

I. Fragile States on the International Agenda

Louise Andersen, March 2008

“One of the great challenges of the new millennium is to ensure that all States are strong enough to meet the many challenges they face. If States are fragile, the peoples of the world will not enjoy the security, development and justice that are their right.”

Kofi Annan, 2005

Introduction

After years of neo-liberal attempts to roll back the state, the state has returned to favour. Strong states are now seen as a prerequisite for both human and international security. Highly influential reports on *Human Security* and *Responsibility to Protect* have linked the fulfilment of human rights, human security and human development directly to the capacity of the state. It is a state's responsibility to ensure that its citizens are 'free from want' and 'free from fear'. However, the reports are also indicative of a more interventionist international role: if states do not live up to their responsibilities, it is the task of the more responsible members of the international community to intervene – for the sake not only of the beleaguered citizens, but also of wider international peace and security. This shift has been ongoing since the end of the Cold War and has gained increasing momentum in the aftermath of 9/11.

Concern for state fragility covers a broad spectrum, embracing claims that fragile states present direct threats to Western national security, alongside arguments that dysfunctional state institutions are the key obstacle to sustainable development. The debate thus links security and development communities in a vague, yet firm, claim that addressing state fragility is one of the most pressing policy questions of our time. Beneath this broad consensus, a number of often contradictory perceptions of the nature of the problem and the appropriate solutions to it lingers. The debate on fragile states is thus infused with politics. This chapter provides an overview of the main points of tension. It is not about state fragility as such, but rather about the different aspects that are brought to bear in the debate over fragile states.

Two elements have been selected for particular scrutiny. The first is the *security-development nexus*, which provides the overall framework for the discussion of *why* fragile states are relevant. The second is *state-building*, which in a variety of forms defines suggestions of *how* to deal with fragile states. To set the scene for these discussions,

the concept of state fragility – and the framing it provides – is briefly presented below. The final section of the paper sums up the discussions by identifying the major fault lines running through the debate.

State Fragility

There is no authoritative definition of state fragility, nor is there an agreed list of fragile states.¹ This spurs considerable debate on what the term actually refers to. Broadly speaking, however, the policy debate is framed by two basic assumptions: first, the idea that all states can be placed on a continuum of strength, based on their fulfilment of basic state functions; and secondly, the notion that there is a need to rethink engagement and identify new approaches.

The idea of a continuum of state strength is reflected in the growing number of schemes that measure and rate states according to performance. Such schemes tend to reflect a belief that ‘to achieve maximum stability a regime must both carry out the tasks expected of a competent government, and maintain legitimacy by being perceived as just and fair in the manner it carries out those tasks’ (Marshall and Goldstone, 2007: 13-14).² In recent years, ‘fragile states’ has become the catch-all phrase for states at the low end. In the development community, it has replaced labels such as ‘poor performers’, ‘low-income countries under stress’ and ‘difficult partnership’. In academia and security circles, terms such as ‘failed states’ and ‘collapsed states’ remain common. Sometimes these terms indicate differences in degrees of state weakness: a fragile state has not yet failed, and a failed state has not yet collapsed. Frequently, however, they are just used as different words for problems that are seen as related to the state’s lack of will or capacity to perform core state functions. For reasons of convenience, this paper will use primarily the terms ‘fragile states’ and ‘state fragility’. Only if it is necessary to clarify a specific point will other terms be used.

The second assumption – that there is a need to redefine international engagement – is based on the claim that ‘it is no longer possible to ignore distant and misgoverned parts of a world without borders, where chaos is a potential neighbour anywhere from Africa to Afghanistan’ (Straw, 2002: 98). This sets the fragile state debate in direct communication with the pre-9/11 concern for *development effectiveness*. The 1990s saw a major shift in aid flows towards the so-called ‘good performers’. The obvious

¹ For a more elaborate discussion, see the chapter by Engberg-Pedersen and Stepputat.

