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Swedish Development Cooperation with India - in a Poverty Reduction Perspective
CDR Working Paper 98.1, January 1998 Email your order for a paper copy to DIIS order form
Contents
Abstract The paper gives an overview of Sweden's development cooperation with India, viewed from a poverty reduction perspective. It is one of the products of a research project, entitled 'Comparative Study of European Aid for Poverty Reduction in India', carried out in 1997 by a group of four European and eleven Indian researchers. The paper deals with the evolution and composition of Sida's programme in India in the context of the donor strategy, assesses the project portfolio in terms of relevance for poverty reduction and discusses the donor-recipient dialogue, programme management and selected issues such as targeting, ownership and the involvement of NGOs. Compared to most other donors, Sweden has for years had a significant poverty orientation in its development cooperation with India. Since the inception of Swedish aid in the early 1960s it has been an overarching objective to help 'raise the level of living of poor peoples'. But like other donors Sweden has also used its development aid to look after Swedish business interests. Roughly two thirds of the Swedish programme is relevant for poverty reduction, the remaining third more linked to business interests. This compares favourably with most other donors. The effectiveness in terms of poverty reduction, however, can be improved through better targeting and a more 'hands on' approach to management, although the latter must be balanced against ownership.
Foreword This paper has been written as part of a large research project, entitled 'A Comparative Study of EU Aid for Poverty Reduction', a collaborative venture involving research institutes from ten EU countries. Development assistance from EU and EU member states as bilateral donors to India, Nepal, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Burkina Faso and Bolivia has been studied as part of the project. The India study has been carried out in 1997 by a group of four European and eleven Indian researchers. A synthesis report, authored by Aidan Cox, Steen Folke, Lau Schulpen and Neil Webster, with the tentative title, 'Do The Poor Matter? A Comparative Study of European Aid for Poverty Reduction in India', is planned to be published later in 1998. The aim of the India study is to investigate the effectiveness of aid from the European Commission and selected EU countries in contributing to poverty reduction. By poverty reduction we do not just mean improvement in income or consumption of the poor, but also amelioration of the conditions that are important for such improvement (e.g. health, education). We have conceptualised poverty reduction as a multi-dimensional phenomenon which involves changes in livelihoods, resources, knowledge and rights. We have selected six donors who have in common that they want to strengthen the poverty orientation of their development assistance, namely the European Commission, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The study has assessed the donor strategies, the donor-recipient dialogue, the recipient's perception of aid as well as the effectiveness in terms of poverty reduction of the programmes as such and a number of selected interventions in nine different 'sectors': watershed, irrigation, forestry, drinking water, primary health, primary education, women's training, urban housing and self-help projects (NGO-supported). In each sector, three-five projects supported by one or the other of the EU-donors have been selected and assessed from a poverty perspective. Most of the projects are found in Uttar Pradesh, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, but one project is located in Kerala, one in Madhya Pradesh and one in Rajasthan. Three Sida-supported interventions have been assessed as part of the study, namely the Lok Jumbish primary education programme in Rajasthan, the social forestry project in Orissa and the Integrated Child Development Services Scheme (ICDS) in Tamil Nadu. Detailed assessments of these are found in three mimeographed reports by our Indian colleagues (Banerjee, 1997; Kripa, 1997; Varghese, 1997). The three Sida-supported interventions are also dealt with in the relevant sections - on education, forestry and health - of Chapter 6 in the synthesis report. Hence they are mentioned only in passing here. Taken together the three interventions represent those parts of the Swedish aid that are most relevant for poverty reduction. But if the aim of our study was to make a thorough evaluation of Sida's aid to India, it would clearly be insufficient to assess only these three interventions. Nevertheless,they do shed light on a number of issues that are important in a poverty reduction context, and as such they are treated in the sector reports and the synthesis report. The purpose of this paper is to give an overview of Sweden's development cooperation with India, viewed from a poverty reduction perspective. It deals with the evolution and composition of Sweden's programme in the context of the donor strategy, assesses the portfolio of projects in terms of relevance for poverty reduction, and discusses the donor-recipient dialogue, programme management and selected issues such as targeting, ownership and the involvement of NGOs. Although the paper can be read independently, it should be seen as a background paper for the synthesis report which deals with the same issues at a more aggregate and comparative level. Similar background papers are being prepared for other donors. There are four main sources for this paper. One is documentary material obtained from Sida in Stockholm and from the Swedish Embassy in New Delhi. This includes both published and unpublished sources. Sida's assistance is well-documented, and I have benefited from the readiness to give me access to available material. The second source is extensive interviews with programme officers in the Swedish Embassy. I am very grateful to Jan-Olov Agrell, Elizabeth Narrowe, Anita Ingevall, Ted Grainer, Rita Sarin and Gunilla Essner for having patiently answered all my questions and for sharing their views. The third source is staff members involved in ICDS in Chennai (Madras) and Chengelpattu district who enlightened me during my visit there, notably D. Sabitha, Social Welfare Director, and D. Usha, Programme Officer. I tried to arrange a similar visit to the Lok Jumbish programme in Rajasthan, but since - according to the Chairman of Lok Jumbish, Mr. Anil Bordia - this would be very inconvenient, I had to give it up. The fourth source, lastly, is interviews with central government officers, of which the most important in this context was with Deepa Baghai Singh, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs. I owe my sincere thanks to all. Finally, I should like to thank Jan Olov-Agrell, Jerker Carlsson and Christer Holtsberg, who have all gone through the manuscript and made a number of suggestions and corrections that have improved the paper. Needless to say, however, they share no responsibility for the views presented. Copenhagen, January 1998 Steen Folke
