

DIIS REPORT

**STRENGTHENING AFRICAN SECURITY
CAPACITIES**

RESEARCH PROJECT ON HOW DENMARK CAN
MAKE A DIFFERENCE IN STRENGTHENING
AFRICAN REGIONAL SECURITY ORGANISATIONS

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Africa Programme for Peace	APP
African Crisis Response Initiative	ACRI
African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance	ACOTA
African Standby Force	ASF
African Union	AU
British Military Advisory and Training Teams	BMATT
Democratic Republic of Congo	DRC
Economic Community of West African States	ECOWAS
Intergovernmental Authority on Development	IGAD
Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development	IGADD
Institute for Security Studies, South Africa	ISS
Organization of African Unity	OAU
Peace and Security Council	PSC
Peace Facility for Africa	PFA
Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre	RPTC
Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix	RECAMP
South African Development Community	SADC
Southern African Defence and Security Management network	SADSEM
Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference	SADCC
United Nations	UN
United Nations Institute for Training and Research	UNITAR
United Nations Security Council	UNSC

Abstract

This report will examine how Denmark can make a significant difference strengthening the security mechanisms of the African regional organisations in the next two years of its expected UN Security Council membership. The starting point is that Denmark in order to achieve this aim has to narrow its ambitious scope of the Africa Programme for Peace and focus the assistance on the organisations and the areas where it can fastest make the most difference. Based on an analysis of the comparative capacities of the individual organisations and the assistance of the major donors, it will be concluded that Denmark in order to make a difference in the short term should prioritise support for the security mechanisms of ECOWAS as the most efficient of the sub-regional organisations and IGAD as the least developed sub-regional organisation with most potential to make a difference in the short term. Further, the support for the security mechanisms should focus on conflict prevention as a less expensive and more effective tool to create stability than peace-keeping and -enforcement training.

Introduction

Since the US withdrew their troops from Somalia in the spring of 1994, the international community has been reluctant to intervene in conflicts on the African continent. Thus, despite the recent boost in UN peace-keeping troops employed in Africa, there is a growing gap between the reluctance of the Western community to employ its troops in Africa and the need for military intervention in the region.¹ Consequently, it has been generally recognised that there have to be African solutions to African problems.² In line with this approach, the G8 countries have just launched a substantial initiative to strengthen the capacity of the African regional organisations to engage in conflict prevention and conflict management operations.³ The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also committed itself to strengthen the African capacity to maintain regional security through its *Africa Programme for Peace* (APP) tied to a budget of 248 million DKK over the next five years.⁴ This constitutes a major initiative by the Danish government and has a potential to make a difference for the capacity of African region regional security. In support of the expected Danish membership of the UN Security Council in 2005, this project clarifies where Denmark can use the programme to profile itself by making a significant difference to improve African security capacities within the two years term of the expected UN Security Council membership. The starting point for the analysis is that Denmark will have to focus its assistance in order to achieve this aim. Two criteria will determine how to focus: 1) the Danish assistance should prioritise the organisations where it will have the greatest impact. 2) The Danish assistance should make a difference in comparison with other donors.

Analytical approach

The analysis will be structured around the two criteria so that the first part will analyse and compare the capacities of the main African regional and sub-regional security organisations: the AU (African Union), ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), SADC (Southern African Development Community) and IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) in order to

¹ International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2004.

² International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2004.

³ Chiahemmen, 2004.

⁴ See Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004.

assess which of the organisations it will be most efficient to support. The second part will describe the main weaknesses of the African regional organisations and compare them to the efforts undertaken by the international community to support African regional organisations. This account will create the basis for an analysis of the areas where Denmark most efficiently can engage to strengthen African regional security organisations. The analysis will conclude by recommending which organisations and what areas the Danish support should focus on to make a difference in the short term.

The analysis of the African regional security organisations will distinguish between structural and operational weaknesses. The structural factors are made up by the environment in which these organisations operate and concern issues such as democracy, human rights, and good governance etc. These factors affect the institutional and operational capacity of the security organisations to function effectively, yet strengthening these is a long term goal which is incorporated into the Foreign Ministry's action plan for development aid "*A World of Difference*". The operational factors, on the other hand, deal with the practical capacity of the organisations to conduct conflict prevention and crisis management operations. They can as such be improved through concrete measures as a short term goal. These factors will therefore be the focus of this project.

Terminology

The analysis requires a definition of how to measure the capacity of a security mechanism of a regional organisation to engage in conflict prevention and crisis management operations. Further, it is necessary to define the different phases of these operations.

Three factors are in this analysis set up to measure the capacity of the regional organisations to successfully engage in conflict prevention and management operations: the *political willingness* to undertake the operations, *the institutional strength* to organise and implement them, and the *resources* available for the operations.

- Evidently, the *political willingness* of the member states of the relevant organisations to intervene in conflicts determines whether conflict prevention and management operations will be implemented in the first place. The political willingness is in this context measured by the proven willingness of the organisation's members to engage in peace operations to solve the conflicts of the sub-region in the past. In practice, the nature of the conflict will determine

whether there is a perceived need for a military intervention or other less forcible measures will suffice. In this context, however, the related willingness to intervene militarily in conflicts serves as the major indication of the political commitment to engage in peace operations.

- The *institutional strength* of the organisation determines the ability of states to communicate and cooperate and thereby act through the organisation. The institutional strength of the organisation depends on the degree to which the norms are shared by the members of the organisations such as rules of behaviour, decision-making procedures, and operating procedures; the extent to which these are specified in rules for the organisation; and the ability of the organisation to act through these institutions. In this context the institutional strength is measured first by the level of inclusion of the members states in decision-making process and the implementation of these decisions. On a practical level, the institutional strength is measured by the amount and quality of the institutions and staff employed to manage the organisation and implement these tasks.
- Finally, the organisations need resources to implement the operations. These are measured by the relative amount of logistics and finances available for the operations. It is not possible to obtain exact numbers for the logistics and resources available for each organisation. Instead an estimate will be made based on an aggregate of the military expenditures and troops of the individual member states.

Obviously, these three factors are interdependent. The fact that a region in total has a high military spending does not in itself enable it to implement peace operations. On the contrary, only in combination with a high level of institutionalisation of the regional organisation will the member states channel their military activities through the regional organisation.

The analysis of the capacity for conflict prevention and management operations are for reasons of clarity divided into five separate – yet in practice overlapping – phases: *conflict prevention, peace-enforcement, peace-keeping, peace-making and peace-building*.⁵

⁵ Adapted from UK Ministry of Defence, 1998:§ 101. NATO uses these terms also. UN terminology is very similar, see United Nations, 1992:§ 20-59; and the relevant entries in United Nations, 1998.