² The quote indicates a strong tendency in the debate to equate ‘state’ with ‘central government’.

flip-side was a tendency to abandon states that performed poorly, i.e. states with weak institutions and a lack of reform-friendly elites. It is this group of states that is now being re-invented as fragile and – precisely because of their fragility – being seen as both needy and worthy of international support. The predicament for donor agencies, however, is that the aid flow cannot simply be shifted towards fragile states. The mechanisms for delivering long-term aid do not work in fragile states: budget support, sector programmes and alignment behind government policies make little sense in settings where the authority, effectiveness and legitimacy of national governments are severely limited. Related to this, the ‘absorptive capacity’ of fragile states is found to be lower than in non-fragile states (McGillivray and Feeny, 2007). Needs may be considerably greater in fragile states, but part of the predicament is that they lack the institutional set-up required to translate foreign assistance into domestic changes. The challenge for donor agencies is therefore presented as not merely a matter of providing more aid to ‘forgotten’ states, but rather one of providing aid differently, in a new manner (Dollar and Levin, 2005).

However, few if any of the problems and phenomena related to state fragility are in themselves new. What is new is first and foremost the high-level of political attention. And in a sense, this is not even that new. Most of the aspects have been on the global agenda for almost twenty years under headings such as humanitarian intervention, post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building. The search for ‘new’ approaches to fragile states thus draws on and continues policy debates that date back at least to the end of the Cold War.

The Security-Development Nexus

When the Cold War ended, security and development were no longer confined within the bipolar logic. Security came to reflect a broad range of ‘new threats’, many of which were seen to stem from the global South. Similarly, the field of development was expanded, and politicized. Economic growth and poverty reduction remained overall objectives, but good governance, democracy and market economies were increasingly understood as the *sine qua non* for development and stability in the poor and disorderly periphery.

The simultaneous broadening of security and development has implied that many issues are now falling within the domains of both policy fields. This overlap, which is often referred to as the security-development nexus, provides the overall framework for the fragile states debate. It reflects a dual claim, on the one hand, that *security is*

fundamental for reducing poverty; and on the other hand, that a *lack of development causes conflict*. It suggests that development and security are inherently related – one cannot be pursued in isolation from the other. As indicated above, however, the nexus also implies a third claim, namely that *security is indivisible*: poverty and conflict in one part of the world creates problems of insecurity and instability in other parts. In order to achieve security at home, Western governments must pursue development abroad (Duffield, 2001; Beall et al., 2006).

Most accounts of the security-development nexus draw on the *liberal peace thesis*, which argues that democratization will create the conditions for peace and development both locally and globally. International order *and* human security can thus be promoted simultaneously by ‘improving’ existing states through democratic reforms, that is, by supporting values and norms such as human rights, participation, inclusion, transparency and accountability. These values are seen as the necessary foundation for a stable relationship between state and society. They constitute a set of international standards that fragile states have difficulty in fulfilling – hence their fragility. The core question is therefore not whether these standards and values are universally applicable, but rather how they can be put into practice in fragile states.

Apart from this very general concern, the security-development nexus frames the debate by making three different claims: first, that state fragility is a source of transnational threats; secondly, that ‘bad’ governance is a root cause of state fragility; and thirdly, that ‘integrated approaches’ are needed to address both the causes and consequences of state fragility. These claims are discussed in turn below.

Transnational Threats

The importance of al-Qaida’s link to Afghanistan cannot be overestimated when trying to grasp the current concern with fragile states. One element in the declared war on terror is an undeclared war on state fragility, based on the assumption that terrorist networks can take advantage of the lack of government control. However, the relationship between terrorism and state fragility remains poorly understood. On the one hand, there is not much empirical evidence to underpin the assertion of a general relationship between the two (Hippel, 2002; Menkhaus, 2004; Patrick, 2006; Møller, 2007). As highlighted in a recent study by the RAND Corporation, ‘not all ungoverned territories are equally suitable as terrorist sanctuaries’ (RAND, 2007: xvi). On the other hand, domestic terrorism and other forms of political violence are more prevalent in fragile states than in non-fragile states. The lack of institutional

mechanisms to deal with crises further implies that the costs of terrorism are greater in fragile states (Keefer and Loayza 2007). The possible linkages are thus considerable more complex than the policy debate suggests.³

The point to be made here is that fragile states are seen as sources of all sorts of cross-border threats. State fragility is being linked to problems as diverse as mass migration, organized crime, violent conflict, communicable diseases and environmental depletion. It is to this long list of 'ills' that terrorist threats have now been added. By referring to something as a national security problem, that 'something' becomes more important and more likely to 'win' in the battle for scarce resources. This does not mean that the problem or phenomenon is being 'invented' in the sense that it is somehow less 'real' than other 'non-securitized' problems. The dire living conditions in many fragile states are very real indeed, as is the poverty, the violence, the insecurity. Framing such issues as a direct threat to Western security, however, casts them in a specific light which may have implications for the sense of priority and the type of policy solutions they inspire (Beall et al., 2006).