Overview of Swedish Aid to India Since the 1950s, there has been development cooperation between Sweden and India, initially on a very small scale. But from the mid-1960s, when Sida was established, India has been one of the main recipients of Swedish aid, usually among the top three. [ This section draws heavily on Edgren (1997).] The total amount of Swedish aid to India since then has been around 1 bill. US dollars. At the outset Sida had six concentration countries; this number has since been gradually expanded so that by 1997 there were approximately 20 programme countries. Over the years India's share of Sweden's bilateral assistance has consequently been declining, but both in 1995 and 1996 India topped the list in terms of aid disbursed. A marginal part of the aid to India has been channelled through Swedish NGOs; this will not be dealt with in the following. In the 1960s and 1970s, the bulk of Swedish aid was in the form of import support, partly untied, partly tied to procurement in Sweden. Paper, fertilizers and a variety of industrial equipment were among the imported goods. The aid was offered partly as grants, partly as loans, but from 1975 the import support was provided exclusively as grants, roughly half tied and half untied. In the mid-1980s this type of assistance was phased out, but only to be replaced by mixed credits, i.e. project loans with a concessional element tied to procurement in Sweden. These loans have primarily been used for projects in the power sector, i.e. for generation and transmission of electricity. In the 1990s these mixed credits have constituted a significant part of Sweden's aid to India. No less than 723 mill. SEK has been allotted as grants and more than double this amount as loan to a single hydro power project near Uri in Kashmir, a turnkey project which at one stage employed around 350 Swedes. All the aid mentioned so far has aimed at supporting India's development efforts in general, but any impact in terms of poverty reduction is at best very indirect. The Government of India in particular has valued the untied aid that could help finance critical imports and reduce the balance of payments gap. The tied loans and grants evidently have also benefited the Swedish firms which have delivered the goods and services, but even on the Swedish side there has been some controversy over this. [ Ehrenpreis (1996:14) comments on SIDA's hydroelectric projects in a number of developing countries, incl. the Uri project in India: "Some of these very large projects ran into severe managerial planning and implementation problems with huge cost overruns. They were highly controversial in the public opinion, thus contributing to growing political criticism of SIDA and foreign aid in general ...".] One problem has been that most contracts have gone to some of the biggest Swedish firms, whereas small and medium-sized firms have only benefited marginally. In some instances, moreover, it has been contested whether the projects were commercially viable - and hence did not fulfil the DAC criteria for development assistance. In any case this part of the Swedish assistance is the least interesting in the context of the poverty reduction objective. So without denying the possibility of a poverty reducing impact of this type of aid in the following we shall concentrate on the other part, namelyproject and programme grants to specific sectoral activities, often with a direct poverty reduction objective. Project and programme grants only gained prominence in the Swedish assistance to India in the 1980s. Already in 1974-75 the board of Sida and the Swedish Parliament took decisions that paved the way for a reorientation of the development cooperation with sectoral interventions as the medium and direct poverty reduction as a major objective. But it took a long time to translate the new policies into concrete activities. Some projects were started in the late 1970s, but it was not until the mid-1980s that this part of the development programme came to dominate the Indo-Swedish development cooperation. One reason for this is that poverty-oriented project aid takes a long time to prepare, and through the 1980s unspent balances kept accumulating in the aid budget. The change of policies in the mid-1970s was partly brought about by public debate in Sweden focusing on the poverty issue. It was criticised that Swedish aid to India was essentially used to finance industrial imports. The Indian governments were quite happy with this kind of assistance (most of it untied then), but the Swedish critics would not accept that nothing was done to directly assist the poor. At a more general level Swedish development assistance since its inception had been supposed to contribute to the fight against poverty, and the discrepancy between this noble goal and Sida's practice in India simply had become too glaring. [ Edgren (1997:18) comments: "In the media and public debate in Sweden, the plight of the poor in India and the apparent lack of progress in alleviating their lot made it increasingly difficult for SIDA's board and directorate to explain the high proportion of Swedish aid being used for industrial imports".] But owing to vested interests on both sides, import support remained a dominant part of Swedish aid to India until the mid-1980s. The Indian government wanted the untied import support to continue as long as possible and the Swedish