and Hans Mouritzen (eds.): Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2010


Mwembe, Carol Emma, Imaiku Nyanbwe, Mikkel Funder and Barbara Van Koppen: Cooperation and competition in local water governance: Inventory of local water-related events in Namwala District, Zambia, DIIS Working Paper 2010:15

Nguyen, Ya Thi Bich, Phuong Thi Thu Thao, Le Huong Thi Mai Pham and Thomas Skelboe: Conflict and cooperation in local water governance: Inventory of local water-related events in Can Cuong District, Nghe An Province, Vietnam, DIIS Working Paper 2010:10

Pašar, Shrin: Dealing with Iran: How Can the EU Achieve its Strategic Objectives? DIIS Report 2010:11


Prazan-Jergensen, Julie: The Islamist Movement in Morocco: Main Actors and Regime Responses, DIIS Report 2010:05


Rivas, Roberto H., Tania Paz Mena, Lilja Gómez and Heite Munk Ravborg: Coopération y conflicto en torno a la gestión local del agua en el municipio de Condega, Nicaragua, DIIS Working Paper 2010:13

Riddid, Qandeel: Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. An attempt to deconstruct the umbrella organization and the reasons for its growth in Pakistan’s north-west, DIIS Report 2010:12

Sørensen, Ninna Nyberg: The rise and fall of the “migrant super-hero” and the new “deportee trash”: Contemporary strain on mobile livelihoods in comparative perspective, DIIS Working Paper 2010:28


Vestergaard, Jakob: Ranjit Lall and Martin Højland: Reforming global banking rules, DIIS Policy Brief

Whitfield Lindsay: Developing Technological Capabilities in Agro-Industry: Ghana’s experience with fresh pineapple exports in comparative perspective, DIIS Working Paper 2010:28

EDUCATIONAL MATERIAL

“Theeresienstadt – Danish Children in Nazi Captivity”. Documentary with testimonies from six Jewish children who were deported with their families from Denmark to the concentration camp Theresienstadt during World War 2. The film (produced with English subtitles) is accompanied by the educational website www.theresienstadt.dk.

www.holocaust.dk. An educational website on Holocaust denial and source criticism on the Internet. The website addresses issues like anti-Semitism; conspiracy theories; hate speech; free speech; denial of other genocides and historical struggles over the past reading.
From Neighbours to Partners – the Future of the Eastern Partnership
3 December, DIIS

Clandestine – Documenting Undocumented African Transit Migration
30 November, DIIS

Evaluering af udviklingsbistanden – Case-studer og fremtidige evalueringer
23 November, DIIS (with the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Caught in the Middle: China and India in Sudan’s Transition
23 November, DIIS

Climate Change Adaptation: Linking Policies and Practice
22–23 November, DIIS (with Climate Change Task Force and DANIDA)

Holy Wrath – My Journey through Pakistan
22 November, DIIS

A New Global Governance? Climate Change Negotiations and International Development Cooperation
19 November, DIIS

Bouncing Back? EU Foreign Policy in a New World Order
16 November, DIIS (with the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Political Asylum in the 21st Century
19 October, DIIS

The Financial Crisis and Development Impacts: Responses and Lessons
14 October, DIIS

Veteranpolitik – giver det fortrinsret til siddepladser i busser?
13 October, DIIS

‘Still Alive’. Youth, Violence and Survival in Post-Conflict Guatemala
12 October, DIIS

Turkey: Identity Foreign Policy and Socialization in the Post-Enlargement Europe
7 October, DIIS

Rethinking Foreign Aid: Where do we go from here?
6 October, DIIS (with Danish Development Research Network (DDRN))

Water Conflict and Cooperation in the South – The Local Dimensions
14 September, DIIS

The Migration Industry: Brokers, Buses and the Business of International Mobility
7 September, DIIS

DfS ‘Competing for Water’ Panel at the World Stockholm Water Week
5–11 September, the Stockholm International Water Institute, SIWI

Lebanon Peace and Security or Justice?
2 September, DfS (with the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Carbon Footprints, Trade and Development
11 August, DfS

Afghanistan: Kvindernes krig – det er ikke Armadillo det hele
23 June, DfS

Standards, Trade and Africa Research, Capacity Building and Policy Outcomes of the SAFE Programme
14 June, DfS

Europe and the Mediterranean: Normative Influence and Threat Perception in the EU’s Southern Neighbourhood
3 June, DfS (with the European Commission Representation in Denmark)

Vi slår ihjel – og lever med det
31 May, DfS

Holocaust Memory: European Responsibility – or German Standard?
27 May, DfS

Post-War Memory of the Holocaust in Europe
26–27 May, DfS (with the University of Copenhagen, History)

The Jihad Affiliates of al-Qaeda
24 May, DfS

Børn i skyggen af Holocaust
5 May, DfS (with Syddansk Universitetsforlag)

Forsvarschefen om forsvarets udfordringer
28 April, DfS

Talking to Terrorists: Understanding the Differing Motivations of Militant Jihad Extremists
8 April, DfS

Rethinking the World Bank
29 March, DfS

‘Send More Money’. The Ambiguous Relations Between African States and their Diasporas
18 March, DfS

Governing Through Standards
24–26 February, DfS

From Africa to Auschwitz and After
29 January, DfS

Auschwitz Day: A range of seminars conducted in relation to the marking of the annual Auschwitz Day
27 January, DfS

Theme Days for high school students and teachers in relation to the marking of the annual Auschwitz Day.

Erhvervssektorbistand og dansk erhvervslivs rolle: Kan Danmark skabe økonomisk vækst i fattige lande?
27 January, DfS

How Does China’s Growth and Innovation Strategy Affect the World Economy?
18 January, DfS

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