

10 The final move?

Displaced livelihoods and collective returns in Peru and Guatemala

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Displaced livelihoods and collective returns

This chapter compares two cases of spatial movement that usually fall into two separate fields of study. One is the return of refugees who, in returning, are by definition crossing an international border, in this case the border between Mexico and Guatemala. The other is the return of Peruvian highlanders who have left their rural villages and sought refuge from the widespread violence in their region in the nearest city. The two cases of movement are similar in the sense that both involve people who have been identified, labelled and assisted by national and international agencies as victims of violent conflict, as 'refugees' in the first case and 'internally displaced persons' (IDPs) in the second. We may categorize the two cases as 'forced migration', but the difference between voluntary and forced migration is not absolute.¹ While the forced/voluntary distinction may not be the most fertile point of departure for an analysis of the directions, dynamics and effects of particular movements, it is important in defining rights, entitlements and livelihood spaces. I will therefore analyse the two cases of movement as taking place partly within a 'transnational space' generated through the appropriation and application of the categories of refugees, IDPs and returnees – partly outside this space.

The post-structuralist critique of essentializing notions of refugees, migrants, IDPs, returnees and repatriated persons came to prominence during the 1990s. Researchers criticized the tendency to regard migrant and refugee lives as problematic in respect of their 'uprooting' and displacement, that is, the perception of displaced people as likely to suffer from trauma, identity problems, poverty and disorientation, and therefore as being in need of healing and assistance. The inherent celebration of rootedness and the problematization of uprooting were linked to the predominance of the territorial nation state and the 'national order of things' (Mallki 1992). Transnational studies were suggested as an alternative, non-national way of analysing mobility and belonging. This move led some commentators to an uncritical endorsement of the notion of mobility which failed to account for unequal access to it or the material constraints of mobile livelihoods (Massey 1994; Stepputat and Sørensen 1999; Hyndman 2000). While endorsing the transnational approach, I will explore an additional analytical path, one

which de-essentializes categories of displaced people by coining and foregrounding the idea of 'displaced livelihoods' in the analysis of mobility, belonging and change.

The notion of a livelihood is seen as comprising not only specific ways of producing, exchanging and consuming, but also ideas about 'proper' lives and the negotiations over recognition, identity, entitlements and rights. However, livelihoods are sometimes disrupted by major political or economic transformations, such as liberal reforms, nationalization, market collapse or violent conflict. These transformations may sweep away entitlements, violate rights, crush vested hopes and investments in the future, undermine customary livelihood practices, dissolve collective identities, and inhibit social and spatial mobility. The term 'displaced livelihood' thus denotes the composite effects of a particular subset of disruptions, namely the disruption of spatial mobility. By focusing on displaced livelihoods rather than displaced people, the analysis does not a priori privilege those who have moved over those who have had their livelihoods destroyed by not being able to move, nor does it a priori problematize spatial displacement relative to the displacement of livelihoods. In addition, the notion elicits a historical analysis of mobile livelihood practices and struggles for the recuperation of mobility.

The collective practices and political identities that are articulated in such struggles constitute an important backdrop for the understanding of the individual and collective strategies of 'refugees' and 'IDPs'. In both the Guatemalan and Peruvian cases, the return movements are similar in the sense that they are both imagined and organized as collective enterprises by the participants in the process. One could argue that spatial movement is often organized collectively, since many people follow the same patterns of mobile livelihood and share information and experience in the process; but in the two present cases, the participants were represented by formal organizations, and the move was undertaken by everybody at the same time in logistically grandiose and highly visible operations. Many, in particular the agencies involved, imagine returns as a final move, the move to displacement and transience, the point zero from which development will proceed.

Finally, given the apparently predominating direction of migration from poorer to richer regions, from rural to urban areas, and from South to North, the two collective returns stand out as exceptions, as counter-currents that call for scrutiny and explanation because they are proceeding in the opposite direction. In the current international context in which migration issues receive a great deal of political attention, such counter-currents are encouraged in many different ways through migration policies, conflict management, humanitarian assistance and development aid. International agencies have presented return and repatriation as the best and most 'natural' solution to problems of displacement, but, as many scholars pointed out during the 1990s, we cannot take the will to return in the aftermath of armed conflict for granted. Likewise a range of concepts, such as reconstruction, reintegration, and reconciliation, convey the image of displaced persons and refugees going back to something familiar, while 'construction', 'innovation' and 'creativity' might be more appropriate concepts for the social processes at play (Gmelch 1980; Hammond 1999).

The following analysis will focus on: (1) The production of a transnational space through the international categories of refugees and IDPs respectively; (2) the histories of displaced livelihoods and rural movements in the Guatemalan and Peruvian highlands; (3) the framing of IDPs and refugees under the prevailing security regimes; and (4) the organization and aftermath of two cases of collective returns in Guatemala and Peru.²

Refugees and IDPs in transnational space

The field of refugees as a particular area of international and national intervention has been increasingly institutionalized since the Second World War. As a point of departure in interpreting repatriation and return movements, I understand the field of refugees as a transnational space in which different agents, operating across borders and engaging governments with reference to universal moral values, produce material effects. This space is defined by discourses, institutions and flows that produce the phenomenon of the refugee as a particular identity, as a problem to be solved and hence as a particular field of institutional intervention. While the field of refugees is generated on the basis of an international convention and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the field has become transnational in the sense that networks of non-governmental agencies, popular movements and people on the move manage the refugee concept in ways that go beyond the direct control of national governments.³

In this space, discourses and images circulate which construct refugees as victims and objects of assistance and solidarity, alongside (contradictory) images which construct them as intruders, dangerous sources of social, political and epidemiological pollution etc. Here we also see certain techniques for the administration and control of refugee populations, the distribution of humanitarian aid and the implementation of programmes for the formation of 'human capital' through training and education.

Using Henry LeFebvre's term, we may talk about the production of an abstract space (LeFebvre 1991), an institutionalized and apparently transparent space that permits the identification and localization of refugees as a visible and controllable social entity, the refugee camp being the archetype of this particular space (Mallki 1992). Thus the logic of the national order conditions the formation of a collective identity based on the category of the refugee. Of course, many other factors intervene in the production of particular collective refugee subjects, but the category defines the limits, rights and qualities that qualify refugees for assistance.

