How transnational jihadist groups are exploiting local conflict dynamics in Western Africa

In November 2019, a spokesperson of the United Nations World Food Programme warned that Burkina Faso could soon turn into “another Syria”. Between December 2018 and March 2020, the number of internally displaced persons in the country, which has 20 million inhabitants, increased from less than 50,000 to over 800,000. The trigger for this dramatic development was an escalation of attacks and massacres carried out by jihadist militants affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, accompanied by the forceful closure of schools, mosques and churches.

It is widely agreed upon amongst scholars of transnational jihadism that its two leading organizations, al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, rarely start new conflicts. Instead, they tap into local grievances, establish linkages with marginalized groups in the society, and on the long run, transform what may initially have been an ethnically, or politically motivated conflict, into a religiously framed, armed struggle. Among the Sahelian countries, Mali, Niger, Chad, and the northern parts of Nigeria had already been experiencing high levels of jihadist violence, prior to the escalation in Burkina Faso. Recently, jihadist attacks have also increased in Cameroon’s northernmost province.

To understand why the jihadists have been able to wreak such havoc in a territory that spans over thousands of kilometers, it is crucial to focus on the situation in the rural areas, where the vast majority of attacks are taking place. These areas have long suffered from state neglection and the lack of access to health, education and rule of law. Moreover, access to land and water has become increasingly scarce due to population growth and a proceeding desertification as a result of climate change. In Burkina Faso, intercommunal, ethnic tensions between half-nomadic cattle herders and farmers had been going on for years, long before the arrival of the jihadists.

This has created fertile conditions for the recruitment into groups, whose Salafi-jihadi ideology generally enjoys little support among local populations, who traditionally adhere to a more moderate Sufi-influenced Islam. But the religious indoctrination of the groups’ fighters usually occurs after the recruitment, which is largely driven by non-religious factors. Many recruits view the jihadists as more egalitarian and just than their governments, whose forces are often accused of human rights violations. Particularly problematic in this regard are ethnic militias that claim to be fighting the jihadists, in the case of Burkina Faso even with parliamentary approval, but carry out massacres against rival ethnic groups. This pushes the targeted communities even further into the arms of the jihadists, who portray themselves as protectors in these inter-ethnic conflicts. Monetary incentives offered by the jihadists are another important factor, generated through their taxing and extorting of civilians, the smuggling of drugs and weapons, and human trafficking.

Recent data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project indicates that the situation in the region is further deteriorating. The number of people killed by jihadist groups between January and mid-April this year, if compared with the same timeframe in 2019, more than doubled in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, and Mali. Moreover, there is now an increasing fear of a spill-over effect into the neighboring countries, as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have repeatedly declared their intention to extend their influence further south. Last year, jihadist fighters were arrested in Togo, while trying to enter the country from Burkina Faso. Similar reports emerged from Ghana and Benin. Many of the factors that have allowed the jihadists to succeed further north are also present in these states, including the internal north-south divide and land disputes between farmers and herders.

Against this background, the EU and its partners should devote even greater attention to assisting Sahelian and Western African governments in addressing the root causes of conflict in their countries. A predominantly military approach alone will remain insufficient and could in fact worsen the situation. Instead, there is a need to combine development policies for the marginalized, rural areas and provide effective governance, while at the same time improving regional cooperation in securing borders and sharing intelligence. Moreover, the EU must identify ways for how to assist governments in their handling of the Covid-19 pandemic. Recently, the European Union Training Mission Mali (EUTM) had to pause its activities due to infections among its ranks. And the domestic security forces are increasingly tied up with enforcing restrictions introduced by their governments. 

Ultimately, curbing jihadism in this region is also important for the EU’s internal security: On April 28, the French national who drove his car into two police officers in Colombes, near Paris, declared his allegiance to Abou Walid al-Sahraoui, leader of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). This indicates that the Western African context is taking an increasingly prominent role among jihadists in other parts of the world as well.

This article was originally published in Jyllands-Posten 10 May 2020.