Book

Counterinsurgency and counterterrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan

New book based on research from both Danish and Pakistani institutions

The era succeeding the declaration of a Global War on Terror by America and its allies saw the Central & South Asian region in great instability and turmoil due to increase in militant and insurgent activities. Consequently, all the regional actors had to evolve new strategies to deal with uprisings, unrest and instability. An elusive and unpredictable enemy, difficult geographical terrain, politico-diplomatic upheavals and public resentment over Governments’ decisions to engage in asymmetric warfare – counterinsurgency (COIN) & counter-terrorism (CT) - haunted the states with prospects of an everlasting military engagement at home or aboard.

The new book 'Counterinsurgency and counterterrorism: Sharing Experiences in Afghanistan and Pakistan'aims tocreate and develop academic connections between Danish and Pakistani research institutions and establish common ground for joint research within the security area. The book analyses counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan to identify lessons that could potentially be implemented in future operations for on both Danish and Pakistani side and thereby have a strategic impact on a political level as well as in a military operational context.

All through the course of writing of this book, one lesson identified stands out in both the Danish and Pakistani experiences in dealing with respective conflict situations, as readers might be able to gather from the earlier chapters. It kept appearing as we looked both at the strategic and the tactical levels and therefore turned out to be one of the most important lessons identified in the book: The great need to have an overarching and comprehensive strategy with clearly laid out ends, ways, and means before any country embarks on a journey to deal with security challenges.

Such a strategy must contain the desired end state, the identified objectives to reach that end state. Further, is must be well-resourced accordingly and endorsed by all concerned quarters in order to facilitate the on-ground implementation of the objectives. The lack of these elements will at best have a prolonging and costly effect on the mission in general and at worst make the COIN and CT, or for that matter CM objectives unrecognizable to the civilian population or even to the tactical level trying to reach them, which, as described in this book, will prevent a sustainable progress in implementing the strategy.

In the absence of an overarching strategy, there seems to be a bias toward using hard power tools, which apparently crowds out soft power tools. The result is a stalemate in COIN and CT strategies not able to fully succeed in reaching the desired objectives and thereby the long-term effects to secure peace, stability, and development. An unwanted side-effect of the almost endless and unsuccessful operations with only minor effects is the need to uphold a large military presence just to create and maintain a rudimental security situation. Yet another side-effect is the risk of implementing and using tools that are counterproductive and thus, could cause unwanted long-term effects. Also, it must be pointed out that the generally observed bias for hard power tools is not in line with the latest population-centric COIN perspectives.

The problem for such approaches is that these involve the risk of increasing tangible support for the insurgents or terrorists considering the means and lines of effort that are used by countries for dealing with security situations. However, the lesson identified about the need for an overarching and cohesive strategy is primarily applicable to situations where the COIN and the CT forces have an area of responsibility. Still, it is a lesson identified that strategy makers have to pay particular attention to create a strategy with ends, ways, and means in order for the operational level to develop series of resourced and obtainable objectives, which at the tactical level can be transferred to specific operations with the aim to lead to the desired end state as quickly and as easily as possible.

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Counterinsurgency and counterterrorism
Sharing Experiences in Afghanistan and Pakistan