However, 'refugee' is a negotiable category that may be appropriated and interpreted in many forms and for many reasons. At the social level I will interpret the refugee category as open and unstable, a strategic space that forms the basis of temporary alliances between individuals and households, and facilitates the generation and accumulation of political and material resources. As such, the category of the refugee provides conditions for certain livelihoods by giving access to ID cards, licences, credits, utensils, technical advice and education, while other livelihoods, in particular mobile ones, are inhibited by the control exerted over refugee

populations. Depending on the degree of control, people may enter and leave the category. But, as the case of the Guatemalan refugees shows, the category, and the collective subject formed on its basis, may also serve as a strategic alliance that permits groups of populations to cross international borders under conditions over which the refugees themselves may have some control.

Internally displaced persons

During the second half of the 1980s, the 'IDP' appeared as a concept at the international level, together with attempts to structure the protection of, and draw attention to, internally displaced people, not least in Central America. In the 1990s conjuncture of military and humanitarian interventions on the basis of criteria relating to human rights, political and technical development in the field of IDPs has been reinforced.⁴

One determining factor in this reinforcement is the increased political importance given to the issue of migration and the related attempts to control immigration to the richer countries. 'Cross-border operations', 'protected areas' and peacekeeping operations may be seen as attempts to contain violent conflict and the creation of refugees that would otherwise be caught up in refugee camps along the borders or reach the countries of the North. Together with repatriation programmes, the IDP is the institutional inventory that can bring about this 'internalisation' of refugees (Suhrke 1993) and extend the transnational humanitarian space still further.

Mobile livelihoods and rural movements in Peru and Guatemala

In the following, I will analyse two trajectories of mobility and livelihood that developed under conditions of violent conflict in central Peru and in the border areas between Guatemala and Mexico. In the Peruvian case, the actions of the Peruvian army and the Shining Path under the leadership of Abigail Guzman drove maybe 600,000 people away from the areas of conflict between 1982 and 1992. In the department of Huancavelica, many Quechua-speaking people responded to the violence by exploring possibilities in and around Huancayo, the commercial centre of the neighbouring province. Like those who went to Lima or to the tropical lowlands, they had the chance to join government schemes of collective return to their villages in Huancavelica during the second half of the 90s.

During the violent conflict between the Guatemalan army and the insurgent groups joined together in the URNG, more than 100,000 villagers in the border area sought refuge in southern Mexico. Many of them were Maya-speaking people from the highlands who had recently settled in the tropical lowlands. Some of the refugees were concentrated and assisted in camps and settlements in Mexico; others soon returned or were dispersed across the region. Between 1993 and 1999, they returned to Guatemala in comparatively large numbers following a negotiated agreement with the Guatemalan government in 1992.

The two conflicts share a number of similarities in terms of the changes in livelihood conditions that enabled armed groups to mobilize rural populations. While mobility between different ecological niches of production at different altitudes constituted an important element of rural livelihood in both regions, conditions in the emerging state changed in the nineteenth century: liberal land reforms and the developing plantation economies had the effect of reducing the highland villages' access to land and pasture at different altitudes. The indigenous communities also became involved in systems of (forced) labour migration to lowland plantations. In practice, indigenous highland communities were excluded from full citizenship.

Access to land as the basis for rural livelihood and recognition of the villagers as citizens became an issue in rural political movements in the twentieth century. Reformist military governments carried out land and political reforms in order to incorporate the indigenous population into the nation state politically as well as economically, but with little immediate success. In the Guatemalan case, reforms were halted and reversed after a military coup in 1954. In Peru, land reforms were carried out in 1968, but haciendas were substituted by co-operatives or large state farms, which many peasant communities regarded as just as dominating as the haciendas had been. When the Shining Path started to organize the indigenous population around 1980, they exploited these tensions between state farms and communities that were longing for increased access to land and pasture.

In Guatemala, land reform re-emerged as a critical issue for mobilization in the social, leftist movements of the 70s, when 'organization' became the basis for political struggle and for alternative visions of livelihoods, involving modern forms of co-operation. In both cases, guerrilla movements attempting to undermine the state dominated the political scene of the 80s. Guerrilla actions in both Peru and Guatemala were concentrated in regions with poor communications and the sparse presence of state institutions apart from the army, which arrived in order to carry out counterinsurgency operations. The armed actions and system of control imposed by both insurgency and counterinsurgency led hundreds of thousands of people to leave or stay away from the countryside in the areas of conflict.

Displaced livelihoods

The organization and representation of space is a central dimension of power, not least of the forms of power related to the territorial nation state.⁵ Segregations, exclusions, ghettos, roads and roadblocks, grids and enclosures all provide methods of managing potentially dangerous differences and subversive movements, social as well as spatial, within the territorial limits of the nation state. Conditions of violent conflict, displacement and exile are no exception. In general, it seems justified to suggest that conditions of violent conflict reduce liberty of movement, as movement becomes an essential issue in security (Stepputat 1999). This is the case for both Peru and Guatemala.

Refugees in Mexico

By carrying out numerous massacres, organizing the population in civil patrols for self-defence and setting up numerous checkpoints, the Guatemalan army gave the rural population little choice. They could stay more or less fixed in the villages, or flee to safer areas within or outside the country. While many peasants took refuge on the plantations at the south coast, movement between the plantations and the highlands was rendered difficult by several factors: mobility required passes and hence formalized relations with the authorities; passage through the numerous checkpoints had to be negotiated in many instances; villagers were obliged to participate in the civil patrols on a regular basis or else pay a substitute if they left the village in order to engage in migrant labour; and those who fled the villages were afraid of being associated with the guerrillas if they tried to return to their villages upon flight.

Likewise, those who left the country were subjected to restrictions of movement or, if they chose to engage in illicit movement, to the increased danger of being arrested, harassed and repatriated by the state authorities. In Chiapas, Mexico, refugees were either recognized as such and located in camps and settlements with limited rights to movement, or else they sought to pass as Mexicans and conduct a life with limited and precarious access to health, education, markets, land and work (Salvadó 1988).

However, mobility was essential for survival, whether they had relief provisions or not. While land was in scarce supply in the areas of refuge, seasonal occupation was available, although at low wages, given the plentiful supply of Guatemalan farm hands. Coffee, corn, cattle and horticulture provided jobs in different parts of the borderlands at different times in the agricultural calendar. Young people, mainly male but increasingly including female refugees, sought better opportunities in the cities of southern Mexico or else left for USA, following paths opened up by the first groups of refugees, who had already reached different places in that country.⁶ Men engaged in construction work in the cities, while women were mainly engaged in the domestic sector. Many others combined wage labour with retail commercial activities, a niche that was not occupied by the Mexicans (Hernandez *et al.* 1993).