- *Conflict prevention*: activities normally conducted under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. These activities range from diplomatic initiatives to preventative deployments of forces intended to prevent disputes from escalating into armed conflicts or from spreading. Thus, at the one end of the scale conflict prevention can include fact-finding missions, consultation, warnings, inspections and monitoring. At the other end, conflict prevention can involve preventive deployment of forces possessing sufficient deterrence capabilities to avoid a conflict.
- *Peace-enforcement*: operations are coercive in nature and undertaken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter when the consent of one or more of the parties to the conflict is uncertain. These operations are designed to maintain and re-establish peace or enforce the terms specified in the mandate. Two main types of enforcement operations have evolved: enforcement of existing peace agreements, which most often does not involve large-scale offensive operations and enforcement aimed at stopping/undoing acts of aggression, which does require it.
- *Peace-keeping*: operations generally undertaken under Chapter VI of the UN Charter by means of military employment with the consent of the major parties to a conflict, to monitor and facilitate the implementation of a peace agreement.
- *Peace-making*: covers the diplomatic activities conducted after the commencement of a conflict aimed at establishing a ceasefire or rapid peaceful settlement. They can include the provision of good offices, mediation, conciliation, diplomatic pressure, isolation and sanctions.
- *Peace-building*: aims to prevent a relapse into violent conflict by setting up the conditions for a stable peace.⁶ This includes mechanisms to identify and support structures which tend to consolidate peace, advance a sense of confidence and well being, and support economic reconstruction. Peace-building also includes disarmament and demobilisation and consequent repatriation and reintegration. The major part of post-conflict peace-building deals, however, with the structural factors entailed in the democratisation of state

⁶ Møller, 2001.

and society.⁷ Peace-building will therefore not be included in this project which focuses on the short term factors.

⁷ See definition of UN peacemaking and peace-building in United Nations, 2004a.

The African regional organisations' security mechanisms

The analysis focuses on the security aspects of the four major African organisations: the AU, ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD. These organisations are the most important regional/sub-regional organisations on the African continent, and they all have some kind of peace operation experience.⁸ Hence, the four organisations are all chosen as targets for the *Danish Africa Programme for Peace 2004-2009*. This section will give a short introduction to the security mechanisms of the four organisations followed by an evaluation of their individual capacities based on the determinants presented above.

The African Union (AU) was established in 2002 as an attempt to overcome the deadlock of its predecessor – the Organization of African Unity (OAU). To achieve this aim, the AU has established a Peace and Security Council modelled on the UN Security Council with two important exceptions. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) does not have permanent membership reflecting the power balance of the continent. In this regard, the Council replicates the weaknesses of the League of Nations rather than the strength of the UN. The PSC also has a mandate to intervene in intra-state conflicts in the case of grave circumstances such as war crimes, genocides and crimes against humanity, and also at the request of a member state (art 4 j and k). This option strengthens the PSC's ability to intervene in conflicts on the African continent, yet at the potential risk of conflicting with the principle of sovereignty in international law upheld by the UN Security Council. The ambition of the Peace and Security Council is to promote activities aimed at conflict prevention, peace-enforcement and keeping, as well as peace-building.⁹ The tools established for the achievement of this objective are: a Panel of the Wise, a Commission, an Early Warning System, a Special Peace Fund and an African Standby Force.¹⁰

In practice, however, the logistical and institutional capacity to conduct conflict prevention and management operations resides with sub-regional organisations.

⁸ See International Peace Academy, 2002a; 2002c.

⁹ African Union, 2004.

¹⁰ Assembly of the African Union, 2002: Art. 2.

These are supposed to constitute the building blocks of the overall security structure of the AU. Consequently, the African standby force, proposed by the AU to be established by 2010, is to be created through sub-regional organisations.¹¹ The AU will instead take the role of an umbrella organ set to harmonise and coordinate the activities of the different organisations as well as provide a mandate for the peace operations.¹² This role is equivalent to the role taken by the UN in relation to regional security organisations such as OSCE in Europe and OAS in the Americas. Therefore, the analysis of the sub-regional organisations focuses on the operational capacity in implementing the different phases of conflict prevention and management, whereas the analysis of the AU focuses primarily on its institutional capacity.

Each of the African sub-regional organisations defines its role as a security organisation covering all the relevant aspects of the conflict prevention and management activities presented above. The ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) established in 1975 has set up the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security in 1997.¹³ In the area of conflict prevention ECOWAS commits itself to strengthen cooperation on conflict prevention, early warning through observation and monitoring, enforcement of sanctions, and preventive deployment. In the area of peace-enforcement and peace-keeping, ECOWAS intends to establish a standby force for preventive deployment, peace-enforcement and peace-keeping as part of the ASF. Finally, ECOWAS endeavours to engage in the various arenas of post-conflict peace-building operations.¹⁴

SADC (Southern African Development Community) dates back to 1992 where it replaced the SADCC (Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference) from 1980. The decision to establish the Organ for Defence, Politics and Security was taken in 1996, but the implementation thereof was delayed till 2001 due to internal rivalry between Zimbabwe and South Africa. The Organ aims to engage itself in peace operations to prevent, contain, and resolve inter- and intra-state conflicts. These efforts include preventive diplomacy and an early warning system. Like ECOWAS in East Africa, SADC is the sub-regional

¹¹ African Union, 2004.

¹² African Union, 2004.

¹³ Berman & Sams, 2000.

¹⁴ ECOWAS, 1999.

framework organisation for the establishment of the Southern African Standby Brigade under the ASF.¹⁵

IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) is centred on the Horn of Africa. Its name changed from IGADD (Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development) which was formed in 1986 and started its mediation efforts in Somalia in 1991.¹⁶ IGAD like its neighbour organisations aims to develop its own capacity for preventing, managing, and resolving conflicts. In the area of conflict prevention it has set up CEWARN – a conflict early warning and early response mechanism. In addition, it intends to set up a standby force – Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) for preventive deployment, peace-enforcement and peace-keeping missions as part of the African Standby Force (ASF). Finally, it aims to develop capacity in post-conflict peace-building.¹⁷

These are all ambitious goals which the respective organisations face serious difficulties in fulfilling in practice. There are, however, vast differences between the relative capacities of the individual organisations. ECOWAS is the most developed of the three with conflict prevention and peace-making experience from Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau among others, and peace-enforcement and peace-keeping experience from Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau.¹⁸ SADC is less developed, yet the member states have experience from military interventions in Lesotho and DRC. IGAD is the least developed with experience in peace-making from Sudan and Somalia only. AU/OAU was the first of the organisations to intervene militarily in conflicts in 1980 (Chad) but has since then only had experience in peace-keeping/-enforcement from Burundi¹⁹ and its current missions in DRC and Darfur in Sudan.

¹⁵ Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004.

¹⁶ Berman & Sams, 2000.

¹⁷ IGAD, 2001.

¹⁸ Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004.

¹⁹ Berman & Sams, 2000.

Capacities of the African regional organisations

In order to determine on which of the organisations the Danish assistance will have the greatest impact, this part will evaluate the relative capacities of the individual organisations. This will be based on an analysis of the relative capacities of the individual organisations as determined by the indicators set up in the introduction: *political willingness, institutional strength and resources*. The analysis will conclude in an evaluation of how to prioritise the Danish assistance between the organisations.

