

Part I

Norms and preferences

History and principles

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2 The normative power of the European Union in a globalised world

Ian Manners

EU partnership and dialogue with third countries will promote common values of: respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, peace, democracy, good governance, gender equality, the rule of law, solidarity and justice. The EU is strongly committed to effective multilateralism whereby all the world's nations share responsibility for development.

(European Consensus on Development 1996)

To what extent is the European Union (EU) a normative power with the ability to define what passes for 'normal' in a globalised world? As the statement from the European Consensus on Development illustrates, in the post-Cold War era the EU has increasingly claimed that its relations with the rest of the world are informed by the normative principles of peace, freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law, equality, social solidarity, sustainable development and good governance (see also the Constitution for Europe 2004: articles I-3.4 and III-297.1). Assessing the extent to which the EU is willing and able to act as a normative power in just one chapter is an almost impossible task because of its polycentric polity and policy breadth, as well as the increasingly transnational nature of the globalised world in which the EU is trying to act. In order to overcome these problems and address the volume's aim of analysing the EU's social preferences and normative power, the chapter will look at just three areas of social preferences, each with a case study in the practice of normative power. Hence the cases of EU development aid, EU promotion of core labour standards (CLS), and EU crisis management will be the focus of this chapter. In each case study I shall first engage with secondary scholarship that seeks to analyse the chosen policy field in relation to EU normative power. Second, I shall try to assess from a more empirical perspective the extent to which the EU is acting as a normative power in each case study. The empirical aspect is particularly difficult because of the mixture of normative ethics that shape the EU's relations with the globalised world, including virtue, deontological and consequentialist normative ethics.

The chapter looks first at European preferences for economic solidarity through an examination of the EU's normative principle of solidarity in development policy. Second, the chapter turns to European preferences for social

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solidarity by analysing the EU's normative principle of equality in the promotion of core labour standards. Third, European preferences for sustainable peace and the role of the EU crisis management operations will be looked at. Finally, the chapter will briefly conclude by arguing that a norms-based international system will only be achieved through normative power that persuades others of the universality of such norms.

European economic preferences – economic solidarity

European economic preferences are often characterised by a belief in a social market economy typified by income redistribution, government intervention and stakeholder capitalism (Stjernø 2005). On the basis of empirical observation, European economic preferences are for more economic solidarity in comparison to most of the world. As previous comparisons have illustrated, over the past three decades average levels of EU inequality have remained significantly lower than most of the world, in particular China, Russia and the US. Clearly there are divergences within Europe for this preference, with relatively higher inequality found in the UK and Italy compared to Denmark, Sweden, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In comparison to most of the world, European preferences for economic equality are broadly shared with developed countries such as Japan and Canada, as well as developing countries such as Pakistan and Bangladesh. A number of economists have recently pointed out that this discrepancy between Europe and Japan compared to the US and China is largely due to the income growth of the super-rich – the top 1 per cent (Piketty and Saez 2006; *The Economist* 2006). For example, Ian Dew-Becker and Robert Gordon argue that US median real wage and salary income has barely grown at all since 1966 (Dew-Becker and Gordon 2005). Such comparative data on inequality and relative poverty indicates that EU members share a relative preference for economic solidarity, particularly in comparison to China, the US and Russia.

The normative principle of solidarity in development policy

The normative principle of solidarity is based on a commitment to promote a more social economy, social partnership and social justice within the EU, and in relations with the developing world. Alongside the principles of democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights, social solidarity has been emphasised in the 1973 Copenhagen Declaration, 1986 Foreign Ministers Declaration, 1991 Council Resolution, 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union, and the Constitution for Europe. The Charter of Fundamental Rights makes these principles explicit with its Title IV on solidarity, including workers' rights, family, health and social security rights.

The particular EU interpretation of this normative principle is solidarity. The extensive understanding of solidarity became clear as the objectives of article I-3 of the Constitution for Europe referred to 'balanced economic growth, [and] a social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress', com-

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1 bating 'social exclusion', as well as promoting 'social justice and protection',
2 inter-generational solidarity, and social solidarity among (and between) member
3 states. The principle of solidarity goes beyond inner-EU relations to inform and
4 shape EU development and trade policies as article I-3 also illustrates when it
5 refers to the Union's contribution to 'solidarity and mutual respect among
6 peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty'.

7 But to what extent do these economic preferences and normative principles
8 within the EU translate into relations and policies with the developing world? As
9 suggested at the beginning of the chapter, this is extremely difficult to evaluate
10 as EU development policy largely consists of 15 EU members and the EC Com-
11 mission working through the OECD DAC (Organisation for Economic Cooperation
12 and Development – Development Assistance Committee). Similarly, the EU
13 is not the only actor in the field of development assistance, with a wide variety
14 of state, international and non-governmental organisations active. Finally, there
15 is the highly charged question of whether trade (i.e. freer market access), aid
16 (i.e. greater financial aid), or good governance (i.e. better instruments of govern-
17 ment) is the best way to promote development.