When, in 1984, the Mexican government decided to relocate the Guatemalan refugees away from the border due to Guatemalan army incursions and fears of social unrest spilling over into Chiapas, the thrust of the international refugee regime was changing, from an emphasis on resettlement as the preferred solution to refugee situations in the 1970s, to 'local integration' in the early 1980s. While the Mexican government was inclined to offer only temporary asylum and to push for repatriation, refugee agencies sought to prevent the 'dependency syndrome' and to reduce overall expenditure by reorienting relief towards projects for 'self-sufficiency'. They invariably imagined the refugees as peasants-in-refuge (Lopez Rivera 1997) and regarded land as the basic precondition for self-sufficiency, in combination with income-generating projects and occasional wage labour in agriculture. The government limited permits to travel and work to the province of

residence and attempted to control labour contracting. Physical control was abandoned after the first year, and soon public transport was connecting the refugee settlements with the major markets in the province.

The idea of the 'program for self-sufficiency' was to create a self-sufficient development where the refugees produced what they needed, including food, clothes and furniture, and where they would develop their production beyond their own immediate needs and start marketing their products in the surrounding area. Thus, the idea of the 'projects' was intimately tied to the settlement and based on the collective organization of cash-crop production, shops, workshops, marketing and training in new skills. Maintaining the settlements depended on the labour and material support of the refugees themselves.

The overall idea was shared by refugee leaders and the staffs of UNHCR and La Comisión Mexicana para Ayuda a Refugiados (COMAR). The programme promised to reduce the necessity for relief over time and hence the costs of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). It was compatible with the government policy of containing the refugees in manageable spaces and maintaining a coherent refugee community that was oriented towards a possible return to Guatemala. Finally, the programme linked up with the academic and political formation of Mexican and international staff, as well as the refugee leaders with respect to 'organization' and 'community development' as the bases of development and integration. The idea of community-based development invariably invoked (Mayan) traditions of collective labour, mutual trust and communal identity, even though the refugee 'community' was very heterogeneous with respect to place of origin, prior land relations, ethnic identity, organizational experience and political affiliations.

In order to make the collective project work in spite of the ever-increasing (and illegal) mobility of the refugees, settlement regulations dictated that nobody could leave the settlement for more than one month. Recycling age-old communal membership practices, everybody had to 'take turns', contribute to general work turnouts, undertake organizational tasks and support teachers and health promoters among the refugees. Therefore, members of the refugee community had to alternate between making money elsewhere and working in the settlement in order to maintain their entitlements there. However, the scheme was not able to counter refugee strategies. Family-based commerce outdid co-operative efforts to organize commercial relations, and although many people were afraid of leaving the safe environment of the settlement, individuals seeking out wage labour soon brought refugees far beyond the limits imposed on their mobility. Not having proper identity papers, the Guatemalans were given miserable conditions, and the obligation to return to the settlements within a month made it difficult to improve work relations over time. Adolescents, however, tended to stay more or less permanently away from the settlements, which then became a place to go to visit the family, see old friends, participate in communal *fiestas* and flaunt the things that money could buy, such as ghetto-blasters, leather boots, watches and BMX bikes.

In the settlements, a remarkably strong distinction was generated between the wage-based form of livelihood, involving work in distant (and for the refugees,

prohibited) cities, and the place-bound 'peasant-refugee' form of livelihood, which included wage labour in local agriculture only. This distinction is the key to several conflicts and differences of a political, cultural and generational nature. For one thing, in accordance with the Mexican refugee regime, the leaders defined the quality of refugeehood in terms of spatial confinement: 'I thought this was going to be a camp of political refugees, confined to this place. Nevertheless, this has turned into a work camp, and it shouldn't be like this; we're political refugees, but people have forgotten that they're refugees, that they're only lodging here. Therefore, I've never left the camp for work. Instead, I prepare my *milpa* better, and my wife and the kids raise pigs and chickens. I think we should have worked more persistently in the projects, but people are not united.'⁷

The peasant-refugee livelihood was promoted by both refugee leaders and agency staff, and clearly involved a generational conflict. By losing land, the older men had also lost power over the young men, but they still controlled the system of distribution of projects through their relationship with the Mexican authorities and UNHCR. Although many young men were largely beyond control in far away places, they were criticized by the older generation for their lack of respect: 'In the city, they lose respect, they lose their qualities. They don't learn anything, but they forget how to make *milpa*, and how to make *tortillas*. They leave as Christians, but they return as delinquents (*ladrones*).'⁷

While defining knowledge in a distinct and limited way, this representation of migrant labour leans on an idealization of the rural community *vis-à-vis* urban modernity, which also draws upon the historical resistance towards migrant labour on plantations. Urban modernity is considered to be insecure, immoral, corrupting and productive of barren wealth only. Adults regarded the BMX bike, for example, as being useless for practical purposes, unlike the tricycle, which was used to transport heavy goods. The city was symbolized by the tempting apple that led to the Fall of Man.⁸

The non-integration policy and anti-migratory livelihood practices were also the main agenda of 'the organizations', the four guerrilla movements present in the settlements, that focused their attention on nation state-centred politics back in Guatemala. In effect, an image of 'the real refugee' appeared in everyday discourse that combined active participation in the refugee community with the desire to return to Guatemala. The refugees should neither integrate too much into Mexican society, nor go back before conditions were safe. Rather, they should consider the future and prepare for their return.

Displaced in a Peruvian city

In stark contrast to the highly visible concentrations of Guatemalan refugees, the 'internally displaced' in the Peruvian city of Huancayo lived dispersed in and around the city during the 1980s and 1990s. For many years, the identity and concept of the *desplazados* (displaced) was not commonly known, and concerned people in Huancayo, mainly connected with the churches, were only remotely linked to transnational humanitarian spaces. Another factor that reduced

the formation of an IDP identity was the Peruvian state's spatial strategy of containing displaced people. This was very different from the Mexican strategy. As in many other cases of internal displacement, the Peruvian state did not recognize displacement as a problem to be singled out and remedied publicly. Displacement was regarded a security issue and a matter for the intelligence services, police and army. In particular, poor neighbourhoods were raided and intensely monitored, and many people, mostly men, who arrived on the city's outskirts were identified and registered. If they appeared on the lists of people being accused of participating in subversive activities, they were arrested.