Political willingness

As argued the political willingness of the organisations is primarily defined by the proven willingness to intervene in conflicts. This should be evaluated by a comparison of the type of interventions with the amount and level of conflicts in the region as depicted in the text box 1 listing the conflicts of each sub-region Table 1. The list of conflicts counts all the conflicts on the African continent from 1990 and until 2002, including the current active conflicts. The security mechanisms of the individual sub-regional organisations were only established in the last half of the 1990's. The security mechanism of the OAU has, however, been active since the 1980's. Therefore, in order to give an adequate picture of the willingness of the organisations to intervene in conflicts, the list counts the number of conflicts from 1990 and forward.²⁰

As shown in Textbox 1 West Africa has been torn by war throughout the 1990's. The stability of the region is currently threatened by two active conflicts in Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire. ECOWAS has since the establishment of its security mechanism in 1997 experienced intrastate war in six of its member states. The organisation has responded to the instability of the region with nine diplomatic efforts at conflict prevention and peace-making operations, and five military interventions in the form of peace-keeping and peace-enforcement. ECOWAS has thereby shown the greatest political willingness of all the regional organisations in Africa to intervene in conflicts (see Table 2). This indicates that, despite divergences of goals and strategies between the different member states,²¹ the

²⁰ The data is collected from Strand, Wilhemsen & Gleditsch, 2004.

²¹ Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004.

Table I: Types of Intervention:

<i>Type of intervention</i>	<i>Mediation</i>	<i>Small observer missions</i>	<i>Major military operations</i>
AU	>19	>100	2*
ECOWAS	>9	Several missions	5
SADC	6	-	2
IGAD	2	1	-

Source: The numbers are primarily taken from *Africa Programme for Peace*. The numbers marked by a * are taken from Berman (2004). *Mediation* and *small observer missions* covers peace missions within the field of conflict prevention and peace-making. The difference between the two is that while the first only include diplomatic effort, the latter involves intervention of smaller observer missions most of which are unarmed. Finally, *major military interventions* include peace-enforcement or peace-keeping missions.

Textbox I: List of conflicts by region:

<p>ECOWAS</p> <p>Wars</p> <p>Liberia 1990-present</p> <p>Cote d'Ivoire 2002-present</p> <p>Guinea-Bissau 1998-1999</p> <p>Sierra Leone 1991-2000</p> <p>Senegal 1990-2001</p> <p>Minor armed conflicts</p> <p>Mali 1990 and 1994</p> <p>Niger 1990-1997</p> <p>SADC</p> <p>Wars</p> <p>DRC 1996-present</p> <p>Angola 1975-2001</p> <p>Mozambique 1981-1992</p> <p>South Africa 1989-1993</p> <p>Minor armed conflicts</p> <p>Lesotho 1998</p>	<p>IGAD</p> <p>Wars Sudan 1983-present</p> <p>Somalia 1989-1996 and present</p> <p>Uganda 1994-present</p> <p>Ethiopia-Eritrea 1998-2000</p> <p>Ethiopia 1989-2002</p> <p>Minor armed conflicts</p> <p>Djibouti 1991-1994</p> <p>AU</p> <p>Wars</p> <p>Algeria 1993-2002</p> <p>Burundi 1990-present</p> <p>Chad 1990-2002, Rwanda 1990-1994*</p> <p>Congo Brazzaville 1993-1999</p> <p>Minor armed conflicts</p> <p>Central African conflict 2001-2002</p>
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Wars: are defined as conflicts with at least a 1000 battle related deaths during the course of the conflict. *Minor armed conflicts*: are defined as at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and less than 1.000 battle related deaths during the course of the conflict.

ability and willingness of the organisation to react on crisis is strong in comparison with the other sub-regional organisations.

The political willingness of ECOWAS to implement peace operations is reflected in the fact that member states, despite their small number of forces and their low military budgets, currently have a relative high number of troops stationed for peace operations abroad. (see Table 2) As of July 2004, ECOWAS members had 9.927 soldiers stationed abroad in UN missions alone. This is by far the highest number of the three sub-regional organisations. This should, however, be compared to the relative population size of the organisation as well as amount of members of the organisation. ECOWAS member states have thus far more soldiers stationed on UN missions than the populous SADC, although compared to the member and population size IGAD member states participate on the same level. The soldiers stationed on UN missions reflect a political willingness of the ECOWAS member states to intervene in conflicts. The willingness to participate in the relatively well paid UN missions,²² however, also indicates that this political willingness could be channelled through the organisation, if it had the resources to level out the difference.

The SADC region has proven to be more stable than West Africa and the Horn of Africa and has only been involved in two wars in Angola and DRC since the establishment of the SADC Organ in 1996. The relative stability of the region is reflected in the fact that the organisation only has acted through six diplomatic efforts at conflict prevention and peace-making. SADC member states have intervened militarily in Lesotho and DRC respectively. Thereby the member states have shown political willingness to intervene in conflicts. The military interventions were, however, executed by individual member states bypassing the decision-making process of the Organ.²³ Political tensions between Zimbabwe and South Africa both striving for regional hegemony have, until recently, blocked the Organ and prevented effective action by SADC as an organisation. The implications of this will be elaborated in detail in the section about the institutional capacity. The organisation has currently fewer soldiers than ECOWAS stationed on UN missions compared to the relative population size. This can be seen as a result of the relative stability of the region.

²² Countries deploying uniformed UN personnel are reimbursed 1000 \$ a month per soldier. See United Nations, 2004c.

²³ Berman & Sams, 2000.

The IGAD region is like that of ECOWAS unstable and currently marked by three active conflicts in Somalia, Uganda and Sudan, the latter of which has lasted for several decades. In total, the region has experienced five wars in the last half of the 1990's. Nonetheless, the organisation has, unlike its two neighbour organisations, not intervened militarily in any conflict yet. It has engaged diplomatically in the peace processes of both Sudan and Somalia, though.²⁴ As will be shown below, it appears that political divisions within and between the member states, and the weak institutional capacity impede any deeper involvement.²⁵ Thus four out of seven member states are participating in UN peace missions – although two of them with a very small number of troops, indicating some willingness to participate in peace operations (see Table 2).

The OAU/AU has, the amount of conflicts on the African continent notwithstanding, primarily intervened through major diplomatic efforts in conflict prevention and peace-making (see Table 1), and has only peace-enforcement or keeping experience from Chad (1980-1982) and Burundi (1993-1996) in addition to an (unsuccessful) attempt to intervene in Rwanda in 1993. This should be seen both as a result of the general lack of enthusiasm for military intervention in conflicts and the strict non-interference principle in intra-state conflicts guiding the OAU.²⁶ This principle has been cancelled with art 4 of the AU Charter. In the meantime the smaller sub-regional organisations whose willingness and capacity to act are less restrained and more developed have taken over the tasks of the AU. The AU will instead, as previously argued, primarily function as the umbrella organisation coordinating and legitimising the operations of the sub-regional organisations.²⁷ It has, nevertheless, shown willingness to engage in mediation and small-scale peace operations and has vowed to send a troop of 300 soldiers to Darfur in Sudan to oversee the return of displaced persons and protect the existing AU observer mission.²⁸ The AU also has troops on missions in Burundi and DRC.

²⁴ Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004.

²⁵ Berman & Sams, 2000.

²⁶ Berman & Sams, 2000.

²⁷ See Assembly of the African Union, 2002: art. 16a; see also Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004.

²⁸ U.N. Wire, 2004.