Governance Matters

The security-development nexus also provides the dominant explanation of what causes state fragility. The explanation largely holds that it is because the domestic institutions of public authority are not working as they are supposed to that some states are fragile (Rotberg, 2003). This implies that state fragility is seen as the result of internal malfunctions and not – as alternative explanations claim – as linked to the global political economy and fragile states' positions in the world economy (see e.g. Clapham, 2002). The internal 'flaws' which are seen as the main causes of state fragility are repression, corruption and patrimonialism – all of which are related in their turn to self-serving elites that have 'captured' the state and created state institutions that benefit only themselves and their clients (Sørensen, 2008). As a result, the *social contract* that is supposed to secure a dual bond of rights and obligations between the people and the state is broken. The state does not deliver to its people, and the people accordingly have to turn to non-state communities (ethnic groups, clans, tribes, religion) for the satisfaction of their material and non-material needs (Sørensen, 2008: 5).

In the policy discourse, this is translated into a concern for the efficiency and legitimacy of the governance arrangements. Efficiency is perceived as a matter

³ See Møller 2007 for a comprehensive discussion.

of whether or not the state is delivering public services to the population, while legitimacy is related to the perception of the state's rule: is it widely accepted or not? In keeping with the idea of a social contract, the two tend to be seen as directly related in the sense that legitimacy depends on efficiency: the fewer public goods the state provides to the people, the less legitimate – and hence fragile – it is. Reforming governance arrangements to ensure that they 'deliver' is thus seen to have both curative and preventive power: good governance is the medicine needed to heal a fragile post-conflict state, an antidote that can prevent a fragile state from collapsing into violent conflict.

The main criticism of this perception is that it draws on a normative model of the state, which, first, does not take into account the context and history of the state in question and, secondly, downplays the fact that governance is not just about delivering services but primarily about allocating who has the right to rule over whom. The legitimacy of governance arrangements does not necessarily flow from efficiency.

Integrated Approaches

The fragile states debate has accelerated the merger of security and development agendas. In doing so, it is accentuating the limitations of the present international architecture. The Cold War disconnect between security and development continues to structure most of the multilateral institutions, as well as most of the governments that are engaging in the fragile states debate. ECOSOC, the Bretton Woods institutions and the specialized UN agencies remain primarily concerned with development, while the Security Council and military alliances are responsible for matters of peace and security. The same division of labour is found between national ministries of foreign affairs, defence and development cooperation.

A major argument of the security-development nexus is that such stove-pipe thinking is counterproductive, particularly in war-torn fragile states. To ensure turnaround, security and development must be addressed simultaneously and in an integrated manner: military and civilian actors must work in concert. This has spurred the establishment of new UN agencies and offices – most recently the UN Peacebuilding Commission – and UN peace operations are being transformed into *integrated missions*. Comparable efforts are ongoing in the EU to improve cross-pillar cooperation when dealing with fragile states, and most OECD governments are formulating 'whole of government' policies to ensure that diplomacy, development and defence (3Ds) are 'joined-up' (OECD, 2007b).

Most of these efforts are focusing on the need for more and better *coordination* between already existing bureaucratic organizations. Coordination is, however, not the same as integration (Sending, 2004). Coordination implies that two or more separate units need to work closely together because their operations are interdependent: it does not establish the shared structure of authority, responsibility, action, implementation etc. that seems needed to bring about a truly integrated response. This highlights the fact that the main challenges and obstacles to reform are essentially political, not organizational. The most ambitious attempt so far at reforming the old Cold War architecture illustrates this well. The UN Peacebuilding Commission was envisaged as bridging the gap between security and development. In the end it was established only as an advisory body. Neither the Security Council nor ECOSOC wished to transfer decision-making power to the new Commission, even though everyone agreed that, in principle, what was needed was a truly integrated body.