The attempts by churches and local NGOs to organize 'internally displaced people' as a group of victims suffered from difficult conditions of security and from the compulsion to survive physically in an area with high surpluses of labour. In comparison with the internationally funded relief reaching the Guatemalan refugees, the resources channelled through local NGOs to IDPs were very limited. However, these provisions did provide the material kernel of organization in the Huancayo area, where family and community networks were mobilized around 'committees', soup kitchens and workshops. According to former participants in the emergency programmes, they used food as a kind of bait in order to overcome the cautious attitudes of prospective IDPs.

Committees of 'migrants from the zones of emergency' were set up in the mid-1980s, organized in much the same way as the formally recognized 'peasant communities,' although they had no access to land. They were indeed de-territorialized peasant communities who kept their records, agendas and communal treasure, to which all members contributed, as well as their paraphernalia of official recognition: mainly the stamp and the paginated record book. However, membership was not confined to the territorial communities 'of origin'; some had broader, albeit regionally defined constituencies, such as the sons of Ayacucho and the Christian Community. The activities of most of them were centred around a soup kitchen, but several managed to attract funds and assistance for minor artisan or agricultural projects.

Encouraged and assisted by local NGOs, the committees were joined together into a central organization, Jatarai Ayllu, which organized cultural festivals and demonstrations together with other popular organizations when conditions of security permitted this degree of visibility. They also arranged mass weddings in order to obtain the identity papers that many of their members had lost. At its height, the organization could mobilize several thousand individuals. Leaders were trained in organization and planning in order to take over responsibility for activities in the longer term. Nevertheless, the NGOs had serious problems with this enterprise. The committees did not work very well in either economic or organizational terms. The workshops tended to become 'personalized', and the participants did not display any understanding of 'the collective character of this activity' (SEPAR 1990: 10). In other words, the workshops carried on as private enterprises as soon as they became viable and no longer depended on NGO support for credits, training etc. After an NGO meeting in Huancayo in 1989, the participants concluded that 'it is hard to guarantee continuity, basically because of the need for permanent

subsidies, or *because of the inherent dispersion and instability of the migrants'* (ibid.: 18, my emphasis).

From the perspective of analysing mobile livelihoods, we may interpret the organization of the 'migrants from the zones of emergency' (later IDPs) as an attempt to fix them in manageable sites and structures. However, this attempt was jeopardized by the constant movement of the migrants, some moving because of the precarious conditions of security and housing, others because of wage labour elsewhere. They also engaged in a number of different economic and organizational activities within and outside the frameworks set up for them by the NGOs. In this respect, the relationship between the migrants and the popular/revolutionary movement was perceived as problematic by several of the NGOs: 'The multi-participation of migrants... could be an obstacle if they lose their identity as displaced, thereby jeopardizing their demanding attitude' (ibid.: 15–16).

Thus, from the NGOs' point of view, the stability and organization of the IDPs was necessary before they could become identified and recognized collectively as citizens of the state with special rights and entitlements as victims of the armed conflict. Since the IDP was a new concept and furthermore was deeply embedded in conflict-related representations, the government ignored the issue until international attention to the situation of IDPs in Peru increased in 1992–4.⁹ By then, the government had organized a programme of assistance for the repopulation of rural Peru, the PAR. The NGOs engaged in the construction of region- and nation-wide organizations of IDPs in order to strengthen the power of both the IDPs and themselves, working as brokers between the latter and the international donors.

In the words of representatives of Jatarai Ayllu, the international attention produced an 'organization fever', with copies of Jatarai Ayllu being organized in many places around the country.¹⁰ But it also produced the problem of policing the limits of the category, keeping people with 'illegitimate' claims from capturing resources for IDPs. IDP representatives, NGOs and the government agency set up for the 'repopulation' of rural Peru all engaged in this policing, fairly unsuccessfully as it happened (as described in Chapter 1). On the other hand, as organizations failed to produce substantial resources, the IDP organizations lost momentum from 1994–5. As of 1999 funds dried up, and the social 'base' was hard to identify and even harder to mobilize for practical purposes. In particular, young people were not represented in the organization. A small group of leaders remained, some of whom tried to make a political career out of their experience, their acquired leadership skills, and the claim to represent a segment of the Peruvian population.

Imagined return communities and the final move?

How, under these different sets of conditions, was 'return' imagined and organized by the returnees and the intervening agencies in the two cases?

Guatemala

In the camp environment, an abstract community of Guatemalan refugees found in the project a concrete expression of the 'organized and collective return' that was

launched by the Permanent Commissions (CCPP). The CCPP was an organization of representatives who were elected in all the settlements and camps in 1987 as a reaction to the official programme of voluntary repatriation. Mistrusting the will of the civilian government to secure their lives in a thoroughly militarized Guatemala, the CCPP insisted on a collective return under certain conditions. The CCPP campaign included a thorough registration of the land that the refugees had left in Guatemala, the land that the CCPP would work to recuperate.

The 'organized and collective return' was a hegemonic project in the refugee camps in the sense that it came to define the parameters and oppositions of the debates that were being articulated among the refugees. The goal was to obtain access to direct negotiations with the Guatemalan government in order to achieve an agreement which would guarantee their right to return collectively (i.e. in larger groups than demanded by the government) and to organize and move freely, their exemption from military service for three years, and access to their land. While these demands were met in the final agreement of 8 October 1992, the CCPP did not succeed in removing the army from the return areas, a demand that challenged the sovereignty of the government.

During their first years in exile, the refugees had construed a common past through the institutionalization of certain narratives that were elicited and appreciated by journalists and solidarity groups. These narratives emphasized the struggle of the poor for dignity, autonomy, democracy and material improvement. They struggled against the rich and their army, who tried to break the back of the indigent people and take over their land through the counterinsurgency programme that had caused the painful exodus from their beloved country, Guatemala.

