DIIS Policy Brief

Three factors may spark violence in Kenya's 2022 elections

As Kenya is heading towards its general election, a volatile combination of violent histories, climate change-induced conflict and ethnic tensions threatens to ignite widespread violence. 
Kenya 2022 election
Supporters of Kenya’s Deputy vice-President William Ruto react during his address at Kibera slum in Nairobi on January 18, 2022. Photo:Tony Karumba/AFP/Ritzau Scanpix

Three factors that may be ingredients for a heated, close election or even violence

  • The leading political contesters have a track record of inciting violence
  • Climate change concerns have grown into security questions and created states of latent volatility
  • New ethno-political constellations have divided the supporters of the sitting president
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Kenya’s next general election will take place on 9 August 2022. This is as important an election for other countries in East Africa as it is for Kenya. Surrounded by instability in Somalia and Ethiopia, Kenya stands as a pillar of stability in the region. If Kenya destabilises it will have ramifications for the country’s nearest neighbours and beyond. 

Elections have a history of flaring up existing tensions in Kenya, most notably in 2007. The next election is a few months away, but the parties have already been negotiating for support and power struggles have taken form since mid-2021. It is likely that the presidential seat will be landed by political long-hauler, Raila Odinga, or the current deputy president, William Ruto. However, the combination of increasing levels of climate change induced conflict, escalating ethnic and political tensions, and histories of violence linked to the leading political contesters constitute a cocktail that could see the country heading into a new outbreak of election violence. The following explains each of these factors. 

Kenya election

1. A history of violent elections

The fear of conflict has been a factor in past elections due to general divisions in the population and many of the current candidates have previously incited or used violence. The sitting president lost support in Laikipia and neighboring counties in the 2017 elections as a response to the government’s inability to handle growing tensions. In the upcoming election, a number of candidates are building on government dissatisfaction in the wider Laikipia region.

One of them is the former leader of the mafia-like Mungiki movement, Maina Njenga, who is vying for the Laikipia Senate seat in support of Odinga. Njenga is a divisive figure who stokes fear among some and fervent support in others, and his movement has been connected to violent attacks following the 2007 election.

Presidential candidate Ruto also has a violent track record. His past campaigns have been powered by inflammatory rhetoric and ethnic hatred, e.g. by encouraging supporters to ‘go to war for him’ following the 2007 elections. Indeed, after the election riots in 2007, Ruto was charged with violence against humanity at the International Criminal Court in the Hague. Specifically, he was accused of planning violence against the Kikuyu, and Uhuru Kenyatta was charged for mobilizing the Mungiki movement to attack Odinga’s supporters.

The divisive nature of past elections has created a precedence for violence as we near the August elections. Should Ruto win, the question is whether he is able to assemble a unifying and effective coalition or whether he will carry his divisive leadership style and inflammatory rhetoric forward under the presidency. The latter would open up new concerns for security and stability in Kenya and the East African region.

2. The link between climate change and security

Kenyan politics is about ethnicity, security and access to resources. Now climate change is worsening existing challenges related to vulnerable livelihoods and conflicts over natural resources. Several studies and reports have already documented how climate change has led to food insecurity and a decrease in natural resources like water and pastures. The wildlife also seeks alternative sources of food and habitat, which escalates conflict with farmers and pastoralists over use of the scarce resources. This has led to increasing volatility and tension particularly in the northern parts of the country.

Laikipia county illustrates well the escalating conflicts in Kenya’s rural areas. The county is located on the frontier of the arid north, from where climate change and conflicts push pastoralists south onto Laikipia’s plains. Here they converge with farmers and owners of cattle ranches and private conservancies. Therefore, tension related to population pressure, opposing claims to land has been at the heart of Laikipia’s conflicts for decades.

Elections have a history of flaring up existing tensions in Kenya
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In the last few elections, the topic has received increased attention as levels of conflict have grown from repeated waves to latent insecurity. This has made conflicts over land a hot topic to speak to for politicians on their campaign trails. Yet despite promises of resolution by different politicians, efforts have been few and inadequate. Solving the issues for some would ostracise others, which carries its own political implications.

The cabinet secretary for the Ministry of Interior, Fred Matiang’i, has been very specific about the implications of the link between security and climate change, stating that: ‘No one knew [10 years ago] that at this point in time, we would spend between 25 and 30 percent of our operational budget on climate change related security issues.’ Matiang’i’s speech can be seen as a direct plea to the national and county governments to include security reform when tackling climate change.