government wanted the same for the aid tied to procurement in Sweden. In the 1990s the overall goals of Swedish development cooperation are the following: economic growth; economic and social equality; economic and political independence; democratic development; sustainable use of natural resources and protection of the environment; gender equality. An overarching objective is to contribute to improving the living standards of the poorest groups. Because of domestic financial problems the Swedish government like many other donors in recent years has cut down the overall level of development aid so that by 1996 the development cooperation funds had been reduced to 0.7 per cent of GNP (as against around 1 per cent in the early 1990s). More than 70 per cent of the aid is bilateral and less than 30 per cent multilateral. [ In 1997 the total Swedish aid frame was 11.9 bill. SEK (0.7 per cent of GNP) out of which 10.2 bill. SEK was allotted to international development cooperation. Aid through international agencies took up 2.8 bill. SEK and aid through Sida 6.9 bill. SEK. Cooperation with Eastern and Central Europe accounted for 0.8 bill. SEK (incl. 0.5 bill. SEK through Sida) and miscellaneous (incl. Sida's administration) 0.5 bill. SEK (Source: "Svenskt bist å nd 1997", Sida, Stockholm 1997).] In 1995 Sida was reorganised and enlarged by merging the old Sida with formerly independent agencies which until then tookcare of industrial development, technical cooperation and support for development research. Although development cooperation is seen as an integral part of Sweden's foreign and security policy Sida has remained a separate entity outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This duality at headquarters gives rise to some ambiguity and administrative problems, but it is likely at the same time to allow more weight to be given to the development goals (as opposed to other foreign policy goals).
Poverty Reduction in Swedish Aid to India The first Swedish parliamentary act on international aid from 1962 explicitly stated that the main aim was 'to raise the level of living of the poor peoples'. Ever since this objective has figured prominently. In a 1977 proposition the aim was further elaborated: 'to contribute to raising the standard of living of poor peoples by means of direct attacks on poverty and its causes'. But in terms of operationalisation of this aim there has always been a good deal of ambiguity. In the 1977 proposition the aim was specified to be pursued through four very different, but interlinked objectives: economic growth, socio-economic equality, economic and political independence and democratic development (gender and environment concerns were added later). In practice such broad objectives imply a risk that the poverty reduction objective may get lost. The recurrent controversies over Swedish aid usually have focused on the extent to which the aid has effectively addressed the needs of the poor. Massive Swedish assistance for structural adjustment programmes in Africa in the 1980s engendered a revival of this debate. On the one hand, Sweden has consistently directed a major part of its bilateral assistance to some of the world's poorest countries. [ Carlsson (1997:21), however, makes an important qualification of this claim. Whereas it is true that the Swedish programme countries generally are among the poorest in the world, these countries have recently received less than 30 per cent of the total Swedish aid (i.e. 3,758 MSEK out of 13,351 MSEK paid out in 1994/95). Cfr. also de Vylder (1996).] But on the other hand - like in other donor countries - there has always been an element of self-interest, more particularly Swedish business interests in the way the aid was planned and executed. And these interests have tallied much better with the economic growth objective than with activities constituting a direct attack on poverty. So, although the modalities have varied over the years - e.g. the use of direct aid tying - in practice part of the aid has been poverty-oriented and part of the aid more business-oriented. In the 1980s Sida gradually built up poverty-oriented project programmes in India. Some of these took the form of direct support to Indian government programmes and some were implemented through UN agencies. In other cases, management and technical backing were left to Swedish consultancy firms. Sida since then has had a very limited field presence and a 'hands off' attitude to the projects and programmes it supports. This attitude has tallied verywell with an Indian desire to avoid becoming dependent on expatriate staff. The major interventions have been in the forestry, health, drinking water and education sectors. In 1994 Sida set up a 'Task Force on Poverty Reduction' to review the experience and propose methods to improve effectiveness in terms of poverty reduction. A number of studies on various aspects of aid and poverty were commissioned. These, however, did not cover the business- and research-oriented parts of Sweden's international development cooperation - included in the reorganised Sida. The task force in 1996 published a synthesis report, 'Promoting Sustainable Livelihoods', which suggests a number of changes in Sida's approach to poverty reduction. Among the recommendations is increased emphasis on recipient participation, gender sensitivity, goal-based planning and donor coordination. The report also stresses the need to promote a poverty reduction agenda in policy dialogue. In continuation of the work of the Task Force, the Swedish government in its letter of instruction to Sida for 1995/96 gave priority to the poverty reduction objective. The important work of the Sida Task Force on Poverty Reduction in the mid-1990s has established a foundation for better operationalisation of the poverty oriented assistance, but the fundamental ambiguity remains within the programme. The merger of Sida with BITS (Board for Industrial and Technical Support), Swedecorp and SAREC (Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation) could open up for the introduction of the poverty reduction objective also in the business- and research-oriented parts of Swedish assistance, but it could also - and perhaps more likely - work the other way towards 'commercialisation' of Sida's poverty oriented activities.
