China's Non-proliferation Opportunity
In 2000, after three decades of nuclear power development, China was operating only three power reactors. Today, it has 20 reactors on the grid, with another 28 under construction. To fuel its ever-growing reactor population, in coming years China will need a lot more uranium. Annual requirements will jump from about 4,000 tons currently to 10,000-15,000 tons in 2020. This is equivalent to 90 1,000-MW power reactors—a number of units exceeded only by the United States.
China is responding by producing more uranium domestically, buying more uranium on the international market, and investing heavily in overseas uranium properties. This means that for years to come, and on many fronts, an ongoing expansion of nuclear power in China’s energy system will challenge the Chinese government’s ability to carry out effective oversight. Main challenges include a lack of clarity about what uranium materials are captured by Chinese regulations, lack of clarity about which organizations perform oversight, and where the critical interfaces are between several agencies which, according to Chinese regulations, are assigned responsibilities.
Because China has entered the competition for uranium resources comparatively late, the political risks China will face in its future quest for nuclear fuel will be greater than for established producers and buyers. This fact should encourage China to thoroughly examine, review, and where necessary improve the effectiveness of its uranium governance system. In this vein, the authors of this policy brief propose a number of areas where action can be taken to provide China with a non-proliferation opportunity.
This policy brief is part of a larger ‘Governing Uranium’ project on global uranium governance, led by DIIS, which seeks to identify governance gaps in uranium accountability and control and provide policy recommendations for improving front-end transparency, security, and regulation.