18 A number of scholars have examined EU development policy in relation to
19 EU normative power, including issues such as the Economic Partnership
20 Agreements (EPA) in the 2000 Cotonou Agreement; the 2001 'Everything but
21 Arms' (EBA) initiative; the 2002 Monterrey process; and the European Com-
22 mission's idea of a development 'policy of solidarity'. In a critical review of
23 EU development policy, Andy Storey makes the point that 'there may be some
24 reality in the idea that Normative Power Europe is in action in the EPA negotia-
25 tions', but that the EU promotion of good governance is too narrowly focused
26 on liberal democracy and market economies which 'may not correspond to the
27 developmental needs of African economies' (Storey 2006: 343). In other
28 words, Storey suggests that the EU is a normative power, but that in develop-
29 ment policy it has a preference for promoting norms of freedom and good gov-
30 ernance at the expense of social solidarity. Peter Hilpold has argued the
31 importance of the principle of good governance in the Cotonou Agreement for
32 promoting human rights and democracy through a preference for positive meas-
33 ures and a recoupling of developmental assistance with its normative founda-
34 tions (Hilpold 2002: 66–7, 71).

35 In his studies of the EBA initiative and the Monterrey process, Jan Orbie
36 argues that 'EU trade policy discourse ... shows a normative bias towards the
37 achievement of [goals such as] sustainable development and global rules' (Orbie
38 2004: 4). He suggests that EBA trade policy 'may well be an important EU
39 instrument for achieving the ... goal of development of the South' (ibid.). Orbie
40 discusses the way in which EU self-perceptions 'as a leading and benevolent
41 actor played a role in the EU decisions towards Monterrey [including] a remark-
42 able shift towards more integration in European development policy' (Orbie
43 2003: 1). Orbie shares Storey's concerns for the (neo)liberal promotion of multi-
44 lateralism and the extent to which the EU is unable or unwilling to resist US
45 hegemony (Orbie 2003: 26; 2004: 415).

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The movement from the Lomé Convention's emphasis on privileged partnership to the Cotonou Agreement's focus on conditionality, differentiation and regionalisation has been criticised by Storey, Orbie and others. The Lomé and the ACP relationship prior to 2000 was motivated by the desire to promote social solidarity and discourse ethics through unconditional and undifferentiated aid and dialogue while being selective in excluding developing societies in the rest of the world. In the post-Cold War world such 'paternalistic, neo-colonial attitudes undermined the principle of equality' (Lethinen 1997 in Bonaglia *et al.* 2006: 172) and were criticised for 'the poor results of EU development cooperation' (Arts and Dickson 2004: 2). Since 1990, the EU's development policy has increasingly moved in a less privileging but more holistic direction, placing an emphasis on conditional and differentiated aid encouraging regionalisation, together with greater overall funding. This changed direction is motivated by the aim of promoting more holistic normative principles (such as good governance, human rights, democracy and rule of law) reflecting a greater emphasis on the results-orientated consequentialist ethics increasingly witnessed in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which question the centrality of the Commission's policy of solidarity.

Empirical perspectives on development aid

It is difficult to confirm or deny conclusively the normative practices and consequences of rapidly evolving EU development aid for the reasons discussed in the introduction. However, it is possible to provide a few empirical perspectives on the EU's development aid policies. It is unquestionably the case that the majority of the world's poor have seen their quality of life improve dramatically over the past 30 years, largely because of the rising levels of development in China and India (UN HDR 2006), but little of this is due to the development aid policies of the OECD DAC members. While the world's least developed countries of Africa have also seen some improvements over the past 30 years, a significant number (Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Lesotho) have seen decreases in human development in the same period (UN HDR 2006: 290–1).

In comparison, average EU development assistance has recently (2005) returned to 1990 levels of about 0.4 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI), just over half the UN target of 0.7 per cent GNI but amongst the highest in the world (UN HDR 2006: 343; OECD 2006). There are concerns within the OECD that such exceptional development aid during 2005–6 is the result of one-off debt cancellation by the Paris Club, in particular for Iraq and Nigeria (OECD 2006: 15). Bilateral aid, excluding exceptional debt cancellation, has also risen over the past few years, although largely accounted for by large increases to Iraq and Afghanistan (*ibid.*). The 1996 IMF/World Bank Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and the 2005 G-8 Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) appear to have helped those countries that have reached completion point criteria, although this is still uneven. However, it is more the case that pre-

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1 viously high-debt countries such as Nigeria, Mexico, Brazil, Russia and Indone-
2 sia have managed to reduce their foreign debt through a combination of high
3 commodity prices (in particular oil) and debt forgiveness. Within the EU there
4 appears to be a division between those countries that count debt relief as devel-
5 opment aid led by the UK, with other G-8 members making dubious claims, and
6 those that have publicly argued against the practice such as the Netherlands and
7 non-EU Norway.