Donor Country Strategy In December 1996 a new country strategy for Swedish development cooperation with India was adopted, covering the period 1997-2001. [ The new country strategy is outlined in three Sida documents, "Landstrategi Indien (1996 - 2001)": "Landanalys" (country analysis), "Resultatanalys" (analysis of results) and "F ö rslag till strategi" (strategy proposal). Only the latter is available in an English version. On the background of these documents the director general of Sida on December 20th 1996 decided the new strategy as described in a document entitled "Inriktningsbeslut f ö r Sveriges utvecklingssamarbete med Indien 1997 - 2001". This decision was preceded by an enabling decision by the Swedish government dated 21st November 1996.] The main objectives are stated to be: 1) fighting poverty and improving living conditions, not least for women and children, and 2) contributing to sustainable utilisation of natural resources and reduction of pollution. Special emphasis is put on innovative and catalytic projects and programmes. The indicative 'country frame' is given as 300 mill. SEK per year, somewhat less than in the preceding years. In terms of sectors, the three main ones will be the social sectors (education, health), energy & environment problems in the modern sector and natural resources (soil, forest, water). In the strategy, the poverty alleviation objective is linked directly to the support to social sectors. Itis envisaged that more than 60 per cent of the budget will be allocated to the social sectors in 1997, but this will be gradually reduced to 40 per cent in 2001. Apart from the main sectors, part of the frame (1 per cent in 1997, 10 per cent in 2001) will be used for a consultancy fund and 'exchange' (of technical and scientific knowledge between India and Sweden). A conspicuous feature of the strategy is geographic concentration. In the future assistance to the social sectors will be concentrated to two states, namely Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu. It is planned to establish a special project office for the activities in Rajasthan in order to improve monitoring of existing as well as planned projects. In preparation for the new India country strategy a number of documents were commissioned, some of them discussed in a (September 1995) seminar and published in the volume, 'Sharing Challenges: The Indo-Swedish Development Cooperation Programme'. A remarkably self-critical analysis of the results of the existing programme has informed parts of the new strategy. Some of the changes inherent in the new strategy have already been described, e.g. the choice of sectors, the geographical concentration etc. From a poverty reduction perspective, the continued weight accorded to the social sectors is of course a very positive feature, although the planned gradual decrease from over 60 per cent to 40 per cent of the total budget over the five-year period weakens the thrust. In the agreement between the Swedish and the Indian government on development cooperation 1997-99, [ "Agreement between the Government of Sweden and the Government of India on development cooperation 1997 - 99", Stockholm, 28th November 1996.] only the aid directed to the social sectors is presented under the heading 'poverty alleviation'. This does not mean that other parts of the Swedish aid may not contribute to poverty alleviation. Especially in the support for natural resource management (soil, forest, water), it must be expected that the poverty reduction objective will figure together with the sustainable resource management objective, but it remains to be seen how the trade off between the two will work out. And in the 'energy sector & modern sector's environment problems (pollution)' it is unlikely that poverty reduction will figure prominently. The same is true of the consultancy fund and the envisaged 'exchange' of experiences and expertise in technical and scientific matters between the two countries. So on the whole substantial parts of the future programme will have an uncertain relationship to the poverty reduction objective. It is obvious that the parts of the strategy which are least poverty-oriented are those which are most interesting for Swedish business and the broader Swedish 'resource base'. Regarding the geographic concentration, it is interesting to notice that there has been a significant dilution compared to the original proposal for country strategy conceived in the development cooperation section of the Swedish Embassy. The proposal envisaged an even greater concentration of all types of future Swedish development assistance to Rajasthan. This made sense both because concentration is likely to improve aid effectiveness, because the experience in this state so far has been good, and because Rajasthan is one of the poorest states in India. From a poverty reduction perspective such a concentration would entailinteresting new opportunities. But in the event the decision taken at Sida headquarters and backed by the Swedish government only prescribed a concentration to Rajasthan (and to a lesser extent also Tamil Nadu) of the support to social sectors, whereas other types of assistance may be given both to these and to other states. Even within other sectors (energy, environment) the aim will be to concentrate to a small number of states, but not necessarily poor states. It is quite evident that the strategy adopted in comparison with the original proposal has compromised on poverty orientation, and it is equally obvious that this will make it easier to take care of the interests of the Swedish resource base. Let it be added that the dilution of geographic concentration is also in accordance with the general view of the Indian government which opposes too much individual donor concentration.
