Al Qaeda affiliates – not Islamic State – behind Bamako hotel attack

Launched only a week after the terrorist attacks in Paris, the 20 November hostage crisis at the Radisson Blu hotel in Mali’s capital, Bamako, immediately made international headlines. After the attack, which claimed at least 22 lives, there is still much speculation about who is behind and whether the events are related to the Paris attacks. While a high degree of uncertainty persist, we argue that a combination of global competition between Al Qaeda and Islamic State and local conflicts triggered this event and affects overall security in Mali.

Competition between Al Qaeda and Islamic State
Despite speculations about a possible link between the attacks in Paris and Bamako, they appear to follow two different logics. In contrast to the Paris attacks and other recent attacks in Lebanon, Tunisia or the Sinai desert, the Bamako hostage crisis was not carried out by Islamic State. At first, the attack in Bamako was claimed as a joint operation by Al Mourabitoun, an Al Qaeda-related group led by the prominent jihadist Mokhtar Belmokhtar, and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). These regional Al Qaeda groups not only differ from Islamic State in terms of strategy; they are directly opposed to this organization. On several occasions, AQIM and Belmokhtar have reconfirmed their pledge to Al Qaeda’s leader al Zawahiri, and in November 2015 AQIM made a public statement openly criticizing the Islamic State caliphate, which they consider “illegitimate”. Moreover, the Al Qaeda-related groups criticize Islamic State for killing fellow Muslims in Syria and elsewhere. These ideological splits may explain the modus operandi of the perpetrators in the Bamako attack who tried to spare Muslim lives by forcing hostages to recite the Koran.

At a global level, there is currently a harsh competition between Al Qaeda and Islamic State, in which Islamic State has the upper hand. While Al Qaeda is struggling to survive, Islamic State attracts a large number of new followers and has the capacity to carry out terrorist attacks in various locations including Europe. This competition between Al Qaeda and Islamic State is also playing out at a regional level. French military intervention in Mali and the Sahel region has hampered the expansion and economic survival strategies of the regional Al Qaeda branch, AQIM. Consequently, a number of smaller regional jihadist subgroups have shifted alliances to Islamic State. In this context, Al Qaeda has to show that it still has the capacity to provide resources and carry out spectacular attacks. Although Al Qaeda is no doubt weakened in the Sahel, it still continues to play a prominent role in this region.

The French connection
AQIM and Al Mourabitoun threatened Europe—France in particular — on several occasions, but in contrast to Islamic State they appear to have a regional focus. They target French soldiers, citizens and interests in the Sahel, not in Europe. In 2012, AQIM and Al Mourabitoun were among the jihadist groups that took control of the Northern part of Mali. The French military intervention in January 2013 put an end to sharia-governance in Northern Mali and forced the militant groups on the defensive. AQIM withdrew to neighboring Algeria, while Al Mourabitoun’s notorious leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar apparently fled to Libya and has been reported dead at least three times without it being confirmed.

The French intervention in Mali in 2013 has now morphed into the permanent anti-terrorist operation “Barkhane”, in which 3.500 troops have been deployed to fight terrorism in five countries in the Sahel. By virtue of being a former French colony, France has expanded political, economic and military interests in Mali and in the Sahel region in general. Following decolonization, France has maintained military support to its Francophone allies in various bilateral defense agreements. Since the September 11 attacks in 2001, French and American military cooperation has also expanded in the Sahel and includes drone surveillance bases in neighboring Niger.

When Al Mourabitoun claimed responsibility for the attacks, they stated on social media that they defy foreign and in particular French military engagement, which they consider an invasion. As such, the Bamako attacks can be regarded as a response to French and Western military interventions in the region, in which French soldiers are allowed to kill presumed jihadist leaders and fighters without prosecution. Al Mourabitoun’s leader, Belmokhtar, is a highly experienced mujahidin who started his militant career in Afghanistan in the beginning of the 1990s, where he met with prominent Al Qaeda figures. Subsequently, he participated in the Algerian civil war in the second part of the 1990s. Belmokhtar has shown his capacity to perpetrate sophisticated attacks, e.g. against an Algerian gas facility, In Amenas, killing 39 foreign hostages in 2013 as a response to the French intervention in Mali. Afterwards, he has taken responsibility for attacks against the UN force MINUSMA and other foreign targets in the region. This career, and the resemblance with earlier attacks planned by Belmokhtar, makes it very likely that the Al Mourabitoun-AQIM alliance is behind the hostage crisis.