8 Similarly, the large increases in EU member state bilateral aid to Iraq and
9 Afghanistan appears to be driven by security concerns rather than the needs of
10 developmental assistance. Ngairé Woods, Jörg Faust and Dirk Messner, amongst
11 others, have raised concerns about allowing security issues to drive development
12 policies in the EU (Woods 2005; Faust and Messner 2005). Interestingly, the
13 EuropeAid Annual Report 2005 illustrates the way in which normative concerns
14 within the European Commission still place human security at the centre of
15 development aid, as Benito Ferrero-Waldner argues, 'promoting human security
16 is central to our approach. We must respond to the full range of threats afflicting
17 the most vulnerable in societies across the world – hunger, deadly diseases,
18 environmental degradation and physical insecurity' (European Commission
19 2005a). However, the OECD Development Cooperation Report 2006 suggests
20 that while debt forgiveness and bilateral aid to Iraq and Afghanistan have made
21 up most of the jump in development aid since 2003, there is a slight rise in
22 underlying official development assistance (ODA) (OECD 2006: 15).

23 In conclusion it is suggested that the changing foci of EU development aid,
24 away from old patterns towards the agenda of debt relief and goal-driven
25 poverty reduction have provoked concerned responses from interested stake-
26 holders. It has also been suggested that the now dense multilateral agenda of EU
27 development aid, including the Millennium Development Goals, the Rio and
28 Johannesburg sustainable development goals, the post-11 September security
29 concerns, the Doha development agenda, the Monterrey Consensus and the Paris
30 Declaration on Aid Effectiveness increasingly makes polycentric development
31 policy difficult, if not impossible (Manners 2007). On the positive side, if EU
32 aid donors live up to the pledges made by the G-8 in Gleneagles in 2005 to
33 increase aid by _38 billion by 2010, then the EU would be well on its way to
34 hitting the UN's 0.7 per cent GNI target. OECD estimates based on 2005
35 pledges indicate EU commitments to moving from the 0.4 per cent GNI of 2005
36 to 0.6 per cent GNI by 2010 (OECD 2006). In addition, the increasing participa-
37 tion and contribution of emerging donors such as Spain, Ireland, Greece and
38 Portugal, as well as nine new EU members, might increase EU-donated develop-
39 ment aid from _42 billion in 2005 to possibly _63 billion by 2010 (which would
40 represent 64 per cent of all OECD DAC aid).

41 On the negative side, most commentators suggest that it would be extremely
42 difficult for EU member states to double their aid contributions in just five years
43 and so far no concrete plans for doing so have been announced. The reality is
44 increasingly that three differing degrees of commitment to the normative prin-
45 ciple of solidarity in development aid appear to have emerged within the EU.

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First, there is the group of DAC members who have hit the UN target of giving more than 0.7 per cent GNI and do not claim large debt cancellations as aid – Sweden, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Denmark. There is a second group of DAC members who are above the EU average of 0.4 per cent GNI but some of which appear to claim debt cancellations as aid – Belgium, Austria, France, the UK, Finland and Ireland. Finally, there is a third group of DAC members who are below the EU average of 0.4 per cent GNI, including Germany, Italy and emerging donors Spain, Portugal and Greece, as well as Japan and the US. In addition, there is the potential problem of industrialising states such as China using Western-style strategic loans and FDI to secure oil and raw materials in developing countries, particularly if these same target states have just experienced debt relief.

Despite these positive and negative aspects, even the average levels of 0.4 per cent GNI for DAC EU donors compare favourably with the OECD average of 0.33 per cent GNI, as well as with the Japanese and US levels below 0.3 per cent GNI. Second, while there are clearly differences between groups of EU members, the best practices of the leading group, together with the role of Brussels-based NGOs (such as the 51 NGOs in Eurodad, the European Network on Debt and Development) and activist movements such as Jubilee 2000 Drop the Debt, Make Poverty History, DATA One campaign and Product Red, can and do shape policy in the EU, albeit slowly. At the nexus of the EU member states, NGOs and activists is the European Commission which appears more responsive to concerns such as commitment to the MDGs, the aid effectiveness agenda, and trying to promote policy coherence between the 15 DAC members and among the EU's multitude of policies (Eurodad Briefing 2007; European Commission 2007b).