Portfolio of Projects Sectoral Composition In the 1990s the sectoral distribution of Swedish aid has been as follows: Disbursement of Swedish Aid to India, 1990/91
Source:"Sweden's Development Assistance in Figures and Graphs 1995/95", Sida, 1996 plus "Sida Financial Country Report - India", April 1997. It can be seen that throughout the 1990s (except the latest year) the health sector has been the most important. Water & sanitation has been significant until recently, where education has 'taken over' as the other important social sector. Forestry has lost and energy gained ground from the early to the mid-1990s. But the energy figures must be interpreted with caution; they mirror fluctuations in disbursement in the large Uri hydro power project (the disbursement for energy alone in 1989-90 was 468 mill. SEK). Outside the country budget a variety of activities are supported, notably assistance through NGOs and through BITS (Board for Industrial andTechnical Support). From 1992/93 to 1994/95 a remarkable concentration took place so that the number of Swedish-assisted interventions under the country budget was reduced from 24 to 13.
Source:Appendix 1 in 'Landstrategi Indien', Sida 1996, plus own categorisation. The above list shows the main projects under implementation in the 1990s with project period and total amount indicated. The list also provides a rough categorisation of their relevance for poverty reduction, but not indicating whether they have been successful in achieving this objective. This is based on a simple classification: 1) Direct: Interventions which address poverty reduction (in a broad sense) directly and seek to target the majority of the benefits to the poor. 2) Indirect: Interventions with a plausible link between the activity and poverty reduction - explicit or implicit - which can be expected to bring substantial benefits to the poor, though others may also benefit. 3) Other: Interventions which may bring benefits to the poor, but the linkage between the intervention and poverty reduction is less clear or likely to occur only in the long run. A simple calculation gives the following distribution of the interventions: Direct poverty reduction: 17% Indirect poverty reduction: 51% Other: 32% This must only be taken as a very rough indication of the interventions' relevance for poverty reduction, and it does not take into account the differences in project periods that vary a great deal. An alternative calculation could divide the total amounts by the number of years of each intervention, but since the whole exercise is necessarily crude, this is not considered worthwhile. In any case this distribution compares quite favourably with that of most other donors in terms of the relevance for poverty reduction. Roughly two-thirds of the programme is considered relevant for poverty reduction and only one-third less relevant or irrelevant. However, there is still room for improvement. Through more careful targeting and participatory approach, no doubt, it will be possible to increase the share of direct poverty reducing interventions from the current low level of 17 per cent. A trend in that direction can be seen in the table, e.g. by comparing the old social forestry projects (indirect) with the more recent wastelands development and tree growers cooperative projects (direct). For the sectors which are most interesting in a poverty reduction context the following gives a brief description of the major interventions. Health In the 1980s and 1990s there have been two main types of interventions in the health sector: Support for the National Programmes to Combat Leprosy, Malaria and Tuberculosis plus Immunisation Total appropriation: 443 mill. SEK (1984-95). In these programmes the Swedish aid has been channelled through a UN agency, either WHO or UNICEF. The programmes to combat the communicable diseases are successors to the highly successful programme that eradicated smallpox, but much less successful. [ Ramasubban (1997:85) criticises them in the following way: "Individually, the programmes have suffered from gross weaknesses in organisation: consistent lack of strong direction and rational structure, poor training of personnel, and even worse quality control in the matter of equipment and skills for efficient epidemiological surveillance, diagnosis, case holding and treatment, as well as failure to ensure extensive spread of health education so that people come forward for and complete treatment".] Sida has done little more than contribute to the financing. The immunisation programme has given priority to preventing diseases among pregnant women and infants - and as such is more related to the second type of health interventions. However, by 1995 Sida had phased out its support for all these programmes. Support for National Programmes Aimed at Improving the Health and Welfare of Women and Children Total appropriation: 783 mill. SEK (1989-99). Sida supports two national programmes of this nature, viz. 