Institutional capacity

The low level of institutionalisation of all the organisations impedes the ability of the organisations to respond to crisis. Yet there are differences in institutional strength between the individual organisations. An estimate of the comparative institutional strength of the individual organisations is, in this context, based on the relative integration of the norms and procedures of the organisation as reflected in the level of inclusiveness of the organisation; the effectiveness of the decision-making procedures; and finally the quality and amount of staff employed.

Of the four organisations, ECOWAS appears to be the strongest. Decision-making of ECOWAS is effective on paper with a requirement for 2/3 majority for sanctioning conflict prevention and management operations rather than the consensus requirement inhibiting SADC and the IGAD. In practice, it is, however, difficult to envision a mission without the acceptance and support of Nigeria as the regional hegemon. Nigeria, on the other hand, seems to have become better at including the other member states in the decision-making process. This has strengthened the institutionalisation of the organisation.²⁹ The institutional strength of ECOWAS security mechanism is first of all reflected by the high level of level of participation – 13 member states out of 15 – in ECOWAS operations.³⁰ This is also indicated by the high level of member state participation in UN peace missions – 11 out of 15 member states participated by July 2004 most of them with more than 100 troops. Secondly, the organisation's relative efficiency to act given the limited resources available compared to its neighbours (see Table 1) should also be seen as an indication of the organisation's institutional strength. Despite the relative strength of ECOWAS security mechanism, financial difficulties impede the effectiveness of the organisation as it is understaffed, and legal and political advisory positions are not filled.³¹

The institutional development of the SADC has, as previously argued, been inhibited by the controversy between South Africa and Zimbabwe, which until recently has prevented the SADC Organ from sanctioning any of the peace operations made by individual member states.³² Because of the consen-

²⁹ Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004.

³⁰ Berman, 2004.

³¹ Berman & Sams, 2000.

³² Berman & Sams, 2000.

sus requirement, the Organ has no enforcement mandate, and it is impossible to intervene in a member state without acceptance of the regime itself.³³ The rivalry combined with the requirement for consensus in the Organ has in fact blocked the institutionalisation of decision-making procedures. The Organ has as a result been rendered irrelevant and overruled by ad hoc decision-making by individual member states.³⁴ In 1999, Jackie Cilliers noted, the SADC Organ “does not even qualify as a talking shop;”³⁵ and according to an IPA report from 2002 “the SADC’s long-standing institutional impasse has severely limited to play a significant role in resolving conflicts in Southern Africa.”³⁶

Some positive developments have taken place since. It appears that the rivalry between South Africa and Zimbabwe for regional domination has been overcome with Zimbabwe too weak internally to compete with South Africa. Consequently the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security planned in 1996 was finally established in 2001 together with its Protocol for Co-operation.³⁷ While the structures are now in place, there is, however, still a long way for SADC to establish effective institutions. The economic deterioration of Zimbabwe is slowing down regional integration, and the lack of intervention in Zimbabwe of the member states stresses the weakness of the institutionalisation of the norms of the organisation.³⁸ It can thus be concluded that while the member states of SADC together have the highest GDP as well as military budget of the three sub-regional organisations by far (see Table 1), this is not reflected in their ability to act as an organisation. The low level of institutionalisation of the SADC Organ is, according to the IPA, exacerbated by the lack of transparency and the limited availability of public documentation regarding decisions taken at heads of state and ministerial levels.³⁹

The weak institutional capacity of the SADC is reflected in the fact that only five out of fourteen member states participated in the two military interventions.⁴⁰

³³ Hammerstad, 2003.

³⁴ International Peace Academy, 2002a.

³⁵ Cilliers, 1999: 144.

³⁶ International Peace Academy, 2002a; See also Cilliers, 1999: 144, for elaboration of the point.

³⁷ Hammerstad, 2003.

³⁸ See Hammerstad, 2003 for elaboration of this point.

³⁹ International Peace Academy, 2002a.

⁴⁰ Berman, 2004.

It should, however, be noted that eight out of fourteen member states are currently involved in different peace missions through the UN or AU (see Table 1). South Africa has chosen to intervene in Burundi through the AU rather than through SADC. This indicates a general willingness to participate in peace missions – a willingness which due to the institutional weakness is not yet channelled through the security mechanisms of the SADC.

The institutionalisation of IGAD security mechanisms seems to be restrained by some of the same features as the SADC. Thus, divisions among the member states combined with a requirement for consensus have limited the effectiveness of the organisation and instead left peace initiatives to be taken by individual member states on an ad hoc basis.⁴¹ In addition, the lack of permanent mediation bodies as well as staff to fill positions in the existing institutions in IGAD⁴² inhibits the institutional capacity. The weak institutionalisation of IGAD is reflected in the fact that only Kenya and Uganda have currently deployed troops abroad for military interventions. Yet five out of seven member states have provided peace observers for the IGAD mission in Sudan. Thus, while it appears that the current level of institutionalisation of the organisation is too weak to carry a major military deployment, the high level of participation of the member states in the IGAD observer mission indicates a relative level of institutionalisation of the goals of the organisation.

The AU has taken steps to overcome the institutional structures, which blocked AU from acting, while adding new constraints as argued above. The new organisation has set up a whole range of institutions to deal with the various aspects of conflict management. It has, however, yet to be seen what the results of this restructuring in terms of institutional strength to act will be. Some of the inherent weaknesses related to the lack of permanent membership of the Peace and Security Council as well as the potential conflict with the UN Security Council have all ready been pointed out in the introduction. At this point it appears the key part is to coordinate the roles and overcome the barriers to cooperation between the AU and the sub-regional organisations.⁴³

⁴¹ Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004.

⁴² International Peace Academy, 2002c.

⁴³ Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004.

Resources

It is generally agreed that all the organisations lack the necessary resources in terms of logistics as well as funding of the operations.⁴⁴ Consequently they all depend on external funding for functioning. Thus, 80% of the SADC budget is for example funded by external donors.⁴⁵ It has been impossible to find any specific data on the resources of the individual organisations. Instead, an estimate is made for each organisation based on an aggregate of the number of armed troops and the military budget of the individual member states.

IGAD as the smallest and least developed of the three organisations⁴⁶ has almost the same number of soldiers between their member states as both SADC and ECOWAS have together. Despite the fact that the organisation has half members that its sister organisations have and a correspondingly low GDP, the member states spend more than ECOWAS on its military budget. In fact, if we adjust for population size we find that IGAD members spend more than double the amount per capita on military budgets than ECOWAS (10.2 US\$ versus 4.8 US\$ per capita), a post which thereby takes up more than three times as much of the aggregated GDP as that of the two other sub-regional organisations. The amounts of resources spent on the individual member states' military budgets attest to the instability to the region, and are not channelled through the weak institutions of the organisation.

The low level of institutionalisation of the IGAD is reflected by fact that while the member states of the organisation have comparatively high military budgets and the highest number of soldiers of the three sub-regional organisations (see Table 1), the organisation has not yet used these resources to intervene in conflicts.

ECOWAS' member states, on the other hand, have the highest population collectively, yet the lowest number of soldiers (see Table 2). These they have, however, proven willing to employ for military peace operations through the organisation in several cases. Of the three sub-regional organisations ECOWAS member states spend the lowest relative amount on its military budgets. Thus, ECOWAS member states have the least resources available for military action

⁴⁴ See Berman & Sams, 2000 and International Peace Academy reports.

