DIIS Comment

New uranium deal between Denmark and Greenland clarifies competences

Greenland retains control over mining, environment and safety, Denmark over non-proliferation

Today, the details of a Danish-Greenlandic deal on uranium were released, along with two declarations on nuclear safeguards and export controls and an annex on safety. Taken as a package, they establish a cooperative, shared approach to ensure compliance with the Rigsfællesskab’s international non-proliferation obligations such as those related to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM).

A Common Approach
The package deal recognises Denmark as the Rigs authority on non-proliferation matters, specifically nuclear safeguards, physical protection and dual-use exports. It identifies the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the ‘State Regulatory Authority,’ dealing directly with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on nuclear safeguards. The package also frames a Danish-Greenlandic structure with Greenland’s Department of Industry, Labour and Trade (DILT) acquiring a pivotal, joint role in treaty implementation (such as on inspections and reporting). As a whole, the deal and accompanying declarations set the stage for two legislative acts — one on safeguards and another on dual-use exports — to be debated in both Parliaments in the coming months.

The deal and accompanying declarations do not alter or limit the balance of competencies in foreign, defence and security matters according to the Self Government Act, or any other legislation, international law or treaties. Indeed, they clarify the Self-Government’s provisions along with previous commitments made at Itilleq in 2003 when Greenland and Denmark agreed to involve Nuuk in foreign affairs relevant to the island. The Itilleq Declaration and principles of inclusion and equal partnership were integrated into the Self-Government Act and subsequently shaped the discussions on uranium production and trade. As noted in the preamble to the joint declaration on safeguards between the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and DILT, the structure agreed to is ‘based on cooperation, mutual respect and equality.’

The statements also do not alter Greenland’s full authority over its natural resources as provided for in the Self Government Act. The Government of Greenland (Naalakkersuisut) sets the conditions and rules for prospecting, exploration and exploitation of uranium and other radioactive materials with licenses subject to the terms of Greenland’s Mineral Resources Act. Naalakkersuisut is also the responsible authority for environmental and health and safety at facilities involved in the processing of uranium or thorium in Greenland.

Highest International Standards
The deal states EU regulations will serve as the basis for forthcoming legislation on safeguards and dual-use export controls along with a joint Danish-Greenlandic commitment to observe the highest international standards such as those practiced in Australia and Canada. This common objective demonstrates a streamlining of what is otherwise an entangled and mixed legal system which is further complicated by Denmark’s membership (and Greenland’s non-membership) in the European Union and Euratom.

Similar to Euratom, Greelandic uranium ore and ore concentrates will be subject to safeguards reporting and their exports subject to amellemstatslig modtagerstatsaftale, or a bilateral agreement known commonly as a Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA). Uranium suppliers such as Australia, Canada and the United States employ NCAs to provide assurances that exports are properly protected, safely handled and used for peaceful purposes. They list ‘conditions of supply’ that have to be met before the trade of nuclear materials can take place. According to the safeguards declaration, there is Danish-Greenlandic agreement that NCAs will include, at a minimum, the following conditions of supply:

  • Uranium is only exported to states that are a party to the NPT and have a comprehensive safeguards agreement and Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Similar measures apply to the five states recognised as ‘Nuclear Weapons States', namely China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States.
  • Fallback safeguards in the event the IAEA is unable to monitor the material for any reason.
  • International standards of physical protection applying to Greenlandic uranium imported.
  • Prior consent be obtained from Copenhagen before Greenlandic uranium is transferred to a third country.
  • Receiving countries are responsible for managing the waste and other products that arise from further processing of Greenlandic uranium.

These conditions are similar to those of Australia, Canada and the U.S, albeit these three suppliers also include prior approvals should the importing country wish to reprocess uranium or enrich it beyond 20% -processes that produce plutonium or weapons-grade uranium for military purposes. The joint declaration on safeguards underscores that the list is not exhaustive and can be expanded upon. It is therefore anticipated that Greenland and Denmark will also include prior approvals for enrichment and reprocessing given that this is standard practice for Australia, Canada and the U.S. NCAs will be prepared by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in coordination with DILT. The NCAs will be signed by the Danish Government and, to the widest extent possible, together with Naalakkersuisut in accordance with paragraph 13 subsection 3 of the Self Government Act.

New Beginnings
The case of Greenland’s uranium is the first to require clarifications to the foreign, defence and security competencies in relation to the 2009 Self Government Act. The package deal builds upon recent efforts to streamline the Rigsfællesskab’s nuclear safeguards requirements such as applying the IAEA Additional Protocol to Greenland in March 2013. Moreover, the deal highlights that the territorial restrictions regarding six other international nuclear conventions will be lifted.

Copenhagen and Nuuk have framed a non-proliferation network that strengthens and builds upon the Self-Government Act, Denmark’s EU membership and the Rigsfællesskab’s international treaty obligations. It serves as the first step to formalise a common approach and administrative system to manage and govern uranium production and trade in Greenland. The next hurdle is for both Parliaments to debate forthcoming legislation on safeguards and export controls. Greenland Parliament will need to provide its assent for the legislation and the Danish Parliament to adopt it. Once legislation is passed, both sides still need to draft joint regulations and guidances on safeguards and export controls. While there is a lot of work ahead, Greenland and Denmark have reached a new level in their relationship, incorporating international and strategic priorities on their way to uranium supplier status.

Regioner
Denmark Greenland
New uranium deal between Denmark and Greenland clarifies competences
Greenland retains control over mining, environment and safety, Denmark over non-proliferation