'Child Survival and Safe Motherhood (CSSM)' and 'Integrated Child Development Services Scheme (ICDS)'. CSSM employs a comprehensive strategy to improve the health of mothers and children and in particular to reduce maternal and infant mortality: providing and upgrading infrastructure, particularly related to primary health centres, supply of drugs and contraceptives, training of health personnel, especially the village birth attendants, immunisation, oral rehydration treatment, prophylactic schemes, etc. The focal person in the scheme is the female health worker who works directly with the mothers and children at the grassroots level. The Swedish aid to CSSM is implemented through UNICEF; the Swedish aid to the programme will be terminated in 1999. ICDS addresses the health and welfare of mothers and children primarily through provision of food for lactating mothers as well as for 2-5 year-old children in anganwadis (kindergartens). In addition the anganwadi children are given pre-school education. The focal person in the scheme is the Anganwadi worker. The programme takes special effort to reach poor women and children. The Swedish assistance to ICDS focuses on three districts in Tamil Nadu; in these districts the aid finances an extra Anganwadi worker in each institution and is moreover used to strengthen the educational part of the programme, introduce kitchen gardens and add a special component offering training to adolescent girls. Sida directly supports the implementation of ICDS in the three districts and it finances a core staff at theDepartment of Social Welfare of the Government of Tamil Nadu. In the first phase the Swedish aid covered only one district; now it is in its third phase. Sida's support to ICDS has been assessed under this study. Drinking Water and Sanitation Total appropriation: 410 mill. SEK (1985-96). For a number of years Sida has assisted the national rural water supply and sanitation programme. In addition Sida has supported rural water and sanitation projects in three districts in Rajasthan as well as a district in Orissa and one in Tamil Nadu. In both the national programme and the district projects implementation has been left to UNICEF. In Rajasthan a special objective of the project has been to eradicate Guinea Worm. All the projects have emphasized the links between water and sanitation and all have built on community participation. The Rajasthan project in particular has used women's groups to raise awareness about health and hygiene issues as well as providing a forum to discuss wider woman and family concerns. The Swedish assistance for the water and sanitation projects was phased out in 1996 and this sector does not figure in the new country strategy. However, water issues will be addressed under the new natural resource management sector. Primary Education Total appropriation: 355 mill. SEK (1987-99). Two major primary education programmes in Rajasthan have received Swedish aid. The 'Shiksha Karmi' programme targets remote and backward areas within the state where it is difficult to get and retain ordinary teachers. The 'Shiksha Karmis' are 'barefoot teachers' trained and financed under the programme, ideally one male and one female in each village (but it has proved difficult to recruit female teachers). In order to raise awareness and support the work of the teachers, village level educational committees have been established under the programme. Shiksha Karmi was initiated by an NGO and later scaled up in collaboration between the NGO and the Government of Rajasthan. The 'Lok Jumbish' (i.e. 'People's movement') programme is a somewhat larger programme aiming at providing elementary education to all. Work towards this goal is built on a community-based approach involving village groups, school-building committees, women's groups, etc. A special effort is being made to enrol girls and children from SC and ST households in school. The programme is managed by the 'Lok Jumbish Parishad', an autonomous society with close relations to the Government of Rajasthan. Sida's support for 'Lok Jumbish' has been assessed under this study. Forestry, etc. The main interventions in the forestry sector are of two types: Social Forestry Programmes Total appropriation: 735 mill. SEK (1987-96, i.e. excl. phase I). Since the early 1980s Sida has assisted social forestry programmes in three states, Tamil Nadu, Orissa and Bihar. The main objective has been to check degradation of forests by tree planting on village and private lands. The idea behind is to give villagers access to fuelwood, fodder, small construction wood and minor forest produce on such lands so as to provide an alternative source and hence relieve pressure on the forests. Millions of trees have been planted and temporary employment created on a large scale. The programmes have been administered by the respective State Forest Department and Swedish consultancy firms have provided managerial and technical backstopping. By and large implementation has been top-down and with emphasis on meeting physical targets. [ The 1996 Country Strategy ("Landstrategi Indien 1996 - 2001 - Resultatanalys", p. 2) gives the following assessment of the social forestry programmes: "In these programmes the physical targets in terms of planting have been fulfilled, the social and distributional targets hardly at all" (my translation).] By 1996 all these programmes have been phased out, but a small-scale continuation, concentrating on training and institution building, is under negotiation with the Government of Orissa. Sida's assistance to the social forestry programme in Orissa has been assessed under this study. Cooperative Tree Growing and Wasteland Development Total appropriation: 130 mill. SEK (1991-98). In the 1990s Sida has supported two smaller projects which can be considered a new generation in afforestation and integrated wasteland development. These projects are not administered by the Forest Department, but by authorities outside the state government structure, in one case a cooperative organisation, in the other an autonomous organisation working closely together with NGOs. The emphasis in both these projects is on popular participation and institution building. Future Programme The country strategy for the