Privatisation and foreign direct investment in mainland Tanzania, 1992-98

CDR Working Paper Subseries no. iv. 99.1, March 1999 
Peter Gibbon 
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Acknowledgement

Thanks to Ole Therkildsen (CDR) for his comments on an earlier draft.

Abstract

This paper presents the fullest currently available information on 83 of the just over 100 ‘real’ privatisations occurring in Tanzania from January 1992 to June 1998. This information is supplemented by a sketch of the non-privatisation based foreign direct investment (FDI) position over the same period. Privatisation revenue roughly accounted for a third to a half of all FDI. Projects in the agro-based sectors comprise the bulk of both privatisation and non-privatisation based investments in number, but the great mass of FDI is accounted for by projects involving mining and power.

Introduction

This paper is a brief descriptive summary of developments with respect to privatisation and foreign direct investment (FDI) in Tanzania since the second half of the 1980s, particularly since 1992. The objective is to bring together existing data sources and to identify some broad patterns. Little or no analytical comment is provided. Privatisation and FDI on Zanzibar are not discussed.

The privatisation process in mainland Tanzania started in the second half of the 1980s with the sale of a number of state farms/plantations, particularly in the sisal sub-sector, and before the formation of a Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PSRC) to oversee the process, in 1992. The most spectacular of the early divestments was the reacquisition by Lonrho of its Mufindi Tea Plantations in 1985, restoring to the company property which had been nationalised in 1978. Many of the sisal farms were sold for tiny amounts (US$ 20-30,000), in some cases also to persons who may have been former owners and amid recriminations concerning favouritism, bribery and fraud.

Between 1989 and 1993 there were very few privatisations indeed, although a number of parastatals were liquidated. It was not until mid-1993 that the PSRC managed to complete valuations of the majority of important parastatals and began the process of advertising their sale, mostly by open tender. Tenders are expected to include information on proposed new investment as well as offers for the existing assets, and are evaluated on the basis of both.

According to a PSRC official interviewed in mid-1997, the principal problem in reaching agreements with private buyers has concerned company liabilities, especially foreign hard currency debts. Most buyers expect some kind of debt forgiveness. In the case of foreign debts, the government is not in the position to assist. A second problem has been that of current employment contracts and/or retrenchment benefits. Under Tanzanian law the latter are the sole responsibility of the owner.

Even after the formation of the PSRC a number of privatisations were set in train by other branches of government. The administration of some companies which were originally heavily indebted to the National Bank of Commerce (NBC) was transferred to the Loans andAdvances Realisation Trust (LART) when the latter was set up to take over NBC’s bad debts as part of the preparations for NBC’s own privatisation. LART sold at least one company (Tanganyika Packers) by private treaty without any kind of tendering process. In October 1998, PSRC also complained that they had not been informed of TRC’s granting to the Trans Africa Railway Corporation (see below) of a 20-year concession to operate parallel services on TRC tracks, an agreement which in some ways pre-empts TRC’s privatisation process.

Many of the buyers (and new investors generally) have taken advantage of donor-financed and/or subsidies in purchasing parastatals. Of particular importance in the Tanzanian case has been the Debt Conversion Scheme, a debt swap mechanism under which prospective investors could obtain hard currency intended for investment at a considerable discount. In other cases donor agencies (notably CDC and IFC) became minority shareholders of privatised enterprises. From a Danish viewpoint the most important example of the latter was Danida’s acquisition of a large minority share in the Cooperative Rural Development Bank, floated in 1996 (see below). Donor agencies are also heavily involved in many FDI projects not involving privatisation.

Total numbers of real privatisations is hard to determine. Out of an original total of 387 parastatals, as of the end of 1996 according to a World Bank survey (White and Bhatia, 1998), there had been 123 divestments. Of these, 49 had been liquidations or asset sales, leaving 74 ‘actual’ privatisations, leasings or restitutions. As of different dates in June 1998 different sources were claiming 156, 183, 198 and 230 divestments respectively. The most reliable of these figures is probably 183, cited in a Presidential statement on May 28, 1998. This figure included 61 bankruptcies and 14 ‘other closures’, as well as leasings and sales of assets of liquidated parastatals. Even amongst the remaining 108 enterprises, there is probably some double counting. As in the case of the sisal and sugar parastatals (see above and below) - and even Tanzanian Breweries - a single parastatal may be recorded as ten separate units for the purpose of privatisation, even when a single buyer acquires the parastatal as a whole. Eight of the privatisations listed by the World Bank as having taken place in 1996 were simply sales of individual buildings (offices, warehouses or even houses) belonging to parastatals which were liquidated or disposed of separately. In other instances privatisations have been claimed without final articles of agreement having been signed. The most spectacular cases of this kind occurred in 1994 when a Kuwaiti prince offered to take a series of companies, including some important ones (Southern Paper Mills, Tanganyika Packers, National Ranching, Tanzania Oxygen (TOL), Tanzania Fertiliser and Tanga Steel Rolling Mill) in exchange for building a new national stadium (worth US$ 60m according to his own valuation). The status of this deal was never fully clarified, although at least two of the companies in question (TOL and Southern Paper Mills) have been subsequently sold to other owners. Presumably it was also the case in relation to, e.g., Mnazi and Msuwero sisal estates (see below), whose sales have each been reported on two separate occasions.

Total privatisation revenue as of the end of 1996 was stated to be US$ 126m (White and Bhatia, op.cit.), and as of June 1998 was variously said to be US$ 237.3m or US$ 252.8m, much of which is claimed to have been used in the reduction of Tanzanian national debt (with only marginal impact however, since at this time the latter stood at around US$ 8bn).

The paper contains information of varying degrees of completeness on 83 ‘real’ privatisations, of the roughly 108 mentioned above, which occurred by mid-1998. Of these, 40 involved sales to foreign owners, with Kenyans and South Africans comprising the largest national groups, and with an overall average value (where the value was known) of US$6.1m. 35 involved sales to Tanzanian nationals, with an average value (where the value was known) of US$ 0.8m. Information on vales was available in 48 cases in all (total value US$ 156.7m, overall average US$ 3.3m).

Data is presented on a sector-by-sector basis.