Normative social preferences – ‘social solidarity’

European social preferences are regularly characterised by a belief in a social model encompassing social legislation, social welfare and social infrastructure investment (Michalski 2006; Manners 2006a: 23–4). At the international level a question arises as to the extent to which other parts of the world share such normative preferences for a more socially sustainable model than extreme neo-liberalism seems to support. Looking at comparative empirical data, European social preferences are for more social solidarity in comparison to most of the world. As previous comparisons illustrate, public social expenditure data from 1990 and 2001 give an indication of much stronger European preferences for social welfare in contrast to other parts of the world. EU governments have the largest social support systems in the developed (OECD) world, alongside Switzerland, Norway and Iceland. There are obvious divergences within Europe on this preference, with relatively low public social expenditure in Ireland and Slovakia compared to Sweden and Denmark. In comparison to the OECD world, average EU social expenditure is not really shared with other countries, with New Zealand, Australia and Canada the closest on social welfare. What is

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1 equally interesting is the extent to which average public social expenditure has
2 increased in the EU during the 1990s, alongside Switzerland, Turkey and Japan.
3 These figures appear to give some indication of the inroads which neo-liberalism
4 has made in societies such as the Netherlands and New Zealand. Comparative
5 data on social, education, and health expenditure indicates that EU members
6 share a relative preference for social solidarity, particularly in comparison to the
7 non-European world (Manners 2006a: 23–4).

The normative principle of equality in core labour standards

11 The normative principle of equality is based on a commitment to the legal prohi-
12 bition of discrimination together with proactive policies to promote equality,
13 both within the EU and in relations with the rest of the world. Within the EU
14 equality has become one of the most promoted constitutive principles discussed
15 here, moving from a relatively narrow focus on preventing discrimination based
16 on nationality to the far broader and prominent value of equality in article I-2 of
17 the Constitution for Europe. In the 1990s, the focus of equality expanded beyond
18 nationality to include equality between men and women (TEC article 2), protec-
19 tion of minorities (Copenhagen Criteria), and ‘action to combat discrimination
20 based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual
21 orientation’ (TEC article 13).

22 The particular EU interpretation of this normative principle is a more inclu-
23 sive, open-ended and uninhibited understanding of which groups are particularly
24 subject to discrimination. Hence, the Constitution for Europe included refer-
25 ences to the prohibition of discrimination ‘based on *any ground* such as sex,
26 race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief,
27 political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property,
28 birth, disability, age or sexual orientation’ in article II-81 (Charter of Fundamen-
29 tal Rights of the Union, emphasis added). One weakness with the implementa-
30 tion of this principle is the extent to which discrimination based on nationality is
31 still widespread in a majority of member states. This is particularly true of
32 employment practices in consensual societies that promote homosociality.

33 Of particular interest here is the question of whether these social preferences
34 and normative principles within the EU are promoted in international institutions
35 to deal with issues such as human rights, as well as discrimination against
36 indigenous and minority groups. Given the competition between trade, develop-
37 ment and human rights promotion within the EU, as well as the resistant agendas
38 of other states and international organisations, this is an extremely difficult ques-
39 tion to answer. In the case of core labour standards (CLS), the EU has no treaty-
40 based competence to promote these, nor can it easily do so as a member of the
41 World Trade Organisation (WTO).

42 Very few scholars have looked at the EU’s promotion of core labour stand-
43 ards, although these are closely associated with the EU’s normative power.
44 Most writers argue that while CLS are higher in the EU than, for example, the
45 US, it lacks the legal competence in this area due to continued application of

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subsidiarity by its member states (Block *et al.* 2003: 464; Novitz 2003: 170). Some have gone further to argue that CLS should not be internationalised or brought under the WTO, particularly as most developing countries see them as a form of protectionism (Rollo and Winters 2000: 562; Novitz 2003: 167; Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 86). In contrast to this body of work is the argument by Jan Orbie, that while ‘the rise of the normative power Europe [NPE] argument with academics and policy-makers should at least be considered an important political and social fact ... The NPE hypothesis cannot be confirmed’ (Orbie 2006: 3 and 26).

Certainly EU member states can be criticised for not allowing CLS competence to be developed within the EU, despite leading the world in setting CLS – ‘there does seem to be a consensus within the Union that the right to strike is a “core labour standard” and a “fundamental right” ... In this sense, the EU acts as an external enforcer of labour standards, even if it refuses to legislate on these internally’ (Novitz 2003: 149). Marise Cremona argues that ‘the most distinctive contribution made by the EU is ... in promoting “just processes of governance at all levels” which are informed by the principles of inclusiveness, transparency and participation’ (Cremona 2004: 557–8). Sophie Meunier and Kalypso Nicolaidis suggest that partly by design, partly by necessity, the EU entertains a very different relationship to power [seeing] itself as ... a normative power, apt at using non-military tools to achieve its goals in the rest of the world ... Increasingly, it uses market access as a bargaining power to obtain changes in the domestic arena of its trading partners, from labour standards to development policies’ (Meunier and Nicolaidis 2005: 248 and 266). Bretherton and Vogler see the promotion of CLS ‘as a counterpart to these liberalising moves [‘Singapore issues’], EU policy at the WTO has also reflected a concern with labour standards and the links between trade and environmental degradation’ (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 85–6). In making clear his argument that the EU promotes ‘regulatory capitalism’, Adrian van den Hoven states that ‘the EU market is far more “regulated” than “liberal”, in the classic sense of non-intervention. This spillover of EU regulatory approach to capitalism on to the multi-lateral trading system could fundamentally alter its functioning’ (van den Hoven 2006: 187–8). Ultimately, as Novitz reasons, ‘the EC seems to have taken matters into its own hands ... constituting an exception under the GATT’ introducing social conditionality, and ‘acting unilaterally to protect core labour standards, including freedom of association’ (Novitz 2003: 168).