⁴⁵ International Peace Academy, 2002a.

⁴⁶ International Peace Academy, 2002c, Berman, 2004.

of the three sub-regional organisations. These limited resources have due to the institutional strength of the ECOWAS security mechanism been used efficiently relative to IGAD.

Collectively, the SADC member states have by far the highest military budget of the three organisations – app. three times that of IGAD and ECOWAS. In fact, if we adjust for population size, we find that SADC spends almost twice as much as IGAD (17.9 versus 10.2 US\$ per capita) and approximately four times as much as ECOWAS (4.8 US\$ per capita). Further SADC member states collectively have double the GDP of ECOWAS and four times that of IGAD relative to the amount of members. Also SADC has twice the number of soldiers of ECOWAS. Thus, the organisation would by far appear to have the most resources available for peace operations of the three organisations. These resources have, however, as a consequence of the weak institutional capacity, not yet been channelled through the SADC organ for military interventions.

It should be noted that the countries engaged in inter- or intra-state war at the time of the budget planning have a relatively higher military expenditure than their more peaceful neighbours. This explains the high expenditures of Eritrea and Ethiopia in IGAD, Liberia in ECOWAS and DRC and Angola in SADC.

To sum up, the organisations suffer from the same weaknesses, yet they vary in their capacity to act in conflicts. ECOWAS has despite the limited military resources of their member states shown the greatest political willingness of three regional organisations and has the strongest institutions of the four organisations. The member states of SADC, on the other hand, have far more resources allocated to their military budgets than any of the other organisations, yet the institutional impasse caused by the rivalry between South Africa and Zimbabwe, in addition to the internal problems of the latter, has inhibited the institutional development of the Security Organ. Finally, the institutional weakness of IGAD has so far prevented the organisation from channelling the high defence budgets of its member states from conflicts into peace operations to help conflicts of the sub-region.

Interestingly, this indicates that while resources are necessary for military action, their use depends on the political willingness and relative institutional capacity of the organisation. Thus, it is the institutional strength and political willingness which defines the capacity of ECOWAS to intervene in conflicts.

Table 2: Military Expenditures:

	Total active armed forces	Forces abroad	Forces in UN missions July 2004*	Military budget 2003 in US\$	Military expenses 2002 in US\$	GDP (million US\$)	Military exp. in % of GDP	Pop. size	Def. budget in US\$/capita
IGAD									
Djibuti	9,850		24	25,000,000	23,000,000	600	3.83	632,000	
Eritrea	202,200			116,000,000	106,000,000	660	16.06	3,837,000	
Kenya	14,120	1736	1,831	310,000,000	368,000,000	11,500	3.20	31,891,000	
Uganda	60,000	1500	20	153,000,000	167,000,000	6,200	2.69	4,772,000	
Sudan	104,500			480,000,000	665,000,000	13,500	4.93	32,304,000	
Somalia	nil				40,000,000	1,000	4.00	9,234,000	
Ethiopia	162,500	n.k.	2,863	408,000,000	467,000,000	5,900	7.92	64,734,000	
Total	553,170	3236	4,738	1,492,000,000	1,836,000,000	39,360	4.66	147,404,000	10.12
ECOWAS									
Liberia	13,000				25,000,000	560	4.46	3,220,000	
Sierra Leone	13,500			18,000,000	18,000,000	790	2.28	4,582,000	
Guinea Bissau	9,250				4,000,000	230	1.74	1,219,000	
Benin	4,550	22	356	61,000,000	49,000,000	2,700	1.81	6,555,000	
Burkina Faso	10,800	13	71	56,000,000	43,000,000	2,800	1.54	12,143,000	
Cote d'Ivoire	17,050		11	175,000,000	144,000,000	10,100	1.43	16,720,000	
Cape Verde	1200			10,200,000	9,000,000	260	3.46	432,000	
Gambia	800	21	217	2,700,000	3,400,000	330	1.03	1,454,000	
Ghana	7,000	1,902	3,341	29,000,000	31,000,000	5,900	0.53	20,110,000	
Guinea	9,700	18	24	71,000,000	61,000,000	3,300	1.85	8,580,000	
Mali	7,350	32	65	91,000,000	72,000,000	3,200	2.25	12,011,000	
Niger	5,300	13	431	45,000,000	34,000,000	2,200	1.55	11,560,000	
Nigeria	78,500	3,995	3,579	426,000,000	577,000,000	49,000	1.18	119,050,000	
Senegal	13,620	657	1,524	88,000,000	69,000,000	5,200	1.33	9,905,000	
Togo	8,550	n.k.	308	32,000,000	24,000,000	1,400	1.71	4,772,000	
Total	200,170	6673	9,927	1,104,900,000	1,163,400,000	87,970	1.32	232,313,000	4.76
SADC									
Angola	130,000	4000**		386,000,000	1,000,000,000	10,200	9.80	13,977,000	
Botswana	9000			414,000,000	269,000,000	6,000	4.48	1,619,000	
DRC	97800				1,000,000,000	4,600	21.74	58,317,000	
Lesotho	2000			34,000,000	22,000,000	760	2.89	2,235,000	
Malawi	5300	19	71	12,000,000	13,000,000	1,900	0.68	11,912,000	
Mauritius	nil		2	8,900,000	8,000,000	4,900	0.16	1,211,000	
Mozambique	8200	4	234	86,000,000	80,000,000	4,000	2.00	18,744,000	
Namibia	9000	5	853	131,000,000	83,000,000	3,000	2.77	1,825,000	
Swaziland									
South Africa	55,750	1172	2,480	2,500,000,000	1,800,000,000	104,000	1.73	45,603,000	
Zambia	18100	868	935	27,000,000	26,000,000	3,700	0.70	9,921,000	
Zimbabwe	29000	2400	97	93,000,000	674,000,000	20,000	3.37	11,449,000	
Seychelles	450			11,000,000	12,000,000	690	1.74	79,000	
U.R.Tanzania	27,000	23	23	131,000,000	135,000,000	9,400	1.44	37,489,000	
Total	391,600	8,491	4,695	3,833,900,000	198,785,000	173,150	1.44	214,381,000	17.88

Source: The numbers are taken from IISS, 2004.

*these numbers are taken from the UN's monthly index over contributors to UN peace-keeping missions, United Nations, 2004.

**the 4000 troops are no longer stationed in DRC.

On the other hand, it is especially the weak institutional capacity, rather than resources, which prevent SADC and IGAD from military interventions through the security mechanisms of their organisations. When evaluating which organisations Denmark should prioritise in order to have the greatest impact, it is possible to conclude as follows:

SADC member states have demonstrated willingness to intervene in conflicts, although not through the SADC Organ. Also the SADC member states have the most resources in terms of aggregated military budget as well as GDP. In fact, the organisation appears to have the greatest potential of the sub-regional organisations given its high concentration of democracies, the region's relative stability and the resources of its member states.

Yet the institutional development is currently inhibited by a weak Zimbabwe that can not serve to lead the organisation forward but instead hamper its institutional development. As stated in the APP: "the huge agenda, which SIPO outlines for the Organ, seems to require strong political leadership of the Organ"⁴⁷. At present SADC seems to be lacking thereof. It is not expected that the Zimbabwe problem is fully solved within the next two years, and it will therefore be difficult for Denmark to make a significant difference through support to SADC in the short term.