FDI in general

A few remarks will be added at the end of each section concerning the general picture of investment, particularly FDI, in the sector over the same period. Official data sources on FDI (and private investment generally) are even more unreliable than that on privatisation. The main source until its dissolution, the Tanzania Investment Promotion Centre (about to be replaced by the Tanzania Investment Facilitation Authority), counts all proposed investments as completed projects, for example [ In October 1998, TIPC claimed that a total of 1,025 new investment projects had been established since 1990, with a total value of UD$ 3.2bn (!).] . According to UNCTAD (World Investment Report 1998, pp 362-403), over the period 1993-98 Tanzania attracted total FDI of US$ 20m (1993), 50m (1994), 120m (1995), 150m (1996) and 250m (1997), i.e. 602m in all [ The same figures are found in the World Bank ’s (1998) Global Development Finance CD-Rom] . This stands in marked contrast to the period 1986-91, when FDI averaged less than US$ 2m/year, and against a total inward stock of FDI of only US$ 698m. Tanzania’s FDI inflows over the 1992-97 period were exceeded in Sub-Saharan Africa only by South Africa, Ghana, Namibia, Uganda and the established oil industry destinations of Nigeria and Angola. FDI in Tanzania easily exceeded that in traditionally favoured Anglophone destinations such as Kenya (total US$ 98m) and Zimbabwe (total US$ 412m), as well as the so-called African ‘tiger’, Mauritius (US$ 144m).

Actual sales and investments. 1993-98

Food, drink, agricultural, forestry and animal products

1992: 70% of the Tanita II cashewnut processing plant to Oltremare (Italy) for US$ 0.1m. The buyer made an investment pledge of US$ 4m.

1992-93: 80% (each) of six separate sisal estates (Msuwero, Rudewa, Mnazi, Torondo, Mkumbata and Ndungufor a total of US$ 1.3m equivalent. Msuwero was sold to Azania Investments (Tz), Rudewa to Farmlands Ltd (Tz), and Mnazi, Torondo, Mkumbata and Ndungu to Export Trading Ltd (Tz).

1993: 55% and 60% respectively of Morogoro and Mwanza Tanneries to African Trade Development Group (Tz), a company owned by the Tanzanian Asian businessman and CCM Member of Parliament Rostam Aziz, for US$1.2m and US$0.9m equivalent respectively.

1993: 75% of Tanzanian Tanneries (Moshi) to IPC (Tz), a company owned by the country’s largest African businessman, Reginald Mengi, for US$0.7m equivalent. All three tanneries have remained largely idle up to late 1998; virtually all Tanzanian hides and skins are currently processed in India, Pakistan and east Asia.

1994: 46% of Tanzania Breweries to Indol (South African Breweries) for US$ 21m. Indol pledged to invest US$ 26m. However US$ 17m of this was their own evaluation of the value of a brewery in Bloemfontein, which was to be dismantled and reassembled in Mwanza. Indol’s share was raised to 50.5% in 1998, when in addition to disposing of some of its shares to Indol, the Tanzanian government disposed of 10% of its holding to the public. 9% of shares are held by IFC. In September 1998 TBL became the Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange’s second company to acquire a listing.

1994: unknown percentage of Tangold Jams to Azania Industries (Tz). Terms of deal unknown [ By 'unknown' is meant that the relevant details have not appeared in the sources listed below.] .

1995: two sisal processing factories, in Kibaha and in Masasi, leased under unknown terms and to a Singaporean/Swiss joint venture and Kenya Assets Ltd (Kenya) respectively.

1995: unknown proportion of Nachingwea Factory to Beachcomber Ltd (nationality unknown). Terms of sale unknown.

1995: unknown proportion of Nilarna Factory to Export Trading Ltd (Tz), terms of sale unknown.

1995: 45% of Tanzania Cigarette Company to R J Reynolds (US). Purchase price US$ 55m; additional investment pledge US$ 32m. Reynolds acquired a further 5% of TTC in February 1998. Under Reynolds, TCC in 1997 lauched a new regional export market brand, ‘Aspen’, with which it claimed to have won 2% of the Kenyan market that year.

1995: 100% of Mbozi Coffee Farms to unknown Tanzanian buyer for US$ 1.4m equivalent.

1995: 80% of Multipurpose Oil Processing Co to unknown Tanzanian buyer for US$ 3m equivalent.

1995: 100% of National Poultry Co Ltd to unknown Tanzanian buyer for US$ 1.4m equivalent.

1995: 70% of Imara Wood Products to unknown local buyer for US$0.2m equivalent.

1995: 100% of Mkata Saw Mills to unknown local buyer for US$0.2m equivalent.

1996: unknown proportion of Dakawa Oil Seed Farm to unknown Tz company. Terms of sale unknown.

1996: unknown proportion of Rubber Plantations to unknown Tz company. Terms of sale unknown.

1996: unknown proportion of National Milling Co to Tz company. Terms of sale unknown.

1996: 70% of Mbagala Cashewnut Processing Factory to Oltramare (Italy). Terms of deal unknown. Oltramare started the first mechanised cashew processing factory in Tz in 1965. It appears to have produced only for a short time before being closed. The Mbagala factory was started in 1978; it has the country’s largest capacity but never operated.

1996: unknown percentage of Tanganyika Packers to Al-Ghurair (nationality unknown). Terms of deal unknown. Sale deemed irregular and cancelled in 1997

1996: the 435 acre Mukuru coffee estate in Hai (Kilimanjaro) leased to N G Emmanuel (Italy) for 15 years. This is one of 42 estates nationalised in 1973 and subsequently managed by the Regional Cooperative Union in Kilimanjaro (KNCU) and its constituent unions. The other 41 estates are due to be let in the second half of 1998.

1996: sale of unknown proportion of shares in the Coffee Marketing Board processing plant, to CMB (Overseas) Ltd (nationality unknown) for US$0.4m.

1996: unknown percentage of Chanjuru sisal estate sold to Bahamis Co Ltd (nationality unknown) on unknown terms

1997: sale of eight other hitherto unprivatised sisal estates to Katani Ltd (origin of company unknown), part of a package which also involved sale of a sisal spinning mill and a sisal carpet factory (see under Manufacturing).

1997: sale of another sisal estate (Mnazi, Tanga) (1647 ha) to Le-Marsh Enterprises (Kenya). Terms of agreement unknown, except that Le-Marsh made an investment pledge of US$ 0.43m. Also according to the World Bank’s (1998) Global Development Finance CD-Rom, 80% of this estate was already sold in 1992 for US$ 0.3m

1997: 100% of the Tanzanian Tobacco Marketing Board (in effect, the Morogoro tobacco processing plant) to United Leaf Tobacco Company (US) for US$ 16.4m.