It is within this strangely politicized, yet consensual understanding of the links between security and development that Western states, multilateral institutions and international NGOs are working to ensure that all states are strong enough to live up to the challenges they face. This agenda is known as state-building and is discussed next.

State-building

In recent years, state-building has emerged as the main solution to the many ills associated with state fragility (Fukuyama, 2004; Dobbins, 2007). The OECD/DAC principles thus depict state-building as ‘the central objective’ for international engagement in fragile states (2007a: 2). What is meant by state-building, and how this elusive concept might be translated into concrete interventions, is considerably less clear. Neither policy circles nor academia have produced an authoritative definition of state-building.⁴ In the present context, however, the term is used primarily with reference to *external interventions aimed at constructing or reconstructing governance arrangements that can provide citizens with economic and physical security* (Chesterman, 2004: 5). To provide a sketchy overview of this multi-faceted field, the sections below focus on two questions that in different ways illustrate some of the deeper-lying dimensions running through the current debate:

- What type of state should be built?
- What role can ‘outsiders’ play in building states?

⁴ See the chapter by Jung for a more elaborate discussion of state-building.

The Nature of the State to be built

The notion that a modern state has to fulfil certain functions is implicit in the conceptualization of state fragility. Drawing on Western state theory, these functions are typically seen as related to security, welfare and representation. The purpose of state-building is to ensure that a fragile state (once again, or perhaps for the first time ever) can fulfil all the functions it is supposed to fulfil. This is by far the dominant understanding in the current debate, but consensus is still not very great. Underneath runs a diverse stream of opposing views on, first, whether some state functions are more basic than others; secondly, whether the state should provide the public goods itself, or merely enable their provision; and thirdly, what 'representation' means? At the core of these questions lie disagreements about the nature of the state to be built: should it be a minimalistic 'night-watch' state, whose primary concern is to maintain security; or should it rather be a welfare state that provides for its citizens from cradle to grave? The discussion of basic state functions is thus essentially a discussion about the proper role and size of the state vis-à-vis other authorities and groups in society. This underscores the intrinsically political nature of any state-building intervention. However, the debate is often formulated in apolitical and quite technical terms. Donors are concerned with finding (and mixing and sequencing) the right instruments to ensure that the state can fulfil its basic functions, but the political realities of opposing values, interests and perceptions tends to be overlooked. Instead of addressing politics, emphasis is placed on improving state capacity.

The discussion of the nature of the state that is to be built re-emerges in the question of how processes of state-building and democratization relate to one another. It is widely acknowledged that democratization can be a turbulent and potentially bloody process. Democracy is not established overnight, and the mere holding of elections does not in itself make a fragile state stronger. Nevertheless, ensuring that the state is considered legitimate by the people and that its rulers are accountable to those they rule is generally understood to be an essential element in overcoming state fragility. In keeping with the liberal underpinnings of the entire agenda, state-building is thus often equated with democratization: holding elections, strengthening civil society, promoting public participation in decision-making etc. etc. Increasingly, however, academics are questioning this approach and arguing that democracy-building and state-building are not 'mutually reinforcing endeavours or even two sides of the same coin' (Carothers, 2002: 9). They suggest that state-building is about strengthening the central political authority, while democratization is about curbing and limiting that authority. Democracy may be a good thing

in itself, but it can only work where there is a functioning state to democratize. Institutionalization must therefore come before liberalization (Paris, 2006). This recommendation is sometimes referred to as ‘sequencing’: a first-things-first approach, in contrast to the holistic and comprehensive peace-building approach that was formulated in the 1990s.

This discussion refers back to the question of whether some state functions are more basic than others. Should the state focus on controlling the territory and upholding law and order before it can attend to the other needs of its people? And should international assistance accordingly be focusing on, for example, security sector reform rather than education and health? Or will the state – no matter how ‘effective’ its security apparatus is – remain fragile as long as it fails to provide social services and other public goods to its people? By framing the questions in these ways, another and perhaps more fundamental dilemma emerge: Why should outsiders have a say in such vital questions? Why are these not purely internal matters?