next five years operates with a country budget around 300 mill. SEK per year. However, in order to ensure that the country budget is actually utilised, an amount roughly one-third larger than the envisaged disbursement is planned for. The sectoral composition planned is as in the table below. It can be seen that the social sectors will continue to be biggest, but gradually be reduced from over 60 per cent of the total in 1997 to around 40 per cent in 2001. Conversely support for energy and environment problems of the 'modern' sector (pollution) will growfrom around 15 per cent of the total in 1997 to 30 per cent in 2001. And 'exchange' (technical, scientific), which also includes a consultancy fund, will grow from almost nothing to around 10 per cent. Support for natural resource management (soil, forest, water) will remain around 20 per cent of the total. On the whole, the strategy entails continuity as well as change. Within the social sectors, health will remain most important, whereas education will 'replace' water & sanitation. Assistance to combat environmental problems in the modern sector is new, and the massive assistance to forestry is replaced by a broader approach to improving natural resource management. Outside the country frame it is foreseen that aid can be given in the form of credits to Swedish firms, assistance to 'a few larger projects', support for research and business cooperation, humanitarian assistance, aid through Swedish NGOs and support for human rights & democracy. So there is scope for substantial aid outside the country frame. Planned Sectoral Distribution of Swedish Aid, 1997
Source:"Inriktningsbeslut för Sveriges utvecklingssamarbete med Indien 1997-2001". It is conspicuous that Sida-supported projects have been widely spread over many states in India - as can be seen from the list of projects above. This of course is administratively demanding and tends to reduce aid effectiveness. It has only been possible because of the administrative model which in many cases has entrusted project implementation to UN agencies or Swedish consultancy firms in collaboration with Indian (central and state) government institutions. Thus the wish for geographical concentration is understandable when at the same time there is a move towards a more 'hands on' approach. However, the new country strategy in the approved version will only help partly because the proposal to concentrate substantially on Rajasthan was watered down.
Donor Essentially there is little genuine policy dialogue between the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Utrikesdepartmentet/Sida) and the Government of India. The 'Indo-Swedish Aid Consultations', which take place at regular intervals, are highly formal. Like in the case ofother donors the Swedish government to a large extent decides the scope, content and modalities of its development assistance, and this is subsequently accepted by the Indian government. Although an important objective of the country strategy procedure is to promote dialogue, the new country strategy, for instance, was largely a donor-driven affair. It did, however, use inputs from independent and eminent Indian experts serving in the role as consultants. Moreover, during the high level consultations between the two sides in Stockholm in November 1996 the Indian side did express a desire that Sida 'should continue to focus on poverty alleviation and infrastructure' (Agreed minutes, point 2.2). The Ministry of Finance/Department of Economic Affairs did also offer comments (mostly of a minor nature) on the draft version of the new strategy. But concerning the poverty orientation of the strategy, the only comment was related to the experience of the social forestry project in Orissa and its eventual extension. Whereas Sida views this project as highly unsuccessful in reaching the poor and creating sustainable institutions, the government of India insists that it has been much more successful in both respects and ought to be extended on a massive scale (and not as Sida would like, on a small scale, mainly to strengthen institutions). A major point raised by the Indian government side was a desire that all Indian states should have access to money from Sida (i.e. against concentration). During implementation of projects obviously there is a running dialogue between Sida (i.e. the development cooperation section in the Swedish embassy) and line ministries in Delhi as well as the respective departments and other government institutions in the states. The quality of this dialogue depends to a great extent on the attitude and commitment of the government bureaucrats (and the Swedish staff). Sida like other donors has been pushing in order to be able to deal more directly with the states. However, the situation is still that in principle all agreements have to be approved by the government of India. But in practice Sida has been able to engage in a meaningful and somewhat formalised dialogue with the government of Rajasthan (with 'agreed minutes', etc.). In some cases negotiations are carried out in a three-party forum (Sida, government of Rajasthan, government of India), but all agreements are routed via ministries in Delhi and with the Ministry of Finance as the principal party. In practice most of the Sida-supported projects in Rajasthan have a strong poverty focus. In contrast there has hardly been any dialogue with the government of Tamil Nadu under AIADMK (Jayalalitha) rule. But even here the Swedish aid has a strong poverty focus. In Orissa the dialogue has been difficult, especially in relation to the big social forestry project.