1997: an unknown share of Mufindi Pyrethrum Extraction Plant to International Chemical Products Ltd (South Africa) for US$ 1m.

1997: unknown but controlling share of Southern Paper Mills Mgololo (Iringa) to ABC Incorporated, a little known US company. Terms of agreement unknown.

1997: takeover of Utegi and Musoma dairy farms, Mara, for inclusion in a mainly Mwanza-based joint venture, 40% owned by the Lake Victoria-based entrepreneur Jumanne Kishimba (active inter alia in cotton and general wholesaling and retailing) and 60% owned by Tetrapack (Sweden). Terms of takeover unknown. Initial investment US$ 1m, said to be partly financed by Furaha Finance (see below).

1997-98: 40% of East Usambara Tea Company and of Derema and Monga tea estates (Usambara) (total 882 ha) to the Commonwealth Development Corporation for US$ 3.7m. CDC is also contributing US$ 0.14m in equity to a new (parastatal) Tanzania Tea Packers’ factory in Mufindi.

1998: 75% of Mtibwa sugar factory (Morogoro) plus a 4,000 ha. estate (a subsidiary of the sugar parastatal SUCECO) sold to Tanzania Sugar Industries Ltd, a consortium of three Malaysian companies and an unnamed local investor, for US$ 21m. This estate was partly privatised to its own management on an informal basis some time prior to sale.

1998: 75% of the Kilombero Sugar Company (another subsidiary of SUDECO) sold to Illovo Sugar Ltd (South Africa) (55%) and E D & F Man (a UK-based commodity brokerage also heavily involved in cocoa and coffee) (20%). Terms of the agreement unknown. SUDECO, like its sisal counterpart, appears to be following a policy of disposing of its various estates individually. The Moshi estates of its Tanganyika Planting Co subsidiary have been advertised separately.

1998: 100% of Sao Hill Saw Mill (part of the parastatal TWICO) sold to Escarpment Forestry Co Ltd (ultimate owners Fjordgløtt (Norway)) for US$ 0.05m. NORAD (the designers, financers, and implementers of the project since its inception in the early 1970s) apparently forced the Tanzanian government to reject an earlier bid from CDC, and after the sale granted the new owners a rehabilitation loan of US$ 1.3m. Escarpment Forestry already had some mobile saw mill activity in the area and owns saw mills in Uganda and Malawi. According to Development Today (No 15, 1998) ‘the important aspect of Fjordgløtt’s involvement in East Africa is to position itself for future trade in CO₂ quotas’.

There has been considerable non-privatisation based FDI in this sector in the 1990s in fishing/fish farming and in cotton ginning. Approximately 11 fish processing plants have opened on the Tanzanian part of Lake Victoria (there are similar numbers on both the Ugandan and Kenyan shores too), all for exporting chilled or frozen Nile Perch. Kenyan Asians are the largest single group of investors in this sub-sector, but the largest single investment is by a Finnish-controlled joint venture. Investments are in the range US$ 0.2- 3.0 m. Permission to construct a prawn farm in the Rufiji Delta, with an announced investment pledge of US$ 180m (most of it apparently a loan from the European Investment Bank), has also been recently granted. The main figure behind this project is the dominant one in Tanzanian fisheries and marine transport, J R Nolan.

Approximately 15 privately-owned cotton ginneries have also opened in the Lake Victoria area. The majority of investors are Tanzanian Asians and Arabs (unit investment around US$ 0.5m, excluding cotton purchasing capital) but the largest single investments are by MNCs (Cargill), Nipha (India), by Kenyan Asians and Tanzanian Africans (investment in the range US$ 0.8 - 5.0m). Five further private ginneries were under construction in 1997.

Cut flower production is said to have expanded substantially since the early 1990s; the Economist Intelligence Unit (Country Report No 2, 1997) quoted export values for 1995/6 of US$5m, and asserted that values had probably reached US$ 10m in 1996/7. In 1998 there were ten floriculture businesses (up from seven the previous year), occupying an area of around 160 ha in all, around Moshi and Arusha. Three of the companies received seed capital (in one case US$ 0.8m) from the Africa Project Development Facility Programme IFC and ADB). Some at least of the companies are contracted to the German importer Omniflora, which until the opening of cold storage at Kilimanjaro International Airport (see below) had chartered three flights a week from Nairobi to Europe to carry the Tanzanian product. Exports are mostly of roses, apart from one company (Hortanzia) specialising in Lizianthus.

There has been an expansion of activity by some very long-term private investors in this sector. For example Unilever (UK), whose takeover of Brooke Bond many years ago gave it tea plantations in Tanzania dating back to 1946, increased its planted area by 500 hectares between 1990 and 1996, giving it approximately 40% of total Tanzanian production.

In the brewing sub-sector a private brewery (Kibo Breweries Ltd) was launched in Moshi by the Tarimo family; in 1997 Kenya Breweries acquired an 80% stake in the company and made an investment pledge of KSh 1.5bn in expanding the plant, which is expected to be in production in late 1998. Worldwide Guinness Brewing (UK) is also amongst the investors in the project.

Mining, petroleum, power

1994: additional 30% of Williamsons Diamonds (since the 1940s a joint venture between the Tanzanian government and De Beers) to De Beers (South Africa), bringing the latter’s overall share to 75%. Price paid US$1.2m, plus a US$ 7.5m investment pledge.

1994: unknown share of Tanalec (supplier of electrical engineering plant to the electricity parastatal Tanesco) to Asea Brown Boveri (Switz-Swe) for unknown sum. ABB made an investment pledge of US$ 6m.

1995: 70% of Tanga Meerschaum Co. to local buyer for US$0.2m equivalent. This was an asset sale, i.e. the mine was closed.

1996: 51% share of Tanzania Cables to Dae Sung Cable (S Korea) for US$ 1.1m plus an investment pledge of US$ 12.5m. Tanzania Cable currently supplies 25% of Tanesco’s electric cable requirements. (The sale of Tanzania Cables to the Chandaria Group, a Kenyan Asian company, had been announced in 1993; it seems this sale never took place.)

The minerals sector and related downstream activity was little developed before or after independence and the minerals parastatal had few properties of value. But Tanzania is regarded as an extremely interesting country for ‘new’ development (the term ‘new’ is apostrophised as many of these are currently exploited by local, informally-organised artisanal miners) and there has been a steady stream of companies engaged in prospecting and exploration. In 1997 Tanzania achieved the second highest level of exploration expenditure in Africa (US$ 57.7m, or 13.3% of the total).