ECOWAS, conversely, as the most developed organisation of the four has with a comparatively high level of institutionalisation and few resources demonstrated strong political willingness to intervene in the conflicts. The organisation appears to be the most efficient of the sub-regional organisations in terms of using resources efficiently to execute peace operations. The stability of the region is, however, threatened by two active conflicts in Liberia and the Ivory Coast. Due to its proven efficiency and imminent need for resources and funding for pending peace operations in the region, Danish assistance to ECOWAS could have a significant impact in the short term.

IGAD as the least developed of the three organisations has been provided minimal support by the APP in comparison to the other organisations. In terms of capacities, the record of the organisation so far is mixed. Thus, the organisation

⁴⁷ See Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004.

has not yet proven any willingness to intervene militarily in conflicts, but has sent observer missions with a high level of participation. Also, member states have participated with troops in UN missions indicating some willingness to intervene in conflicts. Nevertheless, the organisation suffers from a low level of institutionalisation. This stems in part from the lack of staff and institutions and in part from divisions between member states and a consensus requirement limiting the possibility for action. The region is the poorest in terms of aggregated GDP; nevertheless the member states spend a relatively high amount of on their military budgets. The fact that these resources have not been channelled through the IGAD security mechanism should be seen as an indication of the general instability of the region together with a low level of institutionalisation of the norms of the organisation.

Thus, it is possible to conclude that while the organisation's security mechanism currently is weak, this is primarily due to its immature institutional capacity. Development of this capacity will enable the organisation to channel the relative political willingness and the military resources of its member states through the organisation. With three active conflicts in Sudan, Somalia, and Uganda development of this potential is urgent. Thus, Danish assistance to develop the organisation could therefore make a significant difference in the short term.

It is still early to evaluate the effects of the substantial structural transformation of the OAU to the AU. It is, however, possible to point to some potential problems inherent in the structural makeup of the organisation. In the current set-up of the African security structure, the AU at the pinnacle is to a certain extent dependent on its building blocs – the sub-regional organisations. The capacity problems of the sub-regional organisations will be reflected at the regional level in the Peace and Security Council of the AU. Thus, it still has to be seen in practice how the AU will operate given the differences at the sub-regional level between its member states. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the PSC has no permanent membership reflecting the power structure of the region. Given AU's standing in comparison to the sub-regional organisations, it would therefore be logical to draw the consequence and focus a major part of the resources to build up the sub-regional levels prior to the regional level.

To conclude, the analysis of the relative capacities of the individual organisations suggests that Danish support for ECOWAS and IGAD will make a greater impact

in the short term relative to support for AU and SADC. It is now relevant to determine which areas of support Denmark can make a difference in the short term in comparison with other donors.

The assistance of external actors

The second section will examine which areas the Danish assistance can make a difference in comparison with other donors. This will start with an account of the main weaknesses of the security mechanisms of the African regional organisations. This will be followed by an overview of the assistance provided by the major donors and Denmark to alleviate these. The comparison of the international assistance to the Danish will conclude in an analysis of which areas Denmark should focus on in order to make a significant difference.

Despite their differences, the security mechanism of the African sub-regional organisations are all, although to various degrees, inhibited from the same weaknesses. The main factors for the weaknesses of the individual organisations' security mechanisms derive from the *lack of resources, poor logistics, inadequate training and institutional weaknesses*.

- In general lack of resources has affected all phases of the conflict prevention and management operations from the institutional structure to the funding of the different operations. Thus, none of the planned prevention mechanisms of the different organisations are operational and the various peace-enforcement and peace-keeping operations all suffer from the lack of funding.
- Poor logistics, together with the inadequate and different standards of training affect the peace-enforcement and peace-keeping capacity of the sub-regional organisations. Consequently, they will all have difficulties in reaching the ambitious goal of establishing an operational standby brigade for the ASF to be operational by 2010.
- The specific weaknesses of the different stages of peace operations apart, the weak institutional capacity of the security mechanisms prevents all of the organisations to act effectively in all of the different stages and seems to be the overriding problem of the respective organisations.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ There is general consensus that these are the main sources of weakness for the security organs of the African regional organisations. See for instance IPA reports; Berman & Sams, 2000; Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004; Boulden, 2003.

The account of the major donors' assistance will be centred on the above-mentioned areas of weakness: *logistics, training, funding and institutional capacity*. It will focus on the major bilateral actors France, UK, and the US⁴⁹ as well as the major multilateral actors: the EU and the UN. Common for the bilateral donors as major military powers is that they all focus their assistance on the military aspects and prioritise training of soldiers and provision of logistics for peace-keeping and enforcement. The multilateral actors instead focus on funding and institution-building for conflict prevention, peace-making and peace-building.

Peace operations training

There has been a range of efforts to train the African peace-keeping and -enforcement capacity. Recently, in the attempt to seriously boost the African peace-keeping capacity, the G8 has pledged to train 50.000 peacekeepers in Africa over the next five years.⁵⁰ This would constitute a massive increase in peace-keeping troops compared to the existing initiatives in the area.

Before this initiative the US through its *African Crisis Response Initiative* (ACRI) programme – now ACOTA (*African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance*) aimed to train 12.000 troops for peace-keeping and -enforcement. As of December 2001 more than 8.000 African troops have been trained under the programme.⁵¹ The Programme has an annual financial volume of 8-15 million US\$⁵² In addition the US has through OFR trained seven battalions from ECOWAS member states to serve in Sierra Leone.⁵³

Also France and Britain have contributed to the peace-keeping training of African soldiers. France has through its *Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix* (RECAMP) initiative provided classroom training as well as field exercises for 7,000 soldiers in 2001 in West and Central Africa as well as Southern and East Africa.⁵⁴ The UK has through its British Military advisory and training teams (BMATT) provided classroom education in Ghana, Zim-

⁴⁹ The most significant capacity-building initiatives have actually been bilateral: France, UK and the US have the most developed programmes to support African capabilities. See Faria, 2004.

⁵⁰ Chiahemen, 2004.

⁵¹ Berman, 2002.

⁵² Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004.

⁵³ Berman, 2002.

⁵⁴ Berman & Sams, 2000.

babwe and South Africa. Unlike France, the UK has not initiated any significant field training except for its support for operation *Blue Hungwe* in April 1997 and *Blue Crane* in April 1999.⁵⁵

The UN have no concrete initiatives to train African capacities for peace-keeping and enforcement, but has instead established a working group for enhancing peace-keeping training capacity in Africa as a forum for harmonisation and coordination of the efforts to build African capabilities in the field.⁵⁶

Logistics

On the logistical side, France has been the major contributor of materiel to support African forces participating in peace-keeping initiatives in the region.⁵⁷ Thus, France has established depots in Dakar, Libreville and Djibouti and has plans for establishing two more.⁵⁸ Also France has increased its commitment to strengthen the capacity of several African countries to maintain its existing equipment.⁵⁹ The US has through its ACRI programme provided logistical support in terms of non-lethal equipment. Under Operation Focus Relief with ECOWAS the US did also provide firearms.⁶⁰ The UK, in contrast, has not provided significant military equipment apart from its support for the Liberia operation in 1999 and Sierra Leone 2001.⁶¹ It has, however, contributed with funds, troops, trainers and transportation equipment to multilateral and regional exercises.⁶² The G8 initiative will when appropriate also equip the soldiers trained in the programme.⁶³

Institutional capacity

The support of the multilateral organisations goes primarily to strengthen the weak institutional capacity of the regional organisations at the operational level. The UN focuses its institutional support on conflict prevention and post-conflict

⁵⁵ Berman, 2002.