With the conceptualization of the organized and collective return, the refugees began outlining a common future, another characteristic of the nation as an imagined community (Anderson 1991): 'We have to learn before returning to Guatemala. There, nobody will help us. We need our children to learn how to manage tractors, machinery . . . Here [in Mexico] it is possible to learn something, and with the projects there is no need to send our sons to build hotels'.¹¹ In sum, at the beginning of the 1990s, most of the refugees wanted to return or be repatriated to Guatemala. As a UNHCR spokesman said in 1996 in the midst of multiple returns: 'Here we facilitate returns, we do not [have to] promote returns' (Camacho and Aguilar 1997: 155). There is an implicit reference here to many other situations when UNHCR had the role of promoting repatriations, if not directly against the will of the refugees, then by pushing them hard in that direction, as dictated by the overall international refugee policy.¹²

The refugee category and the Mexican administration of this category contributed greatly to the formation of the organization for returnees by subjecting them to a number of formal restrictions in terms of movement, employment and land ownership. The frequent resettlements also had an effect. 'Here we always have to change our attitude [because of the unstable conditions]. To live on one's own land is different'. 'Outside of your home, a long way from your country, one has no rights. In Guatemala, wherever you go, no one can say that you're a stranger'. 'We are floating in the air, we have no land. We have to think about the

future so the children will not be lost when we die. We have to position our family in our own land (*tierra*).'¹³

In the discourses of the Guatemalan refugees, their attachment to their ancestral land and the importance of corn production for their identity has frequently been highlighted as the reason why they fought so bravely for their return (e.g. Hanlon 1999). Many leaflets on the Guatemalan refugees and their return represent them as culturally bound to return, 'culture' being depicted as the traditional attachment to the land. But as the above statements indicate, the will to return had as much, even more to do with the question of how to provide the political conditions of livelihood practices. Thus, for them, livelihood encompassed the right to move, the right to own land and to settle freely, and the security of a place to stay until you yourself decide to move: in short, mobile livelihoods.

Furthermore, while land may be important as linking people to the ancestors, the connection with the future seemed to preoccupy the older generation as well: 'Here in Mexico life is happy, there is food, there is work, but we cannot make progress: you cannot plant even the smallest tree because here we are *posados* [lodged on the land of others]'. Planting trees is not only a long-term strategy for diversifying livelihoods by investing in, for example, fruit and coffee production and hence to 'make progress'; it is also an important symbol of land ownership as opposed to the conditions on the private estates, where tenants were not allowed to 'plant things with roots'. This was, however, an imagination that was specific to the older generation. The younger generation were not necessarily keen to pursue agriculture as their main activity.

Between 1993 and 1999 more than twenty returns took place, with 300 to 2500 participants in each, all heading towards return settlements on former haciendas that had been purchased with funds from the international aid organizations.

Comparing collective returns in Peru¹⁴ and Guatemala

The bulk of collective returns in Peru were organized by PAR, the government agency (Programme for the Support of Repopulation), which had substantial international funding. PAR claimed to have assisted some 150,000 returnees from 1994 to 1998, but this figure was disputed by NGOs (USCR 1998), who also criticized the assistance for being inappropriate at times. The most obvious similarity between the Guatemalan and the Peruvian cases is the staging of public demonstrations. By organizing returns in a formal way and involving national or international authorities, the two return movements were inserted into a (trans-)national space that broadened the scope for alliances for the participants. This provided the necessary political space for negotiating livelihoods. In principle, at least, the returnees enhanced their own protection by being visible from afar. In the Guatemalan returns, UNHCR and the representatives of donors and transnational NGOs accompanied the process, together with government authorities.

The Peruvian returns, on the other hand, had much less international presence, if any. Several ministries, the mayors involved, the government's Human Rights office and the army were 'represented in the returns, together with the authorities

in the department of return. The latter were present in order to 'take over responsibility for the returning citizens'. Journalists and photographers from the national media were invited to magnify the impact of the return of 'victims of terrorism'.¹⁵ Thus, the public spectacle was designed not only to prove to the participants that they were being incorporated as full citizens but also as a national ritual of peace, reconstruction and repopulation, an expression of statecraft. This was 'the re-conquest of Peru's abandoned villages', as a general put it.¹⁶

While many procedures and items were standard, drawn from the vocabulary and guidelines of repatriations and resettlements across the world, the recruitment of returnees in Peru was different from the Guatemalan case. First, Peruvian returnee groups often did not emerge from within pre-existing IDP organizations unless local NGOs working with these organizations were in charge of the return; PAR, the state programme, did not co-operate with either NGOs or IDP organizations. The leaders who took the initiative in organizing a return had to localize and mobilize potential participants through networks of people from their district, who were living dispersed in neighbourhoods in and around Huancayo. Secondly, while the authorities in Guatemala accepted Guatemalan returnees by virtue of their refugee status, the Peruvian authorities undertook a screening of those listed in order to verify their claims to be displaced persons. In both cases, the returnees had to go through a major medical check-up before departure.

The negotiated accord between the returnees and the government, which in the Guatemalan case strengthened their position and entitlements considerably, constitutes the main difference between the two cases. Peruvian returnees did refer to 'the law of return', but this 'law' in its turn referred to the vague formulations in the constitution of PAR, the government programme. While returnees in both cases had access to relief provisions, the Guatemalan refugees were privileged, since the negotiated accords and international support gave them access to credits for land purchases. They were also assisted in organizing productive projects that would help them pay back the loans. The Peruvian returnees were not guaranteed any development projects, but they were assured that the presence of returnees in a community would improve their chances of being targeted by government assistance programmes, now that the authorities had visited them and knew about the condition their communities were in.

Another difference is fundamental for the ways in which collectivity and individuality were framed in the two cases. The Guatemalan refugees had not been able to maintain close relationships with their communities and thus uphold communal entitlements, not so much because of the international border – which represented a minor obstacle – but because of the organization of civil patrols in their home regions, where they would have been treated as subversives if identified. On the other hand, the negotiated return gave them the option of returning to segregated return settlements, where they formed co-operatives and organized production and settlements from scratch.

For the Peruvian returnees, return to their 'communities of origin' was the only option: there was no provision or official support for their negotiating access to

land and pastures, which had often been taken over by fellow *comuneros* and adolescents, who had grown up since they left. In some cases, returnees repopulated abandoned villages, which, of course, provided a different set of dynamics to the situation,¹⁷ but in the region under study, all villages of return had residents who had resisted, or at least maintained membership as *comuneros*, during the armed conflict.

Returnees and the others

Despite the fact that the situations of return in Guatemala and Peru were different in several respects, there were striking similarities when it comes to the ways in which the returnees imagined their return, their new links with the community of origin, and the differences between themselves and 'the others'. The others were either those who stayed, or those who returned independently before the moment of official return. In the Guatemalan case, the neighbours of the return settlement were often labelled 'the patrollers', while in Peru they were just known as *comuneros* or community members.