At the end of 1998 there was one new mine in production (the US$ 48m ‘Golden Pride’ gold project at Lusu (Nzega) by Resolute (Australia) and Samax (UK/Swiss in ownership, but listed in Canada) (financed by a consortium of banks led by Barclays Capital International)) and several others stated by their principals to be nearing or just entering the development stage: a US$ 211m gold project at Bulyanhulu (Kahama) by Kahama Mining Co (Sutton Resources (Canada)); a US$ 45m nickel-cobalt project at Kabanga (Kagera) by Anglo American (South Africa) and Sutton Resources (Canada); a US$ 5m gold project in Shinyanga by Rangold (South Africa) and Pangea (Canada); a project in Tarime by East African Mines/Afrika Mashariki Gold Mines (majority ownership by Portman Mining and minority ownership by Spinifex Gold (both Australian but registered in Canada)) and CDC, declared investment unknown but apparently with funding by CDC; large projects by Samax and Ashanti Goldfields Ltd (Ghana) (the latter valued at US$ 90m) on adjoining properties in Geita, and other Anglo American projects at Buzwagi and Nyamulilima Hill. A story in the Financial Times (25 November, 1998) stated that some of the projects involving only junior companies (especially ones like Sutton Resources without a track record) were stalled as a result of the impact of the falling gold price and the Bre-X fraud on investment backing by North American banks.

East Africa Mines also acquired rights also for the Buckreef, Rwamagaza and Buziba gold reserves in Geita after these were withdrawn from Placer Dome in 1992. In addition, a consortium of Madaba (nationality unknown), Anglo-American (South Africa) and Pangea (Canada) have acquired rights for the Mwime reserve in Kahama.

For most of 1998 discussions were reported to be taking place between Samax and Ashanti Goldfields on jointly developing their Geita properties. In August 1998 this culminated in Ashanti making a US$ 135m bid for Samax, whose principal properties are confined to those described above. If completed, this deal would represent the first inter-MNC M&A to have its origins entirely in post-liberalisation FDI in Tanzania. Trading of prospecting licenses between foreign investors is also common. In August 1998 Anglogold (SA) paid US$ 2m for a 60% share of 11 licenses covering areas south of Lake Victoria which belong to Maiden Gold (Australia).

The Bulyanhulu project (the only gold project which involves underground mining) has been highly controversial. When artisanal miners were evicted from the site in July 1996 their organisation claimed that more than 50 members were buried alive by earth movers. Their claim was taken up by Amnesty International, which called for an international investigation in its 1997 annual report. Both the company and the government denied the claim, which was also unsuccessfully pursued in the Tanzanian parliament by the mainly Sukumaland-based opposition party, UDP.

An interesting case of the creation of a Tanzanian state-based/private joint venture in a branch where there had earlier been no state activity was the formation in early 1998 of a company called Meremeta. Meremeta will buy gold from artisanal miners, initially in Geita district and later in the other main artisanal gold-producing areas. An advertisement in BusinessTimes announcing its inauguration described it as owned 50-50 by the GoT and Triennex (South Africa). The advertisement appeared under the name of the Ministry of Defence (!)

There has been exploration for petroleum and gas for many years in the offshore Songo Songo field, near Kilwa. Petroleum has not so far been discovered in commercially exploitable quantities, but natural gas has. In 1994 a joint venture was formed between the Tanzanian government and two Canadian companies, TransCanada Pipelines and Ocelot for a US$ 300-350m gas-to-electricity project. TransCanada Pipelines and Ocelot’s combined investment in the project is US$ 50m. Finance for the project comes from the World Bank (US$ 200m), the Commonwealth Development Corporation, the European Investment Bank. This project was suspended in mid-1998 during the IRTL saga (see below).

The South African former electricity generation parastatal Engen, now majority owned by Petronas of Malaysia, is investing US$ 22m in either building or renovating Tanzania’s oil refining capacity in Dar es Salaam. Details of the investment are sketchy but the deal includes a license to distribute petroleum products and an option to open a chain of petrol stations throughout the country.

In September 1998, El Paso Energy International (US) and a previously unknown local company, Africommerce International (MD Elisante Muro) announced a joint (50-50) venture to build an petroleum pipeline from Dar es Salaam to the Lake Victoria port of Mwanza. On completion, the pipeline will end the current dependence of the Great Lakes region on petroleum imports via Mombasa (and on politically-connected Kenyan road transporters). The investment is claimed to be worth US$ 380m, which if true makes it the biggest single investment in Tanzanian history. The joint venture, which it is assumed is very highly geared, has hired Fieldstone Private Capital as financial advisers.

Despite the immanent availability of an additional 150 MW of power from the Songo Songo project, sometime in 1995 the Tanzanian government approved a project said by the constructor at different times to be worth US$ 150m or 163m to build a new 100 MW diesel and gas thermal power station at Tegeta, Dar es Salaam. The project came with a contract with TANESCO to supply the national grid. Amidst allegations of irregularities, the project was awarded on a turnkey basis to Independent Power Tanzania (IPT), a joint venture between Mechmar Corporation (Malaysia) (70%) and VIP Engineering and Marketing (Tanzania) (30%). VIP are the little-known Tanzanian minority partner of another Malaysian company (Technology Resources Industries) in the locally-based Tritel mobile phone company. Technology Resources Industries is a sister company of Malaysian Airlines and the chairman of the two companies, Tajudin Ramli, has also been mentioned as a potential bidder for Air Tanzania (see below) and the three banks to be formed from National Bank of Commerce (see below). The principals of VIP is James Regemalira (VIP) and of Mechmar, Datuk Majid. Independent Power Tanzania’s own investment in the power station project is not known. The contract negotiated between the Ministry of Energy and IPT priced the electricity to be generated at 250% higher than the estimated price of electricity from Songo Songo, according to the World Bank meaning that thelocal electricity supply parastatal TANESCO would not be able to honour its contracts with both schemes without tariff increases so high that macroeconomic targets would be missed. Concerns were also raised about stiff penalties which were built into the contract in case of either renegotiation or default. Throughout the first half of 1998 increasing pressure was mounted on the Tanzanian government to cancel the contract by the World Bank and the IMF. The former threatened to withdraw its finance of the Songo Songo scheme and the latter to suspend Tanzania’s Structural Adjustment Facility. Nevertheless, the turbines seem to have been actually installed. In mid-April 1998 the Tanzanian government appeared to state that it was publicly defaulting on the contract, claiming that the turbines installed were medium rather than slow speed, as specified in the contract. (IPT counter-claimed that the change to medium speed had been made at the request of the Tanzanians), and that only US$ 90m had been spent on the project as against a claimed minimum of US$ 150m. Seven representatives of IPT were at the same time served with deportation orders. According to the London Financial Times (20 April, 1998 ‘some donors acknowledged that serious damage had been done to Tanzania’s investment profile’). By early July 1998 however, the Tanzanian government apparently confirmed the contract would be honoured. Then in December 1998 it was announced that the Tanzanian government had referred the case to the UN International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.