The Role of Outsiders

The policy rhetoric is clear on the role of outsiders in state-building: their task is solely to support indigenous processes of reform and reconstruction, not to impose foreign decisions, structures or institutions. However, policy realities are widely acknowledged to differ from this ideal. This is most evident in post-conflict situations, where international engagement tends to be considerably more intrusive than in ‘ordinary’ fragile states. This has spurred a major debate on how outsiders may or may not contribute to building effective and legitimate states. Is the idea of national ownership and home-grown solutions out of touch with the realities on the ground in situations in which formal institutions of governance have collapsed? Or is it rather the notion that foreigners can somehow build legitimate structures that is out of touch with reality?

Within the development community, it is widely acknowledged that imposed solutions are unsustainable. Unless there is local ownership in the community, the results will not be maintained when the foreign assistance is withdrawn. In state-building policies, this is translated into a need for working with (nurturing and supporting) national reformers in building effective, legitimate and resilient state institutions (OECD, 2007a: 1). However, a growing body of literature is arguing that international engagement must be more robust. A certain degree of international control and imposition is necessary in order to bring about a

well-functioning state in which the ruling elites are accountable to the people (Krasner, 2004; Rotberg, 2003). In direct opposition to this view, critical scholars claim that if state-building processes are driven from the outside, they will produce artificial states that are accountable to international institutions instead of domestic societies (Chandler, 2006). A third and final argument claims that the impact of outsiders is minimal: local power structures tend not to be significantly altered by international attempts at state-building (Sørensen, 2008; Barnett and Zuercher, 2006).

The debate is obviously ongoing, partly because there are no clear answers to the questions it raises regarding how resilient links between state and society emerge, partly because the notion of outsiders building states for others evokes disturbing images of 'civilizing missions'. The necessity to place a territory under some form of international administration has been accepted in specific cases (East Timor, Kosovo), but the idea that it might become a permanent or recurrent feature of international life is instinctively felt to be dangerous, since it undermines the principle of sovereign equality on which the current international order is built (Mortimer, 2004: 12). Restrictions on sovereignty are thus justified by referring to the situation as an emergency, a period of exceptionality while 'normality' is being restored. But when the period of exceptionality lasts for years, perhaps decades, it is increasingly difficult to regard the arrangement as an 'emergency'. Then the question of 'who guards the guardians?' becomes increasingly pressing.

The fragile states debate, which takes as its starting point the inadequacy of domestic institutions, thus ends up pointing to the inadequacy of international institutions. In doing so, it raises the question of whether a strengthening of the sovereign state model is the most appropriate solution to the problems encountered in the periphery of the global economy. And if not, what are the alternatives? Is there a need to re-introduce formal trusteeships or perhaps establish other forms of global governance that can ensure accountability between those with real decision-making power and those whose lives are affected by these decisions?

Conclusion

The main thrust of this chapter has been that the fragile states debate is about politics. It is about values, principles and interests, some of which are fundamental to the way we perceive the present world order. This instils the debate with a strong tension between idealism and realism. This is most evident in the notion

that security is indivisible and that ‘a world where some live in comfort and plenty while half of the human race lives on less than \$2 a day, is neither just nor stable’ (White House, 2002: 21). Such enlightened self-interest builds on the assumption that there is a high degree of overlap between ‘our’ national security and ‘their’ human security. Not least following 9/11, this notion has been subjected to criticism. Observers from both sides of the political spectrum are arguing that the current concern with fragile states indicates a return to a state-centric approach to security, an approach that emphasizes the need for a stable regime that is in control of what goes on within and across its borders. Some see this as a deplorable regression to the practice of propping up ‘friendly’ yet repressive regimes, while others see it as a much needed revision of overly ambitious liberal foreign-policy aims. Either way, this division constitutes one of the main fault lines in the fragile states debate: what policy implications are to be drawn from the widely held belief that security is ‘indivisible’?