Empirical perspectives on core labour standards

The normative practices and consequences of very recent EU attempts to promote core labour standards are particularly difficult to confirm or deny conclusively because of the extremely short timescale. However, while the ‘GSP+’ scheme for the promotion of CLS was only announced in June 2005, there is some empirical evidence of previous activity by the EU going back ten years earlier. As mentioned in the introduction, it is a little difficult to disaggregate the

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1 extent to which implementation of CLS are the result of ILO, EU or other the
2 activism of other national or transnational actors.

3 However, recent work by the ILO, Tonia Novitz, Ailish Johnson, and in
4 particular Lisa Tortell and Jan Orbie, provides some empirical verification of the
5 EU's activism in promoting CLS. Tortell and Orbie suggest that there has been
6 some congruence of ILO standards and EU CLS promotion over the past ten
7 years. In particular they analyse the GSP+ additional tariff reductions granted by
8 the EU to Sri Lanka and Moldova in 2003, and to Bolivia, Colombia, Costa
9 Rica, Ecuador, Georgia, Guatemala, Honduras, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Panama,
10 Peru, El Salvador and Venezuela in 2005 (see Council of Ministers 2005a and
11 European Commission 2005b). They identify the way in which the ILO and the
12 EU have become more consistent in applying EU GSP sanctions and instigating
13 ILO Commissions of Inquiry in only two cases since 1990 – Burma and Belarus.
14 By comparing the cases of Burma 1996–7 with Belarus 2003–7, Tortell and
15 Orbie suggest that ILO concerns have become increasingly important in EU
16 practices and policy-making, with recent evidence of cooperation, conditioned
17 by some inconsistencies.

18 Empirical evidence seems to suggest that the EU GSP+ incentives scheme
19 has played a role in encouraging Bolivia (ILO 29), Colombia (ILO 182), Costa
20 Rica (ILO 182), Mongolia (ILO 29 and 105), El Salvador (ILO 87 and 98) and
21 Venezuela (ILO 182) to ratify the CLS in 2005 and 2006 (ILOLEX 2006; Euro-
22 pean Parliament 2006). A number of critics, including Tortell and Orbie, have
23 suggested that the question of effective implementation of ILO conventions is
24 often overlooked by the EU, as in the case of El Salvador (European Parliament
25 2006). Similar concerns have been raised about the GSP+ preferences and their
26 beneficiaries, particularly by the WTO. As discussed in the previous section, it is
27 undoubtedly the case that the EU is isolated on the promotion of CLS in the
28 WTO and its Doha agenda, but in contrast it is increasingly working in coopera-
29 tion with the ILO (Council of Ministers 2003; Lamy 2003; Mandelson 2006;
30 ILO 2006).

31 In conclusion it can be suggested that since the 1995 Copenhagen World
32 Summit for Social Development and the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental
33 Principles and Rights at Work, the EU has increasingly promoted the ILO's
34 'decent work' agenda through membership, accession, the European Neighbour-
35 hood Policy and the GSP+ scheme (see European Commission 1994, 1995,
36 2000).

Normative conflict preferences – 'sustainable peace'

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39 European preferences for resolving conflict can be described as a commitment to
40 a more 'sustainable peace' – resolving both the structural causes and violent
41 symptoms of conflict. As discussed above, the above-average levels of OECD
42 DAC development assistance disbursed by EU member states is just one part of
43 addressing the structural causes of conflict. It is worth noting that preferences
44 for sustainable peace reach beyond development assistance and peacekeeping to
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include global institution-building in areas such as human security and the right to protect (R2P); landmine, small arms and conflict diamonds conventions, and the International Criminal Court. This chapter will focus on just one of these many examples of sustainable peace – the role of the EU in crisis management.

The normative principle of sustainable peace in crisis management

The prime EU normative principle of sustainable peace is to be found throughout the history of European integration. Robert Schuman's opening words on 9 May 1950 provided the historical *raison d'être* for European integration; 'world peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it'. Reiterated again in the preambles of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), and the Treaty on European Union, article I-3 of the Constitution for Europe was to establish peace as the EU's primary objective: '1. The Union's aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples'.

As discussed above, the particular EU interpretation of this normative principle is sustainable peace (see Manners 2006b). As discussed under EU conflict preferences above, the EU approach to conflict prevention emphasises addressing the roots or causes of conflict, mirroring the European experience of ensuring that war 'becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible'. The EU policy emphasis is placed on development aid, trade, interregional cooperation, political dialogue and enlargement as part of a more holistic approach to conflict prevention. However, the EU's growing civil and military operational capacity also has a sustainable peace mission with its focus on 'peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter' (article I-41, Constitution for Europe).