Up to Mid-April 1998 the scandal in many ways repeated the course of events following a similar deal by the Ministry of Energy with a Tanzanian-owned private company (part of the same group, whose principal is J R Nolan, planning the huge prawn farm investment described elsewhere in this paper) the first time that a tender was let for extra generating capacity in Dar es Salaam, in 1994-95, except that the deal with the Nolan company was cancelled.

Intermediate goods

1992: 100% of Mbeya Ceramics to Kyela Rift Valley Foods (Tz). According to the World bank Global Development Finance CD-Rom this was a non-financial transfer.

1994: unknown percentage of Saruji Industries (Wazo Hill cement factory, Dar es Salaam) to Scancem of Norway. Purchase price unknown. Scancem made an investment pledge of US$ 24m.

1994: 70% of Kisarawa Brick Factory to Universal Electric Ltd (Tz) for US$1.4m equivalent, plus an investment commitment of US$1.2m equivalent.

1996: 60% of Tanga Cement Factory to Holderbank Financier Glaris (Switz). Purchase price not disclosed. Holderbank, the former managing agent, made an investment pledge of US$ 13.5m.

1997: 25% of Tanzania Oxygen Ltd (producers of gas for industrial and medical applications) was offered for sale by flotation on the newly opened Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange (until September 1998 it remained Tanzania’s only locally-listed company [ Uganda has had a stock exchange since 1997 without a single company becoming listed. The only recognisable stock exchange in the region is Kenya ’s, begun in 1954.] ). The underwriters managed to dispose of only a little less than a half of the publicly offered shares, despite the company’s monopolystatus and an apparently highly positive profits prognosis. In September 1998 TOL’s board suspended a review of the company’s accounts and ordered both the company’s MD and its Finance and Administration Manager to take indefinite leave of absence ‘in order to defuse a management wrangle’.

1998: 100% of TANESCO’s wooden pole plant to Meehrab Transport Ltd (Mbeya) for US$ 0.85m (downpayment US$ 0.34m).

1998: 75% of Mbeya Cement Company to CDC (51%), Chilanga Cement Co (Zambia) (14%) and the National Social Security Fund of Tanzania (10%). CDC is also a majority shareholder in Chilanga Cement Company. Terms of sale unknown.

Manufacturing

1992: 100% of Aluminium Africa (ALAF) to Chandaria Group (Kenya) (either former owner or former managing agent). Terms of sale not known. The main production line of ALAF is roofing sheets.

1993: 70% of Morogoro Shoes to Gulled & Co (Tz) for US$0.8m equivalent.

1993: 100% of Tanzania (Bora) Shoes to Naz Hauliers (Tz) for US$1.2m. Shoe production was never re-commenced and in January 1998 Bora’s new owners announced that they were investing US$ 4m in plant to produce cycle tyres and tubes and beach sandals.

1993: 50% of Tanzania Electric Goods Manufacturing Co. to unknown foreign buyer in exchange for an investment pledge of US$3m.

1994: unknown percentage of Light Source Manufacturers to Tata Group (India). Terms of sale unknown.

1994: 57% (former government share) share of Tanzania Metal Box to Carnaud Metal Box International (UK) (a subsidiary of Crown Cork and Seal). According to the World Bank Global Development Finance CD-Rom this was a non-financial transfer.

1994: government share (unknown size) of General Tyre to Continental Ag. (Germany). Terms of sale unknown.

1995: 60% each of Keko Pharmaceuticals to Docare Ltd (nationality unknown) for US$ 1.1m

1995: 60% of Tanzanian Pharmaceutical Industries to Pharmaceutical Investments (nationality unknown) for US$1m.

1996: unknown percentage of National Bicycle Co Ltd to Avon Cycles (foreign company, ownership unknown) for US$ 2m

1996: unknown proportion of Tanganyika Tegry Plastics to unknown local buyer for US$ 0.9m equivalent.

1996: unknown proportion of shares of Tanzania Liquid Storage to United Molasses Ltd (nationality unknown) for US$ 0.9m

1996: unknown percentage of National Engineering Co Ltd to Motor Trading Agencies (foreign company, ownership unknown) for US$ 1.7m.

1996: 51% of Friendship Textile Mill (Urafiki) to Diequi (parastatal from People’s China) in a debt for equity swap. Diequi made investment pledge of US$ 11m.

1997: 100% of Kibo Paper to Industrial Promotion Services (subsidiary of the Kenya-based Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development); the company is now called Tanzania Litho Ltd. Terms of sale unknown. Industrial Promotion Services made an investment pledge of US$4.8m, of which US$2.4m was financed by the French government agency PROPARCO.

1997: unknown percentage of Blanket Manufacturers to JTK (Tz), a company connected to the former managers for US$ 0.34m (in local currency).

1997: unknown percentage of Tanganyika Weaving and Dyeing (Sunguratex) to the Sonea Group (Tz), a local company which at the same time bought the most modern private textile mill (CIC) then under receivership and which is said to be in the process of buying the parastatal Taboratex, the most modern spinning mill (vintage 1990) in the country. The terms of the Sunguratex agreement are unknown, but plant would no longer be run as integrated mill.

1997: unknown percentage of Ubungo Garments to VMB Investments (Tz), a company connected to the former management.

1997:100% of Ubungo Spinning Mill (subsequently, New Ubungo Spinning Mills) to Raffia Bags (India (?), owned by the Ladha family, but with a polyester sacking plant already in operation in Dar es Salaam). Raffia Bags agreed to pay US$ 2.4m, with a down-payment of US$ 100,000. Its investment pledge was US$ 5m over five years.

1997: sale of the sisal spinning mill in Tanga and the Kilosa Carpet Factory (also sisal) to Katani Ltd (nationality unknown) for US$ 6.5m. The deal also included eight sisal estates (see above).