The need for targeted security reforms and additional financial resources has now become urgent. To appropriately deal with climate change related challenges will require reforms of the environmental and security sectors, where clashes over access and control over natural resources are specifically targeted and funded. Until that happens, elections will be able to spark insecurity. Therefore, fears of escalating conflicts will be prominent as Laikipians and other rural Kenyans cast their ballot on 9 August.

3. Ethnic divisions and the Kikuyu vote

The third factor that may generate election violence is related to ethnicity. Traditionally, people have voted according to their ethnic affiliation and election violence tends to follow ethnic lines – a situation that fills workplaces and collegial relations with tension around election times. There are three major ethnic groups – Luo, Kalenjin and Kikuyu – and the 2022 election is the first multi-party election since independence with no Kikuyu candidate.

This is significant since the Kikuyu population, as Kenya’s largest ethnic group, have the power to determine an election. This factor forces groups into new and less stable coalitions and threatens tensions that go beyond ethnic lines and into clan affiliations. A Kikuyu vote split between Odinga and Ruto will turn counties with large Kikuyu populations into battleground counties due to the first-past-the-post system. This is especially the case for Laikipia, Meru and Kiambu. When the vote can go either way, the risk is high that a substantial number of voters will end up feeling deceived and angered by the election result.

Kenya's 2007-2008 election crisis

In the 2007 elections, presidential candidate Odinga and then coalition supporter, Ruto, allied the Luo and Kalenjin communities to challenge incumbent President Kibaki, his ally Kenyatta and their Kikuyu-led coalition. Despite Odinga leading in the polls, the final tallies saw Kibaki with a narrow win.

International election observers reported manipulations in the vote counting and declared the election as flawed. Widespread ethnic-based violence erupted and by late February, 1,300 deaths had been reported and 600,000 people had been displaced. Peace was restored when a power sharing agreement made Odinga prime minister to President Kibaki’s government.

Individuals from both sides were later charged for violence against humanity at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague - Rutu for being a principal planner of violence against the Kikuyu, and Kenyatta for mobilizing the Mungiki movement to attack Odinga’s supporters. Neither Kibaki nor Odinga were charged. During the ICC trials, witnesses interference was reported and the inability to produce evidence eventually led charges to be dropped.

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Sitting President Kenyatta, who is Kikuyu, has chosen to endorse Odinga rather than his deputy president, Ruto. This is seen as ‘political betrayal’ by the Kalenjin community since Ruto, a Kalenjin, helped Kenyatta capture power in the 2013 and 2017 elections on the condition that the favour would be returned in 2022. They argue that now it is the Kikuyu’s time to pay back. If the Kikuyu choose to vote for Odinga they run the risk of violent repercussions by the Kalenjin, in a way similar to the conflict following the 2007 elections.

In turn, Odinga is not necessarily a more Kikuyu-friendly choice because of a historical hatred between the Luo and Kikuyu that has developed since independence and has expanded into extensive ethnic stereotyping. As one Laikipian noted, ‘the Kikuyu electorate, finds itself torn between ‘the devil and the deep blue sea’ and it must choose who should ‘devour’ it.’ Ruto seeks to turn the Kikuyu against Kenyatta by claiming that he has failed to support Kikuyu businesses. Indeed, Ruto runs on a bottom-up economic model that resonates well with small business owners and farmers (the majority of whom are Kikuyu).

However, Kenyatta’s endorsement still resonates among other Kikuyu factions, where Odinga is supported by the wealthy and influential Kikuyu and widely among other ethnic groups, including the influential Kalonzo Musyoka and the Azimio la Umodja party coalition. Although Ruto is likely to get the majority of Kikuyu votes, Odinga only needs 30% of votes in the Mount Kenya region to become president – a region that comprises the densely populated Kikuyu counties and the diverse counties of Laikipia, Embu and Meru. No matter how the Kikuyu vote falls out, division is inevitable.

The risks of a close election

At this point in time, all three factors are taking shape. Each holds inflammatory potential, and the prospects for a peaceful election are uncertain. In the 2007 elections, both sides expected to win, and the election result ignited violence based on feelings that voters had been deceived. If the 2022 vote turns out to be similarly close, the risk of violence will grow dramatically. That said, the 2017 elections, where voters in some counties cast their ballot for peace, may also prove inspirational. Two questions remain: are people willing to repress their political sentiments to avoid a repeat of violence? And will the political leaders feed on the division or make responsible choices and reforms that can protect national security and ensure a free and fair election?

Regions
Kenya

DIIS Experts

Marie Ladekjær Gravesen
Sustainable development and governance
Postdoc
91325552
Kenya 2022 election cover
Three factors may spark violence in Kenya's 2022 elections