DIIS Comment

Canada’s Indo-Pacific tilt

canada-indo-pacific
Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, centre left, and Chinese President Xi Jinping, centre right, join fellow leaders as they arrive to the G20 leaders summit in Nusa Dua, Bali, Indonesia on Tuesday, Nov. 15, 2022. Photo: The Canadian Press / Alamy Stock Photo

In late November of last year, Canada finally took the step of releasing its long-awaited Indo-Pacific strategy aiming to make up for lost time and opportunities in the world’s most dynamic and competitive regions. The strategy process was a painfully slow one, but the final result – while not perfect – has elements to be admired and reveals signs that Canada is finally ready to look at the wide scope of challenges and opportunities present in the Indo-Pacific. Indeed, the document clearly highlights the stakes at play, stressing: “Our (Canada’s) ability to maintain open skies, open trading systems and open societies, as well as to effectively address climate change, will depend in part on what happens over the next several decades in the Indo-Pacific region.”

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The strategy, with funding attached at approximately $2.3 billion over the next five years, is a watershed moment for Ottawa, which has openly recognized that its future prosperity and security is not just interlinked with but depends on the trajectory of the Indo-Pacific region. Several key elements stand out. At a high level, the strategy is instructive because this is the first time that Canada has clearly articulated its foreign policy interests in the region. Specifically, Ottawa has recognized the strategic imperative of working to ensure the status quo in the Indo-Pacific and enhancing prosperity and security. The strategy is premised around five pillars: the promotion of peace and security; expansion of trade, investment, and supply chain resilience; people-to-people linkages; working towards climate security in the region; and, perhaps most importantly, a commitment to work as a partner with the region in the long-term.  

The second significant takeaway is the notable language on the challenge posed by a more assertive China. The strategy highlights that China is a “disruptive actor” that continues to pose strategic challenges to the region’s rules-based order and the interests of Canada and its partners. This is a remarkable turn of course for Ottawa and the administration of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, which was wooing Beijing for a potential free trade agreement and viewing it as the key area to diversify its trading relationship a mere seven years ago.

Years of neglect and unbalance

Leading up to the release of the strategy, there have been years of neglect and poor strategic vision from Ottawa as it looked towards the Indo-Pacific. Despite the flurry of attention from other likeminded partners – such as Japan, the United States, France, Australia and others – Canada remained reluctant to clearly articulate its foreign policy interests in the region. Despite its long Pacific coastline, in policy terms Canada has been an inconsistent and – unfortunately – forgettable contributor. The notion that Canada is even close to the same temperature gauge of the countries mentioned above in terms of relevance and reliability is a non-starter. Ottawa’s lack of urgency in embracing its Indo-Pacific future hindered its interests and encumbered its promotion of values that it seeks to advance in the region.

For Canada, the traditional lens to look at such engagement has been through the Asia-Pacific framing – defining the region largely through our experience in the multilateral architecture. Canada was a founding member of APEC in 1990 and has been a dialogue partner in the ASEAN Regional Forum since its formation in 1994. Aside from these two main vehicles, Canada has been active in the international development space over the years and is a member of the Asian Development Bank, and more recently joined – while not before considerable internal debate – the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in 2017. 

Jonathan Berkshire Miller
Jonathan Berkshire Miller is Senior Fellow and Director of the Foreign Affairs, National Security and Defence program for the Macdonald Laurier Institute. He is also senior fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs.

Yet, despite having a key interest in a stable and rules-based region, Canada is late to both the Indo-Pacific game and in clearly and thoroughly articulating its rationale to invest in the region when compared with other middle powers. The volatility in the region underpins the need for Canada to work with our key liberal democracies to push forward the rules-based liberal order. There is not an option to stay on the sidelines. Canada can and should play a role here to promote and stand for a free and open Indo-Pacific vision to promote these shared interests.

As it relates to Beijing, Canada has been approaching its foreign policy toward China in tactical rather than strategic terms — thinking only of short-term goals rather than long-term challenges. Unfortunately, it took the plight of two detained Canadian citizens – Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor – unjustly detained for nearly three years for Canadians to awaken to the real challenges in dealing with an increasingly authoritarian actor in Beijing.

In this context, it was overdue for Canada to frame a serious, clear and coherent strategy toward China, situated within the context of a greater Indo-Pacific strategy. The strategy does deliver on some of this promise and references engagement with likeminded partners based on interests. Countries like Japan, India, South Korea and Taiwan are all potential partners in one way or another and were referenced in the strategy. Canada should also look to complement its engagement with a renewed vigour and focus on robust and comprehensive relationships in Southeast Asia with countries like Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam.

However, one key area where the IPS falls short is the sequencing of the narrative. The region is deep and diverse. The rationale for a strategy was not simply as a response to China’s misdeeds. It also was driven by a recognition of longstanding interests and values that we share with many other countries in the region. Effectively, the recognition that China is in the Indo-Pacific but not the Indo-Pacific is essential. It is expressed in the document, but there still tends to be a causal relationship between Ottawa’s interest in the region and the challenge that China poses. It is not that simple of an equation, and Canada should be engaging with other democracies, such as India, Japan, South Korea, and others simply because we share a lot of economic and security dividends to work together on.