1998: 100% of Tanzania Packages Manufacturing Co (Morogoro) to Rostam Aziz, MP and Mohamed Enterprises. Terms of agreement unknown.

1998: 70% of Ubungo Farm Implements to M/s Tianjin Machinery Import and Export Corporation (a Chinese state company) in exchange for cancellation of Chinese loans to the company and for a new concessional loan. The company will henceforth be known as China-Tanzania Ubungo Machinery Co Ltd. This distribution of ownership was said to reflect ‘the agreed past contributions of the two governments in the establishment of UFI’. An investment pledge of US$ 3m has been made.

1998: 100% of Morogoro Canvas Mill to Abood Group (Tz) for Tsh 2.125bn (US$ 3.125). This is the third time that a deal has apparently been concluded for sale of this enterprise. Its sale to Carpet Management Services (nationality unknown) in 1994 for US$ 2.3m was cancelled after workers took PSRC to court. In 1997 negotiations were almost completed with a Saudi company, El Senid.

Unlike the other sectors reviewed here, the manufacturing sector generally has witnessed a steady process of disinvestment over the last decade. This is evident for private enterprise no less than public. Disinvestment has been most marked in the textiles, paper and wood productssub-sectors. Together with chemicals and soap, it was in these sub-sectors that most manu facturing in Tanzania was historically concentrated.

All but one of the leading private textile companies which were operating in the 1980s has closed and the majority of textile parastatals remain unsold (and are probably unsalable, although in a number of cases prospective buyers actually paid deposits before pulling out of negotiations). Unlike in Kenya, there has been comparatively little interest by Asian investors in ‘quota-hopping’ garment industry investment. One company that did follow this path, the South Korean-owned Gooryang (based in Dar es Salaam and with 1,100 employees), managed to secure a contract for supplying men’s woven shirts to the two major US discount retailers, Wal-Mart and K-Mart, but the contract was cancelled in 1998 - according to Gooryang after Wal-Mart learnt of a US State Department report condemning ‘human rights abuses’ in Tanzania. Wal-Mart later denied this version of events, citing instead commercial reasons (including, significantly, ‘our inability to gain regular and complete access to the facility in Dar es Salaam’.

A Mauritian company, Nash Holdings, is the 80% owner of another new textile producer, Karibu Textile Mills, which started production in July 1998, producing khanga, vitenge and bedsheets for the local and regional markets. Employment by the end of 198 was 400, but it was stated that there were long-term plans for an investment of US$ 7.5m and employment of 1,000. The company’s Tanzanian minority shareholder is Shamshudin Jetha, owner of Furaha Finance (see below).

There has been little private interest evident in the paper and wood products sub-sectors, although Kibo Industries has apparently been privatised (investor, date and terms of agreement unknown).

Since the early 1990s a major source of complaints by Tanzanian manufacturers, from textile to tyre manufacturers has the large-scale import of contraband or grey market products. For example, in a half-page advertisement in the Business Times (12 June, 1998) General Tyre stated:‘the liberalisation process imposed upon local industry has failed miserably due to the Tanzanian government’s inability and unwillingness to control its borders...the progress made by the local breweries, soft drinks bottlers and tobacco companies is to be commended. Those industries however produce inexpensive consumable products characterised by high demand (and are not threatened by smuggling)...We strongly believe that VAT will not solve the smuggling problem...the rampant well-organised smuggling syndicates must be stopped...Tanzania Revenue Authority still has significant elements of corruption within its organisation...we invite you to witness smuggling...first hand by boarding any passenger ship from Zanzibar to Dar es Salaam (and) observe passengers with quantities of consumer items for delivery to shops in Dar es Salaam...These are small-scale operators, (their) large-scale equivalents smuggle full containers through the port of Dar es Salaam or dock small vessels and unload goods along the mainland coast daily...’

Banking, insurance

1994: 19%of Tanzanian Post Bank to unknown buyer for unknown amount.

1996: flotation of Cooperative Rural Development Bank. Danida purchased substantial minority share holding (terms unknown). A majority of the equity was purchased by Regional Cooperative Unions and by some primary cooperative societies.

Final preparations were being made to sell the parastatal former monopoly commercial banker, National Bank of Commerce (NBC), in late 1997. The bank will be split into two companies, one specialising in commercial banking and the other in rural micro-credit. The Tanzanian government plans to retain a 30% share in the banks until they have been operating commercially for 2-3 years, which it will then dispose of through an IPO.

Commercial banking has been the site of very considerable private sector interest in Tanzania since 1992, when market entry was liberalised. The main foreign entrants have been Meridien BIAO (Zambia, since collapsed), Stanbic (South Africa), Citibank (US), Eurafrican Bank (Belgium, but with participation from the French Proparco, TDFC and IFC), Standard Chartered, Kenya Commercial Bank and Trust Bank (Kenya [ In September 1998 Trust Bank ’s Kenyan parent was placed under statutory management after failing to meet its clearing obligations. This followed a run after press reports of mismanagement.] ), and the International Bank of Malaysia. The most prominent new locally-owned banks are Greenland Bank and Akiba Commercial Bank (29% owned by Triodos Bank and 17.4% owned by FMO, both of Holland, and apparently managed by Rabobank (also Holland)). As far as the commercial banks are concerned there is a concentration on very low-risk activities (especially foregn exchange transactions) and locations (only three of the banks have branches outside Dar es Salaam, and these only in Mwanza and Arusha).

There are also at least three finance institutions/‘near banks’ (Savings and Finance Ltd, Crown Finance and Lease Ltd and Furaha Finance Ltd) and a host of Bureaux de Change, all of which seem to be locally owned. Crown Finance is a Kenyan company whose MD is Anver Rajpar, also a director of Eurafrican Bank. Its sister companies include Fidahussein & Co (Tz) and General Shipping Agencies of Pakistan [ Another principal is Abdul Naseer.] . Amongst the most interesting of the new ‘near banks’ is Furaha Finance Ltd, with claimed assets of Tsh 7bn (US$ 10.4m). Furaha is one of the few financial institutions directly involved in commodity trade on its own account, in 1997-98 season financing a considerable part of cotton purchasing in the Lake Victoria area and acting as a lint exporter, and in 1998-99 operating its own ginnery in Shinyanga and acting as a minority shareholder in a small Dar es Salaam textile plant (see above). Furaha’s directors include Al-nasir Jetha, G R Mwamkonda (former deputy MD of NBC) and Bhiku Lukindagila (CCM MP for Kahama and a private cotton trader).