⁵⁶ Faria, 2004.

⁵⁷ Faria, 2004.

⁵⁸ Berman & Sams, 2000.

⁵⁹ Berman, 2002.

⁶⁰ Berman, 2002.

⁶¹ Berman & Sams, 2000.

⁶² Berman, 2002.

⁶³ Berman, 2004.

peace-building.⁶⁴ The organisation has engaged in building local capacity to deal with conflict by establishing early warning indicators and setting up peace-building support offices in African countries affected by conflict.⁶⁵ Also the EU focuses on the softer parts of the peace operations and gives priority to support the regional organisations conflict prevention and resolution capacities.⁶⁶

Of the bilateral actors, the UK has shown the greatest commitment to support the conflict resolution mechanism of the AU, and appears willing to support the ECOWAS mechanism as well.⁶⁷ The US has also supported the security mechanism of AU and ECOWAS respectively, whereas France has not yet provided any significant institutional support for any of the sub-regional organisations.⁶⁸

Funding

EU has provided large amounts of financial support to the ECOWAS Security Mechanism and the SADC Organ of Politics, Security and Defence. It has recently set up a Peace Facility for Africa (PFA) of 250 million EURO to support African field operations and build up the institutional capacity to carry out such operations.⁶⁹ In addition the EU has allocated 10 million EUR to the new Peace and Security Council of the AU and has provided financial support to the individual operations of IGAD, SADC and the ECOWAS.⁷⁰

Some of the bilateral donors are also providing direct financial assistance to the peace operations of the African regional organisations. Here the US has focused on the operational support and helped finance OAU/AU peace-keeping operations as well as ECOWAS operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone.⁷¹ France has previously supported the OAU peace fund and has also provided logistical support other than material for ECOWAS operations.⁷² It should here be noted that

⁶⁴ United Nations, 2004b, UN Security Council Document, 2001; see also UN General Assembly: cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity.

⁶⁵ Faria, 2004.

⁶⁶ Faria, 2004.

⁶⁷ Berman, 2002.

⁶⁸ Berman, 2002.

⁶⁹ Faria, 2004.

⁷⁰ Faria, 2004.

⁷¹ Berman, 2002.

⁷² Berman, 2002.

the Nordic countries have given financial support to the organisations among others through the OAU/AU peace fund.⁷³

Table 3: Overview of donor activities

	<i>Peace operation training</i>	<i>Logistics</i>	<i>Funding</i>	<i>Institutional support</i>
<i>Donor assistance</i>	G8, France, UK, US	G8, France, US (UK)	EU, US, France	UN, EU, UK, US

⁷³ Berman & Sams, 2000.

What is Denmark doing today?

After the presentation of the major donor activities, this part will introduce in brief what Denmark has previously done and is planning to do in the future through the *Africa Programme for Peace* to strengthen the African regional security capacity. This will conclude in a discussion of where and how Denmark should focus its assistance in the future in order to make a difference within the next two years, during which it will be expected to serve in the UNSC.

Danish assistance to African regional security organisations has previously been concentrated on SADC and prioritised peace-keeping training. In the period from 1997 – 2002 the Danish government supported the establishment of a regional peace-keeping training centre (RPTC) together with the establishment of a clearing house to monitor peace-keeping training activities in Harare, Zimbabwe.⁷⁴ Due to disagreements with the Mugabe government the Centre closed in 2002. At the request of Lesotho the Danish foreign ministry is at present considering supporting the establishment of a peace-keeping training centre in the SADC region.⁷⁵

In addition Denmark has supported the SADC analytical capacity building in conflict handling through training courses developed by UNITAR and RPTC and has also supported the training of SADC police officers in Denmark.

At the research level the Danish government has supported research programmes for conflict prevention and security and defence policies at South African think tanks (ISS) and University of Cape Town in addition to the SADSEM – the Southern African Defence and Security Management network – consisting of universities in the region placed in Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, South Africa, and DRC.⁷⁶

In the spring of 2004 the Danish Foreign Ministry launched the *Africa Programme for Peace* with a detailed list of initiatives for a five year plan to strengthen the

⁷⁴ Berman & Sams, 2000.

⁷⁵ Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004.

⁷⁶ Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004.

African regional organisations' peace operation capacity.⁷⁷ This programme ambitiously aims to address all of the abovementioned areas of weakness of the organisations' security mechanisms. Thus, the APP sets out to operationalise the conflict prevention capability; to support the security architecture focusing on ASF establishment; enhance the institutional capacity of the regional organisations; increase access to funding; and finally, promote relations between civil society and regional organisations.

The programme seeks to implement these overarching objectives by operationalising the security mechanisms of the individual organisations as presented in brief below: (see Table 4 for detailed description):

1. The development of a regional conflict prevention capability. This includes the establishment of a specific conflict prevention fund in addition to support for the respective organisations' peace funds.
2. The strengthening of the African security architecture. This will include linking the regional organisations into an operational whole and establishing an African Standby force using the SHIRBRIG model with peace-enforcement capacity as an interim step towards the establishment of an operational stand by force.
3. The promotion of civil society. This will focus on organising and operationalising relations to the regional level with a focus on conflict prevention. (It should be noted that there is no such specific programme for IGAD).

Specifically for the individual organisations, the APP will support ECOWAS institutional capacity building programme. As for SADC the APP will re-establish its support for Peace Operations Training and continue its support for SADSEM.

The overall budget of the APP is 248 million DKK. The budget is allocated such that that AU receives 72 million DKK which is the equivalent of 29.0% of the budget, ECOWAS 66 million DKK equal to 26.6%, SADC: 80 million (32.3%) and IGAD: 20 million (8.1%). The support for the SADSEM,

⁷⁷ Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004.

which is to be phased out, accounts for the higher amount allocated to SADC compared to ECOWAS.

Thus, SADC continues to be central to the Danish effort to strengthen African regional security. Subtracting the support for the SADSEM, the AU, however, comes out as the main recipient of the APP, closely followed by the SADC and ECOWAS. IGAD at the other end of the scale is to receive only a third of the assistance afforded the other organisations. This difference is also reflected in the amount and size of programmes planned for the individual organisations as described in Table 4.

The analysis of the capacities of the individual organisations together with the account of the assistance of the major donors will conclude in a discussion outlining suggestions for where Denmark should focus its assistance to African regional organisations in order to make a difference within the coming two years.

Table 4: Budget for the Africa Peace Programme (APP) 2004-2009.