The question arises over where the balance of emphasis is to be found between addressing the causes of conflict in a peaceful way, and the ability to use force in peacekeeping and genocidal situations. Similarly, there is the associated question of whether this is best done through international cooperation, regional peacekeeping operations, or a UN-authorized force. In addressing these questions of the balance between conflict prevention and conflict management, a number of scholars have looked at the EU in the context of the exercise of normative power. Annika Björkdahl and Ana Juncos have both emphasised the normative power of the EU in southeastern Europe, where there is an 'asymmetrical relationship between the EU as a norm-maker and Macedonia as a potential norm-taker' and arguing that 'a parallel process has taken place in the last decade facilitating the (re)integration of [Bosnia] in the European mainstream and the (re)invention of the EU as a regional normative power' (Björkdahl 2005: 277–8; Juncos 2005: 89). Sonia Lucarelli and Roberto Menotti suggest that such normative power currently excludes certain forms of coercive actions, such as punishment and 'pre-emption', but must be seen as part of a dis-

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1 tinctive political dynamic that is leading towards a greater acceptance of a wider
2 notion of intervention in the EU (Lucarelli and Menotti 2006: 162–3). As Diez
3 *et al.* illustrate in the case of border conflicts, the EU is able to exercise norm-
4 ative power through membership and association negotiations, which in some
5 cases has led to ‘a long-term socialisation of policymakers into European norm-
6 ative discourses’ (Diez *et al.* 2006: 572–3 and 586–7).

7 The notion of the EU’s Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) representing a
8 cosmopolitan military force willing to promote human security is a common
9 representation of normative power (Terriff 2004; Matlary 2006; Liotta and Owen
10 2006). For the European Commission, human security means a concern for indi-
11 viduals, not states, and encompasses both freedom from fear (for example conflict
12 and human rights abuses) and freedom from want (for example poverty and
13 disease) (European Commission 2005a: 2; Ferrero-Waldner 2006: 103–7). Inter-
14 estingly, the origins of the 2003 European Security Strategy are informed by this
15 understanding of human security, in particular with its references to the ‘complex
16 causes’ of terrorism including ‘the pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and
17 political crises’ (Council of Ministers 2003: 3; Glasius and Kaldor 2004; Liotta
18 and Owen 2006: 97). Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor argue that:

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20 there are different versions of the ‘peace project’ including the notion of
21 Europe as a new type of cosmopolitan polity, a ‘civil space’ or a ‘normative
22 power’.... What this means is that [member states] exercise their sover-
23 eignty through the multilateral institutions and they agree to constraints on
24 the use of force.... A human security strategy derives from this conception
25 of Europe.

(Glasius and Kaldor 2005: 79)

Empirical perspectives on crisis management

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29 As discussed in the two previous case studies, the normative practices and con-
30 sequences of EU crisis management are difficult to confirm or deny, particularly
31 as such attempts may have considerable merit even if they fail. Following the
32 agreement at the June 1999 European Council meeting in Cologne, the EU has
33 been increasingly involved in crisis management and peacekeeping operations.
34 Since March 2003 the EU has launched 17 crisis management operations with
35 an emphasis on southeastern Europe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and
36 Palestine. In addition, and largely unnoticed, since May 2001 the EU has sup-
37 ported 52 civilian crisis management operations using the Rapid Reaction
38 Mechanism (RRM). The RRM supported missions have tended to be much more
39 widely spread, covering southeastern Europe, central and south Asia, the Middle
40 East, as well as west, central and east Africa. On top of the 17 crisis manage-
41 ment operations under the Council’s ESDP and the 52 civilian crisis manage-
42 ment operations under the Commission’s RRM, are the hundreds of
43 humanitarian operations led by the Commission’s DG for Humanitarian Aid
44 (ECHO) since its creation in 1992.
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It is this combination of ESDP, RRM and ECHO operations that is often missed in attempts to empirically assess the EU's crisis management activities. To provide an empirical perspective on EU crisis management I will briefly look at three examples of how ESDP, RRM and ECHO are involved in crisis management in three complex conflict situations – Aceh, Palestine and Darfur. EU crisis management in Aceh began with the RRM being used by the Commission in support of the agreement on cessation of hostilities between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian Government in December 2002 (European Commission 2002). The Indian Ocean tsunami on the 26 December 2004 killed an estimated 170,000 people in Aceh and brought back together the GAM separatists and the Indonesian Government. ECHO operations in Aceh involved _3.5 million in December 2004 and _123 million by the second tsunami in March 2005, with an emphasis on linking relief, rehabilitation and development (ECHO 2005: 17; 2006: 8). The launching of three RRM activities during March and April 2005 helped post-tsunami recovery in Aceh and sowed the seeds for peace negotiations (European Commission 2005c, d, e). The signing of a memorandum of understanding in Helsinki between the GAM and the Indonesian government in August 2005 led to the Commission's RRM action on demobilisation and the Council's joint action launching an Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) in September 2005 (European Commission 2005f; Council of Ministers 2005b). The EU's crisis management involvement in Aceh ended with the deployment of a EU Election Observation Mission and the successful first-ever direct local elections on 11 December 2006 (EU Election Observation Mission 2007a; International Crisis Group 2007a).