In any case, the returnees were very outspoken about the changes they had gone through while away. One of the Guatemalan returnees, Isabel, described the changes in this way: 'Well, I think that, thanks to the refuge, we turned out very nice, we learned to write and other things, we learned how to live in the world. If we were the same (as before) we wouldn't think of returns, we wouldn't think about doing nice things, we wouldn't know anything. If Isabel were still in the village, she would be the same. We have changed. We became experienced in Mexico.' It is as if she describes the birth of a modern subject, conscious of its own power to change, to transform not only herself but also the others and the environment, to make plans and projects, and to make them succeed. The official position of the returnees was to share the benefits of what they had learned while in exile, where the NGOs and other institutions had trained health and dental promoters, human rights promoters, and so forth.

Likewise, among the internally displaced in Peru who returned home, there was a sense of being able to contribute to the development of the community: 'We came to this place with one sole objective, to bring development. We did not come to murder, to mistreat, or to invade. As the (PAR) engineer says, the community that has returnees has support'. The returnees saw themselves as innovators with ideas about developing a more productive race of sheep by crossbreeding the small Andino sheep with the imported Hampshire sheep, they showed an interest in the latest technology of stock-raising 'from the most advanced countries', and they speculated about how to develop new crops and other products for export. In this sense, they no longer considered themselves just *campesinos*; rather, they saw themselves as following the neo-liberal trend in becoming farmers or even *empresarios* involved in international trade.

This self-identification with development is linked to their characterization of 'the others', of 'those who stayed', as less developed. Without going into details here, in both cases the returnees' stereotyping emphasizes the following traits: 'the

others' are violent, uneducated, unable to organize properly, immobile, ignorant, destructive of resources and the ecological balance, and unable to change themselves or forge any change in the community. In short, the returnees have adopted the constructions of social mobility found in development discourses and combined them with their own constructions of geographical mobility. This makes it possible for them to imagine themselves as the leaders, brokers and innovators of the community with respect to their experience of movement (Stepputat and Sørensen 1999).

Moving on: Dismantling collective livelihoods

Given the different conditions for the formation of a collective subject 'in refuge' in Peru and Mexico, the forms and problems of resettlement differ. The Peruvian return was framed by the village or district community, with a high degree of continuity between past and present. The Guatemalan return, on the other hand, brought people from different regions, ethnic groups and municipalities together in one return settlement. But the dynamic of relations between the collectivity and individual livelihood practices is nevertheless a common and very explicit subject of debate among returnees in both cases.

'New hope' and old livelihood practices in Guatemala

When, in 1994, two hundred returnee families took over the former cattle ranch of Chaculá, close to the Mexican border, they discussed what name to give their new home. *Colonia Nueva Esperanza* was agreed on, since it symbolized the utopian enterprise of the collective return. The Mexican word for an urban neighbourhood, *colonia*, signalled the inclusive, multiethnic, urban character of the new settlement, and distinguished it from the monoethnic and rural 'village' community or *aldea*. The vision was to found a 'peasant settlement' with an urban layout, but with more space between the houses, for intensive agricultural use. Production-wise, the idea was to construct an industrialized 'peasant enterprise' for the co-operative exploitation of the land, cattle and forest. At the local level, the settlement was supposed to be a model of alternative modernity, with autonomous government, new forms of production and organization, promotion of Human Rights in a militarized area, and initiatives for regional organization for improvements at the level of infrastructure and services. A secondary (board) school, the first one outside the municipal capital, was planned, and leaders envisioned the founding of a 'peasant university' in the settlement.

The intricate organization of the co-operative and the settlement, the centralized control of the common property, the generous (but short-lived) international funding and the technical support were intended to enable the returnees to make a living without having to engage in labour migration. Migration was considered by the leadership, their advisors and the aid agencies to be inimical to the welfare of the population. While resounding with the older generation's 'peasant utopia', which developed in reaction to a century of enforced migrant labour on the lowland

plantations, the younger generation had different ambitions and connections. In particular the young men were keen to explore possibilities in Mexico and the US.

Several years later, the popular name of the settlement was still Chaculá, and the 'new hope' had faded considerably. The co-operative enterprise was in deep trouble, not least because many members actively resisted the co-operative. After two years, 20 per cent of households had left the settlement for good, most of them returning to their former villages. Unpaid labour obligations had been reduced, and high degrees of absenteeism were forcing many aid projects – construction works, reforestation, shops, herding etc – to hire on the basis of salaries. The 'private' land that had been granted by the co-operative to individual households had grudgingly been extended from 0.4 to 2.8 hectares. This reduced the possibilities for large-scale collective enterprises, but individual households were eagerly pursuing individual corn and coffee production. Those who were able to recover their access to communal land in the former village community shared their labour between Chaculá and these villages. As relief provisions dwindled, many men returned to Mexico for temporary work, though this was the general condition of the rural population in the area of return.

The progressive relaxation of the central control of common resources was very similar to the process that the refugees had gone through in Mexico. The recovery of household autonomy seems to have coincided with the reductions in relief supplies in both cases, a process that forced households to secure and control livelihoods by any means possible. Refugees had certainly gained new capacities in the areas of negotiation, organization, book-keeping, project management and human rights, but these were not necessarily helpful in a region with poor communications and meagre resources, limited purchasing power and no employment opportunities. Most of the returnees did not manage specific knowledge of land, vegetation or the microclimate, nor did they have the technical skills necessary to set up industrialized forms of production.

One difference between the processes of individualization of the late 80s and the 90s was the position of women. As has been widely observed, the conditions of camp life may well give the women more control over household resources relative to men, due to the mode of relief provision. In the case of Guatemalan younger women in exile, they also had the opportunity to become literate and learn Spanish in the multiethnic environment of the camps. The communal tasks gave them a chance to become more familiar with public appearances and leadership.¹⁸ This obviously challenged gender relations 'at the heart of the family'. To many women, 'learning to deal with the husband' was the major challenge in exile (Crosby 1999: 185). Back in Guatemala, however, women did not become members of the co-operative, and male leaders even harassed the women's organizations (Krznaric 1997).

Recovering community and land in Peru?