<i>Indicative Budget (million DKK) 2004-2009*</i>	<i>Total**</i>
AU	72
Operationalisation of the AU PSC Protocol	56
AU Advisory Unit/Addis Ababa (2 Conflict Prevention TA)***	10
African Civil Society Forum	6
ECOWAS	66
Operationalisation of ECOWAS Mechanism	25
Conflict Prevention Technical Assistance***	5
NEPAD Implementation	18
West African Civil Society Forum	12
Unallocated	6
SADC	80
Enhanced Democratic Control (SADSEM)	18
Conflict Prevention Fund	16
Conflict Prevention Technical Assistance (optional)***	5
Operationalisation of SIPO	38
Consultancies	3
IGAD	20
Conflict Prevention Fund	8
IGAD Peace Fund	7
EASBRIG Establishment	5
Unallocated Funds	5
Reviews, programme coordination etc.	5
Total	248**

Table is taken from Africa Programme for Peace 2004-2009

* At the time of writing, 1 US\$ = app. 6 DKK

** In the components, budgets are only specified for the first three years of the programme 2004-2006. Specified budgets for the remaining years 2007-2009 will be agreed upon on the basis of joint midterm reviews in 2006.

*** Of the total budget, 20 mill. DKK are foreseen for technical assistance and 228 mill. DKK is drawn from the Bilateral Regional Funds.

Where should Denmark not focus?

As shown above, the APP ambitiously sets out to operationalise the security mechanisms of the African regional organisations through a comprehensive programme to support all the organisations in every aspect from conflict prevention to peace-keeping. In order to make a significant difference in the short term – defined as the two next years, where Denmark is expected to become a member of the UN Security Council – it is necessary to narrow the focus to the organisations where this will have the greatest impact, and support the specific areas where Denmark can make a difference.

Taking these criteria into consideration, the first part will point to the areas of weakness where Denmark will not be able to make a difference compared to the other donors. This will create the background for an evaluation of the areas where Denmark should focus to make a difference.

Logistics: as shown above the major donors such as France and US have made efforts to improve the logistical capacity of the African regional organisations, in particular ECOWAS. While there is need for more, it is beyond the Danish capacity to provide any significant support in this field. The APP has no plans to support his area.

Peace-keeping and peace-enforcement training: Denmark has developed an extensive experience in peace-keeping classroom training from the Harare Centre in SADC Nevertheless, the recent G8 initiative to train 50.000 soldiers cannot, be matched by the Danish government. Therefore, despite the Danish expertise, it will be difficult to make a significant contribution in this field.

Funding: As previously argued, lack of funding of the organisations and their activities in all phases from conflict prevention to peace-enforcement and -keeping prevents all of the organisations from functioning effectively. All of the major donors including the EU are, however, contributing with economic support to the regional organisations as well as their operations to fill this void. It is therefore unlikely that Denmark, through unfocused support to their peace funds as suggested in the APP, will be able to make a difference in this field.

Where can Denmark make a difference?

Having determined the areas where Denmark *cannot* make a difference compared to the other donors, this part will evaluate the areas where Denmark *can* make a difference within the next to years in the short term. This will be determined based on the capacities of the organisations and the areas where there is room for Denmark to make a difference.

The APP sets out to support all of the four regional organisations giving priority to SADC, ECOWAS, and AU over IGAD. However, the analysis presented here suggests that in order to make a difference within the next two years of out expected UNSC membership, Denmark should instead focus on the organisations where it will have the greatest impact. Accordingly the priority given to SADC and AU in the APP should be redirected to ECOWAS as the most efficient of the organisations, and IGAD as the organisation with most undeveloped potential. These two organisations both operate in unstable environments with several active conflicts making assistance urgent. SADC, on the other hand, will not be able to make any significant progress in the near future due to the institutional deadlock caused by Zimbabwe. The AU will rely on the sub-regional level which should consequently be prioritised relative to the regional level.

The comprehensive focus of the APP should be narrowed down to a few areas where Denmark can make a real difference. Thus, instead of supporting the operationalisation of the security mechanisms in all its aspects, the assistance should focus on *conflict prevention* as the most effective and least costly part rather than *peace-keeping and -enforcement training*.

A major part of the peace-keeping and -enforcement training initiatives undertaken by the major donors so far have focused on SADC and ECOWAS, while IGAD has received less attention. Nevertheless, should Denmark decide to make use of its knowledge in the field and make an impact in the short term, it should, given the invitation from Lesotho, continue its efforts in the SADC region. Here Denmark has already gained extensive experience and also has the required contacts. It will be more difficult for Denmark to have an impact in the next two years in the IGAD region.

In the area of conflict prevention, the weak institutional capacity of the security

mechanisms of the regional organisations is one of the overriding problems limiting the capacity. The establishment of the necessary institutions for effective conflict prevention capacities has not been prioritised compared to the more immediate and expensive need for crisis management capacities. Effective conflict prevention mechanisms will provide the least costly and also the most effective tool to achieve regional stability. The UN and EU have already engaged in institutional development of this field. The US and UK have taken initiatives to strengthen the institutions of ECOWAS and AU, but a lot is still to be done. Thus, Denmark can make a considerable contribution to operationalise the conflict mechanisms.

The Danish assistance should be focused on alleviating the specific shortcomings which inhibit each of the organisations and focus on institution-building and strengthening the capacity of existing institutions and fund the necessary staff. Specifically, ECOWAS lacks funding and staff for its existing institutions. IGAD in addition lacks the relevant institutions for conflict prevention. The AU will need substantial support to develop and fund its conflict prevention capacities. The SADC institutions suffer primarily from a lack of legitimacy and transparency,⁷⁸ which it will be hard to obtain due to the present deadlock. The APP initiative prioritises the institutional development of SADC while that of IGAD is not supported at all. In order to make the greatest impact on the short term it would be more efficient to reverse this assistance and prioritise the institutional development of IGAD compared to that of SADC.

The APP initiative to strengthen the linkage between the regional organisations and civil society constitutes an important step towards reinforcing the institutional capacity of the security mechanisms. The connection to civil society actors is crucial for the ability to information about society as a basis for policy formulation. Also the connection with civil society actors will improve the ability to successfully implement conflict prevention initiatives.

Finally, the APP initiative to establish a specific conflict prevention fund will help to prevent all of the resources from being spent on the expensive peace-enforcement and peace-keeping operations. It will instead serve to direct the focus on conflict prevention as a less expensive and more effective tool to create stability. This will enable Denmark to make a difference in the field of conflict prevention.

⁷⁸ International Peace Academy, 2002a.

Conclusion

This report has examined how Denmark can make a significant difference strengthening the security mechanisms of the African regional organisations in the next two years of its expected UNSC membership. The starting point is that Denmark in order to achieve this aim has to narrow its ambitious scope of the *Africa Programme for Peace* and focus the assistance on the organisations and the areas where it can fastest make the most difference. Based on an analysis of the comparative capacities of the individual organisations and the assistance of the major donors, it is concluded that Denmark to make a difference in the short term should prioritise support for the security mechanisms of ECOWAS as the most efficient of the sub-regional organisations and IGAD as the least developed sub-regional organisation with most potential to make a difference in the short term. The support for the security mechanisms should focus on conflict prevention as a less expensive and more effective tool to create stability than peace-keeping and -enforcement training.

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