In contrast to the relatively straightforward success of the EU in Aceh, crisis management in Palestine is part of a much longer-term commitment to addressing one of the most difficult conflicts in the world (Soetendorp 2002; Aoun 2003). EU crisis management in Palestine accelerated following the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000 and the launching of ECHO funding to address the ensuing humanitarian crises (European Commission 2001: 26–7). By 2001 the EU was providing _30 million to Palestinians to address the consequences of the uprising, in particular healthcare, water supplies, food and shelter (ECHO 2002: 17). The March 2002 operation by the Israeli army in the West Bank targeted the headquarters of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Jenin refugee camps, prompting an expansion of ECHO annual humanitarian aid to _35 million to provide for basic health and medical support for Palestinians in Jenin and Ramallah, as well as a RRM to help rebuild the PA infrastructure in June 2002 (ECHO 2003: 16–17; European Commission 2002b). The continued consequences of conflict in Palestine worsened throughout 2003, exasperated by the building of an illegal concrete barrier dividing communities, with an annual ECHO humanitarian funding of _35 million (ECHO 2004: 17 and 26–7). The dire state of the Palestinians and the complete collapse of the peace process led the EU to use the RRM to support local civil society initiatives in October 2003 and March 2004, by which time annual ECHO humanitarian aid was _37 million (European Commission 2003a; 2004a; ECHO 2005: 18). Between the Israeli reoccupation of Gaza and

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1 the West Bank in March 2002–August 2005 and the July–September 2006
2 Israeli–Lebanon conflict, the EU launched two ESDP civilian missions in Novem-
3 ber 2005 – an EU police mission to train Palestinian police (EUPOL COPPS) and
4 an EU border policing mission at Rafah (Council of Ministers 2005c, d). The com-
5 bined effects of the second Intifada, the Israeli military campaigns in Gaza, the
6 West Bank and Lebanon, and finally the election of a Hamas government in
7 January 2006 have considerably challenged EU crisis management. The February
8 2007 Mecca agreement between Fatah and Hamas to share power in Palestinian
9 government may provide the basis for more sustainable EU support for the PA, as
10 well as Israeli engagement, particularly as the EU is the largest provider of finance
11 for the PA and humanitarian support for Palestinian people.

12 In contrast to the direct involvement of the EU in crisis management in Aceh
13 and Palestine, the third example of Darfur illustrates how the EU can work
14 without direct contact. EU crisis management in Sudan from 1993 to 2003 had
15 largely taken place through an average of _20 million in annual ECHO support
16 for humanitarian operations such as ECHO Flights, the UN’s Operation Lifeline
17 Sudan and World Food Programme. However, all of the EU and UN operations
18 have been constantly compromised by insecurity caused by the long-running
19 second civil war between the Sudanese government in the north and the Sudan
20 People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in the south which began in 1983
21 (ECHO 2000: 28; 2001: 19; 2002: 19; 2003: 19; International Crisis Group
22 2004). The Sudanese crisis worsened from February 2003 when conflict in
23 Darfur led to the world’s worst humanitarian crisis involving almost 2 million
24 displaced persons with EU humanitarian resources increased to _91 million
25 (ECHO 2004: 17). An African Union-brokered peace agreement between the
26 government and rebel forces in April 2004 was accompanied by the European
27 Commission’s use of the RRM to provide support for the peace process, includ-
28 ing _1.5 million support for the peace secretariat and the verification and moni-
29 toring team (European Commission 2004b). Despite the peace process, the more
30 complex conflict in Darfur worsened, leading the African Union to create the
31 African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) with AU and EU ceasefire monitors
32 deployed in July 2004 (ECHO 2005: 16). Throughout 2004 and 2005 the situ-
33 ation in Darfur led to international disputes over the extent to which the actions
34 of the government-backed ‘Janjaweed’ militia could be described as genocide,
35 while the UN tried unsuccessfully to deploy a major force of international
36 peacekeepers to support the smaller AU force (International Crisis Group 2006).
37 EU support for peacekeeping initiatives in Sudan and Darfur included a Council
38 joint action enabling an ESDP civilian mission (EU support for AMIS II) and
39 the appointment of special representative Pekka Haavisto in July 2005, as well
40 as using its 2004 Africa Peace Facility (APF) to fund these activities (Council of
41 Ministers 2005e; International Crisis Group 2005). A longer-lasting EU
42 approach to Darfur may be found in the November 2006 decisions to strengthen
43 support for AU crisis management capabilities through much closer cooperation
44 and more sustainable funding through the APF, as well as the 2007 Joint
45 EU–Africa Strategy (Council of Ministers 2006; ECDPM 2007).