The transnational space of action and vision, generated through the internationally supported IDP concept, helped the Peruvian returnees re-establish themselves

in the 'communities of origin'. The frequent reference to 'the Law of Return' illustrates the air of powerful authorization behind the returns, and, as government representatives and returnees argued, 'In Peru, people are free to settle wherever they want to'. If required, police officers accompanied the returnees and stayed with them for a few days, and the return officer made follow-up visits to see if provisions had reached the communities. In one case of acute conflict between returnees and *comuneros*, the government official mediated and drew up an act of reconciliation: 'This act is a transaction with the intervention of the State and the National Police, it is not just an ordinary act. It is an act about a return (which is) organized and supported by the State.'¹⁹

Thus, arrival and reception still took place within the purview of government institutions, and the ideology of community supported the idea of return and reintegration. According to the *comuneros*, the returnees were, after all, 'sons of the community', and they remarked, 'We shall all work as one single man'.²⁰ Hence, the returnees were welcome to find somewhere to live in the 'urban zone', but only if they could prove that they were 'truly sons' of the community, that is, by contributing to the progress of the place, would they become members of the community. Thus, beyond the arrival and the relief provisions, some of which benefited the entire community, improvements depended on negotiations with the community on one side and state institutions on the other.

Since the returnees did not have access to land or official backing to recover land or communal pasture, their bargaining position as a collective enterprise was limited in the (many) cases in which the returnees did not constitute the majority of the community. They depended on the strategy of *ganarse el cariño*, 'winning the love' of the community, as they expressed it.²¹ In the cases observed, the returnees did not have immediate access to the commons. Often, their own agricultural land had been taken over by members of their own family. Given the cost and inconvenience of taking these cases to court, returnees would usually refrain from pursuing recovery.

As for the communal pasture, a *de facto* parcelling of plots had taken place since the early 80s, when most of the returnees left. Formerly, access to the common pasture was conditioned by presence in and membership of the peasant community. Several arrangements existed that gave newcomers or newly established households the possibility to raise their own herds of sheep, llamas and alpaca by taking care of the herds of well-to-do pastoralists in the community.²² But as population and herds have grown, families have come to occupy well-defined tracts of pasture more permanently, with members of the community, whether resident in the village or the city, dividing the commons among themselves. However, the formal privatization of the commons was on the neo-liberal government's agenda during the 90s. Peasant communities were in the process of deciding for themselves whether to privatize or not, a process which was accelerated by the returns. In one returnee community, the highly unequal *de facto* distribution of the pasture opened up possible alliances between the returnees and poorer *comuneros* directed against the (rich) leaders who were pressing for privatization. The poorer section voted for the entry of the returnees.

To a large extent, the return is permeated by a myth, the myth that the state, the NGOs and 'the Nations' will provide some miraculous solution to their problems of generating a livelihood in the countryside. As one of the leaders of a return group asked us during the preparations: 'Can you give us advice as to what to do the day after our return?' The leader of a successful return operation recalled his experience after one year in a few words: 'We were wrong. The reality of the village shocked us.' Most returnees gave up after a few weeks and went back to the city and the migration circuits. A few single mothers had benefited from family obligations to allow new families to raise their own herds by herding the family's animals. Even those who had become *comuneros* depended mainly on continued mobile livelihood practices.

Thus, the collectivity of the return is only momentary. Returnee leaders may retain the group as their personal constituencies if they prove to be successful in negotiations over land, pasture or (income-generating) 'projects' for the returnees. But they are more likely to become integrated into the communal leadership or circuits of *residentes*, mainly urban-based 'sons of the community' with a political or exclusively symbolic relationship to the peasant community. The returnees in question did not see themselves as part of an 'abstract community of return' in Peru that would support their progress in practical terms.

Conclusions

Probably, more than any other disruptive event, the conditions of violent conflict tend to invigorate the control of territory and mobility on the part of local, national and insurgent authorities. Since spatial movement becomes a security issue within as much as across international borders, the stakes at play in regard to mobility are magnified. Therefore, mobility becomes more difficult, to a point where people may be either immobilized or effectively excluded from certain spaces, such as their own houses or land.²³ This spatial regime has severe consequences for people's livelihoods, whether they stay 'in place', 'take refuge' somewhere or they remain on the move and endure the risks involved. I suggest coining the notion of 'displaced livelihoods' to conceptualize the disruptions wrought upon existing livelihoods by the introduction of (new) delimitations in spatial mobility. The focus on spatial mobility justifies the use of a spatial metaphor – displacement – even in cases where people are immobilized. The 'displaced livelihood,' then, becomes a particular form of mobile livelihood, a form that is common but not exclusive to violent conflicts.

The cases of Peru and Guatemala/Mexico provide a plethora of examples of displaced livelihoods. Pastoralists cannot take their sheep to market without being heavily taxed on the way there. People cannot obtain access to non-local stables unless they can afford the outrageous charges for them. It becomes impossible, expensive or extremely risky to leave for migrant labour or regular education elsewhere – or to come back for the harvest or to re-secure local entitlements. Long-distance control of land and other localized resources becomes difficult or impossible. The households' combination of urban and rural livelihood practices

is undercut, and new practices have to be developed. Even the spatial regimes of humanitarian assistance (to refugees, IDPs and returnees) tend to reproduce displaced livelihoods, either by denying the receivers the means and rights of mobility, or by regarding mobility as inappropriate and thereby de-legitimizing their claims to special victim status.

Although the concept of a 'displaced livelihood' does not distinguish between 'those who left' and 'those who stayed behind', the present chapter has focused on two cases of the displacement and collective return of people who are usually classified as belonging to different categories of victim, namely refugees and IDPs. The distinctive characteristic of the refugee camps in Mexico was the seclusion and all-encompassing organization of everyday life. Resources provided to the refugees were on a very different scale compared to those for the IDPs, including houses, land, schools, clinics, transportation, food and workshops, with a high degree of corporate, autonomous organization of everyday life. The UNHCR and the Mexican government shared a kind of negotiated sovereignty, the government being the '(step-)father' and the UN the incarnation of some higher justice to whom to appeal. Together they provided the framework within which refugee representatives controlled sanctions, type of organization and the distribution of resources. Still, households had a great deal of room for manoeuvre, and over time the authorities had to relax the corporate control of activities under pressure from collective insubordination.

In the case of Peru, those who fled the violence melted into the networks of marginal neighbourhoods, although those who looked or talked like people from the south (Ayacucho or Huancavelica) experienced discrimination. While many (especially men) were monitored individually, IDPs were not singled out as a particular subject of governance but were treated by the authorities as belonging to dangerous, marginal neighbourhoods. When people began to organize around soup kitchens on the basis of their experience of violence, displacement and/or discrimination, the organizations had little control over resources or the activities of individual members.