On 22 November, however, the recently emerged group, Maacina Liberation Front, also claimed responsibility for the Radisson attack. The Maacina Liberation Front is likely to have ties to the leader of the Tuareg jihadist group Ansar Dine, Iyad Ag Ghaly, who is attempting to expand his influence and area of operation. Ansar Dine was another of the jihadist groups that in 2012 had taken control of northern Mali and subsequently were expelled from the area after the French intervention. The competing claims (Al Mourabitoun versus the Maacina Liberation Front) illustrate the ongoing competition between the extremely mobile and fluid jihadist groups in the Sahel. Such rivalling groups fight each other over access to and control over territory and resources and have a tendency to break up into splinter groups due to disputes over leadership. In this context, there is more than one possible explanation for the competing claims of the Bamako attacks: it may be that the global competition between Islamic State and Al Qaeda was somehow replicated between rivalling local jihadist groups, striving for control over drugs, arms, territory and international media attention., It is also possible that members from multiple local groups collaborate on a spectacular attack like the one on the Radisson Blu hotel. That competing armed actors collaborate for strategic purposes was demonstrated most explicitly when they occupied Northern Mali in 2012-2013.

Local Conflict Drivers
The global competition between Islamic State and Al Qaeda may inspire and motivate local actors to engage in increasingly spectacular events to attract media attention, recruits and resources. In that sense, staging an attack precisely one week after the Paris attacks did certainly contribute to the visibility of the event. Nevertheless, the hostage crisis was first and foremost a continuation and escalation of the ongoing conflict in Mali with local political goals. The hotel was hosting delegations who were to take part in the planning of the implementation of the peace agreement obtained on 20 June 2015 between Mali’s government, Tuareg separatist fighting for independence of the northern regions and pro-government militias. In 2012, Tuareg separatists, trained and armed in Libya, initiated the uprising that eventually led to a state coup in Mali, which subsequently allowed for the coalition of jihadist groups to consolidate and rule the Northern regions for nine months.

After the French military intervention in 2013, a UN peace stabilization mission, MINUSMA, was inaugurated to protect civilians, maintain the cease fire and reform Mali’s security sector. Despite these efforts, the security situation has deteriorated in the North and during 2015, attacks have increased and moved further south, into areas that were previously considered safe. Due to 56 casualties in only two years, Mali is now listed as the most dangerous country for UN peacekeepers. Denmark has recently decided to expand its contribution to MINUSMA.

Despite its fragility, the signing of the peace agreement provided a glimmer of hope that peace and stability could be rebuilt in Mali. The peace negotiations have taken nearly two years with continuous outbreaks of fighting between the groups. From the onset, the jihadists groups were excluded from the peace negotiations and they have continued to disrupt the process by targeting foreigners and foreign interests by use of suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) including several attacks on the MINUSMA mission. The jihadist groups also defy peace for strategic and economic purposes. Allowing the Malian state and security forces to gain control of the vast desert territories in the North would make it more difficult for them to continue their business of organized crime and to operate freely across the porous borders of the Sahel.

Now that the immediate media attention to the Bamako attacks has decreased, questions about the exact motivations of the groups and their alliances are still left unanswered. But it is clear that the implications for peace are rather gloomy. The attacks clearly state how the jihadist groups, fueled by Western military intervention, are willing and able to strike against large, strong and risky foreign targets. Hence, it will be more difficult and dangerous for MINUSMA forces to carry out their stabilization mission. The main source of insecurity is the unpredictability of the targets and therefore MINUSMA and the Malian security forces will probably be forced to spend even more resources to secure their own safety.