The Tanzanian insurance sector was opened for foreign participation in 1998. The first company to declare its intention to enter the market was Tanzindia Assurance, a consortium of Indian, Kenyan and Tanzanian investors led by the major Indian players General Insurance Corporation and Life Insurance Corporation and already operating in Kenya since 1979 under the name Kenindia. Second was Jubilee Tanzania, again already operating in Kenya, with a majority share holding held directly or indirectly by the Aga Khan. This were joined by Royal and Sun Alliance (UK) in September 1998. Other new insurance ventures (e.g., Heritage A.I.I.) are also offshoots of Kenyan companies.

Hotels and tourism

1994: unknown percentage of Embassy Hotel (Dar es Salaam) to Karmal Juma & Sons (former part owner). Terms of sale unknown. The sale was stalled for the following three years as another former part owner had sold its shares without consulting Karmal Juma or PSRC.

1994: 77% of New Africa Hotel (Dar es Salaam) to Hotel & Resort Investments (Switz) for US$ 1.2m. The company, which is a consortium of Tanzanian Greek, Russian and Swedish (Skanska-Jensen) interests and which was also responsible for developing the Dar es Salaam Sheraton, made an investment pledge of US$ 16m.

1995: 100% of New Savoy Hotel to unknown local buyer for US$0.2m equivalent.

1996: Leasing of the Mount Meru and Serengeti Safari Lodge Hotels to ACCOR-Novotel (France) for US$ 0.5m jointly. Length and terms of lease unknown.

1996: Most of the assets of the State Travel Service in two batches, one representing the STC workshop to an unknown foreign buyer for US$0.3m and the other the remainder of the corporation’s assets, to an unknown local buyer for US$0.5m equivalent.

1997: unknown percentage of Kunduchi Beach Hotel (Dar es Salaam) to AC Gomes (Tz, a company previously noted for its electrical shop on Azikiwe Street). Terms of sale unknown.

1997: 75% of New Safari Hotel (Arusha) to the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tanzania. Terms of sale not known. This was a rare case in which the existing minority shareholder (Grands Hotel of Mwanza) was outbid.

Like mining, fishing and cotton, tourism has been a sector of very high investor interest during liberalisation. Indeed, FDI without privatisation has been much more significant than privatisation itself, largely because the Tanzania government has chosen to lease and/or let out management contracts (including provision for rehabilitation) for, rather than privatise, the great bulk of its own hotels. The Bahari Beach (Dar es Salaam), Morogoro, Mbeya and Mkonge (Tanga) hotels were leased to Protea (South Africa, trading under the name Bushtrekker), while the remainder except those listed above(including Mount Meru Hotel and Serengeti Safari Lodge) or privatised directly have been leased to the ACCOR group (France), owners of Novotel. Mostly, the terms of these leases, and specifically their length and whether they contain a purchase clause, are not known. Only the cost to Novotel of leasing Mount Meru Hotel and Serengeti Safari Lodgeis known (see above). By 1998 the Protea lease of the Bahari Beach Hotel appeared to have been transferred to Hotel and Tours Management Ltd, a subsidiary of the parastatal Tanzania Development Finance Co.

Private investment in hotels and tourism outside of the privatisation process basically falls into three categories, although there are some important exceptions (e.g., the Tata group’s (India) ownership of Hotel Karibu (Dar es Salaam)). Mainly locally-owned companies- many connected to politically powerful individuals- have invested in coastal tourism around Dar es Salaam, while FDI is found mostly in the traditional northern tourist circuit and the major new Dar es Salaam hotels. Serena Hotels (owned by the Aga Khan and with five major hotels in Kenya) have invested US$ 33m in three luxury lodges and a tented camp on the northern circuit (as well as US$ 7m in the Zanzibar Serena Inn), and Sopa Lodges of Kenya have built hotels in the Serengeti and Tarangire Parks (despite heavy criticism of the sites by the Tanzania National Parks Authority). The most spectacular Dar es Salaam project was a new Sheraton Hotel, built by a Scandinavian (Skanska Jensen), Russian and local Greek consortium for a claimed US$ 150m. Finally, a number of long-term resident European expatriates have entered the budget tented camp/’farmhouse’/hunting/eco- tourism markets both on the southern and northern circuits and on Mafia island. Equally, if not more, spectacular has been tourist development on Zanzibar, a subject not covered here.

Other sectors

1998: granting of 25 year lease covering all airport services at Kilimanjaro International Airport to Kilimanjaro Airport Development Co Ltd (KADCO) (75% owned by Mott McDonald (UK), 24% owned by the Tanzanian government and 1% owned by Interconsult (Tz)). Terms of agreement unknown. After the lease was granted the parastatal Dar es Salaam Air Handling Co (DAHACO) (using cheap finance from the East African Development Bank) invested US$ 1.04m in cold storage facilities.

Other than in the sectors described above, most recent larger-scale private investment, both foreign and local, appears to be in what can loosely be called ‘communications’. Besides the case above, only one such investment has been linked to privatisation, however, and even in this case the link was not direct. The setting up of Alliance Airways in 1993 involved the Tanzanian government redesignating part of the property (including licenses for certain routes) of Air Tanzania Corporation to a joint venture with Uganda Airlines and South African Airways, under the latter’s majority control. Details of the arrangement are not known, but the minority Tanzanian state in the new company was taken out of the control of Air Tanzania. According to Air Tanzania sources reported in the Business Times (24 April, 1998) Alliance made a loss of US$ 30m in its first three years of operation. There are two other private airlines now operating inside the country. Since the formation of Alliance SAA has apparently pressed continuously for the absorption of the remainder of Air Tanzania and Uganda Airways, but the ATC board hasinsisted that the remainder of the company be privatised by public tender. The matter was still being disputed in 1997-8.

The French company ACCOR (see above, under Tourism) was the main investor (together with ATC and a local company, Taninvest) in Inflight Catering Services Ltd, a company based at Dar es Salaam airport. ACCOR claims to have invested US$ 3.5m in the project.

Another investment in this sector, which in the future may well have a link to privatisation, is that being planned by the Trans Africa Railway Corporation- whose main shareholder is a company called Comazor, jointly owned by the South African Infrastructure Investment Fund, South Africa’s state-owned rail operator Spoornet and Belgium’s Transerb. The project aims to create a rail link between the Lake Victoria region and Johannesburg by constructing a container trans-shipment centre between the Tanzania Railways Corporation system to the Tazara railway at Kidatu. The container centre project has in different reports been valued at US$ 2.5m and US$ 20m. It is supposed to begin operation in 1998.