The NGOs that supported the organization of IDPs deplored the lack of stability and collectivity. According to other NGOs that argued against exclusive support for the 'displaced', '[s]ome NGOs used the Central American refugee experience to argue their case for them, and gave the *desplazados* the idea that they should have their own schools, their own hospitals, their own land, just like the refugees in their camps and the repatriated in their settlements'.²⁴ While this may be a caricature of their opponents, the refugee camp is but one version of 'asylums' and 'total institutions' that embody the double functions of 'care and control' in the name of a higher cause or reason. In the case of the IDPs, the framing – the modern and corporate ordering of their lives (Mitchell 1988) – did not take the form of a spatially segregated camp. Rather, the IDPs were to be framed in an organization with offices, workshops, leadership, secretaries and donor support, which could encompass and stabilize their livelihoods. In this way, they would stay in (one) place and be able to form a new political subject with national leverage.

The two returns may be compared by means of de Certeau's (1984) distinction between strategies and tactics, and in particular between strategic and tactical movement. The collective returns are strategic in the sense that they rely heavily on visualizing and textualizing techniques which render the move highly visible, controllable, and relatively well known to a broad national and international audience. One important enabling element in this strategic and collective movement is the existence of internationally defined categories of 'unstable' populations that have been given certain rights to be represented *vis-à-vis* national and international institutions. This, in principle, enhances security by mobilizing (inter)national conventions and institutions.

If we turn to the question of how these categories are filled in by the movers themselves, we may note that both situations of return rely on the mobilization of the resource of 'organization' in order to enhance security and change both the sites *and* forms of livelihood practices – in other words, to orchestrate new beginnings for people caught on the move. Encounters and negotiations of livelihood spaces in the sites of return take place within an institutional framework that is authorized from afar. Thus, the places of return are effectively placed on the maps of public institutions.

These strategic techniques, rendering movement visible and constructing 'proper' and stable places from where the environment can be controlled, have usually been considered part of the inventory of states. However, the returnees have appropriated these techniques and the inherent advantages of being seen and known by states and media. Having been either excluded in a camp or deprived of a proper place from where they can claim citizenship, the returnees seem to strive to become recognized as belonging to particular places. It is evident that their understanding of good lives comprises the right to move, as well as access to a proper place of belonging.

Nevertheless, the two cases display important differences. In the Guatemalan case, the collectivity of the return movement draws upon an abstract community, a politically defined, national subject, which became embodied in ethnically mixed settlements of returnees. In the Peruvian case, the collectivity draws primarily on place-bound communities, that is, on collectivities that are defined in terms of particular lineages and a particular place as the common frame of reference. On the other hand, 'internally displaced persons' as a collective and politically potent subject rapidly fades away. This difference is owed, I suggest, to the weaker status of the category of the IDPs relative to the refugee, which relates to issues of national sovereignty and the international governance of mobility. The spatial segregation of refugees in particular camps and settlements, and the strong international support for their return, seem to be the strongest reasons for the difference between the two cases. In both cases, however, the collectivity relies on a celebrated inventory of communitarian practices and ethics.

In contrast to the above description of strategic movement and containment, tactical movement implies individual, unruly or unspectacular movement. This is the kind of spatial mobility that defies control in the villages or camps, on the roads or in the cities, the mobility that questions the legitimacy of the beneficiaries

of assistance and elicits the wrath of authorities. We may also contrast the visible, collective returns with tactical moves involving informal negotiations which are commonly used by people who incorporate new sites and spaces in their livelihood practices or move altogether from one site to another. This kind of movement is often sequential, that is, it comprises many moves back and forth in order to build up alliances and resources in new (or old) places without burning one's bridges. Alliances and access to resources are negotiated along lines of patron-client relationships, family ties, friendships or customary labour-exchange relations.

With regard to the strategic/tactical distinction, the final observation to make is the importance of the overlaps and interactions between these different domains of negotiated movement. It is a case not of 'either-or', but rather of 'both-and'. This is obvious in both cases, although the tactics are much more prevalent in the Peruvian case, due to the weakness of the institutional framework, rights and entitlements of IDPs. In the Guatemalan case, the tactics of individual households contribute to the undermining of the collectivity as defined by the 'organized and collective return'. In any case, neither places of refuge nor places of return imply any absolute fixity or immobile livelihood. Rather, they constitute points of departure for negotiating new sorts of mobile livelihood.

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Notes

- 1 Richmond 1993; van Hear 1998; Crisp 1999; Stepputat and Sørensen 1999.
- 2 The article is based on several periods of fieldwork in Mexico (1988, 1990, 1994), Guatemala (1993, 1994-5, 1996) and Peru (1998, 1999, 2000). Fieldwork in Peru was undertaken in co-operation with Ninna Nyberg Sørensen.
- 3 Appadurai (1993: 419) has described the global refugee regime as a permanent structure of an emerging post-national order, but this is highly debatable, since, for example, UNHCR may be seen as doing the job of (some) national government in order to uphold the national order of things (Mallki 1992; Hyndman 2000).
- 4 See for example Cohen 1998.
- 5 See Foucault 1977; de Certeau 1984; Mitchell 1988.
- 6 Hernandez *et al.* 1993; see also Burns 1993; Hagan 1994.
- 7 Interview, Campeche, October 1988.
- 8 There is a long history in Latin America of linking the image of the devil to wage labour on plantations, down the mines and the like (Taussig 1980).
- 9 Among others, ICVA (the International Committee of Voluntary Agencies) and the representative of the UN Secretary General, Francis Deng, visited Peru in this period.
- 10 Interviewed in April 1999.
- 11 Interview with representative, Campeche, November 1988.

- 12 Chimni 1999. In the late 1980s, many refugees in Mexico perceived a push to return since HCR was continuously forced to reduce their budgets.
- 13 Excerpts from interviews undertaken in Chiapas in 1994.
- 14 See Sørensen, this volume, for further details of Peruvian returns. In this chapter, the emphasis is on the similarities and differences between the two cases.
- 15 The newspapers represented were sympathetic to the Fujimori government.
- 16 Quotes from the return to San Martín, Acobambilla in 1999.
- 17 See, for example, Wilson 1997; Coronel 1999; Gamarra 1999.
- 18 See North and Simmons 1999; Torres 1999; Crosby 1999.
- 19 Field notes, May 1999.
- 20 These expressions were repeated on several occasions in different communities.
- 21 See also Carla Tamagna, this volume.
- 22 See, for example, Smith 1989.
- 23 See also Stepputat and Sørensen 1999.
- 24 Field notes, April 1999.

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