Implementation matters most

The proof, they say, is in the pudding. If Canada strengthens its trade ties, increases its security co-operation, and improves its diplomatic linkages, it can meaningfully offset China’s increasing challenge to the rules-based international order. Moreover, multilateral organizations and trade agreements, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, alongside ad-hoc minilateral alignments, all provide potential anchors for a renewed approach to the region.

But to be clear, the Indo-Pacific strategy itself is no vaccine for years of neglect from Ottawa. A real, clear-eyed approach to Beijing and the risks it poses both to its neighbours and to the rules-based order more broadly must be a foundational element to any strategy in the region. Alongside this, there must also be genuine partnership with the region based on empathy, respect, and shared interests (not virtue signalling and pretentious proclamations).  

Toward China itself, Canada must be far stronger and clearer on issues of human rights. This includes clearly and consistently calling out China’s egregious behaviour against Uyghurs in Xinjiang, being a voice for persecuted groups, such as Tibetans and religious minorities, as well as condemning China’s clear and escalating violations of the Sino-British Joint Declaration over Hong Kong. In each case, we should avail ourselves of our ability to apply Magnitsky sanctions against known human rights abusers, and we should explore paths for greater refugee resettlement for individuals at risk of political imprisonment.

Canada must also take actions at home, including a whole-of-government effort to combat disinformation, undertake serious discussions toward creating a foreign agent registry, and tightening the rules against foreign influence, interference and the threat posed by state-owned or state-affiliated companies that want to invest in, or contribute to, strategic infrastructure. This, of course, includes the recent ban of Huawei and other Chinese carriers from contributing to Canada’s 5G network.

We must not, however, consider this a challenge in one sector or with a handful of technology companies. China’s desire to dominate the critical minerals and raw material supply chain, for example, is a long-term challenge with serious national security implications that Canada must address in tandem with its partners in the region. Indeed, Canada needs to understand the risks of an over-reliance on the Chinese economy and diversify its trade away from China and toward partners in the region. This should include the creation of a dedicated mechanism among democracies to support one another when countries like China use economic coercion to achieve their ends. Such action would send a strong message that targeting trade for political purposes — as China did with Canada’s canola, cattle, and pork exports — will be unsuccessful.

Meanwhile, heated tensions and provocative acts that threaten the stability of Taiwan are simply the latest in a sustained list of concerns with Beijing’s increasing military posture in the region. Indeed, stability in the Taiwan strait is directly connected with China’s other assertive moves in the maritime domain. Meanwhile[St1] , the Indo-Pacific is facing a host of shared security challenges, from maritime piracy and crime to heated territorial disputes. In this vast maritime space – stretching from East Africa to the Pacific Island chains – the foundations of regional commerce and security are secured through the freedom of navigation and secure sea lines of communication.

Yet, there are several key challenges to the rules and order in the region that have underpinned security and prosperity for the littoral states. In the South China Sea, for example, Beijing continues to practice salami-slicing tactics aimed at ensuring its de-facto control of much of this key waterway through extensive land reclamation and the imposition of military equipment and infrastructure. Meanwhile, Beijing also continues to raise regional concerns through its constant incursions into the maritime and airspace surrounding Japan’s Senkaku islands, also claimed by China and referred to as the Diaoyu, in the East China Sea.

Most importantly, Canada’s relationship with China must be contextualized in the broader Indo-Pacific region. Canada should no longer consider bilateral ties with Beijing as an exceptional relationship but rather as simply one important relationship amidst many in a diverse region.

On this front, the Indo-Pacific strategy attempts to deliver with a recognition of Canada’s equities in the broader region. Ties with Japan have been building at a steady pace, and the two countries now have a strategic action plan to engage on a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, which is focussed on a range of fronts, including: the rule of law, security, peacekeeping, humanitarian and disaster relief, health security, energy security, climate change and free trade promotion. The IPS also identifies partnerships with ASEAN, South Korea and India as crucial to Canada’s success in the region. There are some positive movements towards building those relationships, as evidenced by Canada’s renewal of its support for Operation Neon to mitigate North Korea’s attempt to circumvent United Nations Security Council resolutions related to its nuclear and missile programs. Canada is also looking towards building its relationship with India both on trade and security and in recognizing Delhi’s place as a key steward of stability in the region.

Finally, the IPS also matches well with other approaches from other partners, such as the United States, Australia and partners in Europe, on a range of issues, including countering disinformation and economic coercion, and working in tandem to secure supply chains, especially in areas such as critical minerals and technology. Rather than relying on a “one or two trusted partner model”, Canada’s IPS will only be successful if it has diverse regional buy-in.

Regions
Canada
Canada’s Indo-Pacific tilt