Private investment in telecommunications has already been touched on. Besides Tritel the other main mobile phone network player is Mobiltel (US). Three companies, of which easily the largest appears to be Datel (main ownership indirectly with France Telecom, but with support from the French Proparco fund and from IFC)), have been licensed as ‘data operators’, i.e. internet service providers. Datel has made an investment pledge of US$ 10.5m. A local company, Jupiter Telecommunications (also apparently known as Payphone Tanzania Ltd), whose share holding is divided between two donor-supported funds (Tanzania Venture Capital Funds and Venture Capital Tanzania Ltd),has invested an unknown sum in establishing pay phones at post offices and larger street markets in Dar es Salaam. Private investment in printed and TV-based media (all ostensibly local) is also notable.

Land is meanwhile the subject of most smaller-scale local private investment, as well as being an integral part of most larger-scale investment packages. Except in the latter cases, land sales/leases never pass through the formal privatisation agencies however, and systematic information on them is extremely hard to come by.

As is normally the case, private investment in urban land is often linked to investment in construction. Dar es Salaam has seen a spate of expensive office as well as hotel developments in the second half of the 1990s. Amongst the largest of these is ‘International House’, whose construction costs are said to have been US$ 9m. As in most other cases in this category, the investment takes the form of a joint venture between a Tanzanian parastatal (in this case Tanzania Telecommunications Ltd) , a construction company (Mitshubishi/Konoike (Japan)), a foreign investor (Murray and Roberts Holdings (South Africa)) and a donor agency (IFC).

Conclusions

The sales listed here are mostly of relatively well-known parastatals. Others which were less known probably escaped the attention of the press (the main source). After 1995 numbers of sales accelerated, although they cannot realistically be expected to increase much further. Except for some of the Tanzania Tourist Corporation hotels, most of the ‘crown jewels’ have already been sold off. It is difficult to know exactly how this outcome should be read. Certainly, privatisation needs to be judged on grounds other than the total number of sales made.

One of these grounds should be the subsequent commercial performance/fate of the companies. Have they performed better than under state control ? Or the same ? Or were their assets acquired for reasons other than improving the existing business ? In general it is too soon to say. While there are a couple of clear instances of ‘successes’ (e.g., Tanzanian Breweries) there are other purchases which seem to have been for asset-stripping or broader ‘foot-in-the-door’ objectives.

Another ground should be the direct financial returns from the privatisation exercise as such. It seems unlikely that most of the US$ 237m figure cited above has been actually all received by the Tanzanian exchequer. As illustrated in a number of cases above, down payments made by purchasers have usually been rather small, and opportunities for default on later payments are correspondingly substantial. Even if buyers come up with the full amounts agreed, the question remains of how realistic the values obtained for the companies in question have actually been. Sales at below market value, driven either by corruption and/or by panic to meet IMF and/or World Bank targets regarding targeted numbers of sales or budget deficit levels or both, may well have occurred in some cases. This short survey has not looked into this question, and information on prices is sparse, but some prices which have been published look on the low side. For example, however bad its condition in 1994, was the New Africa Hotel in Dar es Salaam (which enjoys the city’s absolutely prime site) really worth only US$ 1.2m ? This in turn raises issues of the transparency of sales by tender, both in Tanzania and generally.

Turning to broader issues of investment both through privatisation and outside it, the following points may be briefly noted. Large-scale investment is firstly in the classic colonial/neo-colonial sector of exportable raw materials. Privatisation has proved the dominant investment mode in most of the traditional exported raw materials, for example tobacco, and new FDI in the less traditional ones - fish and (in the Tanzanian case) mining, where parastatal coverage was very limited. FDI is also the predominant investment mode for raw materials where strategic decisions were made not to privatise, or at least not to privatise immediately (cotton ginning, tourism). All the resulting investment remains of a very basic kind, with local downstream spin-offs into processing only where the latter is a precondition for the commodity to be exported (fish filleting and freezing, cotton ginning).

Investment is also clearly evident in the other classic colonial/neo-colonial sector of import substituting for those intermediate or manufactured goods which enjoy a high degree ofnatural protection: beer, cement, petrol products and arguably power generation and the services surrounding it. A majority of this investment is by privatisation, since the parastatals concerned enjoyed natural monopolies. The same observation could be made of some parts of the textile sector (bagging, blankets) as well as shoes prior to the emergence of the international trade in second-hand (or, more properly, second-foot) shoes.

At least at first sight, here are important exceptions to this dualistic pattern, mainly in producer services (banking, communications) and in construction. The implications of this are not fully clear, and deserve further attention.

As far as ownership is concerned, it seems that the colonial/neo-colonial pattern is again reasserting itself. Former corporate owners are prominent, as are companies headquartered in Kenya and South Africa (with the international division of labour between these countries largely based on levels of capital required for entry). Local investors involved both in privatisation and ordinary investment have mostly been from the ethnic minorities traditionally associated with business and trade. ‘Africanisation’ as it was brought about through the parastatals appears to large degree to have been reversed. The management buy-out and the IPO flotation, classic forms of northern hemisphere privatisation, are notable for their rarity. The assumption that northern hemisphere approaches in general are a relevant yardstick may be questioned, but at least the particular approaches mentioned may have preserved an element of national ownership.

The inability to secure a higher degree of national ownership has been one of the two main sources of political controversy arising in relation to privatisation. A second has been the modalities of certain of the sales and the prices which were realised from them, as in relation to the New Africa Hotel case mentioned above.Controversies around these questions have never crystallised into a clear anti-privatisation lobby or campaign, however - which have arisen by contrast around other elements of the liberalisation agenda, most recently the proposed liberalisation of firearms imports (Business Times, 3 Dec 1998).

Sources

Interviews at Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PSRC), Dar es Salaam, June 1997.

PSRC Secretariat. 1996. ‘Materials for Seminar on Privatisation for Honorable Members of Parliament’, Dodoma, April (mimeo).

Daily News, Business Times, The Guardian, Sunday Observer(all Dar es Salaam), Financial Times (London), Economist Intelligence Unit (London).

UNCTAD. 1997, 1998. World Investment Report(Geneva).

World Bank. 1998. Global Development Finance CD-Rom.

White, O.C. & A. Bhatia. 1998. Privatisation in Africa (World Bank, Directions in Development series).