Trump, Xi and the eclipse of the liberal world order

Until recently, we were operating under the assumption that the liberal world order would prove sufficiently inclusive, productive and resilient to serve as a stable framework for international cooperation. But such optimism seems increasingly unwarranted as a wide host of existential challenges have materialized, including the return of geopolitics, the resurgence of autocratic leadership, the revival of economic protectionism and the rising tide of populism and nationalism.

So, is the liberal world order (subsequently LWO) actually unravelling before our eyes? To begin with, it depends on how we define this order, and most commentaries are careful to point out that the liberal world order has never been a uniform arrangement, over time or across space. Since its inception after World War II, the LWO has gone through several stages, incorporating new elements and extending its institutional reach as liberal forces were gaining momentum at critical junctures, notably by the end of the Cold War. Moreover, even in the heyday of American unipolarity and leadership during the 90s and 00s, the liberal order was always perceived as a set of concentric circles with the Western countries at the center, surrounded by a wide range of non-Western countries like Russia and China that would distance themselves from certain elements of the Liberal Order. Even so, what has turned the current crisis of the LWO into an existential one is the unprecedented magnitude of notably two challenges.

Moral abdication: the lingering effects of the Trump presidency
First, the key internal challenge, eroding the LWO from within, is the rise of populist and nationalist sentiments in the West that have carried Donald Trump into the White House. Trump’s gloomy, zero-sum view of international relations, encapsulated in his trademark “America First” policy, has already taken its toll on US free trade agreements and multilateral commitments, two key principles of the LWO. Yet, what poses the biggest threat is actually the abandonment of America’s longstanding ideological commitments to the LWO as its principal moral standard-bearer. For if the self-defined “leader of the free world” – whether imposing international order as “the liberal crusader” or inspiring others as “the city upon a hill” – reveals itself to harbour such powerful and pervasive illiberal forces as those mobilized by Trump, how can we have any faith in America’s long-term commitment to the Liberal World Order?

Or to put it in starker terms: Are we even sure that the pendulum will swing back in 2020 to re-empower the traditional liberal-internationalist-oriented foreign policy elite in Washington that for decades has enjoyed bipartisan support. As such, the Trump presidency has already done irreparable damage. Not only to America’s standing in the world, but also more broadly to the LWO itself, as America’s liberal-internationalist identity and moral leadership can no longer be taken for granted.

A premature hegemonic transition phase
Apart from being eroded from within, the Liberal World Order also faces a daunting array of external challenges, chief among which is the rise of China. If we take a look at reliable projections of future trends in national power, over the next decade or two China will be the only country powerful enough to potentially upset the unipolar structure of the international system.

Admittedly, the United States is still in a league of its own due to the global reach of its military power projection capacity, the cutting edge technologies and innovation potential of its market economy, the pre-eminence of its elite universities and research community as well as the widespread appeal of its cultural industry and social media platforms. However, the capacity to wield such unrivalled power is not necessarily accompanied by a political willingness to exercise international leadership, as patently demonstrated in the case of the Trump presidency. Beijing may therefore - much sooner than expected - find itself in a position to exploit the leadership vacuum opened up by the Trump administration.

On the face of it, China hardly seems a challenger of the LWO, whose open, rules-based institutional framework has facilitated China’s own impressive rise. Indeed, China is diligently portraying itself as a leading proponent of international free trade and multilateral cooperation in key areas such as the fight against climate change and nuclear non-proliferation. In the words of the trite sloganeering of Beijing’s public diplomacy machinery: “A peacefully rising China” will build “an international community of shared destiny” characterized by “win-win cooperation”. Even if this is true, there are at least three aspects of China’s rise that threaten to undermine the Liberal World Order.

The illiberal challenger
First, the nature of China’s authoritarian political regime not merely jars against the core values of the LWO; Beijing is also forcefully suppressing liberal minded voices at home in a systematic campaign that has intensified since Xi Jinping assumed power. When Chinese leaders somewhat counter-intuitively insist that their country is a strong advocate of human rights, they refer to the undeniable improvement of basic socio-economic human rights rather than the civic liberties of a Western-style pluralist democracy. Meanwhile, China uses its seat in the UN Human Rights Council to shield itself and its allies from criticism of human rights abuses in the more traditional sense. Even worse, its authoritarian version of state capitalism resonates increasingly well with countries around the world, representing an alternative development model sometimes referred to as “the Beijing consensus”.

Secondly, as an emboldened Chinese leadership with Xi Jinping “at the core” has once and for all left behind Deng Xiaoping’s famous dictum of “keeping a low profile” on the international stage, we are about to learn what an alternative order more to China’s liking may look like. The infrastructural construction spree, envisioned in Xi’s “Belt and Road” initiative, promises much-needed investments throughout Eurasia and Africa, but it also heralds the dawn of a more Sino-centric international order characterized by state-sponsored, supply-driven projects that come with strings attached. In fact, Beijing has on many occasions leveraged its economic clout, using various types of sanctions to punish other countries that have violated China’s core interests.

Thirdly, even if the East and especially South China Seas have recently witnessed calmer waters, we should not forget how Beijing has repeatedly demonstrated a disconcerting willingness to assert its territorial claims in breach of well-established international maritime law principles (i.e. the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea). Xi Jinping’s dream of “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” may not be as inherently peaceful as Beijing’s public diplomacy maintains.

Importantly, being steeped in memories of its own unique history, the Sino-centric nature of China’s identity narratives prevents China from offering any truly Universalist visions of international order. It means that although “the Beijing consensus” is likely to undermine the LWO, it will ultimately be unable to replace it. We may be witnessing the eclipse of Liberal World Order, but it is far too early to tell what will rise in its stead.

See also:
Making sense of international (dis)order: a European perspective, DIIS Event, 7 February 2018