Organisational Structure and Personnel In the Swedish Embassy there is a development cooperation section with four Swedish and three Indian programme officers. Decisions concerning development cooperation are delegated by the ambassador to the head of this section. The development cooperation section wasintegrated in the embassy a few years back; this move was opposed by many in Sida, fearing that other concerns than development would influence development assistance after the integration. Subsequent events have shown that this fear was not entirely unwarranted. There was no parallel integration of Sida into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Stockholm. This lack of correspondence has created a somewhat awkward situation. The head of the development cooperation section refers through the Ambassador to the Ministry, but also directly to Sida headquarters. Problems arise when Sida and the ministry disagree. There is little doubt that Sida's considerable autonomy is an advantage for the development and poverty reduction concerns, but it is also clear that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the last word and uses this partly to take care of other concerns. In terms of decentralisation - vis-a-vis headquarters in Sweden - Sida in India is in an intermediary position more or less like Danida, although with less staff: much less centralised than Germany or EU, but not as decentralised as the U.K. Considering the size and variety of the Sida-supported programme in India, the number of Swedish staff is relatively small. This is closely linked to the prevalent 'hands off' attitude of Sida which will be dealt with in more detail below. But even under the new country strategy, which will move in the direction of a more 'hands on' approach, it is not envisaged that the number will increase. Instead, the number of locally recruited staff members is likely to increase as well as the number of expatriates (mainly Swedes) employed on temporary assignments. Moreover, as already mentioned there are plans of setting up a separate project office in Rajasthan, but with less concentration than anticipated to this state it remains to be seen whether and how these plans will materialise. Although Sida has a rather limited field presence, there are separate project organisations, set up and financed by Sida, in most major projects. Most of the staff members are government servants on deputation. This was true of the social forestry projects in the past and it is true of Lok Jumbish, Shiksha Karmi and ICDS today. However, these project organisations function within the respective government departments or within semi-government/semi-autonomous bodies established under the project. Even so their eventual integration may create problems. For instance, in ICDS Sida has for years tried to persuade the government of Tamil Nadu to take over the 21 member project staff, financed by Sida, but so far in vain.
Donor Coordination The view expressed in the Swedish Embassy is that donor coordination plays a role, but is less necessary as in Africa where foreign aid is much more important. India is so vast and donors are active in different sectors and states, so the risk of duplication is small. Nevertheless, exchange of experiences among donors can be useful. Until a couple of years ago the Nordic countries held regular meetings, but this has been more irregular after Sweden and Finland joined the EU. Now Sweden takes part in the regular EU meetings, but it is felt as a problem that other bilateral donors, notably the US, Japan and Norway, are excluded from this forum. Sida is active in some of the sector groups of donors, including health and women in development (WID). The WID group was very active before the Beijing conference with Danida and Sida in leading roles. In various fields the 'likeminded' donors can take initiatives and influence other donors. On the whole there is a preference in the Swedish Embassy for issue-based meetings and flexible formats.
Institutional Dimensions Since a lot of the Sida-supported projects have been channelled through UN agencies and government departments, Sida has not been in a position to influence the modalities of implementation to the same extent as some of the other donors, e.g. Danida. A consequence of this is that traditional bureaucratic top-down approaches have been prevalent in many Sida-supported activities. Even so more participatory approaches have been introduced in a number of projects. In the educational programmes in Rajasthan - Shiksha Karmi and Lok Jumbish - a lot of effort has been taken to mobilise the communities. Especially in Lok Jumbish village committees, largely of women, have been instrumental in mobilising the community and supporting the project activities. Participatory approaches are also central in the new generation of natural resource management projects. An interesting feature of the Indo-Swedish collaboration is that Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) play an insignificant role. One of the reasons for this is that the PRIs until very recently have been weak or non-functioning in most of the states where Sida is active, notably Rajasthan, Orissa and Tamil Nadu. But even in the near future no greater role is envisaged for the PRIs. There are at least two reasons for this. First, so far there has been little devolution of financial resources and responsibilities to the PRIs. Second, and more importantly, the PRIs are expressions of local power equations, and hence it may be difficult to avoid that the powerful groups corner the main benefits if decisions are left to the PRIs. |