Another major fault line is related to the perception of the security-development nexus. As outlined above, the nexus has not led to a complete fusion of security and development. The two fields remain clearly identifiable as distinct policy domains, and tensions between them are clearly evident in the fragile states debate. A core point of contestation revolves around which domain matters the most. The consensus over seeing the two as interrelated is thus often replaced by disagreement on whether – in the final analysis – development is a prerequisite for sustainable peace, or whether it is the other way around? What is more important, freedom from fear or freedom from want?

In a sense, this need for focusing and prioritizing is the core challenge. It indicates that all good things need not necessarily go together. It thus points to real dilemmas and to the tough choices that have to be made between different values, each held dear by the international community.

References

- Annan, Kofi (2005) *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All. Report of the Secretary General*. UN document no A/59/2005, New York: United Nations.
- Barnett, M., and Zuercher, C. (2006) *The Peacebuilders Contract: How External Statebuilding Reinforces Weak Statehood*, paper prepared for the Research Partnership on Postwar Statebuilding (<http://statebuilding.org>).
- Beall, Jo, Goodfellow, Thomas, and Putzel, James (2006) Policy Arena: Introductory Article on the Discourse of Terrorism, Security and Development, *Journal of International Development*, Vol. 18, pp. 51-67.
- Carothers, Thomas (2002) The End of the Transition Paradigm, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 5-21.
- Chandler, David (2006) *Empire in Denial: The Politics of Statebuilding*, London: Pluto Press.
- Chesterman, Simon (2004) *You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration and State-Building*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Clapham, Christopher (2002) The Challenge to the State in a Globalized World, *Development and Change*, Vol. 33, no. 5, pp. 775-795.
- Dobbins, James (2007) *The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building*, Washington, DC: Rand Corporation.
- Dollar, D., and Levin V. (2005) *The Forgotten States: Aid Volumes and Volatility in Difficult Partnerships*, Summary paper prepared for DAC Learning and Advisory Process on Difficult Partnerships, World Bank, Washington
- Duffield, Mark (2001) *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*, London and New York: Zed Books.
- Fukuyama, Francis (2004) *State Building: Governance and Order in the Twenty-first Century*, London: Profile Books.
- Hippel, Karin von (2002) The Roots of Terrorism: Probing the Myths, *Political Quarterly*, pp. 25-39.
- Keefer, Philip, and Loayza, Norman (eds.) (2007) *Terrorism, Economic Development and Political Openness*, Washington DC: World Bank.
- Krasner, Stephen D. (2004) Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failed States, *International Security*, Vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 85-120.
- Marshall Monty G., and Goldstone, Jack (2007) Global Report on Conflict, Governance and State Fragility, *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, Winter 2007, pp. 3-21.
- McGillivray, Mark, and Feeny, Simon (2007) *Aid Allocation to Fragile States: Absorptive Capacity and Volatility*, Helsinki: United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research.

- Menkhaus, Ken (2004) *Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Adelphi Paper* 364.
- Møller, Bjørn (2007) *Terror Prevention and Development Aid: What We Know and Don't Know*, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.
- Mortimer, E. (2004) International Administrations of War-Torn Societies, *Global Governance*, Vol. 10: 7-14.
- OECD (2007a) *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States & Situations*, Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
- OECD (2007b) *Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States*, Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
- Paris, Roland (2004) *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Patrick, Stewart (2006) *Weak States and Global Threats: Assessing Evidence of 'Spillovers'*, Washington DC: Center for Global Development.
- RAND (2007) *Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks*, Washington DC: RAND Corporation.
- Rotberg, Robert I. (ed.) (2003) *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Sending, Ole Jacob (2004) *The Political Dynamics of the Security-Development Nexus*, Paper presented to ECPR/SGIR, September 9-11, 2004, The Hague.
- Sørensen, Georg (2008) *The persistence of weak states – and the little outsiders can do about it*, paper prepared for the ISA Annual Meeting, San Francisco, March 2008. University of Aarhus, Denmark.
- Straw, Jack (2002) *Order out of Chaos: the Challenge of Failed States*, in Mark Leonard (ed.), *Re-ordering the World: The Long-Term Implications of 11 September*, London: The Foreign Policy Centre.
- White House (2002) *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, Washington DC: The White House.