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In conclusion these three brief empirical examples of crisis management say something interesting about the EU's normative conflict preference for sustainable peace. First, it is noticeable that the EU is often engaging in crisis management operations through ECHO and the RRM long before the headline-grabbing conflicts break out. Second, the EU seems committed to attempting some sort of crisis management even under difficult local and international conditions, as the insecure situations and UN Security Council deadlocks in Palestine and Darfur illustrate. Third, the EU institutions themselves seem to be learning rapidly from their own experiences and trying to change their structures and practices to best match need, despite the reluctance of member states and treaty reform to achieve more practical means.

Conclusion: normative power and social preferences in a globalised world

Throughout this chapter I have examined the extent to which the EU has normative power to define what passes for normal in a globalised world. As I stated at the outset, assessing the normative power in terms of its normative constitution, actions and impact is an almost impossible task within such narrow confines. However, I made a first attempt by briefly considering the secondary literature and empirical evidence in three tentative case studies. In each case I looked at EU normative power by considering the way in which social preferences shaped empirical policies. It should be noted that this two-step approach to social preferences and normative power is an interesting means of examining the EU, but it tends to overlook and undervalue the most important element of normative power – the question of the EU's normative constitution or what the EU is, rather than does. I still consider this the greatest normative power of 'contagion diffusion' or 'living by example', but have not addressed this here (Manners 2006c: 76–7).

As the chapter has explored, there is variation in social preferences for solidarity, core labour standards and crisis management which informs EU external promotion. The mix of neutral, interventionist and more passive crisis management preferences in the EU currently leads to greater divergence than the other cases, as was seen in Aceh, Palestine and Darfur. The EU's competence in all the cases is low, with member states retaining control of most of development aid, the internal enforcement of labour standards, control of crisis forces and the signing of international treaties. For the EU, sustainable development and international rule of law are currently major normative principles and are promoted accordingly. While social solidarity and equality unfortunately remain minor normative principles, the strategies to promote them are changing rapidly and may yet emerge as major principles. Understandably, the emerging area of crisis management is still promoted in a minor way, largely because of the fairly recent development of competence and need for greater commitment from member states in order to overcome divergences. Finally, all three case studies illustrated the difficulties the EU faces in trying to promote these normative

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1 principles. In the cases of development policy and CLS, the EU and its member
2 states face resistance from partner countries who feel discriminated against and
3 are hostile to principles such as good governance, equality, human and social
4 rights. In the case of sustainable peace and crisis management the relatively new
5 emergence of competence, together with uncertainty over the merits of crisis and
6 peacekeeping missions, are some of the greatest problems, although the extent to
7 which the EU is the largest international funder of humanitarian and peace
8 efforts in Aceh, Palestine and Darfur is often overlooked.

9 In conclusion, the divergences of social preferences, discrepancies over com-
10 petence, and questions of promotion and implementation in all three case studies
11 suggest that the EU is a committed yet troubled normative power in the glob-
12 alised world. As repeated and numerous policy documents such as 'The Euro-
13 pean Consensus on Development' or 'The European Union and the United
14 Nations: The Choice of Multilateralism' (European Commission 2003b) illus-
15 trate, the EU appears committed to becoming and exercising normative power:

16
17 The EU should adopt a determined 'front-runner' approach to the negotia-
18 tion and implementation of important UN initiatives in the field of sustain-
19 able development, poverty reduction and international security, taking a
20 more proactive approach to the development of international instruments
21 and specific EU implementing actions.

(European Commission 2003b: 9)

22
23
24 Despite such commitments, as the case studies illustrate, the EU appears trou-
25 bled in achieving such ambitious goals of becoming a 'front-runner'. Four
26 factors are at work in restricting the EU's promotion of such goals. Most import-
27 ant is the question of *time* – in most cases it is simply too early to assess the
28 EU's normative power. The diffusion of ideas in a normatively sustainable way
29 works like water on stone, not like napalm in the morning. Second is the
30 changed international *climate* of the Bush/Bin Laden world which makes the EU
31 promotion of a normatively acceptable norms-based international system
32 particularly difficult. Third is the increasing resistance of the 'axis of ego' to the
33 sharing of *sovereignty* in international law. By the 'axis of ego', I mean the
34 permanent members of the UN Security Council (here the US, Russia and
35 China) who consider themselves exceptional or superpowers, and above inter-
36 national norms and law (Manners 2007). Finally there is the argument that a
37 norms-based international system will only be achieved through normative
38 power that persuades others of the *universality* of such norms. It is only through
39 understanding and coming to terms with these four factors that an alignment of
40 social preferences, normative power and EU foreign policy will contribute in a
41 meaningful way to planetary politics.
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